The main disadvantage of the “Tamir” missile system of the “Iron Dome” complex is the impossibility of effectively intercepting high-altitude stratospheric targets, as well as supersonic objects moving at speeds of more than 2200 km / h after
The armament of strategic importance for the Israel Defense Forces, without a doubt, is the missile defense system of the missile defense system “Iron Dome” (“Iron Dome”). Advanced high-energy radar with AFAR EL / M-2084 manufactured by Elta Systems, as well as Tamir medium-range anti-aircraft guided missiles make it possible to intercept BM-21 Grad and BM-27 Uragan unguided rockets (NURS) at ranges of about 70 km, as well as large-caliber 120 mm and 152 mm mortar and artillery shells at a distance of about 40-60 km. In addition, the list of targets of the Iron Dome complex includes complex aeroballistic targets, anti-radar missiles and all types of combat aviation. Multifunction radar EL / M-2, operating at frequencies of 4-2048 GHz of a decimeter S-band, is capable of detecting targets with EPRs of the order of 0,015 m2 (152 mm artillery shell) at a distance of 100 km, and a 220 mm unguided missile 9M27F / K (" Hurricane ”) with an EPR of about 0,035 m2 - at a range of about 125 km. The energy capabilities of this radar are significantly higher than most of the well-known counter-battery artillery reconnaissance radars, and promising high-performance computing tools make it possible to minimize the time of detection and "capture by precise auto tracking" of enemy launching shells. The reaction time of the complex is not more than 1 s.
ABOUT THE EFFICIENCY OF THE IRON DOME ANTI-ROCKET COMPLEX: NOT ALL IS IDEAL
Opinions about the effectiveness of the "Iron Dome" in combat conditions from different sources vary greatly. For example, experts close to the manufacturer of the Iron Dome and the Israeli Ministry of Defense claim that the efficiency of the complex is about 90%, which was partially confirmed during Operation Cloud Pillar, when the first modification of the Iron Dome Block I complex intercepted 421 from 1198 Palestinian unguided rockets, among which were various modifications of Qassam, Grada and Fajra. If you trust the Israeli military, most of the Palestinian air attack weapons that did not threaten Israeli cities and "went into milk" were not intercepted by the Iron Dome because of the relatively high cost of the Tamir missiles (62 thousand dollars per unit), which explains 35% of intercepted Palestinian missiles. In other words, only 525 missiles posed a threat to the country's military and civilian targets, and 673 went into the milk (approximate figures). Other sources (both Israeli and Palestinian) provide diametrically opposite information.
For example, representatives of the Palestinian-Serb militarized unit Al-Quds Brigade, who today, along with the government forces of Syria, Hezbollah, Syrian militias and the Russian Aerospace Forces participate in the antiterrorist operation in Aleppo province, in the spring of 2014 of the year "Artisanal" and quite effective tactical MLRS caliber 107 mm. The range of the system does not exceed 8 km, but the effective scattering surface is no more than 0,01 м2, which is a very serious obstacle for the radar detection and guidance systems of the Iron Dome complex. In practice, this was confirmed during the “retaliation” strike operation for killing IDF officers 3's activists of the Al-Quds division of 11 in March of March 2014. Then in the direction of Israel from the "partisan" PU was released 130 unguided rockets type "Quds", 60 of which crossed the border and fell on Israeli territory. Only three homemade rockets were intercepted by Tamir missiles. Perhaps knowing the safe trajectory of the flight of Palestinian rockets, the calculation of the “Iron Dome” saved the expensive Tamirs. But considering that the manufacturing company Rafael claims to have a decent portfolio of orders worth more than 50 million dollars, such savings on the demonstration of combat effectiveness at least inexplicable.
