Military Review

1914 artillery of the year

37
What was the organization of the Russian, German and French artillery to the beginning of the First World War?


By 1914, it was assumed that the impending war would be of an intermittent nature - both Russia and France were building the organization of their artillery, based on the principle of transience of armed confrontation. Accordingly, the nature of the future war qualified as maneuverable - and the artillery of the warring armies, first of all, should have such a quality as tactical mobility.

In a maneuverable battle, the main purpose of artillery is the living force of the enemy, while there are no serious fortified positions. That is why the core of the field artillery was represented by light field guns 75-77-mm caliber. And the main ammunition - shrapnel. It was believed that the field gun with its significant, like the French, and, especially, the Russians, the initial velocity of the projectile, will perform all the tasks assigned to the artillery in the field battle.

Indeed, under the conditions of a short-lived, maneuvering war, the French 75-mm gun of the 1897 model took the first place in its tactical and technical characteristics. Although the initial velocity of its projectile and inferior to the Russian three-inch, but this was offset by a more favorable projectile, more economical spending their speed in flight. In addition, the gun had greater stability (i.e., the instability of the pickup) after the shot, and hence the rate of fire. The French gun cannon's device allowed it to automatically conduct lateral horizontal shelling, which from an 2,5-3 distance of thousands of meters made it possible for some minute to fire at the 400-500-meter front.


Il 1. French 75-mm gun. Photo: Pataj S. Artyleria ladowa 1881-1970. W-wa, 1975.

For the Russian three-inch the same thing was possible only by five to six turns of the entire battery with a cost of at least five minutes of time. But in the flank attack, at one and a half minutes, the Russian light battery, firing with shrapnel, covered the area to the depth of 800 m and a width of more than 100 m with its fire.

In the struggle to destroy the manpower of the French and Russian field guns was not equal.

As a result, the 32-Battalion Russian Army Corps was equipped with 108 guns - including 96 field 76-mm (three-inch) guns and 12 light 122-mm (48-line) howitzers. Heavy artillery in the corps was not. True, before the war there was a tendency to create heavy field artillery, but three-battery heavy field battalions (2 batteries 152-mm (six-inch) howitzers and one - 107-mm (42-linear) guns) existed as if by exception and organic connection with shells did not have.


Il 2. Russian 122-mm light field howitzer model 1910, the catalog of the material part of the domestic artillery. - L., 1961.

A little better was the situation in France, which had 120 75-mm field guns on the 24-battalion army corps. Heavy artillery in divisions and corps was absent and was only available with armies — a total of only 308 guns (120-mm long and short guns, 155-mm howitzers and the newest 105-mm long Schneider gun of the 1913 model).


Il 3. French 120-mm short field howitzer model 1890 g. Photo: Pataj S. Artyleria ladowa 1881-1970. W-wa, 1975.

Thus, the organization of artillery in Russia and France was primarily the result of underestimating the power of rifle and machine-gun fire, as well as the fortification gain of the enemy. The statutes of these powers at the beginning of the war required artillery not to prepare, but only to support an infantry attack.

In contrast to their opponents, the organization of German artillery was built on the correct foresight of the nature of the coming military clash. On the 24-Battalion Army Corps, the Germans had 108 light 77-mm cannons, 36 light-field 105-mm howitzers (divisional artillery) and 16 heavy-field 150-mm howitzers (corps artillery). Accordingly, already in 1914, heavy artillery was present at the corps level. Since the beginning of the positional war, the Germans created divisional heavy artillery, completing each division with two howitzer and one cannon heavy batteries.

From this correlation it is clear that the Germans saw the main means for achieving tactical successes even in field maneuvering combat in the power of their artillery (almost a third of all the available guns were howitzers). In addition, the Germans reasonably took into account the increased initial velocity of the projectile that was not always necessary during the flattening of shooting (in this respect, their 77-mm gun was inferior to the French and Russian guns) and accepted as non-122-120-mm lightweight caliber for their opponents, and 105 mm - that is, the optimum (in combination of relative power and mobility) caliber.

If the 77-mm German, 75-mm French, 76-mm Russian light field guns roughly matched each other (as well as the 105-107-mm heavy field guns of the opponents), then the Russian and French armies of the German 105-mm divisional howitzer are not have had.

Thus, by the beginning of World War I, the basis for organizing the artillery means of the leading military powers was the task of supporting the advance of their infantry on the battlefield. The main qualities imposed on field guns are mobility in the conditions of a maneuverable war. This trend also determined the organization of the artillery of the major powers, its quantitative ratio with the infantry, as well as the proportionality of light and heavy artillery as applied to each other.

Thus, the ratio of the number of artillery that was part of military units was expressed by the following number of guns per thousand bayonets: for Russia - around 3,5, for France - 5 and for Germany - 6,5.

