“JDAM” for the “Super Hornets” of the Kuwaiti Air Force - preparing the “Arabian Coalition” for future conflicts with Iran
“Stormy applause”, hypocritically performed by the Western elite in the second half of July 2015, when a truly true act was made in Vienna historical The “nuclear deal” of the “six” with the Islamic Republic of Iran, have well-thought-out “roots” a few steps forward. In exchange for a 15-year “freeze” of all programs related to nuclear fuel reprocessing, keeping the capacity of the nuclear reactor in Arak within 20 MW, as well as maintaining the stockpiles of low-enriched weapons-grade uranium U235 within 300 kg, Tehran receives almost complete lifting of all Security Council sanctions UN, including embargo on the supply of various weapons, civilian aircraft aviation, Р ° тР° кже современного СЌР »РµРєС‚СЂРѕРЅРЅРѕРіРѕ РѕР ± РѕСЂСѓРґРѕРІР ° РЅРёСЏ. RЈSЃRєRѕSЂRμRЅRoRμ S,RμRјRїRѕRІ RІRЅRμRґSЂRμRЅRoSЏ PI RoSЂR ° ± RЅSЃRєRoR№ RѕR RѕSЂRѕRЅRЅRѕ-RїSЂRѕRјS <C € P "RμRЅRЅS <R№ RєRѕRјRїR" RμRєSЃ RїRμSЂRμRґRѕRІS <C ... RєRѕRјRїSЊSЋS,RμSЂRoR · RoSЂRѕRІR ° RЅRЅS <C ... ... S,RμS RЅRѕR "RѕRіRoR№ SЃRїRѕSЃRѕR ± RЅRѕ SЃRѕR · RґR ° S,SЊ RґR "SЏ ° F RјRμSЂRoRєR ° RЅSЃRєRoS ... SЃRѕSЋR RЅRoRєRѕRІ · · PI RџRμSЂRμRґRЅRμR№ RђR RoRo RμS ‰ C 'F ± RѕR" SЊS € Rμ RїSЂRѕR ± P "RμRј, RЅRμR¶RμR" Ryo RІSЂRμRјRμRЅRЅRѕ In “P · P ° PјRsS'ERsR¶RµRЅRЅR ° СЏВ” ядернР° СЏ РїСЂРѕРіСЂР ° РјРјР °Р °, С З С‚Рѕ РѕС‚РєСЂС ‹РИР ° ет РґР »СЏ РѕРЅРЁ ительны Рµ неоггрР° РЅРёС З РµРЅРЅС ‹Рµ РІРѕР · можности контрол СЏ РЅР ° Рґ ситу.
It is extremely clear that continued research and progress in Iran’s nuclear field would not have led to an escalation of the Iran’s local nuclear conflict with the neighboring states of the pro-American “camp”, or even a more delusional situation exacerbated by the Western media — the seizure of Iranian MRBDs with nuclear warheads . In addition, the presence of Tehran’s aerospace assault weapons with nuclear “equipment” would be an excellent deterrent for such frantic US henchmen as Saudi Arabia and Israel armed with medium-range ballistic missiles. This would establish a peculiar military parity between the parties, which over time would lead to the loss of the expediency of staying American air bases in the region, as well as the counterproductiveness of further preserving their material and technical base. It was necessary to break the silence as soon as possible in the military-political "swamp" of the Near East, and they used the "nuclear deal", which gave the "green light" to the arms market of Iran. Great prospects opened up for Tehran: the Air Force and the Ministry of Defense immediately started talking about a possible update of the hopelessly outdated fighter fleet by new Russian Su-30CM, Su-35С, and also Chinese J-10A, and the X-NNXX division of the C-5PMM-ZRM C-300PMU-XMN-XMNS-ZRM X-Channel, and Chinese X-NNMXPMU-2A contract, and the X-NNXX X-NNMX-XMNMX-ZNR X-Channel, X-NNMX-XM. final stage.