Another fact, testifying not in favor of the “Iron Dome”, is its huge “dead zone” (the distance from the division to the near line of possible use of missiles), which is 4,5 km. This suggests that if a light uncontrollable C-8 projectile with PU-BNNXXMNNXX PU adapted for ground use from a distance of 8 — 1 km was used against the Iron Dome complex, the complex would be defenseless. Not only foreign amateurs and specialists in the field of aerospace, but also local experts argue about the huge “dead zone”. Thus, Nathan Faber, a doctor in the field of missile defense of the Technion of Haifa, argued that Tamir anti-aircraft missiles have low interception capabilities for enemy missiles and shells at a distance of up to 2,5 km. Clearly, he was referring to targets that are already directly on the last part of the trajectory (below 5 km). As is known, even for such long-range air defense missile systems such as the Triumph C-15 (with the vertical launch method 5H400Е48 and 6М2Е9), the “dead zone” does not exceed 96-2 km. What then is the reason for such a large “dead zone” at the “Iron Dome” that launches “Tamira” at an angle of 2-3 degrees?
The diagram shows the direct stage of interception of an unguided missile of the MLRS Grad. The most optimal angles of dispersion of the fragments of the warhead of the Tamir interceptor missile to initiate the combat equipment of the enemy NURS are given. Undermining the 11-kilogram warhead of the Tamir anti-aircraft missile system occurs according to a laser fuse
The fact is that in developing the Tamir anti-missile, more emphasis was placed not on supermaneuverable qualities, but on the adjusted (verified) optimization of the fragmentation of warhead fragments for the most effective target destruction, as well as on an advanced laser fuse with additional optical-electronic sensors, which contribute to the timely disruption of the warhead. As a result, the Tamir missile defense system did not receive either a gas-dynamic declination system (gas-jet planes in the solid-propellant nozzle channel) or a gas-dynamic “belt” with nozzles of transverse control engines (DPU) for a quick exit to the target immediately after launch. For maneuverability, only the nasal aerodynamic control surfaces are responsible, forming the “duck” scheme. Naturally, only aerodynamic controls will not allow an actively accelerating interceptor rocket to reach targets in a radius of 3 or 5 km for hundredths of a second. The 9М331 anti-aircraft missiles of the Tor-М1 complex for this purpose have nasal gas generators for declining to the target after launch, which reduced the “dead zone” to just 1 km; the presence of such devices in "Tamira" is not reported. Let us turn to the topic of the sale of complexes to Azerbaijan.
ISKANDERS-E AT ARMED ARMENIAN ARMAMENT IS THE BEST HOLDING FOR BAKU
The first information regarding the sale of the complex to Azerbaijan was published by Baku news agency 1news.az October 7, 2016, with reference to the deputy of the National Assembly of Azerbaijan Evda Abramov. Confirmation came on December 17, 2016 from the APA news agency with reference to the country's defense industry minister, Yaver Jamalov. The contract for the purchase of the Iron Dome was concluded directly between the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense and the Israel Defense Department's SIBAT arms export department. Thus, the South Caucasus Republic becomes the first official foreign buyer of this tactical missile defense system.
Rumors about the preparation of this contract have been on the sidelines of Azerbaijani departments for more than one year. And there is no doubt that Baku will continue to organize acts of aggression and provocation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, as it was in early April of 2016, during the “Four-Day War”, but now also wants to hide its servicemen under an “anti-missile umbrella "The Iron Dome". The continuation of the previous strategy of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic can be made by the very same stroke with the extradition of Ramil Safarov, an Azerbaijani soldier who, while undergoing English courses in Hungary, chopped an Armenian soldier with an ax, after which he received the title of Major from the President cash reward and new living space. The accelerated contract on the Iron Dome and another important event was the supply of Iskander-E operational tactical missile systems for the Armenian armed forces. The transfer of the most modern in the world OTRK took place within the framework of the export credit granted to Armenia for the purchase of Russian weapons worth about $ 200 million. For the first time, the complexes demonstrated 16 on September 2016 of the year at the rehearsal of the parade in Yerevan in honor of the 25 anniversary of the independence of the republic, which caused sharp indignation from Baku. On the same day, President Aliyev held an official meeting with the participation of high-ranking officials of law enforcement agencies, where further tactics of possible hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic were developed, including launching missile and artillery strikes against key strategic targets of Armenia. Only here, judging by what is happening, they do not think about Armenia’s membership in the CSTO and other shortcomings of the “salutary” “Iron Dome” in Baku.
