Military Review

Lessons from last year's wars

70
Lessons from last year's warsThe current wars at the same time in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq and Yemen provide an opportunity to assess current trends in the development of military art in the twenty-first century.


All four of these wars are civil wars with foreign participation (veiled or open). In all wars, one of the belligerents is a non-state actor, which is characteristic of a rebellion. However, in none of the wars, non-state actors do not fight as partisans, they all lead a classic war with the constant control of a certain territory and the use of heavy ground equipment. It is still difficult to say to what extent this is a steady tendency to turn turquoise into a classic war, but the fact cannot be noted.

DISCOVERY OF FORCES IN SYRIA

The Syrian war is unique because there are not two, but many warring parties. Nevertheless, the Syrian army and its allies have one real enemy - radical Sunni Islamists, divided into many groups (the Islamic State banned in the Russian Federation - the IG and the Dzhebkhat al-Nusra, the Islamic Front, the Muslim Brotherhood etc.), “moderate secular opposition” exists only in the imagination of Western propaganda. The only real "third force" of the Syrian war are the Kurds.

During the 5,5 years of the war, Syrian government troops suffered huge losses in technology - at least 800 tanks, not less than 700 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, several hundred different artillery systems, up to 100 aircraft and up to 50 helicopters (in all cases, this refers to equipment either destroyed without the possibility of recovery or captured by the enemy). Nevertheless, up to 2,2 thousand tanks, up to 1,6 thousand infantry fighting vehicles, up to 1 thousand armored personnel carriers, up to 2 thousand artillery systems, 2-3 thousand ground defense systems, up to 400 aircraft, up to 150 remain in their arsenal helicopters. Almost all of this equipment is Soviet-made, including in the 60s, a significant part of it has already lost its combat effectiveness and is listed in the Armed Forces purely formally. Deliveries of modern equipment from Russia (tanks T-90, BTR-80 and -82, MLRS "Hurricane", "Smerch" and TOS-1) are extremely small in quantity and cannot fundamentally change the situation.

In general, the technological level of the Armed Forces of Syria is very low. The combat and moral-psychological training of army personnel (completed by conscription) and allied militia formations of various confessional and political orientations (they are, of course, purely voluntary) are very different, and people are very morally and physically exhausted. Extremely limited human reserves.

Nevertheless, the pro-government forces showed very high stability, otherwise the war would have been lost long ago. The Syrian Air Force played an extremely large role in the war, providing, despite high losses, the constant support of ground forces and the supply of isolated garrisons. The Syrian pilots continue to carry out this work with the same intensity after the deployment in the country of Russian aviation the group that took the air campaign to a whole new level.

The motley opponents of government forces are equipped with the same outdated Soviet equipment. Most of it is trophies captured from the Syrian Armed Forces, although perhaps part of it was purchased with Saudi and Qatari money in Eastern Europe and transferred to the opposition in Turkey. Of course, all the numerous opposition groups form on a voluntary basis, while the share of foreigners in them is growing higher (local resources are being depleted no less quickly than among the supporters of Assad). Martial and moral-psychological preparation is also very different, while, of course, morale is highly dependent on success or failure on the front. In particular, the intervention in the war of Russia dealt a very strong blow to all the opposition groups not only in the military, but also in the psychological sense.

DIFFICULT REALITIES OF IRAQ

The Iraqi army has been fighting for about three years against one opponent of those with whom the Syrian armed forces are fighting, the “Islamic state.” In parallel with the Iraqi Armed Forces, but not with them, Shiite formations and again the Kurds are fighting against the same enemy.

Since the beginning of 2014, the Iraqi Armed Forces and their allies have lost more than 70 tanks, more than 400 infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, at least 50 artillery systems, at least 7 helicopters. At the same time, about 350 tanks remain in service, more than 400 BMP, more than 4 thousand armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, more than 1,1 thousand artillery systems, approximately 40 combat aircraft and about 200 helicopters. Technique is a kind of synthesis of a relatively new and very old American with the old and very old Soviet. For several years, Iraqis have been actively restoring that technique from the time of Saddam Hussein, which is still to be restored. Therefore, the Abrams and T-72, who shot each other in 1991 and 2003, now go into battle in the same line.

The Iraqi Armed Forces, unlike the Syrians, are equipped according to the American model, that is, for hire, because of which their combat stability is naturally much lower than that of the Syrians. The Syrian army suffered many defeats, but it never had such a collapse as the Iraqi army did in the first half of 2014. You can also compare the storms of Aleppo and Mosul, the comparison is also not at all in favor of the Iraqis. Pure volunteer Shiite and Kurdish units fight much better than the regular army. I would like to emphasize the fundamental difference between hired and voluntary principles of recruitment. The hired principle is when they go to serve for money, and the volunteer one when they go to fight for an idea.

Equally volunteer "caliphate" (IG) fighting trophy techniques of the armed forces of Iraq. Both in Syria and in Iraq, the “caliphate” uses suicide bombers very widely. In this case, we are talking about tactical tactics, when combat operations begin with the detonation of cars filled with explosives, and sometimes even with BMPs and armored personnel carriers. That is, suicide bombers become a kind of substitute for artillery preparation.

The Iraqi armed forces are intensively using aviation, but it is too small to seriously affect the course of the hostilities. Much more combat aircraft have a coalition headed by the United States, but it is very difficult to understand what its real goals and achievements are.

In addition, on the side of the armed forces of Syria and Iraq, limited contingents of the IRGC of Iran are fighting. Their fighting capacity is not much higher than that of the Syrian and Iraqi military themselves, therefore it is impossible to deny the importance of Iranian assistance in the fight against the IS.

ON THE SPACES OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

The participants of the civil war in Yemen are, on the one hand, the Hussite rebels (local Shiites) and supporters of the former president Saleh, on the other hand, supporters of the legitimate current president Hadi, and the territories controlled by these parties very much resemble the former North and South Yemen, respectively. The “third force” here can be considered the IS and the “Al-Qaeda”, fighting against both sides (but the main opponents of the Sunni radicals are the Housits). Since March, 2015, on the side of Hadi, has been fighting a coalition of Arabian monarchies, led by Saudi Arabia.

