Puff cakes of the Russian front. CH 2. In the August forests

12
“Puff cakes” arose in early February 1915 during the Second August operation 25 in January - February 13 (“Winter Battle in Masuria”). Having concentrated in East Prussia, in addition to the 8, 10 army, the command of the East German Front planned to cover the 10 Army of the North-Western Front, and, having shot down the flank corps, surround and repeat the "Tannenberg" for its main forces.

The 10 Army of the Infantry General, FW Sievers, was the flank operational unification of the front and covered its main forces on the left bank of the Vistula from East Prussia. It contained 4 corps (3, 20, 26 army, 3 Siberian army - 11,5 infantry divisions) and two (1 and 3) cavalry divisions. The number of army - 120 thousand bayonets [Holmsen, I. A. World War. Our operations on the East Prussian front in the winter 1915 Paris, 1935. C. 33]. The lack of reserves and the "linear-serf" nature of the concentration of the army significantly reduced its maneuverability.



High Command 10 Army
Puff cakes of the Russian front. CH 2. In the August forests

1. F.V. Sivers

2. Major General Baron A. Budberg, Army Chief of Staff

Corps Commanders


3. Artillery General Bulgakov P.I., 20 AK

4. General of Infantry Radkevich E. A., 3 SibAK

5. Infantry General A. A. Gerngross, AK 26

6. General of Infantry Epanchin N. A., 3 AK

The chiefs (i.d.) of the 20 AK divisions

7. Lieutenant-General A. N. Rosenshild-Paulin, 29, PD

8. Major General I. Holmsen, 53, PD

The German command created an advantage over their opponent, using up to 8 corps (15 infantry divisions) - up to 250 thousand bayonets [Kamensky MP. Death of 20 corps 8-21 February 1915. According to archival materials of 10 army headquarters. PB., 1921. C. 31]. It increased the composition of the grouping 2 times, redeploying the 4 corps to East Prussia: having a rich combat experience of the 21 Army from France and 38, 39 and 40 of Germany’s strategic reserve. E. Ludendorff especially noted the reinforced composition of the latter, well-equipped and having a large sledding transport.

9. Concentration of fresh buildings in East Prussia

The composition of the grouping: 8-I (Commander General of the infantry O. von Belov; 1-th Army and 40-th Reserve Corps, 3-I Reserve, 1-I and 10-I Landverni, 4-I cavalry division, 5-I infantry and 3 Cavalry Brigade, Letzen Garrison), 10-I (Commander Colonel-General G. von Eichgorn; 21-i army, 38-i and 39-i reserve corps, division Tilsit, 1-i cavalry division, 5-i cavalry division, XNUMX-i cavalry division, reserve corps, division Tilsit, XNUMX-i cavalry division, XNUMX-i I Guards Brigade, Landwehr Koenigsberg) army.

10. O. Belov

11. G. Eichhorn

Corps Commanders

12. Major General War L.V.F. background, 1 AK

13. Lieutenant-General K. Litzman, 40 RK

14. infantry general Belov F. T. K. von, 21 AK

15. cavalry general Marvitz G.K.A. von der, 38 RK

16. Lieutenant General Lauenstein O. von, 39 RK

January 25 The Germans attacked the flanking corps of the 10 Army. If in the south the 3 th Siberian Army Corps in the battles of Luk could repel the blow, on the northern flank three German corps threw the 3 th army and went to the flank and to the rear of the army. Fierce fighting took place in the cold, in the snowdrifts, with a strong wind, when the problem was to dig at least some trenches in the frozen ground.

17. German offensive

18. Decor for 29 January

The command of the 10 Army, in order to gain time before the concentration of the 12 Army and save the troops from the encirclement, decided to withdraw the operational force from the attack.

The corps were supposed to start withdrawing from the right flank (3 AK) - from January 28. The 20 Army Corps was due to depart on the night of January 29, but received an order only February 1.

And the corps became the rearguard, which attracted the main forces of the enemy. His 4 divisions were surrounded in the forests between the years. Augustow and Grodno 9 by German divisions and delayed the German offensive on the 10 day, which allowed the main forces of the army to be withdrawn from attack.

This is where the “puff pie” originated - at Makharts.
Part of the corps, trying to break through, 3 of February inflicted a serious defeat on the Germans near this village, defeating three regiments reinforced by three batteries - from the 65 and 59 infantry brigades of the 42 army corps.