The ratio of the number of heavy guns to the number of light artillery guns was as follows: by the beginning of the war, Russia had about 6,9 thousand light guns and howitzers and only 240 heavy guns (that is, the ratio of heavy to light artillery - 1 to 29); France possessed almost 8 thousand light and 308 heavy guns (1 to 24 ratio); Germany had 6,5 thous. Light guns and howitzers and almost 2 thous. Heavy guns (1 to 3,75 ratio).

These figures clearly illustrate both the views on the use of artillery in 1914, and the resources with which each great power entered into a world war. Obviously, the German armed forces were closest to the requirements of the First World War.
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  1. Cat
    Cat 30 January 2017 17: 44
    +11
    33 "+" per article and no comment?
    Alexey apparently I will say for everyone, no words thanks for the article!
  2. Dekabrist
    Dekabrist 30 January 2017 18: 21
    +11
    For those who want to replenish their knowledge in the matter under consideration:
    Barsukov E.Z. Artillery of the Russian Army (1900 – 1917 years): In 4 volumes. - M .: Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1948 – 1949.
    http://militera.lib.ru/h/barsikov_ez2/index.html
  3. Barcid
    Barcid 30 January 2017 18: 21
    +20
    Yes, the higher are the merits of the Russian army, which, with lesser fire support than the rest, solved serious combat missions
    1. Comrade Stalin
      Comrade Stalin 30 January 2017 22: 51
      +5
      She didn’t decide anything. The Germans beat the Russian troops as they wanted and where they wanted. It’s just that the Western Front was more important for them, and they were not distracted by the Russians. As an example, we can cite 1918, where with the completely absent Eastern Front, the Germans still could not develop success in the summer campaign and were forced to make peace. The Eastern Front in WWII had the same significance as the Western Front in WWII - the role of a utility room. The USSR would have crushed Hitler’s reptile without any Second Front.
      You can still recall the REV. From her I have only mats. How? How?!!! How could you lose so stupidly? !!!
      It was the experience of WWI that led Hitler and his generals to the opinion that the USSR was a "colossus with feet of clay."
      1. Nikolaevich I
        Nikolaevich I 31 January 2017 04: 48
        +13
        Quote: Comrade_Stalin
        The Germans beat the Russian troops as they wanted and where they wanted

        Yes you, my friend, an impostor! A true comrade Stalin would not say that!

        Russian victories: facts and figures

        According to the first of the above two aspects of military defeat, we can clearly say that Russia did not face anything close to it by the beginning of 1917. According to, for example, a man like Winston Churchill, the Russian Army and the Russian Empire were on the verge of victory. In his well-known characterization of Emperor Nicholas II, Sir Winston unequivocally emphasized that the “regime that he led won the war for Russia” 1 by the time she chose to abandon his services as king and commander in chief. With known consequences. Briefly specify what has been said.

        Since the fall of 1915, which coincides with the adoption by the king of the supreme leadership of the armed forces of the Empire:

        1. The German offensive was halted in Western Belarus and the Baltic states. Not on the banks of the Volga, Neva and Kuban, as under Stalin, not in Moscow, as under Alexander I and Kutuzov, and not near Poltava, as under Peter the Great!

        2. It was established the absolute dominance of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, which influenced the following events:

        a) The defeat of the Turkish forces in Lazistan and the capture of Trebizond.

        b) Failure of Germany’s attempt to circumvent the Russian front through Romania: thanks to the rapid deployment of troops along the Black Sea, we quickly created the Romanian front.

        3. The offensive of the South-Western Front - Lutsk breakthrough, which dealt a catastrophic blow to the forces of Austria-Hungary.

        4. Erzurum was taken.

        5. A flotilla of the Arctic Ocean was created to ensure communication with allies through Murmansk.

        6. In the spring-summer of 1917, a simultaneous attack on Germany and Turkey was prepared (Bosphorus operation), which was supposed to put an end to the protracted war.

        The decisive contribution of the Russian Army to the military results of the World War in its numerical expression is given in his "History of the Russian Army" by Anton Kersnovsky.

        “For three years of extremely difficult struggle, the Russian Army took 2 200 000 prisoners and 3 850 guns.

        From this number

        Germans - 250 000 prisoners and 550 guns,

        Austro-Hungarians - 1 850 000 prisoners and 2 650 guns and

        Turks - 100 000 prisoners with 650 guns.

        During the same time, France took 160 000 prisoners and 900 guns,

        England - 90 000 prisoners with 450 guns, and Italy - 110 000 prisoners and 150 guns.

        Russian trophies exceeded six times the trophies of the other armies of Concord taken together. ”2.

        Minor Front? Oh well.....
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 31 January 2017 10: 45
          +4
          Quote: Nikolaevich I
          According to, for example, a man like Winston Churchill, the Russian Army and the Russian Empire were on the verge of victory.