Sun Yemen equipped mainly Soviet equipment. In general, even older than Syria and Iraq. Formally, the army is recruited, in fact, its numerous brigades, even before the beginning of the civil war, were military formations of just as many local tribes. Equally formally, they constituted a single armed forces, which are now divided between the warring parties. Only from the beginning of the monarchy's intervention, the Yemeni army lost (on both sides in total) to 90 tanks, to 40 BMP and BTR, 11 aircraft and 4 helicopters (all aircraft and helicopters destroyed on the ground). What remains now of the Sun of Yemen and, most importantly, in what proportion these balances are divided between the parties, is extremely difficult to understand.

The Arabian coalition, even without the supporters of Hadi, knowingly had and has tremendous quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Hussites and Saleh supporters. Monarchies have never regretted money for the latest technology, primarily American. Based on the formal correlation of forces, the war should have ended in the complete defeat of the Hussites in the month of 2 – 3. In reality, the war has been going on for almost two years, during which time the coalition has only slightly reduced the territory controlled by the Hussites and Salekhovs. The most effective of the monarchist army was the UAE army. But she suffered significant losses - over 50 BBM fighter, Mirage-2000 fighter, high-speed catamaran HSV-2. However, due to political disagreements with Riyadh, the UAE for several months reduced the intensity of their participation in the war.

During the intervention, the Saudi army lost at least 20 tanks, at least 150 BMP, BMTV, armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, X-NUMX F-1S fighter-bomber, to 15 helicopters (including Apache's 6), and also to combat 3 helicopters (including Apache 1,1), as well as combat APLA, and also combat aircraft (APL), and also combat aircraft (PLA), and the BATLA helicopters, APLs, as well as combat aircraft, PLA, helicopters (APCs), and also combat aircraft, PLA, XLUMX helicopters (including Apache’s 600), and also combat aircraft, PLA, XLUMX helicopters (including Apache’s 5,5 fighter-bomber), as well as combat helicopters. ". However, about 1,5 thousand tanks, about 300 BMP, more than 250 thousand BTR, BMTV and armored vehicles, up to XNUMX thousand artillery systems, XNUMX combat aircraft, up to XNUMX helicopters remain in its arsenal. New multi-billion dollar orders in the USA have been made for the latest technology, although the Saudi budget is beginning to seriously feel the impact of the war, coupled with the fall of oil prices provoked by Riyadh itself.

The main problem of monarchist armies is the same hired principle of recruitment. Their servicemen came to serve for money, so, despite the large amount of modern technology, they were so successfully beaten by the poor Hussites with the ancient Soviet technology, because they are fighting for the idea.

UKRAINIAN DISCUSSION

Over the 2,5 of the Donbass War, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost more than 220 tanks, more than 500 BMP and BMD, more than 200 BTR and no less than 100 BTR-D and MTLB, more than 200 artillery systems, more than 10 ground defense equipment, 12 airplanes and helicopters. At the same time, about 1,9 thousand tanks, about 3 thousand BMP, BMD and BTR, up to 2,5 thousand artillery systems, more than 400 combat aircraft, up to 200 helicopters remain in service. However, as in the armed forces of Syria, a significant part of this technology is listed only on paper, since it has fully developed its resource. Practically all the equipment of the Ukrainian army is of Soviet production, the supply of new equipment is purely symbolic in quantity, and they are distinguished by very low quality.

Having canceled the call at the end of 2013, Ukraine, naturally, returned to it in less than a year. However, it is not clear whether there are draftees at the front in the Donbass. In fact, the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other power structures are a mixture of contract soldiers, volunteers, and a mobilized contingent, and among all these components there is a very high proportion of marginalized lumpen. The level of combat training is usually low, although, of course, it has increased over the period of the war. With the moral state the situation is reversed - at the beginning of the war the morale was quite high, now it is at an extremely low level.

Losses in technology were very high, given the duration of the war (its intensive phase lasted less than a year), they are even higher than the Syrian army. Ukrainian aviation, although suffering sensitive but not catastrophic losses in the first months of the war, almost stopped fighting at the end of the summer of 2014, that is, Ukrainian pilots were worse than Arab pilots. However, it should be noted that two of the most disastrous of their defeats (near Ilovaisk and Debaltseve), which accounted for most of the losses, the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not suffer from the militia.

The Armed Forces of the DPR and the LPR are armed with the same equipment as the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Part of it was captured in battle, part was simply bought from the enemy, part came along the line of "voentorg". Of course, they are staffed on a voluntary basis, while foreign volunteers (mostly Russian, but not only) are most motivated ideologically, although quantitatively they make up no more than 20% of the contingent. In general, from the point of view of technical equipment, combat, and moral and psychological training of personnel, Donbass militias are very similar to their adversary. This is not surprising, since they represent one people.

WHAT SHOWED THESE WARS

All these wars are characterized by huge losses in armored vehicles. It becomes finally clear that the traditional infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers have become obsolete because they do not protect the infantry from anything. In all the Middle Eastern wars, “carriages” are also very widely used today - commercial trucks and jeeps with a variety of weapons mounted on them in an artisanal way. Instead of armor, they have a small size and high speed. Nevertheless, the losses in the "carts" are even higher than in the "normal" armored vehicles, which is quite natural and expected, so they will never become any substitute for infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Moreover, there is no substitute for tanks. Accordingly, the only acceptable option for the development of armored vehicles is the further strengthening of the protection (active and passive) of tanks and the unification of the chassis of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.

Another conclusion from the current wars is that it is necessary to abandon the fetishization of aviation and evaluate its role more adequately. This role is extremely important, but nevertheless the outcome of the war is decided on the ground. In each of the four wars, aviation has only one of the warring parties, and the air defense potential of the opposing side is very limited in quantitative and qualitative terms. Nevertheless, aviation has not yet won a single war, but in Ukraine it has, in fact, turned out to be useless. It should be understood that such giant aviation groups that NATO created against Iraq in the 1991 year and against Yugoslavia in the 1999 year, even NATO itself today is already unrealistic, especially since this applies to any particular country. Accordingly, the victory of one aircraft must be forgotten.

Another important conclusion is the confirmation of the extreme importance of the quantity factor, which has its own quality. Above it was specifically shown how great the losses of the warring armies in technology are, but at the same time how much technology they have left. None of the current European armies could have fought even with the Iraqi-Saudi level of losses, not to mention the Syrian-Ukrainian.

And, of course, the exceptional importance of combat and moral-psychological training of personnel was once again confirmed. In particular, it became clear again that the “professional”, that is, purely hired armies, were the worst fighting.