For understandable reasons, this caused a strong outburst of indignation from the leadership and power structures of Israel: the signing of a “nuclear deal” launched the mechanism of a large-scale arms race throughout Front Asia, which was achieved in Washington. In fact, Iran has the opportunity to conclude large contracts for the official purchase of Russian and Chinese military equipment, which instantly upsets the balance of forces in the region, and Tel Aviv and Riyadh have the vital need to immediately increase the combat potential of their armed forces to parry new operational forces. Tehran’s strategic ambitions. And here the United States comes into play with new forces as a “savior”, providing the Israel and Saudi Arabian Defense Ministry with advantageous preferential contracts for the purchase of tactical strike fighters of the F-15E family of “Strike Eagle”, as well as modern high-precision missile and bomb weapons for of them.
Israel and the “Arabian coalition” also have no other choice, except on the conditions asking to negotiate with the United States to deploy additional fighter aircraft squadrons at their own air bases, as well as additional Patriot PAC-3 batteries near the most important strategic objects of the military industrial complex and oil refineries, what is just necessary for full-fledged defense in view of the formation of a new look for the Iranian Air Force, which in the next decade will reach the level of a regional superpower. In this round of the “Great Game” of the USA, skillfully acting on the “sore points” of its Front Asian and Middle Eastern pawns, they kill two birds with one stone. First, they get new profitable contracts to preserve the production lines of the Boeing corporation for the production of F-15E strike fighter jets. Secondly, they retain control over the entire Near-Asian region, deploying bomber and fighter squadrons at such strategic air bases as Al-Dafra and El-Udeid.
The first signs of the beginning of such militarization are already visible today. One of them includes contracts for the supply of 72 F-4QA generation 15 ++ tactical fighters for the Qatar Air Force, as well as 84 similar F-15SA aircraft for the Saudi Arabian Air Force. The second is the Israeli Hel Haavir's interest in additional F-15I "Ra'am" squadrons; and the third, without a doubt, is the contract for the purchase of 32 F / A-18E / F for the Kuwait Air Force. A rapid "pumping" of weapons to all anti-Iranian allies in Asia began. At the same time, Washington is playing a double game here, trying to maintain the confrontation between the Yemeni organization of Shiite-Zaidites (Houthis) Ansar Allah and the Sunni countries of the Arabian coalition (as you know, the former is supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran). Using religious divisions in the region, the United States escalates the situation, and then uses it to its advantage.
A very entertaining December decision by the Pentagon is to cut off the supply of precision missiles for the Allied Saudi Air Force. Official Washington, for strange reasons, filled with unusual humanism and justice, explains its decision by the fact that due to inaccurate airstrikes of the Saudi Arabian Air Force, a huge number of civilian casualties are observed in Yemen. As modern military history testifies, during the hostilities in Iraq, Yugoslavia and Libya, the U.S. Department of Defense absolutely did not give a damn about the civilian population of these states, which was subjected to massive air strikes almost daily by cluster bombs, falling under the corresponding convention, “bought” by the United States itself. Such an unexpected humanism in relation to the population of Yemen has its own explanation. Establishment of an embargo on the supply of precision weapons Riyadh will complicate the confrontation with Yemeni Hussites by several orders of magnitude, stretching the conflict for years, and also provide an opportunity, if necessary, to “skimp” the conflict to involve Iran, which is the fulcrum for Ansar Allah.
The second round of the preparation of the “Arabian coalition” for future conflicts with Iran is the approval by the US State Department of the request of the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers to supply the 750 national air force with JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) for the 500 / 1000 and 2000-type Free Falling Momba Type M fighter bombs of the Mombatnum type M fighter bombs. 82, Mk-83 and Mk-84, respectively (250 kits per caliber). According to American sources, this contract will allow Kuwait to repeatedly strengthen the national security of its state, which is one of the main allies of the North Atlantic alliance outside the bloc. At the same time, it is well known that highly accurate, adjustable and guided missile-bomb weapons are more offensive than defensive type of air attack weapons. If it were a question of defense of Kuwait’s territory, the contract would include the supply of modern Patriot PAC-2 / 3 anti-aircraft missile systems to create a layered anti-ballistic missile defense area in the northern part of the Persian Gulf. We are witnessing yet another arrogant attempt by the US State Department to fool a part of the world community that is ignorant of technical issues, exposing offensive strike weapons as defensive. What opportunities will Kuwait have after purchasing JDAM kits?