ACHIEVEMENT OF EXCELLENCE OVER ARMENIA IN NKR CONDITIONS WILL REMAIN BAKU'S FANTASTIC DREAM
Today, the basis of Azerbaijan’s air defense-missile defense is: 3 of the C-300PMU-2 “Designs Search Engine” divisions (purchased by 16 PU and 112 and the 48XX6EXNNXX control signal), 2 Division (battery) of the “Barak-1” AE missile defense system of the Barak-8 control unit in Israel’s production systems of the Russian Federation’s production in Israel’s production systems of the Russian Federation’s production of the Barak-75 air defense system. of type 18А9М310-1 (Buk-М2 / 1 SAM), 2 of Tor-М8 self-propelled systems, the same Belarusian S-Tlet 2, as well as Israeli Spyder-SR SAMs. Let us estimate the combat potential of this layered air defense / missile defense system. The above means will be sufficient to only partially block the airspace over the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. If only one C-XNUMPPMU-38 division with 300-2 launchers (more divisions of Baku cannot be allocated to the NKR direction due to the need to maintain air defense over strategically important objects in the central regions of Azerbaijan and on the coast of the Caspian Sea), the airspace above the NKR Partially controlled. Difficult terrain will not allow you to control altitudes up to 6 — 8 km even if you use a low-altitude detector (NVO) 1,5H2,5 and a universal tower 76В6М for XRUMXNNXXXXXUMUM40. The situation is similar with the Azerbaijani “Bukami” and “Baraka-6”.
A large number of closely located mountain ranges and elevations greatly facilitate the task of “hacking” even the most powerful missile defense systems, which can be easily accomplished by the Armenian Su-25 attack aircraft, as well as the tactical aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces deployed in the framework of the Allied Republic. From this we make an unequivocal conclusion - dear “Three Hundreds”, “Buki” and “Baraki”, which are of strategic importance for Baku, will not impose upon the Nagorno-Karabakh theater of military operations. In addition, the most complex wooded landscape of the NKR mountain ranges, where the Azerbaijani Armed Forces cannot find a lot of flat lanes more than 100 meters suitable for operational advancement, will not allow traveling around the terrain even with such compact self-propelled anti-aircraft missile systems like Tor-M2. or "Spyder-SR". And the Spyder-SR’s sense against low-altitude targets will not be very much, because the minimum height of the target to be hit by this complex is limited to 20 meters, while many modern means of air attack approach the target at lower altitudes ( 7 to 15 m).
Self-propelled launcher SAMs "Spyder-SR"
The Spyder-SR mobile short-range air defense missile system has positive features: the Derby and Python-5 air combat missiles are used as anti-aircraft guided missiles. On one BM-launcher, there is a quad module on the 2 Derby missiles and the Python 2 missiles. The first one has an initial speed in 1000 m / s, and is also capable of maneuvering with overloads up to 50 units, these figures are higher than those of the 9М331 SAM of the Tor-М1 complex. The Derby anti-aircraft missile is equipped with an active radar GPS, so that even in poor meteorological conditions, the rocket can immediately capture an air target without the aid of an EL / M-2106NG "ATAR-3D" radar detection and target indication, the operator can turn off the radar and without opening their positions, expect a successful interception. Radio command guidance in the Tor-M1 ZRSK, in poor meteorological conditions, requires constant guidance radar operation, up to and including target destruction, which can reveal its own positions for the enemy’s electronic intelligence assets.