19-21. 20 AK actions in the boiler and breakthrough attempts

The 106 Ufa and 108 Saratov Infantry Regiments of the 27 Division took d. Far Las and Sersky Las, defended by the 138 Infantry Regiment. Russian artillery, which opened fire from close distances, constantly changed positions, shooting with shrapnel the enemy’s infantry, which suffered great losses.

Striking a frontal strike, combined with the attack on the flank, moving on the ice of Lake. Serva, the Russians drove the Germans out of Makharts. A mass of Germans rushed to Makharets, and behind them came battalions of the 106 and 108 regiments. 19 machine guns on the 3 km front attacked in infantry chains, occasionally stopping to fire at the fleeing ones - most German infantrymen were killed.

For the infantry moved the batteries, which opened fire on the German infantry and the battery to the south-east of Maharets. At that time, a wounded German colonel who was in Augustów, the commander of the 131 Infantry Regiment, who had admired the advance of the Russian units, was captured.

The German brigade was driven out of Makharets, and the way of departure of the corps to Sopotskin metro station was free. The trophies of the 108 regiment were up to 700 prisoners [Belolipetsky V. E. Fighting infantry regiment in the August forests. 1915 year. M., 1940. C. 54]. The 400 prisoners were captured by the 116 Infantry Maloyaroslavsky regiment of the 29 Division. A total of 1200 people were captivated (including a pioneer company in full force) [Roenshild-Paulin A. The death of the 20 army corps in the August forests. From the diary of the division chief // Military collection of the society of adherents of military knowledge. Belgrade. 1924. Prince 5. C. 273]. Most of the prisoners were from the 138 and 131 regiments, but they were also from the 97 regiment of the 42 division. The latter were surprised by the meeting with the Russians - after all, twelve days ago they were in France near Arras, from where they were sent in an unknown direction, leaving the cars directly from the cars. Maps of France, souvenirs were found from the prisoners, and the banner of the Allencourt fire brigade was seized from one of them.

A German source noted that the losses of the parties "were very significant" [R. G. background. Winter operation in the area of ​​the Mazury Lakes. PB., 1921. C. 46].

The hussar officer V. Littauer, who turned out to be 2 in March in the August woods during the counterattack, recalled piles of bodies that resembled piles of firewood, fields and woods strewn with killed Russian and German soldiers - layers like “stuffing in a pie”, a battery on a firing position (calculations and the horses are dead), an infantry company, mowed down by machine-gun fire, a pile of fallen German soldiers under the bridge and 400 corpses of German soldiers on the outskirts of the village (stood in a column waiting for an order, and were cut by machine-gun bursts from the forest) [Littуэрuhr V. Russian Hussars. Memoirs of an officer of the imperial cavalry 1911-1920. M., 2006. C. 181].

The high losses of the German troops are confirmed by E. Ludendorff, who noted that on February 2-3 the avant-garde of the 21 corps, advancing deep into the forest, was crushed by Russians departing east and partially captivated [Ludendorf E. My memories of the 1914 — 1918 war .. M. -Mn., 2005. C. 126], and M. Hoffman [M. Hoffman. The War of Missed Opportunities. M.-L., 1925. C. 73].

But the prisoners returned to their own. The command of the 20 Corps took into account that the wounded Germans (several of them officers, including the regimental commander 2) were under the open sky, some of which required operations. Ambulance transport headed the commander of the 131-th regiment. Under the red flag (white decided not to use as a hint of surrender) the transport was sent to the German positions.

Soon were released and healthy prisoners who were in the rear of the corps. Fearing that the Germans would inflict casualties on prisoners with fire and decide that the Russians did it, they were led by their commander of a pioneer company and sent to their own. Not the white flag was used again, but the flag of the Red Cross (the cross was painted in blood on a white cloth).

German sources call the total losses only 1 of the German corps - 21 army (120 officers and 5600 soldiers) [Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 7. Berlin, 1931. S. 237], noting the death of a general and the injury of 2 regimental commanders. 60 officers and 2000 soldiers from these casualties fell on the 65 infantry brigade under the command of Major General E. von Estorff.