For a start, it is worth noting the fact that for a long period of time, there is a local territorial dispute between Kuwait and Iran, which sometimes develops into a “skirmish” at the level of defense and foreign affairs agencies. The problem area in this dispute is the Al Dour (Arash) oil site, owned by Kuwait. But the most interesting thing is that the “psychosis” is always initiated by the Kuwaiti side, but Tehran does not show any direct interest in El-Dour (Iran, possessing huge oil and gas deposits, is hardly interested in this). Kuwait, on the other hand, is breaking out. Thus, in the spring of 2016, the emirate accused the Iranian Navy of violating sea borders in the al-Dour area with the 1401 "Hendijan" patrol boat, while the latter conducted standard patrols in the Persian Gulf and slightly deviated towards the ill-starred shelf. Saudi Arabia immediately joined the "skirmish" on the side of Kuwait. Then, in order to incite even greater scandal, Kuwait filed a complaint with Iran at the UN, exposing the latter as a “sea aggressor”, which seeks to gain control over the Kuwaiti-Arabian fields. The United States is well aware of all the subtleties of this problematic issue, and therefore the transfer of such weapons to Kuwait is part of a large strategy to incite hostility between the strongholds of the Sunni and Shiite worlds of Western Asia.
The request for a contract on JDAM kits was made against the background of an updated and growing Iranian air defense system, which confirms the development by the Arabian Coalition of a strategy for conducting an air operation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which would first need to suppress the main territorial missile defense areas located near major sea cities on the Persian Gulf and also in the area of the Iran-Iraq border. It is known that these frontiers hide behind the most advanced C-300PMU-2 systems, as well as Tor-M1 systems, capable of knocking down almost all types and calibers of free-fall and controlled bombs (including JDAM), as well as the RLPM AGM-88 HARM, and therefore similar the confrontation completely eliminates the independent actions of small Kuwaiti air forces, and provides for the engagement of all allies on the Arabian Peninsula, including Saudi Arabia with its DRLO and E-3A aircraft, Qatar, and possibly the United Arab Emirates. The Arabian Coalition, in the event of a possible escalation of the conflict, hopes to suppress the Iranian air defense with the help of an MRAU using anti-radar missiles and JDAM UAB.
Why is it not possible to simply suppress at least one positional region of the Iranian missile defense with just one squadron of the Kuwaiti Super Hornets flying at low altitude without using a large MRAU? Because near the coastline of Iran there are many elevations on which multifunctional radars 30H6Х2 and RPN of Bavar-373 complexes can be deployed; they will be able to detect the low-altitude aviation of the “Arabian coalition” at a distance of more than 80-100 km, and destroy it even at the distant approaches to the country's air borders, and therefore it cannot do without massiveness. The Saudis and their “team” expect to overload the computing facilities of the Iranian anti-aircraft missile systems with a large number of carriers as well as elements of high-precision weapons, which can exceed the number of target channels of all together battery radar target illumination. Iran’s air defense can be seriously damaged, but the losses of the “Arabian coalition” will be terrifying, and will amount to more than 5-7 dozens of tactical fighters. JDAM kits are also important for Kuwait.
Firstly, it is the possibility of delivering high-precision strikes against the facilities of the Iranian Navy at the naval bases of Assalouye, Bushehr and Bender Khomeini. In case of escalation, such strikes will be delivered simultaneously with the anti-aircraft defense operation. The Iranian fleet is very vulnerable to anti-ship missiles and high-precision weapons at the disposal of the Qatar and Kuwait Air Force, since the Iranian Navy’s most serious air defense ships are the Moudge (Jamaran) missile frigates equipped with medium-range Fajr anti-aircraft missile systems "(Analogues of the American" Standart Missile-1 "). Having one target channel, these systems cannot even repel a low-intensity anti-ship strike of 3-5 Harpoon or Exocet missiles. The main Iranian naval forces will be destroyed literally 12 hours after the outbreak of hostilities. These naval bases form the basis of the Iranian fleet in the Persian Gulf. They are based on the command and staff infrastructure of 3 naval areas, divisions and brigades of landing ships and missile boats, coastal artillery batteries, as well as battalions for the protection of the littoral zone and the coast.