          Here are just statistics Churchill's opinion does not confirm. At the beginning of the 1917 of the year, the Russian Empire was on the verge of a transport collapse, with half locomotives and a third of wagons from the estimated needs of the mobplan operational. Particularly difficult was the situation with the delivery of arms and equipment purchased abroad - most of them settled in port warehouses, never reaching the front. The same White movement in the North fought 2 of the year from the Arkhangelsk warehouses.
          Quote: Nikolaevich I
          2. It was established the absolute dominance of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, which influenced the following events:
          a) The defeat of the Turkish forces in Lazistan and the capture of Trebizond.

          That had on the general course of the war about the same effect as the battles on the Thessaloniki front. Moreover, Turkey continued to fight, pulling on itself forces and means. And the Bosphorus operation, which was being prepared for since the 80s of the XIX century, remained in the plans - thanks to Romania.
          Quote: Nikolaevich I
          4. Erzurum was taken.

          The Turks shrugged and continued to fight. smile
          Quote: Nikolaevich I
          5. A flotilla of the Arctic Ocean was created to ensure communication with allies through Murmansk.

          Great power. smile Of the 4 large ships assigned to it, 3 were raised by the Japanese in Port Arthur and Chemulpo (and one of them did not reach the North). The “destroyers” of the flotilla were in fact fighters of the Russian-Japanese era and were armed worse than the German submarines operating in those parts. And under the proud names of “messenger ships” and “minesweepers”, there was a zoo of bought and mobilized civilian courts, which themselves needed protection.
          Unable to produce new orders or purchase ready-made military ships abroad, the tsarist government was forced to buy trawlers, whalers, yachts and steamboats there and convert them into military ships. So, back in 1915, six Norwegian and English trawlers were acquired. Later, five more trawlers were bought in Spain, and Argentine trawlers, one French and two Norwegian whalers, and finally three American trawlers. 14 yachts and steamboats converted into messenger ships were also acquired.

          Quote: Nikolaevich I
          Russian trophies six times exceeded the trophies of the other armies of Concord, taken together

          Just the British and French almost did not fight against Austria-Hungary.
          And most importantly - Britain and France survived the war. And Russia 3 years of the war brought to two revolutions.
          1. Ingvar 72
            Ingvar 72 31 January 2017 11: 15
            +3
            Quote: Alexey RA
            And Russia 3 years of the war brought to two revolutions.

            Moreover, British money.
          2. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 31 January 2017 12: 28
            +9
            Quote: Alexey RA
            And Russia 3 years of the war brought to two revolutions.

            Human paths are inscrutable ..... that’s what brought the Libyans to madness ?! You read what benefits Libyan citizens possessed-licked! And now it remains to say: they had everything!
          3. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 31 January 2017 12: 30
            +7
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Just the British and French almost did not fight against Austria-Hungary.

            Well, at least in some other people you were to blame, and not just Russia!
          4. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 31 January 2017 12: 32
            +7
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Quote: Nikolaevich I
            4. Erzurum was taken.
            Turks shrugged and continued to fight

            Well these are their problems ....
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 31 January 2017 14: 29
              +3
              Quote: Nikolaevich I
              Well these are their problems ....

              Nope - these are just our problems. The peripheral strategy did not lead Turkey out of the war. And the troops of the Caucasus Front, which would be extremely useful in the European part, continued to marinate away from the main theater. Half a million people were stuck behind the Caucasian ridge, and already in 1916 they began to have problems with supply.
              The Turks so often handed over Caucasian fortresses to Russia, that for them the next surrender was not a big shock. smile
              1. Nikolaevich I
                Nikolaevich I 31 January 2017 16: 02
                +1
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Well these are their problems ..

                Quote: Alexey RA
                The Turks so often handed over Caucasian fortresses to Russia, that for them the next surrender was not a big shock

                Yes, Russia also had problems. But I put it about the Turkish ones! Turkey did not hasten to understand what it would lead to, missed the opportunity to "make peace" (or at least to "make peace") ... and was faced with upheavals in subsequent years.
          5. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 31 January 2017 12: 42
            +8
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Here are just statistics Churchill's opinion does not confirm. At the beginning of the 1917 of the year, the Russian Empire was on the verge of a transport collapse, with half locomotives and a third of wagons from the estimated needs of the mobplan operational. Particularly difficult was the situation with the delivery of arms and equipment purchased abroad - most of them settled in port warehouses, never reaching the front. The same White movement in the North fought 2 of the year from the Arkhangelsk warehouses.

            Fir-trees! During the years of the Civil War, a significant part of production was stopped. However, the Tsarist “inheritance” that the Bolsheviks inherited was enough for them for all the years of the Civil War and allowed this war to be victorious! Moreover, V.O.V. Even in the 50 of the last century, this "good!
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 31 January 2017 14: 49
              +3
              Quote: Nikolaevich I
              Fir-trees! During the years of the Civil War, a significant part of production was stopped. However, the Tsarist “inheritance” that the Bolsheviks inherited was enough for them for all the years of the Civil War and allowed them to triumphantly end this war.

