Treason 1941 of the Year (part of 2)

93
Continuation, beginning here

Were Moscow directives implemented?

The very first major capture of the Soviet troops are famous for the 3 and 10 armies of the Western Front, located in the Bialystok ledge. Here, as part of the 10th army, the most powerful in number and quality was located tanks, well-equipped with vehicles, 6th mechanized corps of General Khatskilevich. The armies were located in the border fortified areas, in particular, the 10th army relied on the Osovetsky UR. In 1915, Russian troops in the Osovets fortress glorified themselves with a long heroic defense. As if herself story urged to hold this place.



And the main blows of the Germans passed by these armies. Guderian’s tank group moved through Brest and the location of the 4th army, Gotha’s tank group moved through the location of the 11th army to Vilnius with a turn to Minsk. On June 25, when the 4th Army failed to stop the enemy near Slutsk, intercepting the road from the Belostotsky ledge to the east through Baranavichy became a reality. On this very day 3 and 10 armies receive the PERMISSION of the command of the Western Front to exit the fortified areas and retreat east. Exactly when it is too late to retreat. West of Minsk, these armies, most of whose troops were moving in marching columns, are intercepted. Subjected to severe defeat aviation and artillery on the roads in camp columns. And it is here that the situation of the first mass capture of Soviet troops arises.

Meanwhile, before 25 Jun were still 22, 23 and 24 June. In the afternoon of June 22, a directive No. 3 was sent to the headquarters of fronts from Moscow, which required mechanized forces to inflict concentrated attacks on the enemy in the adjacent territory and capture the cities of Suwalki and Lublin.

Until Lublin, there were approximately 80 km from the locations of the 4 and 15 mechanized corps of the most powerful 6 army of the Southwestern Front. God knows that, the tanks of the mechanized corps drove away for much longer distances in other directions. Still, 80 km - and not too little. But with Suwalki everything is much more interesting.

Suwalki is a dead-end railway station in a swampy wooded bear corner of northeastern Poland. The Suwalki district was wedged in by the USSR to the north of the Belostok salient. And she went to Suwalki railway, the only one on which it was possible to supply the tank wedge of Gotha. From the border and from the locations of the 3 army to the railroad to Suwalki on the inter-grain defile, only 20 km. On the road from Augustów - 26 km. The 3 long-range artillery of the army was able to maintain its own advancing troops until the railway was cut off, without moving from its territory. Regular artillery, not moving away from the warehouses, could provide support for the offensive until the middle of this path. The projectiles necessary for powerful artillery support for a long distance are not necessary. They are here - in the warehouses of the fortified area. And we remember that the reserves on which the 5 Army relied in the Korosten SD were sufficient for more than a month of effective struggle against the enemy.

The blow of 3 to her army, with the support of a mechanized corps in the direction of the railway, made the position of 3 of the Goth tank group on Soviet territory hopeless. No fuel, no shells, no food.

And this order was to hit Suwalki. Specific order with the exact purpose of the strike. And even with a clearly defined meaning. The enemy, who threw troops into a deep breakthrough, set up his rear. On which it is necessary to strike. This is the wording of the directive, which does not allow other interpretations. The troops, who had thrown all their forces forward, themselves set up their rear areas for the rout.

Meanwhile, the command of the Western Front, headed by Pavlov and the chief of staff of the Klimovsky, instead of fulfilling the directive directive, decides not to cross the border to the railway, which is in 20 km, but to move 6's mechanized corps and cavalry through its territory towards Grodno, which is significantly further, and the tanks obviously could not have been provided on this route with fuel using cash filling equipment.

Only immediately note. What is written about the blow to Grodno can not be taken as a fact. So it is written about him. The Germans did not fix the blow. Their reconnaissance did not find large tank forces on Belostotsky bulge. The road littered with broken Soviet equipment did not go to the northeast of Grodno. And to the east - to Slonim. But this is another question.

So far it is important for us that the perfectly realistic goal of a short strike — Suwalki — as a result of which the Gotha tank group remained on foreign soil without supply — was ignored by the headquarters of the Western Front without justifying such ignoring. The mobile troops were ordered to move through their territory. In the event of a strike in the direction of the railroad to Suwalki, the 3-I army did not break away from its supply base in Osovetsky UR, making the financial position of one of the largest attacking enemy groups hopeless. Instead, mobile units are sent to travel through their territory in isolation from the combined arms army, from the supply base.

There are mistakes. But there are no identical mistakes on two fronts. The South-Western Front exactly on the same day, as we remember, the mechanized corps sends to wind the tracks hundreds of kilometers. Directive, providing a blow to Lublin - ignores. Instead, they organize a strike on their territory in Berestechko-Dubna. And, as noted, 27 June, the Mechanized Corps is advancing against an enemy who does not see. He is simply not in front of him. Although it should have been at least a day. Mekhkorpus was late with focusing on the turn of the day's attack. It hurt far had to drag.

It should be noted that Zhukov, who arrived from Moscow, participates in this decision to change the strike problem on the South-Western Front.

Maybe the directive was so obvious an adventure that the front commanders and the chief of the General Staff Zhukov personally considered it possible to ignore it? But no. The German chief of staff, Halder, noted in his diary that actions in the south are unsuccessful (we already know about the failure of the superior German forces near Przemyshl, where the 99 Red Banner Division successfully kicked them out of Soviet territory), we should be helped, but as luck would have it there is no reserve infantry division, and a small tank reserve cannot be sent to help because of the disgusting quality of the roads of Eastern Poland, which are packed with everything else.



Germans have no reserves. And all the roads on the other side of the border are clogged with wagons supplying connections thrown forward. The Soviet mechanized corps, having crossed the border, would not have any forces capable of stopping it, and would only crush the caterpillars, shoot and seize the material resources without which the German troops thrown onto Soviet territory would be helpless. We already know that German tanks stopped in front of Kiev, which was then unprotected by Soviet troops, because of the cessation of military supplies due to the attacks of Potapov’s 5 Army.

But Directive No. 3 of 22 June was not carried out by the command of two major fronts — the West and South-West — and by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Zhukov, who decided on the counterstrike together with the command of the SW front.

Throwing the Germans, headlong, forward - with the unusable condition of the roads in the rear, in the absence of reserves to cover the vital rear communications - was in terms of military capabilities only of the border Soviet armies - an adventure. From the very beginning.

But he was not an adventure. For the Germans knew that they were allowed any nonsense. Allowed by the conspiracy of the generals of the Red Army, which will not execute orders of Moscow. Which will destroy the combat capabilities of its own troops - for example, the destruction of the lifespan of tanks in meaningless multi-hundred-kilometer marches.

A little remark.

The motor life of the tank "tiger" was only 60 km. The first use of the tank near Leningrad in the second half of 1942 was unsuccessful because most of the tanks simply did not reach the battlefield from the unloading station.


The tanks of the Soviet mechanized corps of the South-Western Front in June-early July 1941 passed 1200-1400 kilometers under their own power. Orders did not leave time for inspection of the tank and finding out the fact that the tank stopped due to the unwinding of the nut, which had to be put in its place. But before that, several hours to open the hatches, to swarm in the gland, to look for ...

Well, when the "rattling armor, brilliant brilliance of steel" corps did not come, the turn came and the infantry. She, too, was torn away from the supply bases; they were led to the roads in the traveling columns. Where she was captured now superior in mobility and armament mechanized enemy units.

But to understand this, our historians and analysts lack a primitive: the recognition that the generals of the two fronts grossly violated discipline did not comply with the direct instructions of the country's top military leadership — directive No. XXUMX. And the enemy, who had adventurously placed his rear on a natural, perfectly logical strike, an order for which was issued and sent to the front headquarters, knew that there would be no such attack. He knew that the front staffs would not fulfill the order.



Not stupidly, but exceptionally competently will not perform. They will take away the 8 th mechanized corps from the honest commander-26 General Kostenko, who only from the interests handed over to him under the command of the army would not allow Lviv to take a short and powerful strike by the mechanized corps on the enemy’s threatening flank. And then a wooded Lviv region with two large warehouse centers in Lviv and Stryi, relying on the complex Carpathians from the south, fortified along the border, hanging over the German supply routes through Lublin and on the highway to Kiev would turn into a second splinter of the 5- scale oh army. Even with complete isolation. And even more substantial. In the Carpathians, not the Ukrainian nationalists of the Western countries, but the friendly Ruthenian people. Behind the Carpathians is the territory belonging to Hungary, but historically connected with Slovakia. And the Slovaks are not Czechs. The Slovaks are the Slovak national uprising of the year 1944. Slovaks are requests to enter the USSR in 60. This is Colonel Ludwig Svoboda, the commander of the Czechoslovak brigade, who took the Carpathian passes with the Red Army in the 1944. The Slovak units allied to the Germans, in contrast to the Romanians and Hungarians, did not in themselves leave bad memory on Soviet territory.

But that's not all. For information: in the south of Lviv region - oil-bearing area. Romania supplied 7 million tons of oil per year. Lviv region gave Hitler 4 million tons. Every third ton of the oil on which the engines of the Reich worked! The rapid withdrawal of the Red Army from the Lviv region did not significantly destroy the infrastructure of the region. - Did not have time. Oil production was quickly adjusted. For the sake of oil, the Germans here did not even destroy the Jews, in whose hands was the management of the oil fields.



In short. An alternative to the 1941 crash was. Real. She was not just in itself as an opportunity that the descendants of the backstage mind understood. It was understood and expressed with specific instructions on what to do, in the form of the Stalinist Directive No. 3 of 22 June 1941 of the year. In the middle of the first day of the war the question of the complete and unconditional defeat of the aggressor was actually resolved. "Little blood, a mighty blow." Or at least about depriving him of the possibility of waging a long war.

And this unique opportunity was killed by the headquarters of two main fronts — the Western and the South-Western. There were a lot of people in headquarters. But in each of them there were three people, without the signature of each of which not a single command of the headquarters had legal force: the commander, the chief of staff, a member of the Military Council. On the South-Western Front, Purkaev was chief of staff, and Nikishev was a member of the Military Council. In the period when Purkaev commanded the Kalinin Front, the problem of famine arose in the armies of the front. Dozens of hungry deaths. A commission arrived, Purkaeva was removed, it turned out that the front had enough food, but there was a distribution problem. After Purkaev was removed, this problem was resolved. There is such an episode.

Directive №3 - probe, with which we manage to get into the underside of the catastrophe-1941. The principles of the organization of the army do not allow non-compliance with the directive of the higher command. Even if it seems to you that you understand the situation better. Even if you think the decision of a superior is stupid. It is the bosses. And who knows, maybe a stupid order is not really stupid. You are sacrificed in the name of a plan that is unknown to you. People have to die, fulfilling a knowingly impossible order because a thousand kilometers away is an operation, for the success of which it really makes sense to die in a seemingly meaningless distracting operation. War is cruel.

On the Western and Southwestern fronts, the two fronts headquarters simultaneously canceled the meaning of the directive of the higher command, changed the goals and the very direction of the counterattack. Contrary to military discipline. Contrary to strategy, contrary to common sense. Changed with the subordination of troops. The 8 mk was withdrawn from the subordination of the 26 army to the South-Western Front. On the Western Front, 6 MK 10-th army was withdrawn from the subordination of this very 10-th army. And, by the way, they also drove along the roads of Belarus. The commander of the 7-second tank division of this corps will report later in the report that the corps was thrown by orders from the front headquarters without a clear target from direction to direction. The enemy, who deserved action against the corps, they never met. But on the other hand, 4 times overcame anti-tank lines prepared by the Germans on our territory. As you can see, the handwriting is well recognized.

By the way, the death in the environment of the 13 th army is also curious. She is taken out of the Minsk Republic of Urals - to the Lida region - by order of the front headquarters. And the arriving troops of the Second Strategic Echelon primitively do not have time to take up positions in the Minsk region. The 13 Army itself was sent deep into the future boiler from its positions near the important political and industrial center of the city of Minsk - in an environment where there is already a threat from the northern flank. The directive of the front headquarters on the withdrawal of the army under Lida directly refers to the provision of a threat from Vilnius. But the army is not being taken to the Vilnius-Minsk highway, but is being led far westwards — into the space between the supply bases of the fortified old and new state borders. Going nowhere. In the woods. The army dies for nothing. Subsequently, the army with the same number is recreated on the basis of the divisions of the 4 army again.

And on the defense of Minsk, the newly arrived troops, who do not even have time to occupy the fortified area, rush into the fortified fortified area. Goth tanks moved too quickly through Vilnius from the north. The Soviet divisions entered the battle on the move. There could be no talk of any interaction with the forces of the fortified area, nor of any normal use of stocks of funds in the SD warehouses.



