Answers on questions. Air defense guns on the towers of the main caliber battleships
The photo sent by the reader is an illustration of the question. How expedient was it to place air defense guns on the towers of the main caliber of battleships and how could anti-aircraft gunners fire at planes in battle if they were firing from the Ledger Troops?
This is not just an interesting question, but a kicker. I admit, I had to shovel a fair amount of materials to create a more or less normal picture.
But I'll start from afar. Since the First World War, when a plane appeared in the arena of battles. And when everyone understood that this chirping bookcase of plywood, fabric and braces should be considered. For now from the sky could fly, and fly unpleasant. And most importantly, often more accurately than an artillery shell.
Accordingly, the cry "Battleships, arm someone who can!" Was given, because the storm ship of the seas and oceans the battleship was the most defenseless against air attacks. Dimensions, maneuverability, speed - all this played into the hands of the pilots.
And the battleships began to hastily overgrow trunks aimed at zenith.
Since the veterans of World War I were the first to come under the modernization of air defense, it is not surprising that they began to install air defense weapons on the GK towers. There was no more sane place on the dreadnoughts. The British began to do this first, followed by everyone else.
On the towers of the Civil Code, the British began to mount 76-mm cannons, masts, posts and other heights got machine guns. For the British pulled everyone else.
Italian "Giulio Cesare"
It is a logical decision. After all, the anti-aircraft gunners of that time needed what? That's right, an overview of the space. The anti-aircraft fire control posts (PUAZO) appeared somewhat later.
True, in the interval between the First and Second World Wars, it turned out that the GK tower is not the best place for air defense. Because really, to be there while firing GK guns was simply unrealistic and detrimental to health. The combat regulations of countries generally prescribed a complete absence of crew on the deck during the shooting of the main caliber.
For a long time, the British Conservatives had been running instructions for air defense calculations, which, on a signal from the howler, had to leave their places and hide in a tower casemate. At the then-rate of fire in 1-2, a shot per minute is still a pleasure ...
However, all sane military leaders of that time understood that the enemy aviation It’s unlikely to wait for the enemy ship to fire back to launch an attack. And in the mid-30s, air defense guns began to leave the towers of the Civil Code.
LC "Littorio" (Italy)
LC "Richelieu" (France)
LC "Yamato" (Japan)
The Yamato had small-caliber installations on the second and third turrets, on the rear, but there were only 4 of them, in comparison with the total number of anti-aircraft barrels.
LC Nelson (UK)
LC "Bismarck" (Germany)
All the newest battleships of the Second World War were already with "clean" towers.
The second response of naval aviation was the emergence of the so-called universal gun, capable of performing both the role of an auxiliary caliber and air defense.
It was a different concept of weapons. Auxiliary guns left the side casemates and settled in armored turrets on the deck. The battleships acquired a different look, let's say, the targets on the decks increased, but instead received large-caliber (up to 127-mm from the British and Americans and up to 150-mm from the Germans) long-range anti-aircraft artillery.
Plus, everywhere, where it was possible to plug in, small-caliber anti-aircraft guns were installed, from 20 to 40 mm.
The record in part of the anti-aircraft artillery was, clearly, "Yamato". 12 two-gun turrets with a 127-mm caliber, 53 triple-barrels with an 25-mm caliber. That did not help, and the superlinkor lost outright to the American carrier-based aircraft.
We return to the immediate topic of the question. About our battleships and their air defense. Which, to 1938, in general, was not.
"Gangut." More in Russian navy. We do not observe anti-aircraft guns ...
"Petropavlovsk". Same picture
It is no secret to anyone that with the analysis of the results of the First World War in the USSR it was about the same as with air defense. That is, very bad. All that our fleet possessed is 76-mm and 45-mm anti-aircraft guns and 37-mm machine guns. But the automatic 37-mm gun 61-k, in fact, a copy of the Swedish 40-mm "Bofors", appeared only in the 1938 year.
Until 1938, all that our battleships possessed was the Linder 76-mm anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. But within a few years the ships were upgraded, which also affected the air defense. The best in terms of this indicator was the battleship "Paris Commune" - "Sevastopol".