All these conclusions have an applied relation to Russia. So, the ongoing wars demonstrate that the Armed Forces must be equipped with a significant amount of good quality equipment, and the level of combat and moral and psychological training of personnel must be very high. What has been said seems banal to stupidity, but for some reason this many people do not understand this banality, which can be seen again in the example of the current wars. Therefore, a person who claims that Russia should have a “compact professional army” has nothing to do with military affairs, or with the interests of Russia, or both. The Russian army must be conscripts, and only a person who has served a full year in a call, and then passed a rigorous additional selection, can become a contract serviceman. New equipment should be purchased in adequate quantities: ground - in thousands of units, aviation - in hundreds, sea (except for large surface ships) - in dozens. In particular, the thousands must be purchased "Armata" in the tank version, and in the version of the BMP. The biggest mistake is to acquire new equipment in microscopic quantities (as most NATO countries are doing now). In this case, it becomes “golden” in production and operation and practically inapplicable in combat. Then it is better to upgrade the old technique.

The problem of quantity we are now facing in Syria. After the end of the Second World War in Syria - the most necessary for us in a political sense (along with two Chechens) and the most successful in military terms. However, the results could have been much greater if there were more aircraft and helicopters in the Russian grouping and if there was a regular shortage of aviation ammunition (ammunition should also be available in adequate quantities). That is, in this most necessary war for us, we disentangle the consequences of the previous economy on military spending. If such savings happen again, nothing even remotely resembles the flourishing of the economy and social sphere. Just the opposite will happen - we will dig ourselves a grave with our own hands for the joy of the rest of humanity.
Author:
Originator:
http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2017-01-13/1_932_uroki.html
70 comments
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  1. Niccola Mack
    Niccola Mack 15 January 2017 09: 12
    +11
    All of these wars are characterized by gigantic losses in armored vehicles. It becomes completely clear that the traditional infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers have become obsolete, since they are not protecting infantry from anything.

    A very strange conclusion about infantry protection. Since the APCs as a concept were created during World War 2 with a specific purpose.
    And this goal was the mobility of infantry as part of mechanized formations and its protection from fragments and bullets of small arms on the march. None of the real tactics assumed that the infantry would attack them. She had to be delivered to the field, dismounted and follow the well-armored tanks, protecting them, in turn, from the enemy infantry ("Faustniki", "bottlenecks", etc.) and receiving artillery support from the tanks. And then self-propelled artillery was supposed to move behind the infantry, supporting tanks and infantry with fire and wheels.
    Saturation with anti-tank artillery during the Second World War turned armored personnel carriers on the battlefield into "moving coffins" for infantry. And now with the advent of mass conventional and disposable RPGs and ATGMs - all the more so.
    Initially, the BMP concept was controversial in terms of conducting combat directly from the vehicle - including in the city. The maximum that an infantry fighting vehicle can do is support the infantry in an attack from its on-board weapons and help the tanks in this, moving behind.
    Neglect of these principles has led to such enormous losses. It would be nice for such "tactics" to turn to the experience of the Second World War - that the Germans that ours really related to the use of armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers on the battlefield (this is especially evident from the instructions of the assault groups for operations in the city together with tanks).
    The biggest mistake is to acquire new equipment in microscopic quantities (as most NATO countries are doing now).

    The biggest mistake is not to form functionally complete units from this technique, but to scatter it anywhere and everywhere.

    In general, an article on the topic - "everything is lost and no one knows what to do."
    Experience must be studied in modern and all wars and conclusions drawn, and only then embodied in the “metal” and the states. There are almost no sensible articles on the tactics and experience of the war in Syria - mostly “journalistic” emotions.
    1. captain
      captain 15 January 2017 10: 30
      +6
      Dear Nikkola Mac, unfortunately you are right. As a former military man, I can only testify that very often even the middle and senior officers of our army have no idea why we need tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. He had the "luck" to fight in Afghanistan. We had a tank regiment as part of the 108th mechanized infantry division, which stood in Bagram for several years. From time to time they sent a couple of tanks to escort the columns !!!. I saw how they tried to crush firing points in the mountains with the help of an armored personnel carrier and BMP-1. You can't remember without tears. The angle of vertical attack was 45 degrees, God forbid, we had to pour stone heaps in order to increase it. Who gave these terms of reference? After all, the experience of fighting in cities during the Second World War, the Hungarian events, spoke of the need to increase the angle of vertical shelling and ... I do not want to write obscenities about our customer MO. There were a lot of design flaws, and the load began to move only after Chechnya and Georgia. This speaks of the competence of our military leadership.
      1. Normal ok
        Normal ok 15 January 2017 14: 29
        +4
        As an artilleryman who had contact with combined arms officers (according to the old Soviet terminology) and paratroopers, I can say that they did not learn tactics at all (((Or they studied in some very narrow form. Units can competently apply the given means. Not for bragging I note that any good artillery officer can correctly command the motorized rifle unit (I know specific examples), but no general arms officer can command the artillery.
  2. vladimirZ
    vladimirZ 15 January 2017 09: 14
    +2
    Lessons, lessons, who will only learn these lessons?
    In the eighties, even in a nightmare, it could not have been dreamed that NATO troops, Ukraine and Georgia are at war with Russia in the Baltics, that there are hot spots and US military bases in Central Asia, and that the Russian Army was "reformed" to the point of losing combat capability in a major war.
    Now they are trying to restore something, but somehow not decisively, timidly. And how can you do otherwise when most of the industry is destroyed. They are trying to raise the defense, taken under the presidential wing, to the required level, but to the required level, as the article says "ground - in thousands of units, aviation - in hundreds, naval (except for large surface ships) - in dozens", oh how far ...
    1. Vadim237
      Vadim237 15 January 2017 22: 21
      0
      "And how can you do otherwise when most of the industry is destroyed." - Nothing has been destroyed here - everything works, all 2000 defense enterprises and tens of thousands of subcontractors.
      1. vladimirZ
        vladimirZ 16 January 2017 05: 58
        +3
        Nothing of which has been destroyed in our country - everything works, all 2000 defense enterprises and - Vadim237

        Then where do we have the aforementioned equipment "ground - in thousands of units, aviation - in hundreds, sea (except for large surface ships) - in dozens"?
        If you are trying to argue then rely on facts, not emotions, such as a childish "I want".
  3. demiurg
    demiurg 15 January 2017 09: 39
    0
    Угу вот оно значит как. На тачанках воевать, без авиации. ЗБС теория современной войны.
    The motivation of the troops plays a huge role. Husits ​​and the DPR are examples of this. But even they will not stand against the modern army.
  4. demiurg
    demiurg 15 January 2017 09: 54
    +3
    I wonder what the chances are for 100-200 jeeps with body kits (such as a battalion) of 350-400 people, with weapons, respectively, weighing no more than a ton and corresponding returns.

