Military Review

The battle in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 13: The sun was set to sunset

48



As we said earlier, when Retvizan and Peresvet turned in the direction of Port Arthur, the commanders and junior flagships of the 1 Pacific squadron were in a rather ambiguous position. According to the letter of the charter, they had to carry out what the commander of the squadron admiral ordered, but he was going to Arthur, while the Emperor ordered to break through to Vladivostok. If you are guided not by the letter, but by the spirit of the law, then even then it was not clear what to do: go for a breakthrough on your own, and thus weaken the squadron, if it subsequently makes a second attempt to get to Vladivostok, or stay with the squadron ... but who knows whether it will risk will she go to sea again?

The squadron turned into Arthur approximately 18.20. For a while, all her ships went together, but after 40 minutes, i.e. around 19.00, the commander of the cruiser squad, Rear Admiral N.K. Reizenstein, made the final decision to go to Vladivostok. To this end, “Askold” increased the speed and raised the signal “To be in line with the wake” - it should have been read as an indication to “Pallada” and “Diana” not to follow “Askold”, but to take a place in the battleships, which they fulfilled: N.K. The Reizenstein overtook the battleships and, passing in front of Retvizan, raised the “Follow me” signal. In other words, there was already a third officer (besides PP Ukhtomsky and Schensnovich), seeking to take command of the squadron.

And here again there is ambiguity - of course, the admiral did not know who commanded the squadron and whether PP was alive. Ukhtomsky. But what prevented him from getting closer to Peresvet and finding out the status of the junior flagship? N.K. The Ratzenstein could easily have done this, and then there would no longer be any omissions: nevertheless, the commander of the squadron of cruisers did not do that. Why?

It can be assumed that N.K. Reizenstein decided to go for a breakthrough at all costs. If pp Ukhtomsky is killed or wounded and does not command a squadron, there is no point in requesting Peresvet, and N.K. Reizenstein, being a rear admiral, has the right to do what he considers necessary. If the prince remained in execution, he obviously does not object to returning to Arthur - otherwise the Peresvet would not have gone to the wake to Retvizan. Accordingly, the chances that PP Ukhtomsky allow N.K. Reizzenshteynu break through on their own, minimal, most likely, he will order cruisers to return with the squadron. But N.K. Reytsenshtein did not want to receive such an order at all - and if so, then why would he ask about the state of P.P. Ukhtomsky? Now N.K. Reizenstein had the full right to act independently: Peresvet was badly damaged and didn’t seem to raise any signal (at least they don’t see anything at Askold). But having received an order from the junior flagship, N.K. Reizenstein, of course, will no longer be able to break it ...

Why did Retvizan not go for Askold? The answer is very simple - when the ripple rose and the nose of the Retvizan began to “sink”, being filled with water through the damaged 51 mm plate of the nasal armor belt, E.N. Schensnovich decided that his ship was not able to break through to Vladivostok. Then, not wanting to just get out of the battle, he attempted a ram, but did not succeed, because he received a concussion at the most crucial moment. The ram failed, and E.N. Schensnovich turned to Port Arthur. He had the right to do so - in accordance with the instructions of V.K. Witgefta, "Retvizan" was the only ship that was allowed to return to Port Arthur, as he received an underwater hole before the breakthrough.

It is very difficult to say how justified such a decision was by the commander of the Retvizan. It can be assumed (with no evidence to that) that the battleship could still go for a breakthrough or to a neutral port. We know for sure that the ship had no problems with flooding the nose section, following Arthur, but it must be borne in mind that at that time he was moving, substituting a swell of the port side, so that part of the water that entered the hull through the damaged starboard armor plate even leaked out. back. Also, "Retvizanu" did not require any urgent measures to ensure the survivability of the harbor of Arthur. However, all of the above does not mean that Retvizan was able to go to Vladivostok, substituting the damaged starboard for the waves. Sam E.N. Schensnovich could hardly have witnessed the damage to the bow of his battleship. His injury was not penetrating, and on this basis, some Internet analysts consider him to be quite insignificant and not interfering with E.N. Shensnovichu perform their duties. But what is a splintering of the abdominal cavity? Let us imagine that a person with a full swing was hit in the stomach with the end of a thick metal rod, an armature, if you like. This will be a contusion.

Thus, Retvizan did not turn behind the Askold, because its commander considered the battleship unable to break through, and Peresvet - because PP Ukhtomsky decided to return to Arthur. "Diana" and "Pallas" took their place behind the battleships, as they were ordered N.K. Reizzenshteynom. As a result, of all the squadron ships, only Novik and the 2 th branch of the destroyers under the command of S.A. tried to follow the Askold. Maximova, and a little later - "Diana".