              Heh heh heh ... so the Bolsheviks got the very warehouses in the Central regions of the country, from which stocks never reached the front.
              In addition, a typical “major battle” of the Civil era is a local operation by the standards of the WWII. Despite the big names, the "fronts" and "armies" of the Civilian by the standards of the WWI pulled on the army and corps. And the formidable on paper in terms of strength red and white forces in fact fought in combined strike groups, which amounted to tenths of the total strength. Moreover, the consumption of ammunition in battles by the standards of the WWII was a mockery of chickens.
              They still coped with such a war.
              Quote: Nikolaevich I
              Moreover, V.O.V. also used this “good”. Back in the 50s of the last century, this “good!

              Heh heh heh ... the devil is in the details. Most of the royal inheritance went to us in the form of incomplete elements of shots, shots from which they began to collect and understaff after the end of the Civil. That is why the domestic industry in the most difficult years of the NEP was able to increase its reserves of 76 mm rounds from 4 pieces. (at the beginning of 852) to 904 (at the beginning of 1924).
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 1 February 2017 18: 52
              +3
              Here are the data from the book of uv. Belasha "Myths of the First World" - a comparison of the Civil and the First World:
              One may ask - how did exhausted Russia then last for several more years of the Civil War? The "guess" is simple - the million-strong armies with numerous heavy artillery, aircraft and armored cars were replaced by semi-anarchic detachments of hundreds, rarely thousands, with a pair of light guns.

              For example, from November 1917 to April 1918 (the end of demobilization), according to the information of A. M. Fedorov, no more than 40-000 soldiers voluntarily entered the ranks of the Red Guard and the Red Army. In December 50, the forces of the Soviet government thrown against the Central Rada did not exceed 000 bayonets with 1917 guns, 4500-20 machine guns and an armored train, and in the Rada, up to 40 bayonets and sabers. In the battles for Yekaterinoslav, the red troops lost ... 50 soldiers killed and 10 wounded. In the whole of Ukraine and the Don region at the beginning of 000 there were ... 10 red fighters (estimated by N. E. Kakurin and V. A. Melikov). In March 20, the 1918st Moscow Soviet Rogozh-Simonovsky Regiment consisted of two companies of the 15th Infantry Regiment of soldiers of volunteers of the old army, the Red Guard detachment of about 000 people, 1918 Red Army soldiers who entered the regiment after January 1, companies of volunteers from the former prisoners of war soldiers of the Austro-German army and a company of Chinese volunteers.

              At the same time, according to Zaitzov, “since operating since the beginning of the World War only army groups and all the armed forces of Russia, General Alekseev in Olginskaya operated with a detachment that barely exceeded the infantry regiment in wartime.” The size of the Volunteer Army then did not exceed 4000 people with 8 guns and not more than 75 shells per gun. Krasnov's Cossacks had 15-25 rounds per rifle and from 5 to 20 shells per gun. In the Northern White Army (1800 people) the infantry was untrained, 75% without overcoats and 50% barefoot, artillery (12 guns) had no horses. The machine gunners at the beginning of the battle often had no more than one belt, having two or three was considered "very, very successful."

              According to Kakurin, during the world war, one infantry regiment of 3600 rifles and 8 machine guns consumed up to 2,5 million rounds per day, and an artillery brigade consisting of 36 light guns in 1916 consumed 12 shells per ton of battle, t i.e. approximately 000 shells per gun. In 334, the Revolutionary Military Council established a rate of consumption of cartridges per division of 1918 rounds, 200 000-dm and 15 000-line and 3-dm shells per month. Even during the assault on Perekop, the consumption for a five-day operation should not exceed 1000 rounds for the shooter, 48 rounds for light and 6 rounds for light heavy guns per day.

              In 1919, according to Budberg, the white divisions in Siberia totaled 400-700-900 bayonets, and the regiments each 100-200 bayonets, "you can’t attack with lost artillery, almost without machine guns and with the remnants of communication equipment." In January – February 1919, the Belozersky regiment totaled 62 bayonets. The Erivan regiment near Tsaritsin numbered 400-500 people with 6 carts. In the North Caucasus, white companies reached 15 fighters. In March, in the northwest, "a small group of party members of 50 people were not able to hold a front stretching up to 60 kilometers." In the spring of 1919, there were 30 bayonets per mile against Kolchak. According to Snesarev’s diary, the composition of 1919 people is typical for the Soviet company in the autumn of 132, 32 are available, with actual verification only 18. The length of the fronts reached 8000 (!) Km against 1500 km of the eastern front of World War II. The Red Division had to cover the front to 200 km. S. S. Kamenev wrote that “the whole southern campaign, in essence, did not have a preparatory period, and the decision had to be started somehow on the move; without a developed plan, with a volatile grouping of parts and with unprepared parts. " And even in 1920, according to Uborevich, against the 1st Cavalry Army, the Polish division fell on a plot of 40-50 versts. In the summer of the same year, on the 400 km front, the advancing Reds had about 92 bayonets and sabers and 000 guns, the Poles had about 395 bayonets and sabers with 72 guns.

