Perekuem on "Armata"
The clashes in Donbass and the Middle East show that in a classic war the sides suffer huge losses in armored vehicles, and if tanks just very large, then in the infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers - disastrous. There is only one way out of this situation - strengthening active and passive protection, creating an infantry fighting vehicle based on a tank. Until now, only one country in the world has followed this path - Israel, which is quite logical. The Asian armies, which in this respect were very similar to the Soviet ones, traditionally strive to fulfill a combat mission, regardless of their own losses. But even at such a price, it is not always solved. Modern Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States demonstrate the other extreme - panic fear of losses, for the sake of preventing which the troops easily refuse to perform even a very important combat mission. Israel has so far represented a kind of golden mean - the desire to minimize losses with the mandatory completion of the task. Therefore, he became a pioneer in the creation of "armored infantry fighting vehicles", first on the basis of the old T-55 and "Centurions", then - the modern "Merkava". The second in this sense was Russia, which developed the "Armata" project. Nothing like this in our military stories there was no: firstly, the creation of a new generation of armored vehicles (we used to almost always catch up with them), secondly, a completely unconventional approach for us to save the lives of servicemen.
It is important to note: experience shows that quantity is no less important than quality. There must be a lot of equipment, otherwise its acquisition is meaningless both militarily and economically. The current European practice of purchasing new equipment in microscopic batches is a waste of money, glaring in its meaninglessness. It is better not to buy anything. "Armat" should be purchased for the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation for several thousand T-14 and T-15. In this regard, the question arises about the feasibility of procurement BMP "Kurganets" and BTR "Boomerang." They may be good, but they are built according to traditional concepts, which, as mentioned above, lead to huge losses both in the BMP-BTR themselves and in the infantry carried by them. Isn't it easier to abandon these cars, to throw all your efforts and money at Armata?
"God" is not enough range
The experience of current conflicts shows that artillery has by no means lost the role of the “god of war”, while the reactive becomes more important than the barrel, as it provides a much larger striking effect. Russia has a unique weapon - Flame-retardant RSZO TOC-1, which in its slaughter properties is not inferior to a low-power nuclear charge, only without all its side effects such as penetrating radiation and radioactive contamination of the area. In addition, this machine has increased combat stability, since it was created on the tank chassis. The Achilles' heel of the TOC-1 is a small firing range (only six kilometers even for the TOC-1А). Eliminating this deficiency could provide the Russian army with a significant increase in firepower in both the classical and anti-guerrilla wars.
Finally, the role of communications, intelligence and control is extremely important. Russia is now rapidly catching up in these areas with the United States, Israel, and partly with China, but there is still a lot to be done. In particular, it is necessary to combine all the automated control systems of the Armed Forces and the arms of service in a single system, as well as the creation of shock UAVs.
The wings are short
Losses in aviation in current wars it is much less than in armored vehicles, but its number is no less important. Firstly, the aircraft are still out of order, and if both sides of the conflict have them, the losses will increase many times over. Secondly, even if the adversary does not have aviation, we also lack it, which naturally limits the result. This is best seen in Syria. No matter how efficiently Russian aviation operates there, there are too few of them. If our aviation group in this country were more powerful in quantitative terms, for example, the second surrender of Palmyra would not have followed. Thus, if armored vehicles need to be bought in thousands of units, then planes and helicopters - in hundreds.
In recent years, X-NUMX of Su-90 front-line bombers, at least 34 Su-20М30 fighter-bombers and around 2 Su-80CM, more than 30 Su-50С fighters, over 35 shock helicopters, more than 80 of Su-52С fighters, more than 90 attack helicopters, more than 28 of Su-50С fighters, more than 35 helicopters, helicopters, more than 30 fighters Su-2С, more than 28 helicopters, helicopters, more than 35 fighters Su-500С, more than 200 helicopters, helicopters, more than 300 fighters Su-XNUMXС, more than XNUMX helicopters, helicopters, and more and XNUMX Mi-XNUMXM. Production of all these machines continues, but in all cases orders have already been completed by more than half. Is it enough such an amount - the question is extremely difficult. Apparently, it should be considered as a minimum of minimum. It is advisable to issue additional orders for some of these machines, possibly reducing the number of types (most likely we would have to abandon further production of the Su-XNUMXМXNUMX and Mi-XNUMX or Mi-XNUMX). In general, new aircraft and helicopters, it is desirable to have at least XNUMX, coupled with the modernization of the old XNUMX-XNUMX.
However, the lack of aircraft can be partly compensated by missiles. Nine brigade sets of the Iskander OTRK have already been delivered to the Russian Armed Forces. Moreover, one of these nine brigades was formed in 2015 and immediately received Iskanders, and not in exchange for Points-U.
If the "Iskander" partially replace strike aircraft, the shortage of fighters compensate for ground defense. The C-400 and C-300В4, Buk-М2, Buk-М3 SAM systems are being simultaneously put into service at the same time, the С-350 is expected to be purchased. Moreover, there is also a place not only the re-equipment of old brigades and regiments, but also the formation of new ones (either directly with the latest models or with the C-400PS air defense divisions released upon admission to the C-300). In this case, we can say that the air defense system does not happen much; the territory of the country, the facilities of the Armed Forces, the military-industrial complex, the infrastructure, and the public administration must be covered as safely as possible. Moreover, in this area, Russia is leading the way in the world in no other way. The most important addition to ground defense are EW facilities, where our country has also achieved significant success. The combination of air defense and electronic warfare can level the superiority of Russia's main potential opponents in the number of combat and support aircraft.
Ocean - cormorants
The fleet is the most expensive and most long-standing type of aircraft, so we have the most problems with it. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the Russian Navy is a single purely formal. In fact, it is divided into five (or even six, if we count separately Primorsky and Kamchatka flotilla Pacific Fleet) of associations, the maneuver of forces between which in case of war is extremely difficult or even impossible. Moreover, each of the associations (except for the Caspian flotilla) on its ocean or sea theater is significantly inferior to the Navy of neighboring countries.
In recent years, the Russian Navy has received (and will receive in the near future) three 955 SSBNs, one 885 SSN, one 677 SSN and six 636 projects, two 11356 frigates and one 22350 project, four 20380 corvettes, two project sentry ships 11661, three MACs of the 21630 project and five ISCs of the 21631 project. At least 10 PL and ships of these types are on trial and in construction, in addition, a significant number of patrol ships and boats received the border forces of the FSB. This is, of course, very good. But a little. Moreover, almost all are ships of the sea zone. True, the submarines, submarines, frigates, patrol boats and small-arms complexes are equipped with such effective weapons as the Kaliber cruise missiles that were successfully used in Syria. They can be fired from the coastal waters, where ships are covered by aviation and air defense from land, and the almost safe Caspian Sea. The creation of a full-fledged ocean surface fleet is currently beyond our capabilities. The loss of two perfectly serviceable carrier-based fighters (MiG-29K and Su-33) off the coast of Syria shows that even in greenhouse conditions our only carrier aircraft, Kuznetsov, is only conditionally combat-ready. The construction of ships of this class in the foreseeable future is impossible for economic reasons and it is not necessary for military reasons. Accordingly, there is no urgent need for new destroyers. The released funds are much more appropriate to use for the construction of the submarine and coastal fleets and the development of other types of aircraft.
On the whole, the revival of the Armed Forces over the past eight years is one of the main achievements of modern Russia. Both our own and global experience shows that saving on aircraft is totally unacceptable. But it is possible and necessary to spend the funds as rationally as possible, resolutely abandoning the programs, without which it is possible to do without real, in favor of those without which it is impossible to do.
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