Secondly, it becomes possible to attack the underground military infrastructure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As is known, the numerous command and staff rooms of various branches of the armed forces of Iran are located in bunker rooms at depths of several tens to several hundred meters. Also in these bunkers are large warehouses of missile weapons and ammunition. In October 2015, after another successful test launch of a medium-range ballistic missile (MRSD), a large bunker storage room at a depth of 500 m was stored for the Iranian mass media, and several dozen mobile soil rocket complexes with medium-range MRS were stored. Due to Kuwait’s proximity to Iran (about 20 km), the Kuwaiti F / A-18E / F flying time to the strategically important infrastructure of the Iranian Armed Forces does not exceed 10-15 minutes. Some of the bunkers can be at a depth of up to 15 m, they can be damaged by the version of the JDAM bomb with penetrating warhead.
Such a version is the 2000-pound penetration bomb GBU-31 JDAM. A guided bomb with a mass of 895 kg, with a length of 2500 mm and a diameter of 370 mm is represented by:
- 254-kilogram penetrating thermobaric warhead BLU-118 / B, installed in the body more simple penetrating warhead type BLU-109 / B; The BLU-118 / B is equipped with an advanced fuse FMU-143J / B, which has two activation modes (the first is a contact trigger that operates at the moment of contact with the ground, the second with a 120-millisecond delay after contact with the surface, which allows you to go deeper into the ground for causing significant damage to the underground infrastructure);
- JDAM control kit, built on the basis of a modern computerized inertial navigation system, as well as a GPS receiver; the kit consists of several small extension wings installed on a special belt in the central part of the body, as well as an “intelligent” tail module equipped with an on-board computer, a GPS receiver and aerodynamic rudders to correct the flight path. In addition, there are kits equipped with a large retractable wing, which significantly extends the range of bombs by planning for tens of kilometers. The GBU-31 JDAM can be reset at speeds up to 1500 km / h, which is a very positive characteristic, giving the BLU-118 / B warhead maximum kinetic energy sufficient to destroy some of the fortified underground objects. The product is capable of “breaking through” several meters of reinforced concrete floors until the moment of detonation in the “delay” mode of the fuse.
Nevertheless, for the effective destruction of bunker premises, the highest accuracy is needed, with which Kuwaiti, exactly like American, JDAM in Iran can have serious problems. Today, Iranian EW troops have the most sophisticated electronic countermeasure systems, capable of “suppressing” the GPS signal for subscribers of this global positioning system with excellent efficiency, which was proved during a takeover of US Sentinel RQ-170 UAV in 2011 year over western Afghanistan. Loss of GPS correction for JDAM leads to 2,5-fold loss of accuracy. If the joint operation of the inertial navigation system and GPS provides a circular probable deviation (CVT) in 11 meters, the loss of the GPS channel will impose accuracy on the INS, which will lead to the CVT in 25-30 meters. And this is extremely insufficient for the destruction of well-protected underground objects.
At the same time, such accuracy will be enough for work on open land strategic facilities (enterprises of the military-industrial complex, shipbuilding yards, armaments depots, as well as air bases). Despite the dense network of Iranian ground defense, such attacks can be very successful in the case of a multi-stage strategic aerospace offensive operation by the forces of the Arabian coalition. As is known, the total number of tactical fighters of the transitional generation in service with the Air Force of the countries of the Arabian Peninsula is approaching 550-600 machines. Iran’s air defense assets may simply not physically have enough performance to maintain combat stability against so many enemy aircraft.
The most pressing problem for today, the Iranian Air Force is the complete absence of an advanced fleet of multi-generation fighter aircraft "4 + / ++". It is known that Iran successfully maintains at least 20-25 F-14A "Tomcat" interceptor fighters from 79 purchased in 80-x in combat status. machines. Independent production of spare parts for them has been established, thanks to which the service life of these remarkable fighters continues to be extended. However, the machines need a comprehensive improvement in avionics. The airborne AN / AWG-9 radar with a slit antenna array (AAR), although it has a decent detection and “capture” range of enemy air targets (F / A-18E / F will be “captured” at a distance of 175 km), as well as the simultaneous firing of 6 targets is not capable of operating in a difficult jamming environment, which will be installed on air theaters of the Rafalei, Super Hornets and F-15S / QA airborne countermeasures, which are in service with Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabian air forces. To increase the effectiveness of the Iranian "Tomcats" in the air battle, it is necessary to install modern radars with AFAR, for example, those that are in service with the Chinese J-15S. It is also necessary to equip fighters with promising long-range air-to-air missiles (for example, with our P-33C or Chinese PL-21D).