Well, quite a minor touch to the picture of the conspiracy in the Red Army. Among the memories of the soldiers came upon the testimony. Soldiers arrived at the front near Polotsk. On the outskirts of a village they had breakfast in the morning. Lieutenant Bardin, whom the soldiers knew, built them without weapons (weapons remained in the pyramids) and led to the village. There were already Germans. Bardin stopped the formation and told the soldiers that the war was over for them. Like this.

Treason 1941 of the Year (part of 2)Vlasov.

In the described episodes, the figure of General Vlasov appeared, through the positions of the mechanized corps of which the Germans broke through to the outskirts of Lviv. Not much trouble.

And the last episode of Vlasov’s military biography in the Red Army was the command of the 2 shock army of the Volkhov front. It is known that the army fell into a difficult situation, died. And Vlasov surrendered. But it is almost not known that the army died due to non-compliance with Vlasov's order of the General Staff. The General Staff realized that the advance of the army was choking, now it was in a dangerous position. And they ordered Vlasov to withdraw the army to safe borders. The withdrawal of the troops was ordered to be carried out before 15 May 1942. Vlasov referred to the poor condition of the roads, the employment of these roads by a cavalry unit. And he announced the date when he will be able to begin the withdrawal of the army - May 23. The German offensive began on May 22. The army was trapped in full force.

If not to peer intently at the events of the first days of the war near Lviv, then this could be considered a fatal coincidence of circumstances, and Vlasov was a person who had a revolution in his outlook on 1942 due to the mistakes of Stalin in the first year of the war. But the events near Lviv were. Vlasov directly involved in them. Both roads, along which the Germans could get to Sknilov, literally passed along the edge of that forest, where the tank division of his corps stood in anticipation of the 31 order. The rest of the corps, too, were not far away. They directly covered the direction in which the breakthrough of the mechanized forces of the enemy was carried out, taking the east bank of the River Vereshitsa.

We can definitely conclude that Vlasov was also an important participant in the military conspiracy in the 1941 year. Moreover, the subsequent fate of Vlasov as the creator of the ROA itself becomes evidence of collusion with the Germans of those who led the headquarters of at least two fronts and individual armies of these fronts in 1941 year.

But this can be understood only by carefully studying the event series of the initial period of the war.

And you should definitely see the "toy soldiers" - the most important result of these games. The troops were taken away from the areas where giant stocks were concentrated in warehouses in both the new and old state borders. The conspirators deprived the Red Army of the means of warfare accumulated over several years of work of the defense industry.

Conversely, supplied the enemy with these means. Gasoline, projectiles for guns left by the Germans, air bombs, food, spare parts for equipment that were thrown due to minor breakdowns, medicines, explosives, wires, rails, sleepers, tires for cars, and fodder for horses. An interesting detail. In preparation for the war with the USSR, the Germans reduced their orders for the production of ammunition. They definitely knew that the Red Army in a short time will face a shortage of shells.


Vyazemsky boiler.

I am not ready today to talk about every problem 1941 of the year. Not everything is feasible. It is difficult to talk about what happened near Kiev.

But it was possible to clarify many important things about the Vyazemsky cauldron.

For me, the most surprising was the fact of the deployment of ten divisions of the Moscow national militia (BOT) - strictly against the direction of the main German strikes in Operation Typhoon. Five personnel armies of the Reserve front in the middle. And on the obvious directions of the possible offensive of the enemy - along the main highways - just now at the militia division.



Militias put on the most dangerous areas. Well, simply according to the logic: among the deaf Smolensk-Vyazma forests there are two highways. Minsk and Warsaw. Well, not through the forests and swamps to the advancing Germans. - Along the roads. And on both roads, the first to meet the blow was the operation of the Typhoon 10 divisions of the Moscow people's militia. Most of the national militia divisions arrived at the September 20 front. Literally 10 days before the start of the German offensive. And they received sections of the front, where the enemy is most likely to hit.

Secured over the head with everything that the servicemen could have missed, the 5 armies of the Reserve Front disappeared as a result of Operation Typhoon - as they never did.



And the Moscow militia-do not disappear. Rounded 8 BOTTOM - drawn on October 16 at the Borodino field. Later, the fighter of this BOT, Emmanuel Kozakevich becomes the author of the well-known story “STAR”, according to which the film of the same name was shot.

Three bottoms of the southern direction of the German breakthrough somehow overtake the Germans - and stop them in Naro-Fominsk, near Tarutino, near Belev.

In the northern section more difficult. The 2 BOTTOM at the cost of heavy losses breaks through the ring of the surroundings of the Reserve Front near the village of Bogoroditskoye. And he is surprised to find that the armies of the front do not wish to leave the encirclement through a passage that had been broken through by thousands of lives. The exsanguinated 2 BOTTOM in December 1941 was disbanded.

Another Moscow NWT after a long retreat, after leaving the encirclements, occupied the defense on the Pyatnitsky highway between the Panfilov and Beloborodov divisions. She became the 11 Guards Division. Panfilov's division became the 8-th Guards. The division of the Moscow national militia, thrown into battle without preparation, became the 11-th Guards.



And five - not divisions, but the armies of the Reserve Front, especially did not show themselves militarily, and at the same time provided the Germans with hundreds of thousands of prisoners. How can this be?

There are memoirs of the divisional commander of the 2 division of the national militia that on the first day of the German offensive he received an order from the command of the army, to which he submitted, to retreat. Following this, the liaison officers from General Lukin's 19 Army arrived to him - and ordered not to retreat, but to take such and such a line of defense - and to ensure passage through the positions of the division of this army. The paradox of the situation is that the divisional division executed this particular order. - Order someone else commander. Why?

And the division broke through the corridor from the Vyazemsky boiler, too, on the orders of Lukin. But the surrender of the army in captivity took place after the injury of Lukin.

About the very 19 army knows that literally before transferring it under the command of Lukin, the former commander Konev made a long list of officers of the army headquarters, whom he suspected of treason. And there is a memoir of a military doctor, who watched Lukin build officers of the army headquarters around 300 and summon volunteers to command three breakthrough companies. There were no volunteers. Company commanders were appointed by Lukin. With the task of a breakthrough, they nevertheless failed.

It seems that fragments of the terrible truth of the initial period of war have surfaced. The vastness of the officers' conspiracy was so significant that honest officers and generals had to take it into account constantly. And, it seems, to use the methods of identifying "their".

But that is another question. Important. And extremely relevant to today's Russia.

Output.

The main thing is that there was a conspiracy, the most important episodes of which and the writing of the realization of which we identified. The information that allowed him to calculate - surfaced. And they managed to capture the eye. Identify in the chaos of what happened contradictions and patterns.

The Soviet country was not put on the verge of collapse by the power of the German divisions, not by the lack of professionalism of our soldiers and officers of the year 1941, but by treason, carefully prepared, thought out, planned. Treason, which was taken into account by the Germans in the development of a completely adventurous, if objectively judged, plans of attack.

The Great Patriotic War was not a fight of Russians with Germans or even Russians with Europeans. The enemy was assisted by Russian officers and generals. It was not a clash of imperialism with socialism. The enemy was assisted by generals and officers, who were raised up by Soviet power. She was not a clash of professionalism and stupidity. The officers and generals who were considered the best, who, as a result of their service in peacetime, were elevated to the elite of the Red Army, helped. Conversely, where the officers and generals of the Red Army did not betray, the German military genius showed his own helplessness. The 5 Army YuZF - the clearest example of this. And then there were Tula, Voronezh, Stalingrad. Stalingrad from history is hard to wash off. There was a hero-city of Tula, a strike against which was taken by the workers of the Tula factories as part of the Workers regiment and Tula, the militarized protection of the plants, as part of the NKVD regiment. In 2010, the parade in Tula is not provided. They do not like Tula.

Nor do they like Voronezh. Although Voronezh in the defense phase - was the second Stalingrad.

After the discovery of the betrayal problem of 1941, the question of who fought against whom becomes much more relevant than it still seems. And this question is internal. Who fought with someone in our own country? He fought in such a way that the funnels from that war were not equal to this day. And spiritual wounds - not only veterans but also their grandchildren will get angry? - In contrast, no less brutal in terms of events at the front - the first world war, which for Russia is “forgotten.” The Great Patriotic War was worse, but more meaningful.

With this to be dealt with. So that there is no “end of story”, which has recently become too often mentioned.

It is necessary to understand that the person had a future.

Final note.

The proposed article takes into account the current state of minds. I did not begin to make it naukoobraznoy - with links and citations. And the current reader is disgusted, and at the same time everything can be found on the Internet. Everything is easy to find by keywords. Just in case (substitutions in the texts - and we are not insured for this) in the near future I will try to provide the article with citations and the texts of operational reports, combat orders, memoir quotations - in separate Appendices.

But while I am in a hurry - to lay out exactly the considerations that I have set out - and move on to equally important tasks. There are a lot of them now. Lots of.

And we also need to deal with them urgently - so that the “end of history” does not come.
93 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. Vovanchyk
    +16
    13 August 2012 12: 23
    Wonderful analytics ... !!!
    1. +4
      13 October 2016 20: 15
      Remarkably dumb annallitek, from the word anal.
      1. +8
        21 December 2016 00: 24
        Quote: KaPToC
        Remarkably dumb annallitek, from the word anal.

        Apparently someone gave a vote precisely from anal (I'm talking about a comment)
        1. +16
          9 March 2017 21: 16
          Found an article. The article is interesting.

          And - here are my five cents.

          Why did the almost impossible succeed in 1941 - to evacuate hundreds of factories and enterprises to the east of the country, where they deployed and began arms production? Did you succeed ?!

          And - the successful evacuation of industry against the backdrop of INSULATED logistics and wasted marches in the army ... These facts speak in favor of the version of betrayal.

          There were no traitors on the railway ...
  2. Vovanchyk
    +9
    15 August 2012 22: 55
    And, not a single Hurray (woe-) patriot unsubscribed.
    There is something to ponder and what to analyze.
    1. +4
      13 October 2016 20: 17
      There is no desire to throw a bisser in front of pigs.
      1. +8
        25 October 2016 16: 48
        Are you talking about yourself?
        Objections to the essence of the article are such that you are so obviously throwing something ..... showing yourself as a kind of expert on events but do not want to put forward at least some kind of counterargument in defense of yours .... do not understand what position.
        1. +2
          28 February 2018 06: 10
          The general conspiracy was. Already in December of the 41st, 25 generals and colonels were shot, not like Pavlov, for "negligence", but specifically for treason.
          But the generals from history talk about it - oh how they don’t like to remember ...
  3. pavka
    +9
    1 June 2013 00: 38
    read also:
    Martirosyan A.B. - June 22: Blitzkrieg betrayal
    и
    Martirosyan A.B. - June 22: Detailed Anatomy of Betrayal
  4. realist
    +7
    1 November 2013 00: 27
    Even if you do not indulge in emotions, questions about the first months of the war remain.
  5. jurgin65
    +14
    26 December 2013 18: 12
    I accidentally wandered into this site and read it. Frankly, I'm shocked! When the scattered facts come together, it already "hits on the head"!
    1. +5
      9 October 2016 17: 43
      The site is good, but not everything that is written in black letters on a white background and set out with a bit of logic is true. There are many facts that the author did not name, and without them - how? And you, too, do not know them and think that is all! And this is only a part! But who judges the whole part?
      1. +9
        13 October 2016 09: 46
        Well, name your "global facts", if you do not have enough facts in the article, read, discuss, or you have facts ... so let's say the same as corned beef with rezun?
        1. +1
          April 9 2017 14: 48
          Quote: The Bloodthirster
          "if you don’t have enough facts in the article,

          "Give me a bible and I will prove to you that this is the book of Satan."
          The article, of course, is of interest. Only in a certain way, selected facts can greatly distort reality. I’m not ready to participate in the discussion personally, I am not competent, but it would be great to watch it.
    2. +5
      13 October 2016 20: 20
      All these facts are far-fetched, the real reason for the defeat of the 41-year-old is the Wehrmacht's preemption in deploying the Red Army. The Red Army simply did not have a chance, even theoretically.
      1. +12
        22 October 2016 21: 10
        The Red Army simply did not have a chance, even theoretically.

        How low do you value the capabilities of our Red Army if you refuse to give it even theoretical chances. Just like Hitler in 1941.
        But the author of the article showed that there were still some chances. And not even some, but rather serious ones. What you call "The Wehrmacht preempted the Red Army in deployment" is only partly true. The Wehrmacht preempted the Red Army in the attack. And so, yes, the Red Army was not deployed. But not deployed to the defense. But for the offensive, the Red Army (if not all, then at least a significant part of the armies concentrated on the western border), was even very deployed. And if those units of the Red Army that stood in the direction of the planned attack (okay, stood in the direction of the planned retaliatory attack) nevertheless struck as the author writes, at least on Suwalki, then the plans of the Germans would have suffered serious damage. And if at the same time we attacked Suwalki and attacked Lublin, I don't know where the Germans would have reached in 1941. The Germans really do not like panic in the rear. They would have been forced to deploy the advancing tank wedges (well, even if at least half of the tank wedges) with the front to the West. And even if the Germans managed to take our armies advancing on Suwalki and Loblin into a ring, then during this time, in more favorable conditions, the armies of the Second Echelon would have deployed more calmly. That would hit the German ring from the outside. And our armies in the summer near their supply bases would have held out for a couple of weeks. And if they had captured Suwalki and Lublin with German reserves, they would not only hold out, but also beat the Germans. For we would have stocks, but the Germans would not.