    And the rival will be the usual such motorized rifle battalion, with attached tank company, and battalion artillery? Plus, you can add the possibility of air support.

    The motivation for both groups is the same. Detection of the enemy outside the zone of opening fire, UAVs can have both opponents. Accordingly, the battlefield is a forest-steppe with streams.

    Interestingly Khramchikhin himself would have agreed to participate in the offensive on the cart on the position of SMEs?
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 15 January 2017 12: 06
      +2
      If it is a settlement, forest, mountains and other similar places, the motorized rifle battalion will be torn, like a Tuzik heating pad
      1. svp67
        svp67 15 January 2017 12: 14
        +1
        Quote: Spade
        If it is a settlement, forest, mountains and other similar places, the motorized rifle battalion will be torn, like a Tuzik heating pad

        And what is your evidence?
        All these "jihad mobilis" operate so successfully only because there is no one who prevents them from doing it. If, however, their maneuverability is limited by routes pre-targeted and equipped with mine-explosive obstacles, then they will lose their main trump card - the ability to quickly attack and roll back ...
        1. Lopatov
          Lopatov 15 January 2017 12: 24
          0
          The trouble with the motorized rifle battalion on the BMP is that it has few motorized rifles. The infantry on cars do not have such a restriction.
          The next item is a portable group weapon. The BMP battalion simply doesn't have one. Except maybe one AGS platoon. And in the conditions of a settlement, forest or mountains, it comes to the fore, a tank cannot be dragged onto the roof of a nine-story building ...
          1. svp67
            svp67 15 January 2017 12: 29
            0
            Quote: Spade
            The trouble with the motorized rifle battalion on the BMP is that it has few motorized rifles.

            about three hundred people are just infantry, this is certainly not a lot and not a little. Here the main thing is how to dispose of them ...
            Quote: Spade
            The next item is a portable group weapon. The BMP battalion simply doesn't have one.

            PC machine guns, AGS, LNG or ATGM grenade launchers, mortars, all this is available in SMEs
            Quote: Spade
            And in the conditions of a settlement, forest or mountains, it comes to the fore, a tank cannot be dragged onto the roof of a nine-story building ...

            It is possible to remove anti-tank missiles from an infantry fighting vehicle, ground-based launchers are located in the spare parts, there are already not so few tanks and no need ...
            1. Lopatov
              Lopatov 15 January 2017 12: 40
              0
              Quote: svp67
              about three hundred people are just infantry, this is certainly not a lot and not a little. Here the main thing is how to dispose of them ...

              We, as an initial postulate, implied that the personnel were equally trained and motivated, and the command personnel were equally literate.

              Quote: svp67
              PC machine guns, AGS, LNG or ATGM grenade launchers, mortars, all this is available in SMEs

              Okay, machine guns and 4 AGS. The rest of the motorized rifle on the BMP is not. 120-mm mortars are not particularly "wearable"

              Quote: svp67
              It is possible to remove anti-tank missiles from an infantry fighting vehicle, ground-based launchers are located in the spare parts, there are already not so few tanks and no need ...

              Only with BMP-2. And after the impending modernization, such an opportunity will disappear. In addition, there is no one to shoot from them; there are no trained ATGM personnel in the infantry infantry fighting vehicle on the BMP.
              1. svp67
                svp67 15 January 2017 12: 49
                0
                Quote: Spade
                trained ATGM in infantry on the BMP no.

                Here the question of preparation becomes in all its glory. I remember being remembered in the Coastal Forces infantry very well, including the handling of all types of weapons available in the unit, as it meant the features of action. That is why parts of the Marine Corps did not show themselves badly in all conflicts. Apparently this experience should not be handed over to the commanders, but made MANDATORY.
                1. Lopatov
                  Lopatov 15 January 2017 13: 07
                  0
                  Quote: svp67
                  Here the question of preparation becomes in all its glory.

                  Whom to cook? That, in fact, is the question. In the ZIP, the BMP-2 is not a launcher, there is a tripod. That is, the launcher can only be removed from the BMP, while the BMP will lose a significant part of its firepower. In addition, the only one who can be trained to use this "launcher" removed from the BMP is the gunner-operator. That is, by removing, we essentially turn the BMP into an unarmed transporter. With one crew member, a mechanic.
                  1. svp67
                    svp67 15 January 2017 13: 12
                    0
                    Quote: Spade
                    With one crew member, a mechanic.

                    There are three crew members in the BMP-2. If you send a gunner with an ATGM, then the commander will sit at the console in the tower.
                    Quote: Spade
                    Who to cook?

                    Yes everyone. It’s necessary to let everyone through the ATGM simulators to understand how to use these weapons.
                    1. Lopatov
                      Lopatov 15 January 2017 13: 44
                      0
                      Quote: svp67
                      BMP-2 has three crew members.

                      Where are three from? Two. The squad leader dismounts with his subordinates
                      Quote: svp67
                      Yes everyone. It’s necessary to let everyone through the ATGM simulators to understand how to use these weapons.

                      This is a palliative. There is group weapons, there must be a calculation. Specifically for "Fagot" - two people. In addition, only a tripod is in the spare parts and accessories. No packs for carrying the launcher and TPK, no indicator of light interference ...
                      1. svp67
                        svp67 15 January 2017 14: 14
                        0
                        Quote: Spade
                        Where are three from? Two. The squad leader dismounts with his subordinates

                        By placement. The crew, and this is the driver-mechanic, is in the control compartment, in the front left side of the hull, the BM commander and gunner are the operator in the tower, but the compartment commander, who dismounts, sits right behind the mech-water ...
                        Quote: Spade
                        No Launcher Carrying Packs

                        View enters ZIP
          2. demiurg
            demiurg 15 January 2017 13: 11
            0
            1. With all due respect, but I meant an equal total number of fighters.
            2. An infantry fighting vehicle can survive a close explosion of a mortar mine. No technicals. As a matter of fact, for 2 kilometers to the front line you will have to remove all weapons from the techs and drag it. It’s all the same in defense, but how to attack without armor?