The Python-5 rocket has even more outstanding parameters. First, the Piton-5 is the only short-range interceptor missile that uses a bispectral optical-electronic homing head simultaneously with an infrared long-wave channel (8-13 μm) and a television channel (targeting the target silhouette). It provides for the defeat of warm-contrast air targets, small “cold” objects (territorial and position reconnaissance UAVs), artillery shells and guided bombs. The rocket has the highest performance characteristics achieved by the use of the largest, in the practice of military rocket production, destabilizers, large aerodynamic nose rudders, and a gas-dynamic control system of an interceptor or gas-jet type. The reloading limit of the Python-5 design is estimated by the Rafael developer company at 70 units, and the coordinator’s sweep angle is rated at 75-90 degrees. The maximum speed of the rocket is also the highest among all known URVV melee (about 4100 km / h). A dual-mode RTDT has a period of 22 with (4 with in accelerating mode and 18 with in marching mode): this indicates the possibility of using the thrust vector deflection system in all parts of the flight path. The only drawback of the rocket is the absence of the short-wavelength range (3-5 μm) of the operation of the GOS, which creates problems with the introduction of a mode of operation on ground targets.
“Spiders” and “Torahs” Azerbaijani military units will be able to use exclusively on small highways, which will make the process of detecting them using ORTR Tu-214Р planes even easier. As for the “Three Hundreds”, “Barracks”, “Bukov” and “The Iron Dome”, the main bets were made on the formation of the airborne defense line of the advanced fortifications of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, located a few dozen kilometers from the NKR border. At a distance of 40-60 km from the active site of the theater of military operations, the Armenian Armed Forces do not have the ability to suppress Azerbaijani motorized rifle brigades and strongholds using the Grad MLRS, only the RSNO 9А52 Smerch with 12 guides, or long-range ones, have the necessary range for this Barrel Artillery (203-mm SAU "Peony"). To protect it from such artillery, Azerbaijan purchased the Iron Doom tactical anti-missile system: in fact, many NURS (as in the case of Grad) will not have to intercept, and the defense will be sufficient. According to sources, the 4x20 PU "Iron Doom" with 80 Tamir interceptor missiles ready for launch was purchased.
In this configuration, the Iron Dome can reflect full volleys of approximately 4 or 5 Smerch MLRS combat vehicles, as well as various modifications of the Pion 203-mm projectiles even a couple of tens of kilometers from the defended object. But this applies only to the NURS approaching the anti-missile battery, when interception occurs in the forward hemisphere (PPS). When the “Iron Dome” misses at least one high-speed supersonic NURS, the Tamirs will not be able to intercept it afterwards (to the rear hemisphere). A very negative feature of the Tamir missiles is their relatively low maximum speed, which is about 2600 km / h, while most MLRS missiles have speed in 3-4М. The highest efficiency of "Tamirov" is achieved only when intercepting targets on opposing trajectories.
MAIN FAULTS OF “IRON DOME” AND AZERBAIJANI AIRCRAFT IN GENERAL
One of the most important qualities of the Iron Dome complex is the ability to work in a tactical missile attack warning system (EWS). This function is assigned to the EL / M-2084 MRLS, which can detect 300-mm unguided missile type 9М55Ф at a distance of about 110 km. Thus, the operators of the complex can not only intercept a part of these shells, but also notify the advanced units of the imminent attack by rocket artillery, so that the latter can move from open spaces to shelters. This multifunctional radar station has a not very good feature, which we did not discuss at the beginning of the article. The EL / M-2084 station has an extremely small viewing area in the elevation plane, which is only 40 degrees. This is absolutely not enough for intercepting aeroballistic and planning means of air attack, which “fit” (dive) to the target at 50 angles and more degrees from the stratosphere. In simpler language, over the Iron Dome division, a “dead zone funnel” is formed with an 100 angle of hail, through which the EL / M-2084 radar can be easily destroyed. Moreover, to get to this “funnel”, the enemy’s air attack means absolutely no need to initially climb 35 km, because the Israeli brainchild has another drawback - the maximum height of the targets hit, which is about 12 km (the majority of types of tactical aircraft).