        In general, not everything is as clear as you say that
        The Red Army simply did not have a chance, even theoretically.
        1. +3
          22 October 2016 21: 43
          Quote: Seal
          How low do you value the capabilities of our Red Army

          The capabilities of the Red Army have nothing to do with it, pure geography, because of the great distances, the Red Army was mobilized and concentrated three times longer than the Wehrmacht. That same preemption in deployment and a "surprise" attack, not because Stalin did not know, and not because intelligence had missed the mark, but because there was no physical opportunity to overtake the Germans. The tsars, then the communists, now the democrats puzzled over this problem, it has not gone anywhere.
          Quote: Seal
          The Red Army was undeployed. But not deployed to defense. But before the offensive, the Red Army (if not all, then at least a significant part of the armies concentrated near the western border) was even very deployed.

          This is utter nonsense, the same divisions defend and attack, they have no differences for attack or defense. no need to take on faith the writings of the traitor Rezun (he is not Suvorov).
          Quote: Seal
          For we would have reserves, but the Germans would not.

          The Germans had reserves, but we did not. The lack of everything, primarily and primarily the shells, was caused by the relocation of industry to the east.
          1. +8
            23 October 2016 07: 20
            but because there was no physical opportunity to overtake the Germans.
            What are the "physical" possibilities? In what ways could we not overtake the Germans, or at least could not achieve the same speed as the Germans? In the transfer of troops to the border?
            1. As of 22.06.1941/3/1, we already had enough troops there for defense. For the ratio of attackers to defenders equal to XNUMX: XNUMX has not been canceled. And it operates always and everywhere, well, with the exception of, for example, "Spaniards armed with firearms and clad in armor against American Indians with spears."

            2.
            the same divisions defend and attack, they have no differences for attack or defense
            This is utter nonsense. Never a division standing on the defensive (defending) will be able to attack as effectively as a division deployed in battle order to attack.
            For us and the Germans (and the author of the article showed it again), the groupings of forces were concentrated for the attack. At the tip of our possible strike there were runny German chains, and at the tip of a possible German blow were our runny chains.
            Yes, let the Germans strike first. But in the absence of panic and with firm leadership, that configuration of troops that both we and the Germans had was equally dangerous for the attacker first, whoever they were. We, with our concentrated groups for the attack, could actually cut off the advancing enemy groups from their rear units.
            As well as the Germans, if we hit first. But the Germans would have less chance, since we had the T-34 and KV. Yes, albeit raw and low motor resources - but they would have had the strength to travel 100 kilometers in a straight line to the West. But the Germans remained there was nothing.
            Suvorov (Rezun) has nothing to do with it. There is elementary logic, tactics, operational art.
            In fact, our two groups concentrated for the attack (both at Pavlov and at Kirponos) are two huge fortresses with all the necessary supplies inside the fortresses. And if then these "fortresses" at least stood up in a tough, intelligent active defense with strikes, as provided for in the "red packages", it would be an active defense, and not aimless races of mechanized corps through forests and swamps in order to develop motor resources.
            But in fact it turned out that our mechanized corps tossed around inside our fortresses, burning fuel and losing their equipment. And the Germans more or less calmly circumvented them and went to the East, sweeping away our liquid shields on their way.
            But if the "fortresses" moved directly (in a straight line) to the West, then the same picture could be, only in relation to the German thin barriers. Our new tanks, which the German artillery did not take, would become the very knife that would go into the German defense like butter. For the Germans realized that only their anti-aircraft guns can successfully fight our new tanks - far from immediately. And they would not have enough anti-aircraft guns for all our tanks. In reality, they had to be additionally transferred from the rear and from the West. And this is also a waste of time.
            The Germans had reserves, but we did not.

            You must have mixed something up. The author discusses 1941, not the 1914th. In 1941, we had huge stocks.
            1. +1
              23 October 2016 10: 22
              Quote: Seal
              1. As of June 22.06.1941, XNUMX, we already had enough troops there for defense.

              As of June 22.06.1941, 3.2, 5.5 million Red Army fighters are concentrated on the western border of the USSR versus 4.2 million Wehrmacht fighters with satellites, of which 20 million are Wehrmacht, i.e. there is a half-fold numerical superiority of Germans and Poles, with only XNUMX% numerical superiority.
              It is obvious that the Red Army did not have time to concentrate and the Wehrmacht was able to beat the enemy in parts.
              Quote: Seal
              For the ratio of advancing to the defenders equal to 3: 1 has not been canceled.

              This is the opinion of the couch expert, a one to six ratio is necessary IN THE PLACE OF BREAKTHROUGH, and not on the entire front.
              Quote: Seal
              But the Germans would have less chance, since we had the T-34 and KV.

              A special case that does not affect the overall picture.
              Quote: Seal
              But if the "fortresses" moved straight (in a straight line) to the West

              That would be left without supplies - without shells, without fuel, without food - this happens with parts that were surrounded.
              Quote: Seal
              You must have mixed something up. The author discusses 1941, not the 1914th. In 1941, we had huge reserves.

              You underestimate the rate of consumption of fuel shells and other things, just take an interest in how much the warring units need for general development. Logistics is the basis of any war.
              Quote: Seal
              Our new tanks, which the German artillery did not take, would become the very knife that would enter German defense like butter.

              This is a classic fallacy, our tanks were not taken by artillery of the company and battalion level, the Germans calmly pulled more powerful guns and without problems destroyed both T-34s and KV, the same anti-aircraft guns, in addition, there are other ways of fighting tanks.
              The fact that the Germans fought with the KV and T-34 only says that the professionalism of the Wehrmacht soldiers was STRONGLY exaggerated.
              Quote: Seal
              Never a division on the defensive (defending) will be able to attack as effectively as a division deployed in battle formation to attack.

              And how much time does it take for a division deployed in an attacking order to defend itself? Seconds? Minutes? Clock? You are trying to pull the inventor's fabrications by the ears.
              1. +7
                23 October 2016 20: 18
                As of June 22.06.1941, 3.2, 5.5 million fighters of the Red Army are concentrated on the western border of the USSR versus 4.2 million fighters of the Wehrmacht with satellites, of which XNUMX million are Wehrmacht, that is, there is a half-fold numerical superiority of the Germans,

                Oh, you priesthood lights, what passion-mugs. Whole 5.5 million Wehrmacht fighters, and even with some "satellites" say? Oh really ?
                Let's start parsing your crap with "Satellites".
                Well, enlighten us, and what such “satellites” entered our land together with the Wehrmacht on 22.06.1941/22.06.1941/27? Yes, Hitler had enough satellites politically. But who exactly entered the battle against us along with the Germans on 1941/22.06.1941/23.06.1941? Sorry, but history says that, in fact, Romanians alone. Italy declared war on Sunday late in the evening, but Italian troops on our front appeared still oh, if not soon. Hungary declared war on the USSR only on June 24.06.1941, 25.06.1941. Finland a little earlier, but also not on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX. And not even XNUMX. And not on June XNUMX, XNUMX. But only in the afternoon of June XNUMX, XNUMX.
                The total of all your satellites at the time of the Wehrmacht invasion was Romania alone.

                Now about the number. Who can know best of all the number of German troops, if not the Germans themselves, who, as of June 22.06.1941, XNUMX, were in the top general posts in the Wehrmacht?
                We read Halder's Diary.
                In the paragraph of June 20, 1941, Halder indicates the number of troops.
                20 June 1941 year
                General composition of forces Germany (for operation "Barbarossa")
                Infantry divisions + mountain infantry 102*
                Panzer divisions 19
                Motorized divisions 14**
                Cavalry divisions 1
                Special connections 5***
                Total 141 divisional formations
                * Including 4 light infantry and 2 mining divisions.
                ** Including 4 SS divisions.
                *** Including 3 security divisions and 2 divisions of the 15th line.

                Continued below
                1. +4
                  23 October 2016 20: 27
                  A total of 141 divisions. The strength of the German division on the staffing table as of 22.06.1941/17/2, we take the maximum, and even with an appendage - 397 thousand people. How much is it? And it turns out 2,4 million 2,4 thousand people. Well, let 4,2 million. Oh, it turns out that you apparently just rearranged the digital books. Actually XNUMX million, and you have XNUMX million hi

                  And how many Romanians? It turns out that with satellites - 5.5 million, without satellites - 4.2 million. Since at the moment under discussion only one satellite (Romania) entered the war - do you mean that the Romanian army totaled 1,3 million people? Is it not fat for Romanians? negative
                  In fact, all the Romanian armed forces as of June 22, 1941 totaled 703 thousand people. How do Romanians enter the war need to retell? angry

                  My calculation is directly confirmed by Halder in the paragraph of July 2, 1941.
                  July 3, 1941. 12th day of war
                  Losses: From 22.6 to 30.6, our losses amount to a total of 41087 people = 1,64% of the available staff (with the number of troops equal to 2,5 million people). Killed: 524 officers and 8362 non-commissioned officers and privates. Wounded: 966 officers and 28528 non-commissioned officers and privates. Losses of officers in relation to total losses: wounded - 3,3% (campaign in the West - 3,1%), killed - 6,2% (campaign in the West - 4,85%), missing - 1,5 % (campaign in the West - 2%).

                  The total number of troops is directly indicated by Halder - 2,5 million people. Well, this is evident already with the "satellites" - the Romanians and the Finns who have already entered the war.
                  What reserves did Germany have? Maybe your lost 1,8 million “Wehrmacht fighters” is Germany’s Reserve?
                  We read Halder again, having returned a little back, before the war, the paragraph for June 16, 1941.
                  16 June 1941 year
                  Replenishment position. In the reserve army, up to 1.10–450 thousand people. Of these, a normal decrease (diseases, unsuitability, etc.) is 150 thousand people. To make up for combat losses in Operation Barbarossa, 300 thousand remain. To this can be added 70 thousand - from field reserve battalions = 370 thousand ..
                  Total in the army of the Reserve until October 1, 1941 - only 450 thousand people. Moreover, to compensate for combat losses in Operation Barbarossa, 300 thousand remain. To this we can add 70 thousand - from field reserve battalions = 370 thousand ..

                  The rest of your nonsense is simply not interesting, not to disassemble - even read.
                  Especially this
                  And how much time does it take for a division deployed in an attacking order to defend itself? Seconds? Minutes? Clock?
                  fool
                  Damn, have you ever dug a trench in your life? And the division in defense is kilometers of open trenches, with a full profile, hundreds of dugouts, dozens of bunkers and bunkers, and a wire connection between them all. Arranged in positions and disguised artillery, moreover, artillery scouts should set guidelines, and artillery itself, if possible, carry out at least some sort of sighting. And this is just the most basic thing that distinguishes a division on the march or a division that was prepared to attack from a division in defense.
                  1. +1
                    23 October 2016 23: 17
                    Quote: Seal
                    take the maximum

                    You compose the figures I have indicated are a medical fact.
                    Quote: Seal
                    The total number of troops is directly indicated by Halder

                    I’m not interested in the propaganda of the enemy.
                    Quote: Seal
                    Since at the moment under discussion only one satellite entered the war (Romania)

                    I did not say this, stop talking to myself.
                    Quote: Seal
                    that means you believe that the romanian army totaled 1,3 million people

                    The figure is correct, only not one Romanian division was present.
                    Quote: Seal
                    And the division in defense is kilometers of open trenches, with a full profile, hundreds of dugouts, dozens of bunkers and bunkers, and a wire connection between them all. Arranged in positions and disguised artillery, moreover, artillery scouts should set guidelines, and artillery itself, if possible, carry out at least some sort of sighting.

                    All this is done quickly enough; you apparently didn’t dig a trench in your life.
                    Quote: Seal
                    The total number of troops is directly indicated by Halder - 2,5 million people. Well, this is evident already with the "satellites" - the Romanians and the Finns who have already entered the war.