              As Tau noted, “the available number of cars was so small that there was no question of any serious use of motorized means by the Red Army. Cars were barely enough for servicing the higher headquarters and special arms of service. ” Armored trains played an extremely important role in all shock operations, and the armored units acted not only together with the cavalry, but also independently. However, the role of mobile shock forces was played by ... peasant carts and machine-gun carts. Cavalry replaced high-speed tanks, carts - small tanks supported by infantry and cavalry, infantry on carts - motorized convoys of strikes and pursuits. Airplanes, repaired dozens (!) Times, often assembled from 4–5 “served brothers,” instead of fuel, flew on the “Kazan mixture” of everything that was at hand — kerosene, gasoline, alcohol, and ether. In the Black Sea, they tried to use waste from the production of vegetable oil in ship furnaces.

              The food ration of the Northwest Army in the first months of the Civil War was half a pound of bread per day and half a pound of dried fish once or twice a week. “The boots were not thrown out until one top was left, however, the percentage of barefoot soldiers and officers steadily increased ... The Reds and the Whites practically fought in the same rags, it was difficult to distinguish them from each other.” In a November 1918 report, Wacetis noted the frequent cases when the regiments did not go to classes because they were hungry and had to go to the city to get their own food. Epidemics raged. In Petrograd at the beginning of 1920, the mortality rate increased compared to 1914 more than 4 times - from 21,5 to 90 per 1000 inhabitants. According to Nikolai Reden, half of the Northwest Army soldiers died of typhoid fever ..
          6. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 31 January 2017 12: 47
            +7
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Turks shrugged and continued to fight

            For Russia, the Caucasian (Turkish) front was secondary ... even the armaments supplied there were outdated in comparison with the German front.
          7. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 31 January 2017 12: 52
            +5
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Just the British and French almost did not fight against Austria-Hungary.

            Does it make sense to further "argue" with you? You seem to be one of those people about whom they say: Although the count on the head is tedious, everything is useless .......
        2. The comment was deleted.
        3. Bormanxnumx
          Bormanxnumx 31 January 2017 12: 10
          +1
          2. It was established the absolute dominance of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, which influenced the following events:

          To a greater extent, this was due to the lack of conditioned coal for the Goeben, and not the actions of the Black Sea Fleet.
          1. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 31 January 2017 12: 21
            +8
            Quote: BORMAN82
            2. It was established the absolute dominance of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, which influenced the following events:
            To a greater extent, this was due to the lack of conditioned coal for the Goeben, and not the actions of the Black Sea Fleet.

            Well, with a lot of itching you can always find a reason .... like a "dancer." Goebenu ....
          2. BRONEVIK
            BRONEVIK 31 January 2017 12: 23
            +17
            First of all, this is the result of the appearance of the Black Sea dreadnoughts Empress Maria and Empress Catherine the Great. Geben could only hide in the base
          3. hohol95
            hohol95 31 January 2017 15: 19
            +2
            At a distance of 100-120 miles from the entrance to the Bosphorus Strait, on the southern coast of the Black Sea, there is an area supplying coal to the capital of Turkey. It was necessary to export coal by sea through the port of Zunguldak, since there were no land roads connecting the region with Istanbul. In peacetime, the Turks also used imported - mainly English - coal. But as soon as Turkey entered the war and the blockade of the Dardanelles from the Aegean Sea began, the influx of foreign coal ceased, peacetime reserves were quickly depleted, and Zunguldak remained the only source of fuel. That is why the sea route between the Bosphorus and the port of Zunguldak from the very beginning of the war has become an important artery for the Turks. On this artery day and night on dozens of steamers, hundreds of sailing ships, on everything that could sail a distance of 100 miles with a load of several tons, fuel was continuously distilled.
            To stop or significantly reduce the supply of coal to the Istanbul region is the combat mission set by the Russian command before the Black Sea Fleet at the very beginning of hostilities.
            And this task was very successfully solved by Russian sailors. In the first year of the war alone, 58 steamers and an uncountable number of sailing ships carrying coal were sunk. Then the Turks had to abandon their warships to guard the coal ships - first destroyers, then cruisers, including the Breslau. But this did not help either.
            Almost every day, Russian destroyers still destroyed the last steamboats and sailboats, seized dozens of fishing vessels. The coal blockade was already strangling the Turks. And then the Germans and Turks decided to take the extreme measure - to send their strongest warship, the Goeben, into the sea to cover ships returning from Zunguldak with coal.
          4. hohol95
            hohol95 31 January 2017 15: 31
            +1
            The reason for the start of operations against the Coal Region was the request of the Allied Naval Command, acting against the Dardanelles, to stop the supply of coal to Constantinople and thereby cause coal hunger. This request, transmitted through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and provoking a rate directive dated November 1, 1914, marked the beginning of a long series of “Zunguldak” operations and the blockade of the Ugolny district, which continued at the Black Sea theater with various intensities almost until the end of the war. In total during 1914, 1915, 1916 and before the February Revolution, the Black Sea Fleet carried out: 5 bombardments of Zunguldak and coal points by large ships, more than 20 bombing by destroyers and small vessels, 1 attempt to block the Zunguldak harbor by flooding ships, several bombardment operations from the air and, finally, countless searches to destroy coal transport on transports, sailboats and barges, carried out by destroyers, submarines and auxiliary vessels serving under the blockade.
        4. Comrade Stalin
          Comrade Stalin 31 January 2017 14: 47
          +1
          Monarchism laughing ?
          1. The German offensive was halted in Western Belarus and the Baltic states. Not on the banks of the Volga, Neva and Kuban, as under Stalin, not in Moscow, as under Alexander I and Kutuzov, and not near Poltava, as under Peter the Great!