In the literature, the Askold breakthrough is usually described in the most enthusiastic tones: probably, anyone who was at least a little interested in the sea battles of the Russo-Japanese War read a description of how the Askold fought first with a detachment of Japanese ships led by the armored cruiser Asama ”, And he could not delay the Russian cruiser, caught fire and retreated, and“ Chin Yen ”received two hits. Then the way to the Russian cruiser was intercepted by the Yakumo and the 3 battle squad, but Askold was damaged by one of the Takasago-type cruisers and set fire to the Yakumo, so the Japanese were forced to withdraw from the battlefield.



Let the spectacle be large, but only an armored cruiser, which made the two much larger and better armed than he, armored ships retreat, of course, is amazing, but, alas - not quite true.

What really happened? To 19.00, the position of the opposing squadrons was approximately as follows:

The battle in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 13: The sun was set to sunset


"Asama" and 5 of the Japanese combat squadron approached the Russian squadron from the northeast, which, generally speaking, was a fair amount of arrogance on their part - the only armored cruiser and antiques of the 5 squadron went to the distance of Russian battleships, While H. Togo and his battleships were too far away and could not support them with fire. But the Japanese commander separated from the 1 military unit "Nissin" and "Kasuga", which followed the Russians from the southeast, and to the south-west of the Russians was "Yakumo" and the 3-th combat unit.

"Askold" passed along the ranks of the Russian squadron and cut its course - at that time he really had an exchange of fire with the "Assam" and the ships of the 5 squadron. It is likely that the Japanese ships at that time fired at the "Askold", but you need to understand that the Japanese could not go to intercept or chase him - behind the back of the flagship cruiser N.K. Artillerymen of the 1 th Pacific Squadron, which, of course, the “Assame” and the 5 squad were too tough. Therefore, the "Askold" did not break through the "Asama" and did not force it to retreat - the Japanese ship was forced to depart in order not to be substituted by the Russian battleships. In addition, in this firefight, “Asama” did not receive a single hit, he did not receive any damage in the battle at all, therefore, there could not have been any fire on him. But in the “Chin-Yen” two Russian shells really pleased, but it is impossible to say for sure whether it was the result of the fire of “Askold” or whether the commanders of another Russian ship achieved success.

After N.K. Reizenstein passed under the nose of "Retvizan", he turned to the south-west and the shootout subsided. Behind "Askold" rushed "Novik", which went to the left of the Russian battleships, and the destroyers of the 2 th branch: "Silent", "Fearless", "Ruthless" and "Stormy". The 1 Division under the command of Captain 2 Rank E.P. Eliseev did not follow “Askold” - they chose to follow the instructions of the deceased V.K. Witgefta, who ordered at nightfall to stay near the battleships. Somewhat later, E.P. Yeliseyev distributed his destroyers to the battleships and tried to approach the main Retvizan on his "Vigilant", but the latter, having taken the "Vigorous" as a Japanese destroyer, opened fire on him, so that Eliseev was forced to go to Arthur on his own. As for the "Diana", the cruiser of about 19.15-19.20 tried to follow the "Askold", but quickly found that he could not catch up with him, why turned back and stood in the wake of the next in Arthur "Pallad".

Thus, out of the entire Russian squadron, only two armored cruisers and four destroyers went on a breakthrough, while the destroyers immediately fell behind - they could not go against the wave (swell into the right cheekbone) at the speed of the armored cruiser. “Askold” and “Noviku” were faced with a hot deal: in front of them there was an armored “Yakumo” and 3 battle squad of three best Japanese armored cruisers - “Chitose”, “Kasagi” and “Takasago”. In addition, the 6 combat squadron was located in close proximity - three more small armored cruisers. All this was more than enough to stop and destroy the Russian ships. Nevertheless, the Japanese could not do it, and the reasons for how this could happen are completely unclear.

Heihatiro Togo had every reason to let the Russian squadron back to Arthur, because he became a trap for the 1st Pacific squadron. In addition, in the upcoming night, the Japanese destroyers could well succeed by sinking one or even several Russian battleships. H. Togo probably already knew that his ships were not too damaged and were ready to resume the battle at any time, but the Russian squadron could suffer losses from mines, torpedoes, land artillery until the next exit ... and all this played into the hands of the commander of the United fleet.

But the breakthrough of two high-speed cruisers to Vladivostok did not at all fit into the Japanese plans - they had to hold large forces against the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers anyway. Therefore, "Askold" and "Novik" should have stopped, and the Japanese seemed to have everything they needed.