                    The armed forces of fascist Germany before the attack on the Soviet Union totaled 8,5 million. The ground forces (5,2 million people) had 179 infantry and cavalry, 35 motorized and tank divisions and 7 brigades. Of these, 119 infantry and cavalry (66,5%), 33 motorized and tank (94,3%) divisions and two brigades were deployed against the USSR (see table. 157). In addition, 29 divisions and 16 brigades of Germany-Finland allies were put on alert near the borders of the Soviet Union. Hungary and Romania. In total, in the eastern grouping of troops of fascist Germany and its allies, there were 5,5 million people, 47,2 thousand guns and mortars, 4,3 thousand tanks and about 5 thousand combat aircraft. The Wehrmacht was also armed with captured tanks of Czechoslovakia and France.
                    1. +3
                      24 October 2016 09: 08
                      Hmm request Hard case. sad Comrade is clearly not adequate. stop
                      He does not cite his sources of "knowledge", so to speak.
                      The internationally recognized and uncontested document "Halder's Diaries" he rejects right from the start.
                      About the time of entry into the war of Hungary, Finland, he generally knows nothing and does not want to hear. Perhaps he was banned in Google, but there is Yandex, Rambler, Satellite at last. He does not know anything about the fact that in order to drag Hungary into the war, the Germans had to carry out a provocation - to bomb on June 26, 1941 with planes raised from one of the Romanian airfields, then the Hungarian (now Slovak) town of Kosice.
                      About how much time is needed for a grouping of several armies, concentrated for an offensive, to be put on the defensive - he has no idea at all. A single dispersal will take at least a week.
                      And the funny thing is that he doesn’t even read what he himself places. So he posted
                      Of these, 119 infantry and cavalry (66,5%), 33 motorized and tank (94,3%) divisions and two brigades were deployed against the USSR (see Table 157).

                      Okay, so be it. We count. 119 infantry and cavalry divisions + 33
                      motorized and tank divisions + 2 brigades (we take these two brigades for 2 divisions, although the number of brigades, of course, is smaller than the division) = 154 divisions. Take the maximum staffing level and even with an excess of the German division in 17 thousand people. We multiply 154 divisions x 17 thousand people = 2 million 618 thousand people. That is, returning to the normal staffing of the German infantry division of 16859 people, the German tank division - 16 952 people, the motorized - 14 029 people, the mountain - 14 000 people, and the light - 11 000 people, and considering the brigades as brigades, not of the division, we are exactly going to the figure given by Halder of 2,5 million people. With which I congratulate my near, but arrogant and self-confident opponent hi
                      Data checked - re-checked repeatedly.
                      Müller-Gillebrandt, in his book "German Army in 1933-1945" gives the following figures for forces in the East:

                      1. In army groups (ie, "North", "Center" "South" - approx. Auth) - 120,16 divisions - 76 infantry, 13,16 motorized, 17 tank, 9 guard, 1 cavalry, 4 light , 1 mountain rifle division - the “tail” in the 0,16 division arose due to the presence of compounds not reduced to the division.

                      2. At the disposal of the OKH behind the front of army groups — 14 divisions. (12 infantry, 1 mountain rifle and 1 police)

                      3. In the reserve of the Civil Code - 14 divisions. (11 infantry, 1 motorized and 2 tank)

                      4. In Finland - 3 divisions (2 mountain rifle, 1 motorized, 1 more infantry arrived at the end of June, but we will not consider it)

                      And in all - 152,16 divisions, out of 208 divisions formed by the Wehrmacht. These include 99 infantry, 15,16 motorized, 19 tank, 4 light, 4 mountain rifle, 9 security, 1 police and 1 cavalry divisions, including SS divisions.
                      Let’s try to figure out the discrepancies between the data from Halder and Muller-Gillebrandt. Obviously, Halder does not include the Finnish group (3 divisions), 6 security divisions and 1 SS police division as part of the forces. In addition, if we recalculate the compounds indicated by Halder, for some reason 142 divisions are obtained. Given that Finland (respectively, German divisions on its territory) entered the war on June 25, 1941, and the presence of 9 security and 1 police divisions on the eastern front is confirmed by numerous historians, we have to admit that the Mueller-Gillebrandt estimate is still more accurate.
                      Total according to the data of Muller-Gillebrandt In the army groups (ie, "North", "Center" "South" - approx. Aut) - 120,16 divisions. Including 76 infantry, 13,16 motorized, 17 tank, 9 security, 1 cavalry, 4 light, 1 mountain rifle divisions - the “tail” in 0,16 divisions arose due to the presence of formations not kept in the division.
                      And this is less than 2 million people.
                      But what with the fact that "At the disposal of OKH behind the front of army groups - 14 divisions. (12 infantry, 1 mountain rifle and 1 police)", that is, approximately another 220 thousand people are already close to Halder's figures of 2,5 million people.

                      It seems that my next opponent has the main agrument
                      "this is a medical fact"
                      in itself, the object of interest is more likely to medicine than the interests of participants in the discussion of military history recourse
                  2. +1
                    24 October 2016 18: 42
                    The Germans are famous liars, your idol Halder did not count the Air Force 1200000 people, did not count the fleet and SS divisions, all your speculations are based on the testimony of a liar - the same false.
                    1. +4
                      26 October 2016 08: 41
                      I said a hard case. fool
                      Following his logic that all sources of information are "idols" of those who bring them, Zhukov's conversation with Stalin on 21.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX was as follows: "Comrade Stalin. Today he went over to our side my idol, the German sergeant-major said that the war would begin tomorrow ". hi
                      Well, it goes without saying that our intelligence agencies used the information of their "idols" throughout the war, for whom they sent hundreds of thousands of our scouts of various levels across the front line laughing

                      About Halder. And, that, all the German Air Force, too, 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, too crossed our border? Let me remind you that German planes flew over our border and returned back. Well, those who were not shot down over our territory. And at least the first 10 days of the war, the German Air Force operated exclusively from its territory. Now let's take it. Almost all Germans fighters were controlled by 1 person. The German bombers have yes, there are 4, or even 5 crew members. In total, if 22.06.1941 thousand German fighters and 1 thousand German bombers flew over our border on 2/10/XNUMX, this in total will not reach XNUMX thousand people - crew members.
                      Is there a difference between the actual number of Germans in our sky of 10 thousand people and yours - in 1 million two hundred thousand people? How many times have you lied?
                      Well, and besides, we also did not consider our own air forces of the Red Army, who waged war with the Germans in the air hi
                      The German navy is even more interesting. Well, tell us how about the actions of the German "pocket" battleships or submarines in the swamps of Belarus and the steppes of Ukraine in the first days of the war?
                      At the time of the invasion, the Germans did not have a fleet in the Black Sea. In the Baltic, the German fleet also did not show itself in any way. He didn’t conduct naval battles with our fleet; he didn’t land landings anywhere.
                      And again, our Navy, which you do not take into account, was much more numerous than the German in terms of crew numbers. Plus we had coastal parts of our fleet. And also our Navy had its own aviation, not counted as the Red Army Air Force.

                      So, Mr. KARTos, who accuses others of lying - maybe you should just confess and start fire-fighting in relation to your own hat? hi
                      1. 0
                        26 October 2016 20: 03
                        Dear, I do not want to offend you, but I have to ask this question, you dupe? You will seriously argue that the German Air Force did not fight against the USSR? There were 1,6 million people in the German Air Force, 1,2 million were those who fought against the USSR. For your information, the Air Force is not only pilots, it is also airfield services, a system of observers, and airborne troops.
                        You counted the USSR Air Force completely, until the last cleaner.
                  3. +1
                    30 December 2016 00: 22
                    Do you accept the assertions of beaten German generals at face value? Well then, you are a very naive person, there is a lot of evidence that they in every possible way underestimated their losses, for example. according to Müller-Hillebrand, the total losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to a little more than 4 million people, whereas in reality, according to the latest studies carried out by German researchers, they amounted to about 7 million, and such facts, incriminating the lies of battered warriors, can be found abundant if desired.
                2. +2
                  24 October 2016 15: 55
                  Such stupidity can be answered with stupidity, in the border military districts there were 170 divisions and brigades, the average number of formations was 8000, we multiply 170 by 8000 and we get 1360000 people, who were superior and what? Can Halder forget to calculate something? How am I in my example?
                  1. +4
                    28 October 2016 08: 30
                    The average actual number of infantry divisions of the Red Army is approximately 12 people, tank or motorized - 215 each.
                    Plus, only on the border with Germany 40 thousand of our border guards. And these are at least well-trained fighters. After all, only in the films show that the yellow-horned recruits are sent to the border.
                    And further. Mr. KARTOS suggested that the Germans consider, for example, the protection of airfields. But German airfields were abroad, in Poland, Germany. But a significant part of our airfields was at the border. Consequently, the protection of those of our border airfields is quite worthy in order to include it in the calculation of troops that could resist the invading German group.
                    The partition of Poland has ended. The USSR regained Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, restoring borders within the borders of the Russian Empire. The air units of the Red Army Air Force located at Polish airfields were in terrifying proximity to it. From the border to the airfield in Pruzhany it was only 14 km, to the Malye Zavody airfield only 20 km, to the Tarnava (Tarnovo) airfield –12 km, to the Vysoké Mazowiecki airfield - 16 km ... In addition, Soviet aircraft were more numerous than Polish and to each airfield I had to plant two or three aircraft parts.

                    The Air Force GU and the General Staff of the Red Army certainly understood that it was impossible to keep aviation so crowded and so close to the border with Germany, but they could not do anything. An airfield, even a field, is a complex engineering structure that requires a lot of money, equipment, people and time to create. Neither one nor the other in the right amount was available. The country fought with Finland.

                    And further. And why does everyone forget about the ratio of the total number of the military unit and its military core? How many of the total number of the German division of 17 thousand people were its military core? That is, units directly leading the battle? God grant that half. The Germans are the advancing side. The military units of the Wehrmacht crossed our border. The rear units for several days were in Poland and Germany. But the Red Army - attacked, defending side. Here it is already possible to repel the attack and it is necessary to put everyone in the ranks - and the protection of headquarters, and clerks, and cooks and shoemakers and grooms, and so on.
                    1. +1
                      5 November 2016 05: 54
                      Personnel Rifle Division for 8900 people. in the state of peacetime from 14.08.1939/XNUMX/XNUMX at least. inappropriately equating them with wartime divisions. or let's talk about tank troops
                      By May 1940, 4 motorized divisions were created (258 tanks each), separate tank and armored brigades.
                      July 9, 1940 NPO of the USSR approved a plan for the restoration of mechanized buildings. On October 4, NPO reported on the completion of the formation of 8 mechanized corps, 18 tank and 8 mechanized divisions. By December 1, 1940, there were 9 mechanized corps in the Red Army (18 tank and 9 motorized divisions, as well as 2 separate tank divisions) and 45 tank brigades (40 T-26 and 5 brigade brigades) [7]. In February - March 1941, the formation of another 20 mechanized corps began. moreover, all these troops were formed in the states of peacetime !!!!!! without the necessary means of transportation even.
                  2. +3
                    28 October 2016 09: 04
                    The difference between the combat nuclei of the Soviet and German units is visible even at the level of companies.
                    German infantry company (Schuetzenkompanie).

                    The total number of German infantry companies is 191 people (179 people in the Soviet rifle company).
                    Four messengers up to and including the Gefreiter.
                    One of them at the same time I am a bugler, the other a signal light.
                    Armed with carbines.

                    Two cyclists in a rank from to Gefreiter inclusive.
                    Armed with carbines. They move on bicycles.

                    Two coachmen in the rank up to and including Gefreiter. They drive a heavy horse-drawn cart into which four horses are harnessed.
                    Armed with carbines.

                    The groom for an officer horse in a rank to a gefreyter (Gefreiter) inclusive. Armed with a carbine. For movement is equipped with a bicycle.

                    Thus, the total number of combat units of the control unit was not 12, but 9 people. With the company commander - 10 people.

                    The basis of the combat unit of an infantry company was an infantry platoon.
                    There were 3 of them, just like in the Soviet rifle company.

                    The total number of soldiers of infantry platoons was 49x3 = 147 people.
                    Given the number of combat units of the control department, including the company commander (10 people), we get 157 people.

                    Infantry platoons at the company level received reinforcement in the form of an anti-tank compartment (Panzerabwehrbuchsentrupp).

                    There are 7 people in the department. Of these, 1 non-commissioned officer and 6 soldiers.
                    Group weapons are three anti-tank rifles Pz.B.39.
                    Commander of the department in rank from Obergheyfeiter to Unterfeldwebel. Armed with a carbine.

                    Three calculations of the rifle.
                    Each calculation consisted of a PR shooter in ranks up to and including Gefreiter (personal armament is a gun) and his assistant in ranks up to and including Gefreiter. Armed with a carbine.

                    Total number calculated is 4 people.
                    The number of branches - 7 people (3x2 +1 division commander)
                    The armament of the anti-tank compartment was:
                    Pz.B.39 anti-tank rifle - 3 pcs.
                    Mauser 98k magazine rifle - 4 pcs.
                    8-round pistol - 3 pcs.

                    Total in the German infantry company, the combat personnel is 157 + 7 = 164 people out of 191 people registered in the company.

                    27 people are rear guards.