            The department accounts for a 30mm gun, ATGM and AGS. Plus a 120mm mortar to platoon, ideally something like Hosts. A plus to the platoon is a 125 mm tank gun. And even in the city, armor is a plus. BMP can quickly, decisively change position. Even under fire from small arms. DShK or Kord quickly and quickly do not drag. Moreover, the paired memory beloved by jihadmobiles.
            If the armor did not play a special role, then why the BMD paratrooper? Would make landing UAZ.
            1. Lopatov
              Lopatov 15 January 2017 13: 57
              0
              Quote: demiurg
              With all due respect, but I meant an equal total number of fighters.

              And why such a restriction? The infantry in cars do not.
              Quote: demiurg
              2. An infantry fighting vehicle can survive a close explosion of a mortar mine. No technicals. As a matter of fact, for 2 kilometers to the front line you will have to remove all weapons from the techs and drag it. It’s all the same in defense, but how to attack without armor?

              Well, first of all, the Typhoon-K can carry the infantry, but their protection is more abrupt than that of the BMP-2. Secondly, each tool has its own job. In an offensive, infantry (not motorized rifle) units are good for reinforcing motorized rifles. And not to replace them completely.
              Quote: demiurg
              The department accounts for a 30mm gun, ATGM and AGS

              AGS motorized riflemen have 6 pieces per battalion, and not one per squad.

              Quote: demiurg
              Plus a 120mm mortar to platoon, ideally something like Hosts.

              Breaking the mortar battery is an absolute and absolute evil. In addition, how to divide 6 mortars into 9 platoons?
              1. demiurg
                demiurg 15 January 2017 14: 38
                +1
                http://www.modernarmy.ru/article/455/motostrelkov
                aya-rota-sostav In the brigade company 6 AGS.

                Initially, the conditions sounded something like this:
                I wonder what the chances are for 100-200 jeeps with body kits (such as a battalion) of 350-400 people, with weapons, respectively, weighing no more than a ton and corresponding returns.
                And the rival will be the usual such motorized rifle battalion, with attached tank company, and battalion artillery? Plus, you can add the opportunity air support.
                The motivation for both groups is the same. Detection of the enemy outside the zone of opening fire, UAVs can have both opponents. Accordingly, the battlefield is a forest-steppe with streams.


                I will not argue about the battery.


                If we take the mobilization resource of the two warring parties equal, then it is logical to accept a meeting of peers equal in composition.

                In principle, I don’t care what people offer to arm different countries. But to offer troops on jihad vehicles for Russia, and at the same time to say that aviation is not needed, it sounds at least strange.
              2. KaPToC
                KaPToC 19 January 2017 00: 48
                0
                Quote: Spade
                In addition, how to divide 6 mortars into 9 platoons?

                Maneuver not by technology but by fire.
          3. demiurg
            demiurg 15 January 2017 13: 25
            +1
            I can’t edit the post anymore, I’ll supplement it. Khramchikhin also indicated aviation as unnecessary.
            I would like to know how the technical warriors will dig out the entrenched SME. Will they drag me to the front line of non-recoil? Counter-battles between stationary and mobile mortars will be won if all other conditions are equal, mobile ones.
            1. Lopatov
              Lopatov 15 January 2017 14: 00
              0
              Quote: demiurg
              Will they drag me to the front line of non-recoil?

              You can have them. If we take the OSF of the foot air assault battalion as a model, he has a lot of firepower. For example, in each company, a mortar platoon in addition to the battalion's mortar battery. The battalion has a full-fledged anti-tank battery, rather than an anti-tank and machine-gun platoon, which, incidentally, was also taken away from motorized rifles. Well and so on ...
              1. demiurg
                demiurg 15 January 2017 14: 40
                0
                Quote: Spade

                You can have them. If we take the OSF of the foot air assault battalion as a model, he has a lot of firepower. For example, in each company, a mortar platoon in addition to the battalion's mortar battery. The battalion has a full-fledged anti-tank battery, rather than an anti-tank and machine-gun platoon, which, incidentally, was also taken away from motorized rifles. Well and so on ...


                And why then do you need armored vehicles? All transplanted to Typhoons. Cheap and cheerful. Something is wrong here.
              2. Aviagr
                Aviagr 15 January 2017 19: 19
                0
                Shovels becomes preacher mosquito weapons?! wassat
                Well, sanity finally prevailed! drinks
                Each soldier must have his own rocket and artillery battery in the form of a Hog with Trailers and Skolopendras (or a 40-barreled 82-mm mine-rocket launcher, or with a 7,72TT double-barreled machine gun, or MANPADS, or ATGMs ..). Yes, there on the Trailer you can transport whatever you want: at least for an infantry fighting vehicle, at least for a Patriot with Toyota - the main thing is that there is a sense, and not a "second" Palmyra .. wassat
                And hundreds of drone UAVs over the battlefield - Khramchikhin did not sleep naked near the reservoir ... lol
                1. Vadim237
                  Vadim237 15 January 2017 22: 24
                  0
                  That's what we really miss; it's hundreds of shock UAVs in service.
                  1. Aviagr
                    Aviagr 16 January 2017 11: 39
                    0
                    By the way, about the payload for flexible wing - here is an analogue:
                    http://www.arms-expo.ru/news/novye_razrabotki/int
                    erpolitekh_2016_sredstvo_dlinnoy_ruki /
                2. Lopatov
                  Lopatov 16 January 2017 10: 37
                  0
                  Maaaskite? 8)))
                  How many hundreds of people are needed to drag the Trailer onto the roof of a five-story building? Or "40-barreled mine rocket launcher"?
                  1. Aviagr
                    Aviagr 16 January 2017 10: 50
                    0
                    Quote: Spade
                    to drag the "Trailer" to the roof of the five-story building

                    for the 1 Trailer - 1 people (if the spans are not damaged), for hundreds of Trailers - a couple dozen - with respite. This is if their filling will be about 100-120kg.
                    But it’s not entirely clear why dragging the 40-barrel rocket-mortar onto the roof - ordinary Nons drag there ?! Although the two can even drag it in - learn physics and geometry: weight, sine, lever, rolling friction ... tongue
                    For example: I pulled a washing machine (7kg) on ​​a two-wheeled trolley to my 87 floor - there are more troubles due to the dimensions ... hi
                    1. Lopatov
                      Lopatov 16 January 2017 11: 05
                      0
                      Quote: Aviagr
                      This is if their filling will be about 100-120kg.