F-14A Iranian Air Force
Today, Iranian Tomkats use MIM-9B medium-range anti-aircraft missiles, adapted to work with the AN / AWG-23 station, used in the Hawk air defense system. As is known, their range at launch from an air carrier can reach 90-110 km to the forward hemisphere, but the maneuverability of the rocket, as well as the immunity of the semi-active radar seeker leave much to be desired. The situation with the 36 MiG-29A / UB and 64 multipurpose fighter F-4E / D "Phantom-II" is slightly better. “Twenty-ninths” are still equipped with an outdated single-channel radar with a Cassegrain H019 “Ruby” antenna array with a fighter-type (EPR 1 m2) target range 52 km. These vehicles cannot conduct high-quality long-range air combat even with outdated F / A-18C “Hornet”; their only trump card is highly maneuverable short-range air combat with any type of 4 ++ generation fighter aircraft, which is unlikely to reach, given the effectiveness of modern AIM-120C-7 / D family of 120-180 km. The pilots of the Iranian "Phantoms" built at the end of the 60-s will not be able to outperform the most advanced fighters of the "Arabian coalition" in a single air duel, not only in long-range, but also in close combat. F-4E / D is still equipped with outdated airborne radar with a parabolic antenna "Westinghouse" AN / APQ-109, as well as the "ancient" analog fire control system (FCS) AN / ASQ-91, with which almost no modern air combat missile with ARGSN using a digital data exchange interface with a carrier.
Today, only the Greek F-4E and the German F-4F have completed a more or less modernized modernization program as part of the ICE and Peace Icarus projects. The machines received: a digital data bus for exchanging information and controlling weapons MIL-STD-1553R, a radio station exchanging information about the air situation over the coded radio channel CPU-143 / A from GEC Avionics, a new on-board radar AN / APG-65 (is the basis of Aviation AIRC of multi-purpose F / A-18A “Hornet” fighter jets, as well as AV-8B + “Harrier-II Plus” SACS, as well as the possibility of using AIM-120C AMRAAM URVV of various modifications.
Iranian cars are critically outdated. If you describe the situation without embellishment, you can state the absence of a full-fledged air component of the Iranian Air Force, which puts the country's defense capability in a big question. To establish parity between the Iranian air force and the Arab coalition (including the Israeli air forces), Tehran needs to think about preparing contracts for the purchase of 4-5 hundreds of 4 + / ++ generation fighters as soon as possible. The most optimal configurations can be considered “150 Su-35C + 250 MIG-35”, or “150 Su-30MKI + 350 J-10B”. This ratio completely redraws the balance of power in Asia Minor in favor of Iran. Thus, the miserable "Adir" (F-35I) and "Raama" (F-15I) Israeli Air Force will no longer pose a threat to the Su-35С and MiG-35, equipped with on-board radar "Irbis-E" and "Beetle-AE" ; Yes, and the Chinese J-10B, stuffed with "minced meat" from the modern high-performance electronics of the Middle Kingdom, as well as the radar with AFL KLJ-10, are quite capable of giving the Saudis and Israelis many surprises (do not forget that the airframe of the car is made mainly of composite and radio absorbing materials, which made it possible to achieve EPR in 0,8 - 1,5 м2 with a “moderate” air-to-air suspension configuration). In addition, the J-10B (export designation FC-20), like its Russian counterpart MiG-35, is equipped with the most advanced optical-electronic sighting system OEPS-301 and an integrated REB complex. A more modest, but no less interesting contract with Shenyang for the purchase of X-NUMX multi-role fighters J-200 (FC-31 Krechet) could fundamentally change the situation.
Now it remains only to guess how the process of updating the Iranian Air Force fleet will begin, but for now the fact remains only the critical vulnerability of many strategic facilities of the Iranian fleet and military industry, located in close proximity to the Persian Gulf. And each subsequent stage of supplying the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, as well as Israel with advanced American weapons, will have a very acute effect on the balance of forces in the region.
Information sources:
http://forum.militaryparitet.com/viewtopic.php?id=12189
http://www.airwar.ru/weapon/ab/jdam.html
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