                    Means of transport:
                    1. Riding horse - 1 pc.
                    2. Bicycle - 3 pcs.
                    3 horse-drawn heavy wagon - 4 pc.
                    Only 4 horses per company.
                    1. +1
                      28 October 2016 09: 05
                      Soviet rifle company
                      The rifle company was the next largest tactical unit after the platoon and was part of the rifle battalion.

                      The rifle company was commanded by the company commander (company) with the rank of captain.
                      The company relied on a riding horse.
                      Because on the march of the company he had to control the movement of the company, which stretched during the march, and if necessary, the horse could be used to communicate with other companies or the command of the battalion.
                      Armed with a TT pistol.

                      The assistant company commander was a company political officer.
                      He conducted political and educational work in company divisions and kept in touch with the political department of the battalion and regiment.
                      Armed with a TT pistol.

                      But the company’s foreman was the actual assistant to the company commander.
                      He was in charge of a rather poor, it must be said bluntly, company economy, he dealt with the issues of providing the company divisions with everything necessary, getting it all necessary in the battalion, which included the rifle company.
                      For these purposes, there was one horse in the company with a cart, which was driven by a sled in the rank of ordinary, armed with a rifle like the foreman.

                      His own clerk was in the company. He was also armed with a rifle.

                      There was one messenger in the company with the rank of private. But despite the rank and file, he was perhaps the left hand of the company commander. He was entrusted with responsible tasks, he was always near the battalion commander, he knew all the platoon and squad commanders, etc. And he was known not only in the company divisions, but also in the battalion.
                      He was also armed with a rifle.

                      The basis of the rifle company was rifle platoons.
                      There were 3 such platoons in the rifle company.
                      At the company level, rifle platoons gained reinforcement primarily in the form of a machine-gun platoon.

                      Machine-gun platoon.
                      The machine-gun platoon was led by the commander of the machine-gun platoon with the rank of lieutenant.
                      Armament - TT pistol.

                      The machine-gun platoon consisted of two calculations of the Maxim machine gun.
                      Each calculation was commanded by a sergeant.
                      Armament - TT pistol
                      The calculation consisted of a calculation commander and four privates (gunner, assistant gunner, ammunition carrier and mount) armed with rifles.
                      According to the state, each calculation relied on a horse and a cart for transporting a machine gun (cart). The calculation was armed with rifles.

                      The number of machine gun crew was 6 fighters.
                      The number of machine-gun platoon was (6x2 + platoon commander) = 13 fighters.
                      In service with a machine-gun platoon:
                      Machine gun "Maxim" - 2 pcs.
                      Self-loading rifle SVT 38/40 - (4x2) = 8 pcs.
                      TT pistol - 3 pcs.

                      The main purpose of the Maxim machine gun was to suppress enemy firing points and support infantry.
                      High rate of fire (combat 600 rounds per minute) and high precision machine gun fire made it possible to carry out this task from a distance of 100 to 1000 m to their troops.
                      All fighters of machine-gun crew equally possessed machine-gun shooting skills and, if necessary, could change the crew commander, gunner, etc.
                      With each machine gun, a combat set of cartridges was busy, 12 boxes with machine-gun belts (tape - 250 rounds), two spare barrels, one box with spare parts, one box with accessories, three cans for water and grease, an optical machine gun sight.
                      The machine gun had an armor shield that protects against fragments, light bullets, etc.
                      The thickness of the shield is 6 mm.

                      German machine gunners have no protection except a helmet.
                      The company also included a sanitary department.
                      The unit was commanded by the unit commander sergeant-medical officer.
                      In his submission were 4 orderlies.
                      The department has 1 gun.
                      Well, it’s practically one orderly per platoon.
                      In rifle platoons, unlike German infantry platoons, the state orderly was not supposed to be in the ranks.
                      But as we can see, the platoon did not remain without an orderly.
                      Total: 5 people. Armed with one gun.

                      Total number of companies:
                      Company Commander - 1 pers.
                      Company Political Officer - 1 pers.
                      The foreman of the company - 1 person.
                      Messenger - 1 person
                      The clerk - 1 person.
                      Driving - 1 person
                      Shooting platoons - 51x3 = 153 people
                      Machine gun platoon - 13 people
                      Sniper - 2 people
                      Sanitary department - 5 people.
                      Total: 179 people.

                      In service with the company:
                      Easel machine gun "Maxim" - 2 pcs.
                      Machine gun PD Degtyarev - 12 pcs. (4 pieces each in each rifle platoon)
                      Lightweight 50 mm mortar - 3 pcs. (1 pc each in each rifle platoon)
                      PPD submachine gun - 27 pcs. (9 pieces in each platoon)
                      Rifle SVT-38, SVT-40 - 152 pcs. (36 pcs. in each platoon + 8x4 = 32 + 8 pcs. in a machine-gun platoon + 4 for the rest)
                      Mosin sniper rifle with a PU sight - 2 pcs.
                      TT pistols - 22 pcs. (6 pieces in each platoon + 1 in a machine-gun platoon + 1 in the sanitary department + 2 in a company and a political officer)

                      Means of transport:
                      Riding horse - 1 pc.
                      Horse with a cart - 3 pcs.
                      Only 4 horses
                      1. +1
                        28 October 2016 09: 06
                        In service with the German infantry company / in comparison with the Soviet rifle company:

                        1. Machine gun - 12/12
                        2. Easel machine gun - 0/2
                        3. Submachine gun - 16/27
                        4. Magazine rifle - 132/0
                        5. Self-loading rifle - 0/152
                        6. Sniper rifle - 0/2
                        7. Mortar 50 mm - 3/3
                        8. Anti-tank rifle - 3/0
                        9. Pistol - 47/22

                        From this we can conclude that the Soviet rifle company at the company level significantly surpassed the German infantry company in terms of firepower and armament.

                        Conclusions by numbers.
                        The total number of German infantry companies is 191 people. (Soviet rifle company - 179 people)
                        However, the combat unit of the infantry company was only 164 people. The rest belonged to the rear services of the company.

                        Thus, the Soviet rifle company outnumbered the German infantry company by 15 people (179-164).
                        At the battalion level, this excess was 15x3 = 45 people.
                        At the regimental level 45x3 = 135 people
                        On a divisional 135x3 = 405 people.
                        405 men are almost 2,5 companies, that is, almost an infantry battalion.


                        The advantage in vehicles, carts and draft power at the company level in the German infantry company was associated with the work of the rear services of the German company.
                        The warhead of the company was moved on foot in the same way as the Soviet rifle company.

                        Vehicles of the warhead of the Soviet rifle company:
                        1. Horse riding - 1 pc.
                        2. Horse with a cart - 3 pcs.
                        Only 4 horses per rifle company

                        Vehicles of the warhead of a German infantry company:
                        1. Riding horse - 1 pc.
                        2. Bicycle - 3 pcs.
                        3 horse-drawn heavy wagon - 4 pc.
                        Only 4 horses per infantry company.

                        On the march, the German infantry company moved exclusively on foot, as did the soldiers of the Soviet rifle company.
      2. +1
        2 February 2018 21: 30
        Perhaps the Red Army did not even have a chance, but the chances of victory in border battles and the defeat of the Wehrmacht, but the chances of at least reducing losses in personnel and equipment were quite if it weren’t for such wild miscalculations and mistakes of the command of the districts, mistakes. which, as they say. sometimes worse crimes.
      3. -1
        11 September 2018 05: 42
        In the mountains of the Chechen Republic, armed with small arms and RPGs, Dudaev’s militants, deprived of supplies and ammunition (almost), confronted the Russian army for almost a year and a half. What prevented Soviet troops in the western regions of Ukraine from fighting surrounded by the Wehrmacht, having warehouses, trained military personnel and support from the population?
  6. +7
    23 June 2014 17: 16
    I also recently discovered this site from this particular article, not a bad analysis from Pokrovsky, thanks. But the more I delve into his analytics, the more questions, it turns out that the wrong ones were shot in the dungeons of the NKVD, or there were, so to speak, agents in the army from outside and substituted the bodies of loyal military leaders. Or the conspiracy of the NKVD and there was a direct installation to identify loyal and talented commanders and military leaders and replace them with "their" sent Cossacks. The fact that the betrayal and conspiracy was understandable, only where the "legs" grow. One way or another, the damage to the commanding staff of the Red Army was irreparable, which led to catastrophic consequences in the initial period of the war. I am inclined to believe that there were traitors in the highest echelons of the command staff, because a German resident was in the General Staff in Moscow. This fact was recognized by the Germans and confirmed in our time, but they did not announce it, citing the fact that his descendants still live in Russia and they do not want to complicate their life. It would not be, but this is the biggest failure of our counter-intelligence and security agencies. The agent was deeply conscientious, enjoyed great respect and trust among the Abwehr. They even planned to appoint him the Gauleiter of Moscow and make him the first person in the new government of conquered Russia.
    1. 0
      14 October 2016 18: 30
      Quote: cat hippo
      This fact was recognized by the Germans and confirmed in our time,

      Yeah, that's cool. Merkel herself admitted? Before the imposition of sanctions? Well, these won't lie.
  7. andronis74
    0
    19 September 2014 23: 20
    always have been, are and will be
    1. +1
      2 February 2018 21: 32
      To this traitors and traitors, so that the relevant authorities do not doze off.
  8. +3
    18 January 2016 18: 06
    Question to the author - what are you writing about? Go to the library, real with books on paper. A set of contextual phrases, sentences and phrases from electronic sources of information is not an analysis. Your conclusion must be an epigraph to the article. What are you calling for ???
    1. +1
      9 October 2016 17: 41
      Some strange Vlasov traitor. First he betrayed, then he fought in such a way that his portrait in Pravda was placed next to the portrait of Rokossovsky, they started writing a book about him ... then he betrayed again. Such a sinusoidal traitor. Up, down, up, down ... and no one noticed this, including the author-analyst himself.
      1. +2
        24 October 2016 21: 28
        Not in relation to Vlasov, whether he really is a traitor or not (here we need to understand more deeply), with regard to your doubts, we can say that one does not contradict the other. If we assume that Vlasov was originally a traitor, then there is logic in how he fought. At the very beginning of the war - a traitor. But since the blitzkrieg began to drag on, it is not surprising that perhaps Vlasov was tasked with rising as high as possible in the hierarchy of Soviet commanders. For this, the Germans "created conditions for him." It is not surprising that, under these conditions, the Germans did not attack Kiev in the best way in the defense area of ​​their 37th army. Moreover, the Germans took Kiev in such a way that, in fact, Stalin, who followed the battle, had no complaints about Vlasov. The Germans allowed Vlasov to get out of the encirclement, although Tymoshenko and Kirponos "forgot" to convey the order to withdraw to the 37th Army.

        But, all this, I repeat, does not mean that Vlasov is necessarily a traitor. Traitors at the time the war began and at that time (the defense of Kiev) were rather Tymoshenko, Kirponos, Baghramyan.
  9. +4
    9 October 2016 17: 44
    And I would like links, especially to the MO archive in Podolsk ... And without them, how?
    1. +6
      13 October 2016 09: 51
      Links?
      And what will the links give you?
      For example, you look for Tukhachevsky, his recognition, then compare with what happened and observe almost complete compliance with what he described in his Plan of defeat, on 160 sheets in small handwriting and what happened at the beginning of the war.
      Then look at the Military Historical Journalist, for 1989, if I’m not mistaken, and there ... there is little evidence from the generals and senior officers about what is happening?
      Or you, the writings of rezun, corned beef, volkogonov, as a source of "truth"?
  10. 0
    12 October 2016 13: 33
    -Something strange .. -What did these "commanders-traitors" of the Red Army expect then ..? - That they "after the victory" suddenly become Germans ..? -Because the WWII Germans "invented and founded" precisely on the theory of "Aryan superiority" ... and the enslavement of all other nations ... -Well, if the Germans won ... and ... and .... these traitors would would have remained pitiful henchmen and would have been running errands all their lives ... and their children ... would also have "continued" the pitiful fate of their "traitorous ancestors" ...
  11. +9
    12 October 2016 17: 16
    Thank you for the article. Analysts read a lot about the reasons for the defeats of the spacecraft in 1941. Nobody seriously considered the topic of betrayal, but apparently in vain. In general, by default, it is believed that all repressions were unfair and there were no reasons for such measures. And then the time was turning point and people in their heads could rumble such "chariots" that we could not understand. Thanks again for the info. I'll put another puzzle in the picture of the first days of the war.
  12. +1
    13 October 2016 09: 11
    "Icebreaker" Suvorov, or rather its continuation am An attempt to mediocrity, cowardice, inconsistency, sloppiness of the military of different levels and ranks pass off as conspiracy and betrayal? But to be honest that part of the leadership of the Red Army were simply not smart people? Stalin's personnel policy, repression is the reason for the defeats of 1941.
    1. +4
      13 October 2016 09: 15
      Quote: fif21
      Stalin's personnel policy, repression is the reason for the defeats of 1941.