22. Obituary of E. Estorffe

“Layer Cake” appeared on February 7 near the metro station Rudavka. The rearguard of the 20 Corps was mixed up in it (10 company 112 infantry regiment of the Urals regiment - to 1200 fighters, 4 companies from 110 th Kamsky and 210 Bronnitsky infantry regiments - to 800 people with 8 machine guns, 8 XMXXNXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXMXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX I am a brigade.

The brigade was not lucky - the Russians, hiding behind the forest, followed her. When the brigade sent Sayyonek to cover the left flank of the brigade of the 1 battalion of the 17 infantry regiment, the connection with it was interrupted - only later did the Germans learn that it was destroyed. Moreover, he lost his banner - after a long search, he was found under a pile of bodies, because the territory was left to the Germans [A. Kolenkovsky. Winter operation in East Prussia in 1915, M.-L., 1927. C. 110 - 112].

As a result, the 65-I brigade was cut off from the German troops. Such is the specificity of the “puff pie” - von Estorff, who participated in the encirclement of the Russian corps, himself was surrounded with the brigade and died. The commander of the rearguard advanced one battery directly to infantry trenches. Thanks to this, the Germans' night attacks were repelled [Belolipetsky V. Ye. Decree. cit. C. 80]. The German brigade ran into the position of these infantry support guns.

Russian losses were also very high. Thus, the 108 Infantry Regiment of Maharet lost up to 300 people, including 7 officers [Belolipetsky V. Ye. Decree. cit. C. 58].

The most tragic pictures occurred in the last hours of the life of the corps, who fought the enemy to the end. So, when the units were moving towards a breakthrough, a corps commander appeared, shouting encouraging words: “hurray” in response.

115-th Vyazemsky and 116-th Maloyaroslavsky infantry regiments, deployed on the edge of the forest, attacked the heights at the village of Starozhyntsi, captured the first line of German trenches, but when attacking the second they fell under flank machine-gun fire and with great losses went into the forest. The remnants of the regiments seized in the last battle with units of the German 31 division. Some companies escaped to the edge, and the superior forces of the Germans met with fire.

116 th regiment was killed along with the commander. One battalion in the hollow lay down and died almost completely, the second was in the trenches under crossfire. At the head of the reserve battalion, Colonel KA Vitznud was mortally wounded. Regimental adjutant with a banner and 30 fighters escaped from the environment [Rosenschild - Paulin A. Decree. cit. C. 278].

23. K.A. Vitsnuda

The Cossack hundred headquarters of the 27 division passed the bridge at the Folv. Mlynok and faced with a chain of German infantry out of the forest. Cossacks crushed the Germans and broke through.

The rear guard held the longest.
When the infantry, unable to withstand flank artillery fire, retreated, the artillery remained in place and detained the Germans until the shells ran out.

The commander of the rearguard, at the head of two companies, rushed to the attack, and, breaking the fire at close range, with four fighters, he made his way into the forest - on February 23 he stepped forward to meet parts of the 2 Army Corps.

Lieutenant Fishchenko witnessed the heroic end of the artillery of the corps, which fought under machine-gun and rifle fire and a hail of howitzer shells. The batteries fought in a completely open position - but despite the fact that many guns were hit, charging boxes exploded, most of the gunners died, they fired while helping the infantry [Kamensky MP Decree. cit. C. 165].

24. Russian battery

25. German infantrymen

26. German soldiers killed in East Prussia. Winter 1915

27. Captured Russian officers, winter 1915

Total losses of the 10 Army units to February 9 [Holmsen, I. А. cit. S. 298]: AK 20 - 34 and 146 thousand guns, AK 3 - 5 and 17 thousand guns, AK 26 - 4 and 18 thousand guns, Seebach 3 - 8 thousand people, 57 PD - 5.... Thousands of people and 13 guns. Total - 56 thousand people. But the army survived and later launched a counterattack.

A.P. Budberg divined the scheme of German coverage and demanded regrouping and leaving stretched positions. He proposed to take a shorter front with strong corps reserves and two army reserve groups on the flanks. But the command of the army did not support these considerations. The role of front command was negative, in the person of Quartermaster General M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich insisting on maintaining the position of the army [Holmsen I. A. Decree. cit. C. 38].