          Do not compare incomparable. In the Second World War, Germany did not have a Western Front, Hitler threw all his forces to the East. In addition, he had the resources of the conquered France, Benelux, Denmark, and Norway. If RI had fought one-on-one with Germany and the AB in 1914, there would have been a bat and Kaiser troops would have marched in a parade along Palace Square and Red Square.
          Since the fall of 1915, which coincides with the adoption by the king of the supreme leadership of the armed forces of the Empire:

          Have you read the diary of the Rag King? Where does he write, how he walked, shot at crows and cats, spanned the garden, slept, ate? Yes, he was a very great leader.
          1. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 31 January 2017 16: 27
            +8
            Oh ho ho! I expressed my disagreement with the phrase "... the Germans beat the Russian troops as they wanted and where they wanted ..." and showed that, despite the failures and even defeats, the Russian troops were not a "whipping boy" as you try "prove" you! You, a couple of "like-minded people", cling to each letter .... I suppose that you really do not need the truth ... you, most importantly, leave the "battlefield" behind you! Why should I indulge you, repeating the same thing again and again!? Yes, I was just not interested, even bored! For I already said: Although the number on the head is comical, it’s all the same useless to common sense to “reach out” to you!
        5. Uncle Murzik
          Uncle Murzik 31 January 2017 16: 29
          +2
          Nikolaevich I that you are all about the Turks and the Turks lol It seems that the losses of Germany and its allies in both world wars, including and broken down by the main fronts - Western and Eastern. But the losses do not always reflect the true picture of the intensity of the fighting, the tension of the nation in one direction or another, and most importantly, the dangers and “values” of the opponents. For example, a significant portion of the prisoners captured by the Western Allies in April-May 1945 represented our legitimate prey.
          Therefore, I decided to figure out - and what forces was Germany (and its allies) forced to exert in the West and East during these wars?
          Introduced the unit - division-month (such as man-day). To take into account the Allied divisions, I applied a lowering coefficient (it is clear that their combat effectiveness was lower than that of the German ones) - 0,75 for the 1st MV and 0,5 for the 2nd (the increased role of equipment and maneuver operations made the gap larger), except for the Finnish army - it was considered equal to German. It did not take into account individual brigades, the confrontation during the Strange War of 1939-40, operations in Poland and Yugoslavia (the Germans did not clash with the troops of the Western allies there), the Italian and Serbian Fronts of the 1st MV (except for the forces opposing the Anglo-French) and troops opposing the Romanians on the Eastern Front; cavalry divisions are not counted. In the 2nd MV, it took into account various infantry (including motorized, mountain, etc.) and tank divisions. The calculations were carried out according to Zayonchkovsky (1st MV) and Müller, ours, Gillebrandt (2nd MV). Naturally rounded, but the general ratio and order of numbers are correct.
          World War I:
          Eastern Front (with the Caucasus, August 1914-December 1917, inclusive):
          2200 German division-months, 1500 (3/4) Austro-Hungarian, Turkish and Bulgarian division-months (including 350 - Caucasian Front), TOTAL - 3700 division-months against Russia
          Western Front (with Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Thessaloniki, Palestine, Italian Front - opposing only the Anglo-French!):
          6300 German division months (including 4400 - until January 1918) and 450 other division months (with a 3/4 coefficient, incl. 300 - until January 1918), TOTAL - 6750 division months against the Entente and Americans (including 4700 - until January 1918)
          TOTAL Germany and its allies set up 10450 division months (8400 - until January 1918), incl. about 2/3 - against the West (55% against the West until January 1918). Separately in Germany - a total of 8500 German division months (6600 until January 1918), including almost 75% against the West (2/3 against the West until January 1918)
          Thus, the West took over the bulk of the troops of the Central Powers, especially the German ones - the most efficient and won, Russia was opposed by a smaller part of the enemy forces, but it lost the war. What’s the conclusion? But it is very simple - the supposedly rapidly developing and advanced Russian empire was not able to compete against Germany on equal terms, while Russia, in the form of the USSR, passed the test, won
          1. Rotmistr
            Rotmistr 31 January 2017 16: 50
            +16
            Well, you give a pancake. The same phrases for all occasions. At least something new would be added for interest - apart from the numbers of unknown and beloved Mueller-Gillebrandt.
            1. Uncle Murzik
              Uncle Murzik 1 February 2017 08: 43
              +2
              Rotmistr the fact is that I do not give facts to you, you all already know perfectly well, but to people like Nikolaevich I from whom there is one verbiage! hi
          2. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 1 February 2017 10: 18
            +1
            I appreciate your information with gratitude! hi
            1. Uncle Murzik
              Uncle Murzik 1 February 2017 12: 26
              +1
              Russian historian A. Kersnovsky in his work “History of the Russian Army” writes:
              “Unprecedented stress entailed unprecedented losses. The size of these losses can never be determined exactly. The Russian high command was completely not interested in the already used human meat.
              The Central Sanitary Administration was not interested in this either: in hospitals there were no statistics of those who died from wounds, which cannot but stun the researcher.
              Losses were calculated during and after the war by individuals using incomplete and unsystematized data. They were random in nature and led to completely different, often fantastic conclusions (suffice it to say that the number, for example, of prisoners was determined in the range from 1,3 million to 4,5 million people).
              The bet was not at all interested in the issue of losses incurred.