Now we have also determined the fact that at the moment of an intensive and well-thought-out anti-radar air operation of the enemy, the battery of the Iron Dome anti-missile complex would not last long; and this requires the involvement of a pair of Buk-М1-2 or Triumph divisions (to eliminate the funnel). In fact, the Israelis, in the process of designing the complex, did not teach the weak points of the Egyptian “Kub” air defense systems, which have similar craters of “dead zones” through which Hel Haavir often managed to successfully destroy 1X91 self-propelled radar systems. For comparison, I will give you the dimensions of the “funnels” of our complexes: all modifications of the “Thors” have a total 52 degree, the same number of the multifunctional 30Н6Е radar (elevation areas of the 0 to 64 complex degrees). The “funnels” of the “Three Hundreds” are not so small, but in order to penetrate them painlessly, the enemy aircraft must initially fly around it even higher than the maximum height of the C-300PM1 target they hit, which is about 35 - 45 km.
Now we will discuss the most sensitive issue for the General Staff of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces - the presence of Iskander-E operational-tactical missile systems in Armenia. Baku’s fears on this score are far from groundless. After all, the realities are such that all the air defense systems of Azerbaijan, which are in service with the air defense system of Azerbaijan, do not have the ability to resist Iskanders. Let's start with the main object of our today's review, the Iron Dome complex.
As we have already seen, his Tamir anti-missiles are equipped only with aerodynamic controls in the forward part of the hull. Consequently, the maximum overloads implemented by the rocket barely reach 40G; this is quite enough for intercepting rocket and artillery shells flying along flat, mating and attached trajectories, especially since these projectiles do not make complicated anti-aircraft maneuvers that complicate the process of intercepting Tamir missile guidance and control systems. Another thing is the operational-tactical ballistic missile (OTBR) 9М723-1 / К5 of the Iskander-E / M complex. Its radar signature corresponds to an 122-mm artillery projectile (0,015 м2), but this is no longer just an unguided "pig", but an actively maneuvering "smart" high-precision object. The 9М723К5 rocket dives at a target at an angle of about 80 degrees, which creates enormous problems for detecting and “capturing” the Iron Dome and C-300PMU-2 radar, the ballistic missile “enters” into the funnel of the “dead zone” from 50 km . Even if the EL / M-2084 (“Iron Dome”) guidance radars and 30Н6Е2 (С-300ПМУ-2) radar can detect and escort her at a distance of 80-110 km, it will be difficult to intercept it even if Azerbaijan is zenithed - missile divisions will overlap each other funnels "dead zones".
First, official sources say that the C-300PMU-2 radar equipment (30Н6Х2 and 64НXXUMUMX) have an EPR target of 6 m0,02, and the XBNUMXXXUMNXX2 EPR has a similar pattern, a similar pattern is applied by a similar pattern. Secondly, the rocket on the final part of the trajectory performs intensive anti-aircraft maneuvers with overload up to 9 units, which requires interceptor missiles to maneuver with 723 times greater overloads (at least 5-30 units). Antiaircraft 2,5N62E65 missiles, "Tamir" structurally designed for overload only about 48 units and upgraded SAM type 6M2 complex "Buk-M40-9" -. Not more than 317-1 units that will not step closer Azerbaijani calculations to success. interception of Iskander-E missiles. Thirdly, the hypersonic flying speed of an operational-tactical ballistic missile 2М25К27, depending on the target range, fluctuates within 9 - 723 m / s, which is far beyond the maximum speed limits of the targets targeted by the S-5PS, Iron Dome, as well as Buk-M2100-2600. Imagine 300 1М2К8 rockets rushing towards defended targets from a height of 9 km at an angle of 723-5 degrees. Flight time (at a speed of 50-80М) from the top point of the trajectory will be about 85 s, and the rockets will also maneuver wildly, having a radar visibility, slightly more than the average bird. It is only possible to dream about the interception of such a product to the Azerbaijani calculation of the Triumph air defense system, and Baku absolutely cannot do anything here.