It can be assumed that the following has happened. It is known that Yakumo had big problems with speed, and according to some testimonies in battle, July 28 had difficulty holding 16 nodes. He, of course, tried to intercept the “Askold”, but could not block his path, and the fire of the artillerymen “Yakumo” was not accurate enough to inflict heavy damage to the Russian cruiser. Thus, Yakumo did everything it could, but Askold was unable to catch up or damage. At the same time, Vice-Admiral S. Deva showed extreme caution, if not to say - cowardice and did not dare to fight his three high-speed cruisers against "Askold" with "Novik". And it is not clear. Yes, “Askold” was one-on-one superior to “Kasagi” or “Takasago”, but the latter were individually stronger than “Novik”, so the Japanese were superior in strength, who could also count on the support of 6 squadron cruisers, and if “Askold” succeeds in speeding down, then “Yakumo”. And even if it had suddenly turned out to be quite bad for some Japanese cruiser, it was easy for him to get out of the battle - the Russians were going for a breakthrough and did not have time to finish off the enemy.

It is also surprising that the Japanese do not record hits in their ships in this episode of the battle. It is reliably known about just one hit in “Yakumo” - when “Poltava”, in the interval between the 1 and 2 phase, took a twelve-inch projectile into this cruiser. As a result, the behavior of the Japanese during the breakthrough of “Askold” and “Novik” is somewhat shocking: not a single Japanese ship was damaged, the gunners of Russian cruisers did not achieve a single hit, but S. Deva, having superior forces, does not risk pursuing N.K. Reizzenshteyna! How can this be explained - by the indecision of S. Deva or by concealing combat damage, the author of this article does not know, although he is inclined to the first.

In any case, only the following are credible - approximately in 19.40 “Askold” and “Novik” engaged in battle with the 3 combat squadron and “Yakumo”. Passing past them, the Russian cruisers fired at the Suma, which had lagged behind the 6 squad and quickly got out of the way of the Russian cruisers. In 20.00 it was dark and 20.20 "Askold" stopped firing, as he no longer saw the enemy. In the future, the honor to pursue "Askold" and "Novik" fell out of "Akashi", "Izumi" and "Akitsusime" - a persistent feeling that the Japanese were sent in pursuit of precisely those ships that were obviously not capable of catching up with the Russians.

The result of the fire of the Russian cruisers during the entire breakthrough period was one likely hit in Izumi (which Pekinham mentioned about the damage on the night of July 29), which followed along with the 6 squad, although this could not be reliably asserted.

However, regardless of the number of hits achieved, the courage of Rear Admiral K.N. Reizenzsteyna not subject to any doubt. He could not know about the problems with the boilers and (or) machines "Yakumo" and had to believe that he was going into battle against the high-speed armored cruiser, far superior in firepower and protection "Askold" and "Novik" together. But, apart from Yakumo, the Japanese had a great power advantage over N.K. Reizzenshteynom, so that the battle promised to be very heavy, and the Russian ships - almost doomed to defeat. The Rear Admiral, of course, could not have imagined that the enemy would be so timid and unobtrusive - and yet he went for a breakthrough. And therefore, despite the fact that “Askold” did not inflict damage to the Japanese ships that are attributed to him, but his valiant (even if not very skillful) crew and the admiral himself fully deserved the respect and admiration of contemporaries and descendants. Of course, the decision N.K. Reizenzstein to leave the squadron, rushing to a breakthrough on their own, at that moment was controversial, but subsequent events confirmed his correctness. The 1 Pacific Squadron failed to break through again and was buried alive in the harbors of Port Arthur, while the actions of the rear admiral rescued Askold for Russia.

But even before the “Askold” ceased firing, two large ships separated from the squadron and went to Vladivostok - the Tsarevich and Diana decided not to return to Arthur at 20.00-20.05, and the Thunderstorm destroyer followed the “Diana” .

In all, Arthur made a breakthrough with 6 battleships, 4 armored cruisers and 8 destroyers, of which 1 battleship, 3 cruisers and 5 destroyers did not turn back. For various reasons, none of these ships reached Vladivostok, Novik and Storny died, and the rest of the ships were interned in various neutral ports. All this happened after the July 28 battle of 1904 r and, thus, is beyond the scope of this study. But nevertheless, it is necessary to warn those who are ready to indiscriminately blame the commanders of the ships that did not return to Arthur just because the latter refused to make a breakthrough to Vladivostok and went to neutral ports. "Tsesarevich" did not have coal to go to Vladivostok. "Askold" on the morning of July 29 could not give more 15 nodes of the course - so affected by the damage received by the cruiser during the breakthrough. The “Diana” was a sad sight at all - the hit of the Japanese 10-inch projectile in the underwater part led to the fact that three stern six-inches could no longer fire, so the cruiser was left with only three operating 6-dm guns (he went on a breakthrough with just 6 such guns, since the other two remained on the Port Arthur batteries). At the same time, the maximum speed of the "Diana" before the enemy hit was 17 nodes - it was with such speed that the cruiser tried to follow N.K. Reizzenshteynom, and it is obvious that, having received a heavy projectile from the "Kasuga" under the waterline, the cruiser still lost in speed. In fact, the only major ship capable of making a breakthrough without eliminating at least some of the damage was the Novik - but it was he who made such an attempt.