                      100 kg one person on a vertical ladder? Will people also be new, freshly acquired?

                      Quote: Aviagr
                      But it’s not entirely clear why to drag a 40-barrel mortar-mortar onto the roof - ordinary Nons drag there ?!

                      Man-portable or portable ATGMs, machine guns and grenade launchers carry them there.

                      Quote: Aviagr
                      Although the two can even drag it in - learn physics and geometry: weight, sine, lever, rolling friction ...

                      And time is not included in this list? Oh yes, it's tactics, pseudoscience
                      1. Aviagr
                        Aviagr 16 January 2017 11: 25
                        0
                        Quote: Spade
                        Man-portable or portable ATGMs, machine guns and grenade launchers carry them there.

                        In 1 millionth of a second? Or for the same Trailer time? By the way, all the above elements are just easier roll-drag on the trailer.
                        And about my personal experience with a washing machine - they decided to get off with monkey monkeys ?! Tactic simple: took - and drag ..
                        Quote: Spade
                        100 kg one person up the stairs?

                        This is at hayloft with rubber Noah's Ladder - vertical... In ordinary houses, it is at an angle ... Although, "shovels" can live far from real buildings .. wassat
    2. Kenneth
      Kenneth 15 January 2017 12: 26
      +1
      The assault on Palmyra. Barmalei on carts tore a classically organized adversary. But here of course motivation plays a big role
      And saturation of portable VET
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 15 January 2017 12: 42
        0
        Rather, they just missed it. And to prevent this, it is necessary to develop reconnaissance, and not to transfer infantry from infantry fighting vehicles to "Toyota tanks"
        1. Kenneth
          Kenneth 15 January 2017 15: 31
          0
          Of course, bmp is better.
      2. demiurg
        demiurg 15 January 2017 13: 16
        +2
        Give an example where jihadmobili broke through the defenses of at least NATO.
        1. Kenneth
          Kenneth 15 January 2017 15: 30
          0
          At least NATO. And what is not Martians. Where NATO forces confront IS directly
    3. BAI
      BAI 16 January 2017 12: 31
      0
      The key phrase is "forest-steppe battlefield".
      In ideal conditions for the actions of tanks and aircraft, the specified SME is cooler. In the mountains, the city, the forest, a man with a machine gun and a grenade comes first.
    4. KaPToC
      KaPToC 19 January 2017 00: 51
      0
      Quote: demiurg
      I wonder what the chances are for 100-200 jeeps with body kits (such as a battalion) of 350-400 people, with weapons, respectively, weighing no more than a ton and corresponding returns.

      No chance. The main disadvantage of terrorists is the inability to protect their rear. Such units will have almost zero combat stability.
  5. knn54
    knn54 15 January 2017 10: 35
    0
    And not a word about precision weapons. As if there were no targeted attacks by cruise missiles from the Caspian and Mediterranean seas with the help of an orbital group ???
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 15 January 2017 12: 17
      +2
      The effectiveness of precision weapons is somewhat exaggerated ... 8)))

      Here, for example, a hammer drill. Nothing better has yet been invented for drilling concrete walls. But to sell the whole instrument, leaving only him, is a great stupidity. But the developers of precision weapons in their booklets offer exactly that.

      The reserves for increasing the accuracy of conventional weapons are enormous; they are little used due to the excessive enthusiasm for the WTO. And this is bad, the development of weapons must be balanced.
      1. knn54
        knn54 15 January 2017 14: 23
        0
        - Shovels: but sell the whole instrument, ..
        It is necessary to sell "yesterday" (as the Yankes do), not the most modern.
        "Literally before our very eyes, the nature of military conflicts is changing, the methods of unleashing and conducting them. Robotic combat systems are developing. Precision weapons are practically not inferior in their capabilities to strategic ones and affect the global plan of forces. Space and cyberspace is being militarized, special operations mechanisms and tools are widely used "soft power", V.V. Putin.
        Or "we disagree" ...
        1. Lopatov
          Lopatov 15 January 2017 17: 34
          +1
          The history of the hammer goes back thousands of years. But without it in any way.
  6. creak
    creak 15 January 2017 10: 43
    +3
    According to Khramchikhin, it’s not volunteers who fight badly, but those who went to serve for money ... But our contractors serve and fight, probably for free and they don’t care about money? And what about the officers - they also receive a salary for their service, and the material side also plays a role in deciding on military service.
    Why is this hypocrisy?
    Well, the authors conclude that the moral and psychological training of the personnel should be high, and the new equipment should be purchased in adequate quantities - there is no serious analysis, besides such platitudes, in Khramchikhin’s conclusions ....
    What is the meaning of such revelations at the level "And the Volga flows into the Caspian Sea" ...
    1. demiurg
      demiurg 15 January 2017 11: 30
      +1
      In the Middle East, people think differently than in Russia or Asia. There it is considered the norm to slaughter a neighbor if there is something to profit from and there will be nothing for you. It is not customary to perform feats for your people. And even the mercenaries there are always ready to arrange a cleaning of the village, but as soon as the shooting begins, they dump out of harm's way. From all over Iraq they gathered only one division capable of fighting for money.
      1. Mikhail3
        Mikhail3 15 January 2017 18: 16
        +2
        They have big problems with the concept of "their people". The country was cut by the British arbitrarily, the rulers were appointed in the same way, simply by catching the first bandits that came across the nearest dune. The East was so plowed with wars that there actually took place the realization of an old dream of liberals - the ultimate atomization of society.
        Simply put, the Arab has no one to fight for but himself. Look, the Pashtuns have Afghanistan, and they give anyone a light. And what about the rest? English "countries"? Problem...
    2. Niccola Mack
      Niccola Mack 16 January 2017 07: 12
      0
      And our contractors are serving and fighting, probably for free and they are not interested in money?

      All the same, there must be certain foundations and principles.
      There is a good definition of mercenaries in international law (as opposed to volunteers, "international brigades" and other ideological fighters):

      takes part in hostilities, guided mainly by the desire to obtain personal gain, and which in fact was promised by the party or on behalf of the party to the conflict, material rewards significantly exceeding the rewards promised or paid to combatants of the same rank and functions included in personnel of the armed forces of a given party;

      These are the people we are talking about - with the appropriate moral side - they are fighting, where they pay more. And their attitude will be the same.
      1. creak
        creak 16 January 2017 11: 05
        0
        Quote: Nikkola Mac
        And our contractors are serving and fighting, probably for free and they are not interested in money?
        All the same, there must be certain foundations and principles.