WHY GEORGIA CHOSE SAMP-T ZENIT-ROCKET COMPLEXES?
The Defense Ministry of Georgia distinguished itself by a more well-thought strategy of counteraction against our Iskander-E. While in the spring of 2014-year, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan refused the offer of the French side to conclude a contract with Eurosam for the purchase of several divisions of the SAMP-T anti-aircraft missile system, the Georgian office immediately began to consider the tempting offer. Georgians have repeatedly expressed concern about the deployment of our Iskander-M complexes in South Ossetia. For example, December 23 2015, the then Georgian Defense Minister Tina Khidasheli, called the placement of our OTRK in the South Ossetian settlement of Java “a threat of a regional scale, as well as a huge challenge for the entire South Caucasus,” apparently referring to Turkey and Azerbaijan. To date, information about the arrival of the SAMP-T kits in Georgia has not been observed, but the execution of the contract may follow at any time.
A very important reason why “Iskander-M” must necessarily be on combat duty in the South Military District and in the Caucasus is not only the aggressive actions of Baku against the NKR and Armenia, but also the strategic partnership of Georgia with NATO, as well as USA. Official Tbilisi, which continues to consider power strategies to return South Ossetia and Abkhazia, whose population has been subjected to genocide by Georgia for many years, slowly and confidently turns the country into a NATO strategic strategic base to control the southern regions of the Russian Federation. The base of this bridgehead is the Vaziani military base, located near Tbilisi. Starting from 2015, this military object acquired strategic importance for Georgia and NATO: it hosted the first joint military exercises of the Georgian armed forces with the multinational composition of the North Atlantic Alliance called Agile Spirit-2015 (Agile Spirit-2015). The second, most large-scale, maneuvers were conducted from 11 to 26 in May of 2016 of the year as part of the exercise “Noble Partner” (“High-level partnership”). Then, for the first time in storiesAmerican main battle Tanks M1A2 "Abrams", as well as BMP M2 "Bradley" were transferred almost to the "gate" of the Southern Military District of Russia. US NE units in Europe had a unique opportunity to test their equipment on the lands of the Caucasus, which is another alarming sign. The contingent that took part in those exercises was represented by 1300 troops from Georgia, the USA, and the UK.
The latest Vaziani-based exercises called Georgia-NATO-2016 took place from 10 to 20 in November of 2016. Their goal was a general check and refinement of the level of coordination between various military units of such alliance countries as the USA, Great Britain, Bulgaria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Lithuania and Latvia, as well as Slovenia, Macedonia, Hungary and Romania. In addition to NATO officers, officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were also present here, who, after complete defeat in the confrontation with the people's militia corps of the LDNR (Novorossiya Armed Forces), are obviously preparing to perform cannon fodder of the NATO bloc in any escalation involving the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The importance of these exercises for the alliance is evidenced by such an important fact as the inclusion of the NATO Ground Forces Command (LANDCOM) in the territory that is outside the military-political bloc. The Caucasian theater of operations is becoming for NATO a very important frontier of operational and strategic blocking of Russia in the south.
Against this background, the reason for such a high interest of Tbilisi in the procurement of SAMP-T anti-aircraft missile systems, whose anti-aircraft guided missiles possess much higher anti-missile qualities than the slow Tamir interceptors, is perfectly clarified. If we compare the Israeli “Iron Dome” with the European “SAMP-T”, then in their tactical and technical characteristics one can immediately notice the radically different purpose. The Iron Dome is designed for the early detection of unguided and corrected missiles, and then their destruction using a properly optimized zone of dispersion of fragments of the Tamir interceptor missile. For maximum fire performance (target canal) of the Iron Dome complex, an EL / M-2084 radar is used, capable of tracking NURS or artillery projectile or 200 aerodynamic targets as well as active radar homing, allowing to launch into the air. up to several dozen expensive Tamir antimissiles.