              People who for three consecutive years glorified millions of Russian officers and soldiers for slaughter, invented the “double bypass of the Masurian Lakes”, “the offensive in the heart of Germany”, gave the frenzied armies frenzied directives “Not a Step Back!”, Erected pyramids of skulls on Bzur, Naroch, Kovel, these people have not once in three years taken an interest in finding out what, at least approximately, Russia and the Russian army cost their strategic work.
              When in July 1917, General Jean Janin, the French representative at Stavka, requested information about the losses suffered by Russia, Stavka was taken by surprise. After three months of fussy searches, Stavka presented the first figures to the French. Only 700 thousand people were listed as killed, but 2,9 million were captured. Giving these explanations without any reservations or explanations, our military bureaucrats did not bother to realize that the calculation of the killed was carried out at all satisfactorily only on the troops of the Northern Front. The headquarters was completely unaware of the fact that this kind of "information" would only dishonor the Russian army in the eyes of foreigners.
              According to the Military Department, submitted shortly before the February Revolution to the Council of Ministers, our "final losses" - those killed, died from wounds and illnesses, people with disabilities, missing and captured - were determined from the beginning of the war to December 1916 to 5,5 million people.
              According to information officially reported to the Russian Red Cross by the enemy, by the winter of 1916/17, there were 2,2 million prisoners of war in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. This figure is quite reliable (the enemy had no reason to downplay it).
              Subtracting this number from the total, we get 3,3 million Russian losses only before the February revolution.
              1. Uncle Murzik
                Uncle Murzik 1 February 2017 12: 27
                0
                We will continue! There were 200 thousand people in unauthorized absence (in other words, so many military deserted). 600 thousand people were commissioned from the army due to injuries received in battle, 300 thousand people were commissioned due to illness.
                Adding these losses, we get 1,2 million crippled, dead from wounds and deserters.
                The remaining 2,1 million were considered dead (we repeat once again - this is before the February Revolution).
                There are also ambiguities with the generally accepted figure of 2,4 million Russian prisoners during the WWII.
                In 1919, “Centrifugal”, an organization involved in the return of prisoners to Russia, took into account the following number of captured Russian military personnel according to its personal lists and registration cards:
                In Germany - 2 million 335 thousand 441
                In Austria-Hungary - 1 million 503 thousand 412.
                In Turkey - 19 thousand 795.
                In Bulgaria - 2 thousand 452.
                Total - 3 million 911 thousand 100 people.
                Add here and 200 thousand dead in captivity and get the figure of more than 4,1 million people. It is hard to imagine that another 1,7 million were surrendered in the year since the February Revolution and before the conclusion of the Brest Peace. Most likely, the initial figure of 2,4 million for the winter of 1917 was underestimated. Another important point. The number of Russian soldiers captured in the First World War - 4,1 million - in relative terms is much larger than the surrendered of Soviet soldiers in the Second World War. 14,5 million people were mobilized in WWII, i.e. prisoners made up 28,2% of the army. 34 million people were mobilized in WWII, 5,6 million people, or 16,2% of the army, were captured. And this is taking into account the fact that WWII lasted almost half a year for the USSR more than for WWII.
                That is, not only the number of tsarist generals who surrendered, well describes the spirit (or rather, its absence) of the Russian army in WWI, but also the total number of prisoners! Losses and condition of the Russian army during the First ...
                scisne.net ›a-890
      2. Rotmistr
        Rotmistr 31 January 2017 06: 12
        +18
        The experience of the Soviet-Finnish war led Hitler to the opinion that the USSR was a "colossus with feet of clay." And underestimate their homeland can only, as a true comrade Stalin would say - only enemies of the people
  4. The centurion
    The centurion 30 January 2017 18: 25
    +4
    It should be said that with the general equality of the pre-war mistakes and miscalculations by the military-political leadership of the countries of the Entente blocs and the Triple Alliance, there were also nuances that allowed Germany to have some military advantage at the beginning of the war. One of the main was the superiority of the Reichswehr in heavy artillery. By the beginning of the war, Germany had 1688 heavy field artillery guns, Austria-Hungary - 168, Russia - 240, Great Britain - 126, France - 84. This was due to the fact that the German command always proceeded from the fact that they would have to break through powerful lines of border fortresses and fortified areas, for which there were connections of powerful and super-power long-range and siege artillery. However, at the very beginning of the war, another worthy use was found for this artillery, the counter-battery struggle. Especially catastrophic situation has developed on the Franco-German front. By the number of heavy guns the Germans outnumbered the French dozens of times. The German army, using its advantage in long-range large-caliber guns, destroyed the French light field artillery at long range with impunity and inflicted heavy casualties on personnel. With the help of intelligence information from airplanes and aerostats, German heavy artillery quickly led to silence all the light field artillery of the French.
    Infantry units were left without artillery fire support and allied forces were shot with impunity by German artillery. The French armies on the whole front, suffering heavy losses from enemy artillery fire, retreated. There was a gap between the army of Belgium and the left flank of the 5 th army of the French, and their retreat went in different directions.
    https://topwar.ru/63856-kazaki-i-pervaya-mirovaya
    -voyna-chast-ii-1914-god.html