      Right?
      Would you please deign to present the lists of "generals" who, in your opinion, are undoubtedly the most competent and skillful in military affairs.
    2. +5
      14 October 2016 18: 39
      Quote: fif21
      Stalin's personnel policy, repression is the reason for the defeats of 1941.

      Of course, the Germans confirmed this! And, most importantly - the Americans approved !! Stalin - a bloody tyrant - all 27 million in person! And the Germans are white and snowy white. Never got dirty during the whole war, going around puddles of blood spilled by Stalin!
    3. +2
      30 December 2016 00: 35
      And which of the "outstanding" commanders did Stalin repress as a result of which, in your opinion, the catastrophe of 41 years happened? Maybe Tukhachevsky, who shamefully surrendered his army near Warsaw in 20, or Blucher, who showed complete helplessness in the Far East?
  13. 0
    13 October 2016 09: 38
    Quote: Vovanchyk
    Wonderful analytics ... !!!

    Are you serious? lol The defeat of the Red Army in 1941 was laid back in 1936. Remember KShU conducted by the General Staff of the USSR Zhukov and Pavlov (Zhukov for the blue). The author is trying to prove that the cause of the defeat in 1941 is a conspiracy and betrayal! So did Stalin and Beria! Many still cannot recognize that Stalin and his entourage are to blame. So they are trying to make at least someone guilty, but not the ruling elite. laughing
    1. +6
      13 October 2016 10: 11
      Well, of course, of course ... do you draw your knowledge from feature films?
      In this case, explain how, why, in Pavlovo’s okrug, not a single type of measure was carried out that was in the Directive of June 18 and was carried out in the Military District, in the KOVO, and the OdVO?
      Why were orders coming from the ZAPOVO command that went not only at odds with the requirements of the situation but also directly preparing for defeat?
      The reasons for the defeat of the USSR in the summer and autumn of 1941.

      Strategic military factors.

      1. The invading army outnumbered the troops of the border districts.
      2. The invading armies exceeded the troops of the border districts in motorization.
      3. The invading armies were superior to the troops of the border districts in matters of military logistics.
      4. The invading armies were superior to the troops of the border districts in matters of organizing communications and protecting them.
      5. The invading armies surpassed the troops of the border districts in matters of the general organization of command and control.
      6. Vermhat tank groups were a more effective means of warfare than the Soviet mechanized corps, despite the fact that the number of tanks in the Soviet Union in the border districts surpassed Germany and its satellites by 2-2,5 times.
      http://pikabu.ru/story/kompleks_prichin_porazheni
      y_v_1941_godu_832188
      It’s not worth singing a song about the mass of tanks in the USSR, an empty lesson for people who absolutely do not understand military affairs.
      1. +1
        13 October 2016 20: 31
        I would like to add that the Third Reich with satellites surpassed the USSR in population by one and a half times, and in industrial potential by three times. This is information for thought for those who believe that the USSR allegedly filled the enemy with meat, the USSR did not have "meat" for this.
        And the words "Women are still giving birth" was said by an American general during the Civil War in the United States, Zhukov never said that.
        1. -1
          25 July 2017 15: 24
          Yes, Allen Dulles is to blame. The son of Mickey Mouse and Cleopatra.
      2. +2
        24 October 2016 22: 08
        In this case, explain how, why, in Pavlovo’s okrug, not a single type of measure was carried out that was in the Directive of June 18 and was carried out in the Military District, in the KOVO, and the OdVO?

        Why do you think that everything was done in KOVO? KOVO was just lucky that the Germans delivered the main blow to the north, against the ZOVO. In fact, everything in KOVO was prepared for the "successful invasion of the Germans" at least no worse than in ZOVO.
        We are reading the memoirs of Baghramyan.
        On the same morning (June 19, 1941 - my footnote, read the memoirs themselves), a telegram from G.K. Zhukov arrived from Moscow that the People's Commissar of Defense had ordered the creation of a front-line administration and by June 22, transfer it to Tarnopol. It was ordered to keep this "in the strictest secrecy, about which to warn the personnel of the district headquarters." We already had everything thought out in advance. According to our calculations, it was not only difficult, but also too noticeable to transport the entire front-line command by road. Therefore, it was decided to use the railway as well. The commander of the district ordered the train echelon to be sent from Kiev on the evening of June 20, and the main headquarters convoy - in the morning of the next day.
        “What about the troops?” I asked the chief of staff.
        - So far, an order has been received only regarding the district administrative apparatus. And you need to, without wasting time, prepare all the documentation on the district’s operational plan, including the state border cover plan, and send it by train to the General Staff no later than June XNUMX by train. After that, together with your department, you will follow us in motor vehicles so that you can be at the place in Tarnopol no later than seven in the morning of June twenty-second.
        Naturally, I expressed surprise that the command leaves for the command post without an operations department: after all, if something happens, it will not be able to command troops without at hand either officer operators or secret communication specialists. But the proposal to leave two or three commanders with me, and the others, headed by my deputy, to be sent simultaneously with the Military Council, was not approved by Purkaev. This is not necessary, he explained: by the morning of June 22 the operations department will already be in Tarnopol, and before that it is unlikely to be needed.
        “So everything is going according to plan,” the general impatiently waved his hand, making it clear that there was nothing to waste time talking.
        On the evening of June 20, we saw off those leaving by train, and in the middle of the next day, those leaving by car. "

        That is, as early as June 19, 1941, the western military districts received an order to create front-line directorates. But KOVO carried out this order through the stump-deck. So, as of the beginning of the war, neither the remnants of the Headquarters of the Kiev OVO, nor the part of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front that had already moved to Tarnopol, were able to transmit to the troops the order to open the "red packages". Since comrade Baghramyan with the operational and encryption departments from Kiev has already left, and they have not yet reached Tarnopol. And when the then (at the time of the beginning of the war) Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front Purkaev tried to force the commanders of the armies and corps of the South-Western Front to take orders to start the war by phone, then most of the commanders gently but insistently recommended that he send them a code in the prescribed manner.
      3. +1
        24 October 2016 23: 14
        1. The invading army outnumbered the troops of the border districts.

        Excelled. But absolutely uncritical. Just a little bit.
        According to Müller-Gillebrandt, in army groups (that is, "North", "Center" "South" - approx. Author) - 120,16 divisions. Including 76 infantry, 13,16 motorized, 17 tank, 9 security, 1 cavalry, 4 light, 1 mountain rifle divisions - the “tail” in 0,16 divisions arose due to the presence of formations not kept in the division.
        And this is less than 2 million people. More precisely - 1 954 100 people l / s. They were opposed by 1 people. fighters and commanders of the Red Army. Yes, we can say that 841 212 1 is also:
        The first echelon - (0-50 km from the border) - 53 rifle, 3 cavalry divisions and 2 brigades - about 684, 4 thousand people.
        The second echelon - (50-100 km from the state border) - 13 rifle, 3 cavalry, 24 tank and 12 motorized divisions - about 491,8 thousand people.
        The third echelon - located at a distance of 100 to 400 km or more from the state border - 37 rifle, 1 cavalry, 16 tank, 8 motorized divisions - about 665 thousand people.
        But firstly, the second echelon was practically next to the first. At arm's length.
        And secondly, the Germans far from immediately crossed the border with the whole mass. That is, we believe that there was bash on bash.
        2. The invading armies exceeded the troops of the border districts in motorization.

        Also not a fact. Analysis after, I want to sleep.
        3. The invading armies were superior to the troops of the border districts in matters of military logistics.

        Why? We were on our territory. We have our own railway track. Then 1524 mm. The Poles and Germans - 1435 mm. From the first kilometer of the border, the Germans had to either alter our broad gauge to their own, or use the rolling stock we had captured. But in the early days of the war, the Germans did not yet have the rolling stock captured from us. At least in sufficient quantities. Another thing is that the Germans were able to organize everything quite clearly in the conditions of worse logistics. Yes, by the way, and not everyone was able to organize. The Germans were lucky in that we left a lot of things to the Germans in our warehouses. Betrayal?
        4. The invading armies were superior to the troops of the border districts in matters of organizing communications and protecting them.

        Well here yes. It is in the organization of communication and its protection. We also had a connection. But the ability to use it - alas, was not.
        5. The invading armies surpassed the troops of the border districts in matters of the general organization of command and control.

        But this, alas, of course. And they excelled in skill and knew how to effectively use communication. And alas, with the help. The Germans were much more effective in helping their own. It often happened in our country that even seeing that a battle was raging somewhere nearby, our unit remained in the position occupied "by order". Accordingly, the Germans beat the neighbor of this unit without hindrance, and then proceeded to beat this our military unit as well.
        6. Vermhat tank groups were a more effective means of warfare than the Soviet mechanized corps, despite the fact that the number of tanks in the Soviet Union in the border districts surpassed Germany and its satellites by 2-2,5 times.

        Again these "satellites".
        The 17 German tank divisions were armed with 3266 tanks (and if we subtract from the total number of 146 unarmed "command tanks" and 152 combat training tankettes Pz-I with machine-gun armament, then the Germans do not have even three thousand tanks). Already in the first 2 weeks of the war, this was opposed by 20 Soviet mechanized corps, which had 12379 tanks before the start of hostilities.
        The Germans had 11 more divisions and 7 batteries of self-propelled "assault guns", which adds another 246 vehicles to the German armored weapons
        However, we had two mechanized corps forming in the Western OVO, 17 MK and 20 MK, which were armed with 63 and 94 tanks, respectively. There were tank regiments of cavalry divisions. There were fifteen hundred light amphibious tanks in the reconnaissance units of rifle divisions and corps. In general, the composition of the tank fleet of the Red Army on June 1, 1941 was expressed by the figure of 19540 tanks (and this is not counting 2,4 thousand obsolete T-27 tankettes, not counting 3,6 thousand light amphibious T-37 / T-38 / T-40). In addition, the Red Army was armed with 3258 cannon armored vehicles, in terms of their armament (45-mm cannon in a tank turret) exceeding two-thirds of what the Wehrmacht called with the loud word "tank".
        But it is precisely that our mechanized corps turned out to be completely unbearable. Yes, still silly used.
        Yes and still important. The quality of training troops. In the composition of 1,8 million people. of the first strategic echelon of the Red Army, there were 802 thousand new recruits who were called up and got into units in May-June 1941. These soldiers can in no way be considered equal to the Wehrmacht soldiers - the period of their stay in units is from 0 to 7 weeks. Their German counterparts at that time were trained in the reserve army. Those. these 802 thousand people in terms of training, they corresponded approximately to the German army of the reserve, which was not listed in the active forces of Germany at all. In addition, many were called up from the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus that recently joined the USSR.
        I do not think there is a betrayal. Just in time trouble, organizing the transfer of recruits from the central regions of the USSR, and even more so from Siberia and the Far East, was irrational.
        If we struck first, or if we had successfully repelled the first blow - these "recruits" would have nowhere to go - we would have gone on the offensive, like cute ones. But in the conditions of our first military failures, these 802 thousand, of which probably half were "Westerners", turned out to be a huge problem.
        They created panic. And if a unit consisted of new recruits, and even more so "Westerners" to a large extent, this unit very often exposed its sector of the front. Correct "Soviet" recruits gave up or surrendered in fright. And the Westerners, in whose ranks there were apparently agents, at best, they simply abandoned the front. At worst, they went over to the Germans. Moreover, taking or shooting commanders. And the Germans successfully used these holes in our defenses that appeared here and there.
    2. 0
      5 November 2016 05: 36
      Many still cannot recognize that Stalin and his entourage are to blame. All is correct. Can not. why should it. no country at that moment could resist the new tactics without deployment and preparation. Why not start saying that the Frances and the Britons pissed off the armed forces because of the betrayals of their generals ,,,,,, They say give the man power and immediately see what he is. Because of such as this so-called historian ********** and we had 37 years.
  14. 0
    13 October 2016 09: 53
    Quote: The Bloodthirster
    Stalin's personnel policy, repression, is the reason for the defeats of 1941. Exactly?
    Yes sir! soldier Blame the leaders on the performers of the old Russian fun! Yes
    1. +2
      13 October 2016 10: 11
      This is not Russian amusement, this amusement has certain features and extremely non-Russian physiognomy.
  15. 0
    13 October 2016 10: 49
    [quote = ratfly] Thanks for the article. Analysts read a lot about the causes of spacecraft defeats in 1941. No one seriously considered the topic of betrayal, but apparently in vain. List of generals of the Red Army who joined the Germans:
    Vlasov AA, Zhilenkov GN .Malyshkin VF, Richter (Rudaev) B.S., TrukhinFI.
    At the service of the Germans was 1.4mil citizens of the USSR
    But a lot of Wehrmacht generals Pauls also went to the service of the USSR ..... hi
    1. 0
      13 October 2016 20: 34
      These millions of "Russian" traitors were recruited in the western regions of the USSR, annexed before the war.
  16. 0
    13 October 2016 10: 53
    Quote: The Bloodthirster
    This is not Russian amusement, this amusement has certain features and extremely non-Russian physiognomy.