“SAMP-T” is a completely different air defense missile system with pronounced anti-missile qualities inherent in the best anti-missile complexes of the 21st century. First, it is a multifunctional radar with AFAR "Arabel". Operating in a centimeter X-band (8-12 GHz frequency and a wavelength from 2,5 to 3,75 cm), the station has a much higher accuracy than the decimeter Israeli EL / M-2084. Despite the fact that the Arabel range indicators are about 3,5-4 worse in times (the “fighter” is found from 70-100 km, and the low-profile OTBR is 25-35 km), this does not prevent it from aiming effectively at 16 air targets as much Aster-30 anti-aircraft missiles. At the same time, the station can carry out simultaneous 130 start of aerial aerodynamic or ballistic routes.
One of the most important characteristics of the Arabel radar, which puts the entire complex one step higher in the autonomy of the anti-missile missions being performed, is the airspace scanning zone in elevation from -5 to + 90 degrees! The radar is absolutely "cured" from the typical technological problem of the presence of a "dead zone" funnel in the upper hemisphere. And it means that the Iskander-M complex operators flying the OSTB 9М723К5 complex almost at right angles will find at an altitude of about 20-25 km, the launch of the Aster-30 SAM will start approximately 8 - 11 seconds . Considering that one SAMP-T battery can launch 10 Aster-8 rockets with 30 seconds in 1,25 seconds, plus another three to five seconds to detect the target, roughly the 3 interceptor missiles can reach the Iskander interceptor trajectory ”, In this case, 1 to 2 hits can be achieved, which may well be a breakthrough for modern anti-missile systems.
Here, between "Aster-30" and our OTBR 9М723 "Iskander" can actually be set relative parity, which allows the former to intercept the latter in some cases. Today only single interceptor missiles have such capabilities, including: 9М96Е / Е2 (С-400 Triumph) and ERINT (Patriot PAC-3). All of these rockets have a pulsed gas-dynamic control system, which is denoted by the acronym DPU (engines of transverse control). With reference to Aster-30, in the French manner PIF-PAF (Pilotage en Force-Pilotage Aerodinamique Fort). The gas-dynamic “belt” “Aster-30” is represented by an 4-xsopliv solid-state gas generator, where each nozzle at the time of the maneuvers produces thrust in 750 kgf. Nozzle channels are built into the developed planes of the cruciform wings, so that the jet stream of combustion products protrudes far beyond the limits of the air flow, suitable for the tail aerodynamic control surfaces. The gasdynamic “belt” is located at the center of mass of the 2 th (combat) stage of the missile defense system, which contributes to the most efficient movement in space during interception.
The Aster-30 rocket has a limit on extreme overload in 62-65 units, which is significantly higher than the 48Н6Е missiles of the С-300ПМ1 or MIM-104C missiles, this makes it possible to implement the most important anti-missile principle of kinetic destruction of a hit to-kill. " In addition, it is known that the SAMP-T complex (with the modification of the Aster-30 Block I SAM) is adapted to intercept tactical ballistic missiles with a range of up to 600 km and flight speeds up to 3000 m / s.
The high accuracy of hitting the Aster-30 targets is also ensured by the high-frequency active radar homing head of the AD4A type. It works on the upper frequencies of the centimeter J-band (10-20 GHz) and is capable of “capturing” a fighter-type target at a distance of about 35 km. Similar to the GOS installed on the medium-range guided missile “MICA-EM”. The impulse-Doppler type of this GOS s combination with a slit antenna array has many advantages, including a large target detection range against the underlying (marine or terrestrial) surfaces. Development companies Dassault Electronique and GEC-Marconi have built AD4A around a modern high-performance element base with a large number of Doppler filters that can effectively accompany small targets against the background of natural and artificial radio-electronic interference.
To be continued ...