  5. Niccola Mack
    Niccola Mack 30 January 2017 19: 04
    +9
    Thus, by the beginning of World War II, the organization of artillery assets of the leading military powers was based on the task of supporting the advance of their infantry on the battlefield. The main qualities presented to field tools are mobility in conditions of maneuver warfare.

    So it was necessary to prepare for a maneuver war, to develop deep breakthroughs, the organization of supply, reconnaissance, and the use of radio communications.
    And at the very beginning, the armies of Samsonov and Rennenkampf could decide the outcome of the war.
    The war with the Japanese taught little. The incompetent organization and management ruined Samsonov’s army.
    And then a positional war began - for which German artillery was preparing.

    Good article - especially detailed numbers!
  6. Cartalon
    Cartalon 30 January 2017 19: 21
    +9
    The Russians had too few guns on the battalion affected by Turkestanism, they really thought that it was no longer necessary.
  7. hohol95
    hohol95 30 January 2017 22: 18
    +3

    "Russian Field Artillery 1382-1917 years" series "military chronicle". The book consists of several chapters, which describe the design of tools from the 14th to the beginning of the 20th century, pages 112, many illustrations, drawings.
  8. CTABEP
    CTABEP April 1 2017 12: 46
    0
    The article is not bad, short and to the point, it’s a pity only about Austria-Hungary there is no information (although, their situation was sadder than all emnip - there were few guns, in terms of quantity and quality of shells they were inferior to all). By the way, the ratios were considered by guns per 1k bayonets as - for an army of war or peacetime - I have something in terms of converting something average (in the Republic of Ingushetia the peacetime army is 1,35 million, this gives 5,3 guns per thousand soldiers) ?
    The Germans generally perfectly prepared, the only ones who did not have strong problems with shells / ammunition in 1915, who initially had heavy art. And after all, just a little was not enough in 1914 to take Paris - and then history would have turned in a completely different way. But in the war of depletion against 3 empires, the strength was not enough.
  9. Seamaster
    Seamaster April 10 2017 10: 09
    0
    And this is also taking into account the fact that WWII lasted almost half a year for the USSR more than for WWII.
    -------------------------------------------------
    -------------------------------
    And most importantly - in World War I, the enemies retreated / attacked their two, and, therefore, at the same speed.
    There were no bridges and roads destroyed by the “pieces”, there were no deep embraces by tank and mechanized units, there were no airborne assaults thrown out on the retreat route and, as a result, numerous boilers.
    And in World War I they gave up interestingly.
    For example, Kornilov, learning that his division was surrounded, immediately ordered to surrender.
    Hero, however.