    Russian Yes - Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ryazan ....
  17. +3
    14 October 2016 08: 10
    Quote: Vovanchyk
    Wonderful analytics ... !!!

    Do not tell my slippers! And this "analyst" first needs to look at simple topographic maps, then the deployment of troops, reporting maps of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht. This is how he thought of 6 MK (in which divisions are scattered from 50 to 100 km from each other and the headquarters and which in one it is not possible) throw it to Suwalki through Osovets?! Without dorog.It directly into the swamps?! Then the Germans only used infantry divisions there.
    And where did the "analyst" see the DNO on the Priselye-Ustye line on the Western Front on 30.09.41/XNUMX/XNUMX?! And even more so, did he find the roads north of Yartsevo leading from west to east ?! They are not there now ... and the fact that the divisions The ZF of the first line of defense (between the Loynya and Vop 'rivers, just east of Dukhovshchina) held the entire Dukhovshchina grouping for three days ?!
  18. +5
    14 October 2016 09: 44
    In my opinion, of course, it is necessary to publish various views on events. But not the profane.
    Well, how much can you? Publish a specific heresy of people who have hardly studied historical events. They take one document and conclude for the whole period. Not learning anything else. A whole bunch of orders and directives for this period. Everything is on the sites.
    If this is a military review, then print people who are knowledgeable in the matter.
    They are read by people who are interested in knowing the assessment of events, but from people who have studied the issue. We are given articles of specific losers.
    Let’s also write Zhukov into traitors, well, bullshit. In 1941, the traitor in 1945, the winner.
    The author on one sheet gives an estimate to almost all boilers 41 years old. Is it interesting that he himself at least understands what he is writing?
    1. Mwg
      +2
      15 October 2016 10: 56
      For kbtuy333. Actually, Zhukov’s personality is characterized by the fact that his popularization began under Nikita Sergeevich. What are the benefits? After all, the first liberal of the USSR just did nothing? And the fact that Zhukov was removed from the General Staff during the Second World War and then from the fronts is a fact. And the fact that he screwed up on the command of Berlin, they also wrote about this. As well as his involvement in the affairs of the family of the singer and general in besieged Leningrad. There is no smoke without fire. My opinion.
  19. +2
    14 October 2016 20: 43
    An attempt to whitewash the leaders of the party and government, which did not want to hear that the probability of a German attack on the USSR was 100%. It turns out that the Germans were helped by traitors. My uncle was an officer of the Red Army and fought from beginning to end. He told such things that his hair stood on end on end.
  20. 0
    14 October 2016 21: 13
    The article is a set of letters, I think. A question for experts on the 1st photo (T-26s in the field) and other similar ones. Very often I saw photos of our T-26 and BT, which were killed at the beginning of the war, standing with their turrets turned back, what is the reason? Here they stand in the field in heaps and everyone "looks" there ... Armored cars also come across in this form, but they seemed to be supposed to fight like this, attacked backwards. T-34, T-28, heavy tanks were not seen in the photo, so that in droves and with guns back, what is wrong with light tanks?
  21. Mwg
    +1
    15 October 2016 10: 47
    The article is good: there is a sense in it, and the theory is viable. But now I want to insert my own five cents. About the dead it is either good, or nothing but the truth, as someone from the ancients said. About Vlasov is not quite the same as that of the author. This is a special case. Oddly enough, the Vlasovites had a significant role in the Second World War: on the Kursk Bulge and during the capture of Keniksberg, their sudden withdrawal allowed ours to pass to the rear of the Germans, during the battle for Berlin the Vlasovites fought desperately with the Americans advancing from the west, which made it possible for ours to take Berlin. All (I emphasize) the captured Vlasovites were taken to the United States, although the rest of the prisoners, with the exception of some, were kept in Europe. Why so much attention was paid to them by our "partners"?
    Vlasov himself has always been a very uncharacteristic character: he actively communicated with fascist officers in Harbin back in 38-39, although the rest were punished for this; arrived in the 2nd army, when it was already surrounded; his family was not repressed; while in Germany, he was married to the sister of a German general from an old noble family who was captured in the USSR; he was arrested twice in Germany by order of Hitler and twice released; he himself went to the Soviet fighters and surrendered, although he could escape, there was no obstacle to this; and, finally, there were no and there were no witnesses of his execution, just as the documents about the place, time and executor of the sentence were not preserved.
    By indirect signs, a well-planned operation of the USSR special services, or perhaps Stalin himself, with the participation of the notorious traitor general, is seen. So is he a traitor?
    1. 0
      16 October 2016 01: 34
      Vlasov was actually hanged. And there is a photo. What makes you think that all the captured Vlasovites were exported to the United States? Most of them were serving their sentences in forced labor camps in the USSR.
      1. +2
        17 October 2016 22: 09
        Our captured Vlasovites were shot either immediately, on the spot, or after interrogation.
        To transfer them to the rear to assembly points was not accepted.
        Lucky to get into the camps to those whom the Americans handed over to us at the end of the war.
      2. Mwg
        +1
        20 October 2016 08: 58
        For Sergej1972. Photos of the Americans on the moon, too, and Hitler’s skull is also in the museum. And that doesn’t mean anything. Vlasovites were serving their sentences in the USSR after they returned from the United States. And far from all - 20% percent, whose betrayal was confirmed by facts. The rest, oddly enough, were sent home after 6 months of filtration camps
  22. +3
    18 October 2016 16: 39
    it is believed that if it were not for the repression of 1937, the war would have been lost in the net.
    As for the question, who fought with whom from the Russians, then apparently (in my opinion) the Great Patriotic War was for many a continuation of the civilian.
  23. +1
    25 October 2016 11: 59
    Quote: Seal
    What you call "The Wehrmacht preempted the Red Army in deployment" is only partly true. The Wehrmacht preempted the Red Army in the attack. And so, yes, the Red Army was not deployed. But not deployed to the defense. But for the offensive, the Red Army (if not all, then at least a significant part of the armies concentrated on the western border), was even very deployed.

    The next rehash of the fable of the rezun, the falcon-corned beef.
    1. 0
      25 October 2016 21: 39
      Quote: The Bloodthirster
      The next rehash of the fable of the rezun, the falcon-corned beef.
      Uh-huh. And also "the next rehash of the fables of Baghramyan, Halder, Müller-Hillebrandt and hundreds of other researchers, participants, eyewitnesses, and so on." hi
      And only bloodsuckers and potatoes have the right to truth laughing
      1. 0
        25 October 2016 21: 52
        Yeah yeah, go on. And now more specifically, with the facts, arguments, state your undoubtedly brilliant opinion. "Arguments" corned beef, cutter, falcon
        ova, Svanidze, not to be considered.
        Got something to say?
        1. 0
          26 October 2016 08: 18
          And you read, read. I have everything with quotes from Halder's Diaries, from Baghramyan’s memoirs, from Müller-Gillebrandt’s analytics. This is your one unsubstantiated slogans.
  24. +1
    26 October 2016 21: 11
    KaPToC, Well, one more proof of the insanity of the opponent. Dear, extinguish the hat, it burns after all.
    You will seriously argue that in June 1941 Argentina attacked us together with Germany? Oh, you didn’t say anything like that? Then with what a binge you brazenly ascribe to me your perverted fabrications that
    "Are you seriously going to assert that the German Air Force did not fight against the USSR?"

    Where can you see the fool, the insolent, the sharpie all rolled into one?
    Correctly. In the morning, when you shave, in the mirror.

    Here is this inadequate opponent who does not find a fool in the mirror wrote
    There were 1,6 million people in the German Air Force, 1,2 million were those who fought against the USSR. For your information, the Air Force is not only pilots, it is also airfield services, a system of observers, and airborne troops.


    I do not know how many times he will play the role of non-commissioned officer widow, but let him play if he likes this role. Earlier, I recall, he could not produce an elementary afrimetic action - multiplication.
    Well, now, in general, a masterpiece.
    In my opinion, I wrote him in Russian
    at least the first 10 days of the war, the German Air Force operated exclusively from its territory.

    To which he "cleverly" answers me that
    For your information, the Air Force is not only pilots, it is also airfield services, a system of observers

    Does anyone else understand why the airfield services of the German Air Force, which at least the first 10 wars were located somewhere in the area for example Lublin or Koenigsberg, should be taken into account in the number of German troops crossing the border on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX?
    And here is another example of it, either stupidity or arrogance
    "You counted the USSR Air Force completely, to the last janitor"

    His hysteria is caused by my remark that Well, and besides, we also did not consider our own air forces of the Red Army, who waged war with the Germans in the air
    How do you understand the whole Russian language or half? Or understand, but vice versa? I wrote in Russian that we are alsoe did not consider own air forces of the red army
    In what sore head, this phrase, digested, could turn into
    USSR Air Force you counted completely, until the last cleaner

    Well, thank God, he seems to have calmed down with the German navy. Now he has a new feature - the German airborne troops.
    Listen, good lord, aren't you tired? In the sense of not tired of shame?

    Attending July 19, 1941, at a reception that Hitler arranged at his headquarters in honor of the participants of the Cretan operation who were awarded the Knight's Cross, the Student did not believe his ears, hearing how Hitler, speaking to him, remarked:
    - Crete proved that the time of the parachute troops has passed. These troops are a means of surprise, and after Crete, the factor of surprise has completely exhausted itself.
    The student at first thought that this was a joke. He did not suspect that, impressed by the heavy losses in Crete, Hitler came to this conclusion quite seriously, and his military advisers only strengthened this too hasty opinion in him. After Crete, Hitler, who usually always encouraged new types of weapons and various improvements, almost completely excluded parachute troops from his plans and ideas ...
    Hitler's point of view, expressed by him in July 1941, was a brutal blow to the German airborne troops and their creator. Inspired by the successes in Crete, the Student nurtured the most daring plans for the further development of this kind of troops. Nevertheless, he did not lose heart and continued to work tirelessly to improve new weapons, which would be indispensable for delivering decisive blows in the war against Russia that had begun at that time. But during the war in the East, the parachute landing operation was carried out only once, and then in the very first days of the war.
    On June 25, 1941, one platoon of the Brandenburg Special Purpose Regiment in the amount of 34 soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Lex threw itself out of two Junkers in the vicinity of the Bogdanovo station, having the task of mastering the railway bridges across the Berezina on the Lida-Molodechno line, located not far from this station. The landing was successful, despite the unforeseen difficulties encountered during the landing. A long and stubborn struggle followed with Russian tanks and infantry. The platoon suffered heavy losses: Lieutenant Leke and four soldiers were killed, 16 people were injured. The remaining 14 people from the platoon managed to keep the bridges they had captured until the evening of June 26, when German motorcyclists made their way to the paratroopers.
    This was the first and last German parachute landing for the entire period of the German offensive in the East. Although stubborn rumors circulated in Moscow in October 1941 that German paratroopers were about to land on Red Square and even in the Kremlin itself.
    Something incredible happened on the Eastern Front - where operations conducted on a wide front urgently required the use of airborne troops, they were not used. Command literally became afraid of fire of all kinds of airborne operations ... "

    Not only were German Airborne Forces not involved in the invasion of our country at all, the funny thing is, the Brandenburg Regiment as part of the Luftwaffe did not enter hi
    German paratroopers began to fall on the Eastern Front much later. And not at all for landing operations. On the Eastern Front, German Airborne Forces were used to strengthen weak sections of the front. As for most of the dead soldiers of the Wehrmacht, the USSR became the grave for the military elite of the Third Reich - the German Airborne Forces. So, in October of the 43rd, the entire 1st Airborne Division - 6 soldiers with weapons, equipment and equipment - was relocated to Russia on 000 trains. 75/1.06.1944/2 the remnants of a once formidable formation, together with the replenishment received at the front, returned to the Reich in XNUMX rosters!