The army command responded to the maneuver bypass by retreating the army with a bend in the right flank - the only possible maneuver in the absence of reserves. But the withdrawal was not started on time (the problem was the lack of high-quality intelligence information, while the Germans conducted successful radio intelligence), which gave the Germans time to intercept the retreat routes of one of the corps. Tactical miscalculations led to the defeat of the 10 Army, but, despite the double superiority, the Germans failed to destroy it.

The strategic reserve divisions went to the Russian front: 75-I, 76-I, 77-I, 78-I, 79-I, 80-I reserve, and from the French front - 31-I and 42-I infantry. This again became the most favorable factor for the allies of Russia, leading to the passivity of the Germans on the French front and allowing the French to launch a second offensive in Champagne [Danilov Yu. N. Russia in the World War 1914 — 1915. Berlin, 1924. C. 301]. P. Hindenburg received 4 full-blooded connections, "the best that Germany has ever had in the war" [Falkengine E. von. High Command 1914 — 1916 in its most important decisions. M., 1923. C. 58], but such an increase did not produce results [Ibid. C. 58]. The Chief of the Field General Staff, General of the Infantry, E. Falkengine “firmly held the idea of ​​using the new corps in the west” [ibid. C. 61], but P. Hindenburg and Konrad Gettsendorf pushed through the solution they needed.

Again, the Russian front influenced the German strategy [Moser O. von. A brief strategic overview of world war 1914 - 1918's. M., 1923. C. 56]. The use of a strategic reserve in the east marked a further long rejection of large-scale operations in the west [Falkenhain E. Decree. cit. C. 62; Moser O. Decree. cit. C. 57].

"Puff cakes" led to heavy losses of opponents, the death of generals and entailed serious strategic consequences.
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  1. +9
    19 January 2017 08: 13
    Soon F.V. Sivers was removed from command. In April 1915, dismissed. He was depressed, he was very upset by the defeat of the army. His further fate is unknown, and the information is contradictory. There are allegations that he shot himself. There is evidence that he died during the civil years ..
  2. +19
    19 January 2017 09: 33
    A very interesting approach to the topic. I heard about Maharets somewhere, but nothing at all about Rudavka’s fight.
    At all times, our soldiers bravely fought in all conditions - and in encirclement, too.
    Eternal memory and glory
    1. +1
      19 January 2017 13: 44
      Yes, and the enemy. Everything, I am worried, according to our defeats in the WWI.
      How would they retreat if the Germans already had cars and tanks? -Drift and surrender?
      1. +6
        19 January 2017 21: 43
        Yeah, and if the bomb would be so khan finally sad
        1. +1
          20 January 2017 08: 30
          this is the only option, without roads and with illiterate peasants
          1. 0
            20 January 2017 08: 59
            Dear antivirus, many here disagree with you! Listen to them and won the Russian-Japanese! laughing
            1. 0
              20 January 2017 09: 03
              I'm talking about weakness - the lack of roads and their transport. wht tanks
          2. +16
            20 January 2017 09: 27
            It’s only strange - how is it that in many photos of the WWI, illiterate Russian soldiers read newspapers ... And write diaries (for example, the famous Diary of Shtukaturov) and letters, however
            1. 0
              20 January 2017 09: 37
              read-write -------- this is 4 cells of central school. !!! or YOU ???. and know astronomy and sopromat, yes + geography, and not just read the map.
              And biology.
              4 against 7 or 10 cells of education. This is child labor from 12-14 years old and homelessness, and prostitution from 12 years of working outskirts and hereditary higher education. Worse than the paid tower now.
  3. +4
    19 January 2017 10: 27
    The tactical training of the personnel army of 14-15 was really good and could compensate for the superiority of the Germans in artillery, but the operational command ruined everything
    1. +1
      22 January 2017 11: 24
      Quote: Cartalon
      The tactical training of the personnel army of 14-15 was really good and could compensate for the superiority of the Germans in artillery, but the operational command ruined everything

      I agree with you, apparently this is the trouble of our Army. The soldiers are good, the lower and middle level officers are not bad. But above at the level of the headquarters of the army and the supreme genitality is just a swamp! My conclusion is the same, promotion from time immemorial has been about patronage and the ability to please the higher authorities. That in the tsarist army, that in the SA, as in modern Russia. IMHO!
  4. +7
    23 January 2017 17: 42
    Article plus. Competent analysis of the actions of Russian and German troops, and, valuable, the information is confirmed by links to archival documents. The author - my sincere gratitude for the work done! hi

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