        The principles and moral principles should be in any normal person, and not just a soldier ...

    3. KaPToC
      KaPToC 19 January 2017 00: 56
      0
      Quote: ranger
      And our contractors are serving and fighting, probably for free and they are not interested in money?

      Horses mixed in a bunch, people .... Khramchikhin, with his arrogance, equated our contractors and Westerners. A Western contractor is fighting for money, our contractor is fighting for an idea, but he also gets paid.
  7. The leader of the Redskins
    The leader of the Redskins 15 January 2017 11: 28
    +5
    I don’t want to talk about Syria - I’m not strong in this perspective, but for Ukraine, which is close to me ... The author "classically" redistributed data from subjective Internet resources on losses, without even bothering to check them. For example, the Ukrainian Air Force lost 12 aircraft (including one for those reasons) and 7 helicopters (plus one for those reasons).
    With armored vehicles and artillery it is much more difficult. There are magazines where authors scrupulously, from photographs, "catch" burned-out tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (photo video confirmation), but they also admit that their lists are not complete. There were cases of capture and re-capture of equipment. How to count? Ukrainian expert Serhiy Zgurets pointed out the losses quite accurately in his books. Moreover, he analyzed the nature of the damage, but that was a year and a half ago.
    In addition, the author, as it modestly kept silent about the losses "foreign participants" (as he himself put it). If we return to the same "military balance", which many refer to, then the questions arise where about 1500 BMP and 1200 cannon artillery "evaporated" from the "Voentorg"?
    And what are the lessons to be learned so that more such losses do not happen? Personally, I thought that after the Afghan war, fifty years will pass without interference in the affairs of other states - those who have left friends and their souls in the mountains of their southern neighbor are still alive ...
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 15 January 2017 12: 46
      +1
      Quote: Leader of the Redskins
      Where did about 1500 BMP and 1200 cannon artillery from the "Voentorg" "evaporate"?

      On drank and re-melting.
    2. Vadim237
      Vadim237 15 January 2017 22: 28
      +1
      “In addition, the author, somehow modestly kept silent about the losses of the“ foreign participants ”. One was filmed in Mariupol all the time - and no one else was seen.
    3. BAI
      BAI 16 January 2017 12: 39
      0
      Here (http://lostarmour.info) all the damaged armored vehicles in Ukraine are only 1072 units on both sides. I spell: ONE THOUSAND SEVEN TWO units from BOTH SIDES. What kind of 1500 infantry fighting vehicles are we talking about? About those found at the Black Sea digging?
      1. The leader of the Redskins
        The leader of the Redskins 16 January 2017 20: 05
        +1
        But the author "counted" only 1020 pieces of destroyed equipment from the APU? I just added the "data" that he took from the rather dubious (for me) resource "military balance".
  8. Normal ok
    Normal ok 15 January 2017 14: 06
    0
    The DNR and LNR armed forces are armed with the same equipment as the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Part of it is captured in
    in battle, a part was simply bought from the enemy, a part came through the “Voentorg” line. Of course, they are staffed on a voluntary basis, while the most motivated are ideologically foreign volunteers (mainly Russian, but not only), although quantitatively they make up no more than 20% of the contingent.

    Who is who, and Khramchikhin should know that since 2015, the LDNR Armed Forces have been built according to the Russian model (brigades) with a predominant manning under the contract. At VO this has been discussed in detail many times. And there are practically no volunteers from Russia in the last year (not counting the "vacationers")
  9. zvereok
    zvereok 15 January 2017 16: 54
    0
    Regarding helicopters, something they no longer actively use.
  10. Mikhail3
    Mikhail3 15 January 2017 18: 04
    +1
    As usual. Mr. Khramchikhin’s conclusions are ... highly controversial.
    About the armored personnel carrier and infantry fighting vehicles. The author carelessly confuses sweets with greens, as a result of which ... the comparison is strange. BMP and armored personnel carriers were invented primarily for delivering infantry to the battlefield. So that people could not be beaten in a couple of lines. This technique still copes with this role, although it is getting worse and worse due to the development of mine explosives and long-range artillery. I must say that Mr. Khramchikhin completely ignores this task of the technology under consideration.
    The second task of the BMP is to participate in the battle, that is, to move along the battlefield a certain number of fighters in a mobile shelter, with the possibility for them to fire from their standard weapons. The equipment almost does not cope with this task, its armor really no longer holds. The author ignores this task too.
    The only purpose of the presence of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles in battle is seen by the author in transporting a light artillery system or a heavy machine gun to the place of firing. That is what different "rebels" do with the help of their pickup trucks. What is the author's conclusion? Increase the number of tanks. Uh-uh ... In response to the presence of pistols in the enemy, we need to radically increase the number of MLRS. Some kind of plague.
    We go further. Aviation is "overrated". The current aviation is aimed at destroying equipment that matches it. Large, heavy, massive, expensive cars. Let's increase the number of tanks so that they can be picked out from the air! And also the current aircraft are designed to destroy factories, large warehouses, etc., that is, the country infrastructure. Aviation is not overrated. Overestimated (as always) the general's brains, persistently preparing the army for the last war. We need aircraft that have a time reserve in the air like long-range bombers, and a speed maneuver like a helicopter. Because only such means are capable of providing effective support to their troops in a battle that is conducted not by massive armadas of equipment, but by light, maneuverable, semi-guerrilla formations saturated with compact weapons. The weapon systems of such aircraft must be completely redesigned, for the task of hunting small-sized maneuverable targets, as well as the destruction of compact camouflaged devices such as, for example, anti-tank complexes like Javelins.
    It is no longer possible to sweep over the battlefield, triumphantly roaring a turbine at a speed close to sound. The benefits of this are frankly not enough ... You can’t abandon modern aviation (they will immediately tear it apart), but it needs to be seriously supplemented.
    Personnel. Yes, contract soldiers are not a substitute for the call, here the author is right. However, moral-volitional qualities begin when a person has an order in his head. That is, he clearly understands what he is fighting for, what he defends and what he opposes. There are problems ... however, they have nothing to do with army tasks.
    In general, as usual. Mr. Khramchikhin developed the picture well, after which he made inarticulate, crumpled, very controversial conclusions.
  11. Thunderbolt
    Thunderbolt 15 January 2017 18: 43
    0
    However, it should be noted that the two most catastrophic defeats of their own (near Ilovaisk and Debaltsev), which accounted for most of the losses, the Ukrainian Armed Forces still did not suffer from militias.
    Comrade Khramchikhin, ordinary miners did it. So it is, comrade ...
    1. Normal ok
      Normal ok 16 January 2017 00: 36
      0
      Quote: Thunderbolt
      However, it should be noted that the two most catastrophic defeats of their own (near Ilovaisk and Debaltsev), which accounted for most of the losses, the Ukrainian Armed Forces still did not suffer from militias.
      Comrade Khramchikhin, ordinary miners did it. So it is, comrade ...