It was installed on it:
- 6 pieces 76-mm anti-aircraft semi-automatic guns of the 1931 model of the year, manufactured according to the technology of the German company Rheinmetall (7,5 cm Flak L / 59);
- 16 machines 61-to caliber 37-mm;
- 16 machine guns DShK.
Over "Oktyabrina" also worked.
Quite tolerable, if you do not look at foreign colleagues. For example, I decided to take the English battleship "Royal Sovereign", aka "Archangel", which in 1944-49 served in the ranks of the Northern Fleet.
As I have already noticed more than once, the British would not give a good ship. So here, the battleship from 1942 to 1944. stood in reserve, as the Admiralty considered him no longer fit for anything. Because they gave us.
Against enemy aviation, the Arkhangelsk was armed:
- 8 Vickers guns caliber 102 mm in four two-gun panel installations;
- 24 automatic guns "Vikkers" caliber 40 mm in two eight-barrel and two four-barred installations;
- 60 automatic guns "Oerlikon" caliber 20 mm (46 in paired and 14 in single-barrel installations).
Feel, as they say, the difference. And this, I note, peers. "Royal Sovereign" joined the fleet in 1916 year, "Sevastopol" - in 1914-m ...
But the problem is that our battleships could not afford such an air defense. The whole “stuffing” of “Sevastopol” remained all the same, at the level of the 1 World War II. And the “Arkhangelsk” had radars that made it possible to detect targets much earlier than the observers of “Sevastopol” and adjust the air defense fire.
So, Sevastopol, which, in essence, played the role of a night-time floating artillery battery on the Black Sea, could afford to place air defense weapons on the towers of the Civil Code.
Quote from the "official biography": "During the period of hostilities on the Black Sea: the battleship made 15 military campaigns, passed, in difficult combat conditions, about 8 thousands of miles (7700 miles); his main-caliber guns fired 10 (more than 3 thousand shots) at enemy positions near Sevastopol and on the Kerch Peninsula; his anti-aircraft artillery participated in repelling the 21 attack of enemy aviation, shooting down an 3 aircraft; as a result of effective measures taken by the fleet command and the commander of the Black Sea squadron personally, the ship did not receive any serious damage. "
"Measures taken by the command" - is based in Poti and Batumi, to which the German bombers could not fly in principle. Plus "work" in the dark. With appropriate efficiency ...
The Baltic colleagues of Sevastopol were less fortunate. The use of the Marat and the October Revolution in the Gulf of Finland as artillery batteries led to known results.
Although in the Baltic, certain conclusions were made after the Marat stopped being a ship.
Summary: the deployment of air defense on the towers of the main caliber of the Soviet battleships was not connected with the desire to make air defense calculations disabled, but due to many factors:
1. The absence of radar and the ability to fully control the air defense fire.
2. The inability to install universal tools (because of the four-tower layout there simply was no place for them) in the proper quantity.
3. The lack of the required quantities of anti-aircraft machines.
By the way, the layout of the towers of Russian battleships, which were already outdated by the time they were built, effectively reduced to "no" all attempts to somehow strengthen the air defense. Here is a snapshot of the "October Revolution" after the repair with the installation of 130-mm universal guns in the B-13 and B-2ML towers.
In the next picture, as you can see, the remnants of the "Marat". Also with a modification.
In principle, air defense placed on the towers of the main caliber of a floating battery is a normal solution. For if an enemy aircraft raid, the main caliber may not fire. The real battleship (with which our battleships were not) was more difficult. This proved the "Yamato", "Prince of Wales" and many other ships.
Unbelievable, but true: during the First and Second World Wars, Russian / Soviet battleships of the Sevastopol class (Petropavlovsk / Marat, Gangut / October Revolution and Sevastopol / Paris Commune) engaged in battle with the enemy ships.
But this is more on the topic of our naval admirals.
As a result, countries that were in service and used battleships for their intended purpose rather quickly abandoned the inconvenient practice of placing air defense weapons on the towers of the main caliber. Since the Soviet battleships were essentially floating large-caliber artillery batteries, they could afford, based on the objectives, to place air defense on the GK towers. Combat missions performed by these ships did not provide for the simultaneous reflection of attacks by enemy aircraft and the firing of the main caliber.
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