    Excuse me, how about your question about yourself?
  25. The comment was deleted.
  26. +1
    30 October 2016 23: 43
    The author is in many ways right, unfortunately. The sale of the generals has been practically proved and is confirmed by history, including modern one. 1991, 1993, 1994, 2006, proving that the generals do not care about the fate of the motherland. It is a great success that not all the generals turned out to be corrupt and there were courageous people who prevented bacchanalia and defended Russia.
  27. +1
    3 November 2016 15: 12
    Can simple illiteracy, the fear of making decisions?
    Rokossovsky K.K. in his memoirs he spoke very negatively of Kirponos and Pavlov. Not directly but also criticizes Zhukov, Vatutin. Koneva, after he nearly brought him under the tribunal, ignores him. For a handshake person does not consider.
  28. +2
    5 November 2016 07: 12
    Lublin was approximately 80 km from the locations of the 4th and 15th mechanized corps of the most powerful 6th Army of the Southwestern Front. God knows that, tanks of mechanized corps drove over much greater distances in other directions.
    I look at the deployment of 4 fur housing of lions and not 80 but 220 from it
    15 mechanized corps location fords to Lublin 270km. in a swampy place, possible movement only along the roads ,,,,,,,
    I read carefully the strongest corps ,,,,, The 15th mechanized corps began to form in March 1941 from 4 mechanized corps ,,,,,,
    Suwalki is a dead end railway station in a swampy-wooded bearish corner of northeastern Poland. The district of Suvalok wedged the territory of the USSR north of the Bialystok ledge. And the railway went to Suwalki, the only one along which it was possible to supply the Got's tank wedge. From the border and from the locations of the 3rd army to the railway to Suwalki according to the inter-lake defile - only 20 km. On the road from Augustow - 26 km.
    I look at the location of the 3 army in August, only one division 27 rifle
    read wiki
    In September 1939, she took part in the Polish campaign. Later it was thrown to the north to strengthen the LenVO troops during the Soviet-Finnish War (1939-1940).
    He was part of the 4th Corps of the 3rd Army. The division occupied an unfavorable location in the ledge of the so-called. The Bialystok Sack.
    On June 22.06.1941, 256, the headquarters was stationed in Sukhovol, units were located on the border in the area of ​​Augustow, Graevo, Sukhovo. There, the division took the first battle with the 162th Infantry Division and the 23.06.1941nd Infantry Division. Fighting separately, its units fought in isolation from each other, without a single control, interaction and communication. The main part of the division was forced without a fight, threatened by the environment, to retreat in the direction of the Beaver River, where it occupied the line of defense, which was breached in the evening of the same day. On 24.06.1941/60/25.06.1941, the division covered the Sokulka area, part of its units made an unsuccessful attempt to recapture Dombrow. 1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, the division, which already accounted for about XNUMX% of the composition, received an order to counterattack. On June XNUMX, XNUMX, the division took the line on the Svisloch River, having received the order "to stand and fight to the death", covering the retreating units of the army, where it was destroyed in the Novogrudok Cauldron. By August XNUMX, the scattered, few remnants of the division left the encirclement.

    the rest of the 3-army were 100 kilometers further,

    So you are such a historian ,,,,,, Tell me, and you didn’t work at the NKVD in 37g. the handwriting is painfully familiar,
    1. +1
      5 November 2016 08: 04
      Dude remembered Beria digging. and he was such that he would put everyone to the wall.

      Lublin was approximately 80 km from the locations of the 4th and 15th mechanized corps of the most powerful 6th Army of the Southwestern Front. ,,,,,
      4 mechanized corps are lions, 15 mechanized corps are fords, to Lublin on the roads 200-250km. straight cut the swamps.

      Suwalki - a dead end railway station in a swampy-wooded bear’s corner ,,,,, And the railway went to Suwalki, the only one along which Goth’s tank wedge could be supplied. From the border and from the locations of the 3rd army to the railway to Suwalki according to the inter-lake defile - only 20 km. On the road from Augustow - 26 km. Long-range artillery of the 3rd army was able to support its own advancing troops until the cutting of this railway without moving from its territory.

      only in August was not the 3rd army but the 27th division of the 4 mechanized corps of the army. On June 22.06.1941, XNUMX, the headquarters was stationed in Sukhovol, units were located on the border in the area of ​​Augustow, Graevo, Sukhovo.
      Imagine even in the division the units are scattered 40km, the remaining units are 10-120km deeper

      The division on the first day of the war took the first battle with the 256th Infantry Division and the 162nd Infantry Division. Fighting separately, its units fought in isolation from each other, without a single control, interaction and communication. The main part of the division was forced without a fight, threatened by the environment, to retreat in the direction of the Beaver River, where it occupied the line of defense, which was breached in the evening of the same day. On 23.06.1941/24.06.1941/60, the division covered the Sokulka area, part of its units made an unsuccessful attempt to recapture Dombrow. 25.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, the division, which already accounted for about XNUMX% of the composition, received an order to counterattack. On June XNUMX, XNUMX, the division took the line on the Svisloch River, having received the order to “stand and fight to the death”, covering the retreating units of the army, where it was destroyed

      And now, as a model, the Southwest Front
      During the border battles of 1941, front troops repelled the attacks of the German Army Group South on the southwestern borders of the country, inflicted damage on the enemy in a tank battle near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody, and delayed its progress. In the second half of July - early August, together with parts of the Southern Front, parts of the front were encircled near Uman and Kiev. Front troops suffered heavy losses. Only more than 500 thousand soldiers and commanders were captured. The front commander, Colonel General Kirponos, the chief of staff of the front, Major General Tupikov and a member of the Military Council of the Front Burmistenko died in an attempt to get out of the encirclement.

      Imagine the front commander, the chief of staff of the front, a member of the military council of the front while trying to get out of the encirclement, they died. Surely traitors.
      1. +1
        5 November 2016 08: 18
        In November 1941, Stalin called Vlasov and ordered him to form the 20th Army, which would be part of the Western Front and defend the capital.

        On December 5, in the area of ​​the village of Krasnaya Polyana (located 32 km from the Moscow Kremlin), the Soviet 20th Army under the command of General Vlasov stopped parts of the German 4th Panzer Army, making a significant contribution to the victory near Moscow.
        Overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the 20th Army knocked out the Germans from Solnechnogorsk and Volokolamsk. On December 13, 1941, the Sovinformburo published an official report on the Germans being repelled from Moscow and printed in it photographs of those commanders who had distinguished themselves especially during the defense of the capital. Among them was Vlasov. The message was printed in the central Soviet newspapers — Pravda and Izvestia — and reprinted in many local newspapers. January 24, 1942 for these battles Vlasov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and promoted to lieutenant general. His image appears in the American version of the documentary "The rout of German troops near Moscow," awarded the Oscar in 1943

        Precisely conspired German agent.

        Vlasov was captured and then betrayed. for which he was then tried and shot.

        People who litter ancestors moral and physical ********
  29. +1
    30 November 2016 18: 26
    The article is interesting, but it's so hard to read, no matter how, we were taught that "The Red Army is the strongest." Although even now only a fool does not know that the losses of the USSR only by prisoners in 1941-42 exceeded 3 million soldiers and officers, dozens of military formations were simply surrendered by their commanders, the book of A.V. Isaev "From Dubno to Rostov" directly tells about such cases (the chief of staff of the 6th corps of the 6th army, Major General Richter is a traitor) Don and Kuban Cossack corps The Red Army took more than 6 months to form, and the traitors Shkuro, Kononov, Pavlov, Krasnov, Naumenko (the author of the book "The Great Betrayal") formed the Cossack units of the Wehrmakhat in the shortest possible time, according to various sources the number of those who betrayed their homeland and served the Nazis was more than a million. Now the trouble is with our Motherland, there will be no less such creatures and it is time for the competent authorities to deal with them now.
  30. +1
    7 December 2016 00: 14
    For me, the fact of mass betrayal cannot be disputed even by the fact that the main materials and documents on this long-past war are still classified.
    Not willing to unveil the mass betrayal of possible future Marshals of Victory?
    The British “declassified” everything, but the fact and data on Hess are still stored under seven locks. So the snout is down!
  31. +1
    27 December 2016 16: 28
    Oh - another "strategist" has spoken ...
    Striking the rear with enemy mechanized corps when superior forces are already reaching your communications?
    Yes, this is unfriendly for you, and Zhukov and the command of the fur corps acted as they were.
  32. +3
    8 January 2017 00: 14
    A long time ago the writer Viktor Pelevin said: "The world is ruled not by a secret lodge, but by an obvious mess." There is no need to look for a "conspiracy" where there was tremendous stupidity and monstrous incompetence! And this stupidity is a consequence of, among other things, the "fight against the conspirators." The stupidity and incompetence of the commanders, about which the author speaks for so long and in detail, is precisely an indicator of the WEAKNESS AND UNREADNESS of the Red Army.
    The author in the first line of his "treatise" says "it is not true, the Red Army was a strong army," and then for a long, long time lists where and how its commanders got involved. This is all crap ..
    1) The fascist army and the entire war machine of the Hitler Reich were REALLY stronger than the USSR in the summer of 1941.
    2) the USSR was very likely to die.
    3) But the USSR survived and won. Because:
    a) There were talented commanders and generals and they were given command.
    b) There were talented directors of factories and further throughout industry and the state
    c) There were talented weapon designers
    d) There were brilliant strategic decisions of Stalin and his team.
    4) Everything said in paragraph 3 "was" existed only because the country was preparing for war all its life since 1924.
    5) And still, Hitler had every chance to win if he were the best strategist, or if our leaders (Stalin and the team) did not learn from their mistakes.
    1. 0
      21 January 2017 18: 06
      Quote: tigoda
      where there was tremendous dullness and monstrous incompetence

      Well, we are now the most intelligent and all-knowing. "Stupid and incompetent" rarely become generals, commissars, ministers. Yes, they do _in our opinion_ strange and inexplicable actions. It was not in vain that a "strange war" had been going on in Europe since 1939 for almost a year, when the French and British, observing Hitler's preparations from the Maginot Line, in fact passively waited for him to attack. Does the situation look like nothing? Considering that England and France have already declared war on Germany, such inaction looks like a betrayal. No, not generals, but the highest military-political leadership. So the article only reveals another facet (perhaps not the most significant one) of this historical puzzle.
      1. 0
        4 February 2017 14: 01
        Everything secret sooner or later becomes apparent!
        Despite the fact that many years have passed. This is important for everyone who lives in today's Russia!
        And everyone should be rewarded according to his deeds ... at least many years later.
        In order not to repeat the tragic mistakes of the past.
        It is high time that the WWII began to carefully and impartially deal with these events!
        Despite the ranks and past achievements of those who were involved in this at that time ...
  33. +1
    25 February 2017 22: 53
    The article is certainly interesting, but I think the author greatly exaggerates the "conspiracy theory." At first glance, everything seems to be smooth. But while reading the article, the thought didn’t leave me, “why such difficulties, what goals did the conspirators set, and why were they not realized”. There are no answers in the article. While I see criminal negligence and inaction. Again, there are many contradictions in the article. For example, if Kirponos merged the front, why didn’t he merge himself then?
    So far, I consider the article an unreliable "sensation".
  34. 0
    24 June 2017 20: 52
    Read A.V. Isaev "From Dubno to Rostov" and much will become more clear. There was a conspiracy, but the NKVD didn’t reveal it, but it’s a pity. Yes, and commissars like Mehlis (stubborn and stupid militarily) had to be shot before the start of the war. How many of these fools had “done business” at the beginning of the war, and then the General Staff all tried to blame, but they could keep the Nazis in the border regions of the USSR.
  35. 0
    12 July 2017 17: 22
    The article lists the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet commanders at the initial stage of the war, which led to a number of serious defeats of the Red Army.
    They come down mainly to tactical erroneous maneuvers and failure to fulfill orders. Let me remind you, in the conditions of a broken connection, often receiving directly conflicting orders and general confusion.
    And the author’s claim about the premeditation of these actions, in fact, is based only on their infidelity.
    However, there is no evidence in the article that these errors were intentional or even the existence of any kind of conspiracy.
    You can assume anything.
    However, with such a scale of the conspiracy, allegedly involving hundreds or even thousands of officers in it, the complete absence of direct evidence suggests, rather, that there could have been no conspiracy.
    And the defeat of the Red Army in 1941-1942. could have been caused by elementary mistakes by commanders, none of whom in their careers had encountered combat operations of this magnitude, except for the service of some in the First World War in junior ranks. Unlike the Germans, under the blows of which a number of European countries have already fallen.
  36. 0
    17 September 2018 21: 01
    "Little remark.

    The service life of the Tiger tank was only 60 km. The first use of the tank near Leningrad in the second half of 1942 was unsuccessful because most of the tanks simply did not reach the battlefield from the unloading station. "
    The author confuses motor resources and power reserve at one gas station.
  37. -1
    April 2 2020 14: 50
    The article is interesting, of course, but it does not go beyond the analytical essay of an employee (former?) Of the NKVD + co-comrades .... Skill is a combination of theory and practice, with repeated repetition of what has been passed when theoretical knowledge passes into physical skills. (This is mandatory from a soldier to a higher command staff) If neither one nor the other is enough, then this is an imitation of skill, you can probably call hack ... This is in civilian life. A huge problem in the army is communication and the exact exchange of information: it was, it is, and it will remain .... Chaos reigning in the first months of the war cost the lives of millions of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. Could this be avoided? Yes, if the army would go about their business, not lawns ....