      Yeah, and also the wipers and plumbers. You didn't hear anything about the "north wind" along the way)))
      1. Thunderbolt
        Thunderbolt 16 January 2017 00: 50
        0
        Quote: Normal ok
        You didn't hear anything about the "north wind" along the way)))

        "... Vladimirsky central, North wind ... fellow ",no, have not heard. smile
        And even if he had heard, he would not have said. There was no army order for gratitude for especially distinguished units, and therefore there were no units. Therefore, Khramchikhin is forgivable, he did not even live in the army for a day. curious laughing
      2. BAI
        BAI 16 January 2017 12: 42
        0
        The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (one must think of a completely pro-Russian comrade) said (in pure Russian): "There are no Russian armed forces in the Donbass." And what about this zradnik?
  12. iouris
    iouris 15 January 2017 19: 25
    +2
    The general lesson of all these wars is that civil war is the most effective way to destroy the surplus labor force, since it is waged at the expense of the internal resources of the “extra” countries, and its consequences are comparable to those of the use of nuclear weapons. Each side is helped (not for free, of course) so that they kill each other as much as possible. There are practically no borders, except for natural ones. We live in a colossal civil war over oil, gas, bread and water.
  13. Glory1974
    Glory1974 15 January 2017 20: 06
    +4
    Nevertheless, aviation has not yet won a single war,


    Why forget Yugoslavia? A couple of months of bombing and the government agrees to all conditions.
    1. iouris
      iouris 16 January 2017 01: 37
      0
      We even had to bomb.
  14. Vadim237
    Vadim237 15 January 2017 22: 12
    +1
    "Nevertheless, up to 2,2 thousand tanks, up to 1,6 thousand infantry fighting vehicles, up to 1 thousand armored personnel carriers, up to 2 thousand artillery systems, 2-3 thousand ground air defense systems, up to 400 aircraft, up to 150 helicopters ". 70 percent of this list has already been lost, in Syria every day several armored vehicles from ATGMs are knocked out and destroyed.
  15. BAI
    BAI 16 January 2017 12: 24
    0
    "However, it should be noted that the two most catastrophic defeats (near Ilovaisk and Debaltseve), which accounted for most of the losses, were still not caused by the militias."
    Well, what did the author hesitate to say from whom the APU was defeated?
    1. tezey
      tezey 16 January 2017 13: 18
      0
      Apparently, the author has secret information on this issue, but for some reason he is not sharing with us. The Ukrainians themselves on this occasion wrote that they saw enemy attack aircraft. Very scared and hid. And the attack aircraft just flew somewhere and that's it. Why flew incomprehensibly. And whose warriors they were with fear did not make out plainly. And in the battles for the city of Uglegorsk, according to them, they met with terrible and wild, cruel, notorious Buryat tankmen. And it is clear that it was impossible to resist such a force. Well, there are different Sparta and others. They shot and shouted, but to no avail. Glorious ukrsky lads did them at once. But the Buryats. There are no methods against the Buryats.
  16. tezey
    tezey 16 January 2017 13: 44
    0
    It is fundamentally wrong to mix civil conflicts with a hypothetical military confrontation with the armies of developed countries, NATO, and the USA. Therefore, to draw conclusions about the construction of the army of the Russian Federation based on the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine is a thankless task. These wars are specific, regional in nature. Accordingly, in such wars, tactics, forces and means, combat use are also of a specific nature. Actually what the author told us about. The Russian army, of course, must take all this into account and draw the right conclusions, since such wars were in the last century and will continue to be. But by and large, the main guideline for the construction of the armed forces should be, first of all, the presence of a perfect nuclear triad, air defense and missile defense in the quantity and quality necessary to defeat the air group of a potential enemy, means of effective detection and control of air and outer space, a sufficient number of high-precision weapons of all types of basing, perfect control and communications, electronic warfare equipment superior to the enemy’s counterparts and reconnaissance. This is what our armed forces need. And of course, trained and motivated personnel including high-class staff officers. According to the intensity, nature and scale of the conflict, the tactics of choosing forces and means should correspond. But it is safe to say that in modern warfare the need for traditional means — tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery does not disappear, as well as the fact that without infantry actions, in the long run, remotely, a war cannot be won. We do not consider the general nuclear war.
  17. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 17 January 2017 11: 17
    0
    The main advantage of the infantryman is that he is "unobtrusive" (compared to a tank or BMP). If trained, he can easily turn into a real "stealth" on the battlefield. Mobility is also not so bad - 16 km in two hours with own feet and full equipment is a standard swoop. Its modern portable weapons are also quite good - ATGMs, MANPADS, 82mm mortars, RPGs, mini drones, blinding lasers, and so on, and at the same time they are quite cheap compared to tanks, BMPs, combat aircraft and heavy artillery. The expenses for the classic mechanized battalion will be enough for a light infantry brigade of 4-5 thousand people.
    1. KaPToC
      KaPToC 19 January 2017 01: 08
      0
      Quote: Kostadinov
      The main advantage of the infantryman is that he is "hardly noticeable"

      The main drawback of the infantryman is that he is not very autonomous.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      Mobility is also not so bad - 16 km in two hours with own legs with full equipment is a standard march-attack.

      Do you dream that the Chinese coolies will supply your army?
      Quote: Kostadinov
      Spending on a classic mechanized battalion will be enough for a light infantry brigade of 4-5 thousand people.

      The main means of destruction in modern warfare is artillery - and you can't drag it on yourself, especially ammunition. Modern artillery will mix with black earth any amount of your "light" infantry, shells are cheaper than people, even the cheapest.