The remaining 5 battleships, the Pallas armored cruiser and the destroyer 3 went to Port Arthur. On the night of 28 on 29, the commander of the United Fleet threw out against the scattered ships of the 1 th Pacific squadron of 18 fighters and 31 destroyer. Attacking the Russian ships, the latter fired 74 torpedoes, having achieved one hit in the stern of the squadron battleship Poltava, but, fortunately, the torpedo that hit an acute angle to the hull did not explode. The only damage was the incapacitation of the Victory 254-mm gun with a direct hit of an 57-mm projectile.

To summarize the long articles in the current 12 cycle. The battle of 28 July 1904 g is usually considered a draw, because it did not lead to a decisive result and not a single ship of the opposing sides was lost in it. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Russians suffered a defeat in it, since their task - to make their way to Vladivostok - was not fulfilled. The combined fleet was supposed to prevent the breakthrough of the Russians to Vladivostok, and so it happened in reality: in spite of the fact that part of the ships of the 1 th Pacific Squadron escaped the Japanese, almost all of them were forced to take part in neutral ports, and did not participate in further battles .

However, the fact that the Japanese fleet achieved its goal does not mean that it acted exemplary. The commander of the United Fleet made a lot of mistakes in the management of the forces entrusted to him, and it can be said that victory was achieved not thanks to, but rather, contrary to the naval art of Heyhatiro Togo. In fact, the only reason for the Japanese victory was the overwhelming superiority of the training of the gunners of the Japanese squadron over the Russian. The battle of 28 July 1904 g, also called the battle in the Yellow Sea or the battle of Shantung, won the Japanese artillery.

Usually, the pre-war system of training naval gunners is reproached for the low level of training of Russian commanders, but this is not true. Of course, there were a lot of complaints about the training of commanders - the number of trainings was insufficient, as was the consumption of projectiles per gun, usually fired at fixed or towed at low speed shields, and the firing distances were extremely small and did not match the increased distances of naval combat. But with all this, and provided that the artillery training programs were not violated, the training of Russian and Japanese commanders should be considered comparable.

As we wrote earlier, in the 27 battle on January 1904, the ships of the 1-nd Pacific Squadron achieved a comparable number of hits with the Japanese. The percentage of large-caliber shells hit by Russian ships turned out to be 1,1 times lower than that of Japanese ones; the Japanese turned out to be 1,5 times more accurate by average caliber. And this is despite the fact that:
1) Before the 2,5 battle, the Russian ships stood in the armed reserve for a month and, unlike the Japanese, had no training at this time.
2) Shortly before entering the reserve, many of the old commander left the squadron (demobilization 1903 g), they were replaced by "young soldiers", the time for training which is almost gone.
3) Japanese artillerymen had much better technical equipment - there were more rangefinders, and besides, Japanese guns were equipped with optical sights, while the Russians did not.
4) The Japanese had a staff of officers, while this was not the case on the Russian ships, with the result that in a number of cases the conductors commanded the plutongs and towers.

We also exemplified a situation in which the Black Sea fleet found itself, including the armored cruiser Memory of Mercury, after the war, having only stood for three weeks in an armed reserve, it worsened 1,6 shooting accuracy almost once - and it would be okay , but a sharp drop in the accuracy of "almost doubled" turned out to be characteristic of all the "reserved" ships. So after all, it was only 3 of the week, not the 2,5 of the month, and there was no demobling between shots. The above allows us to conclude about the need for regular training and a quick decrease in the quality of shooting in the absence of such.

In other words, if for some reason the war would start not on the night of 27 in January of 1904 g, but in the late summer of 1903 g, even before demobilization, then we can assume that the Russians could have demonstrated even more accurate shooting than the Japanese.

Thus, the Japanese superiority in shooting accuracy in 28 July 1904 r did not contribute to gaps in the pre-war artillery training, but disregard of combat training during the war itself. Starting with the release of 1 in November 1903 g to the armed reserve and until the 28 battle of July 1904, almost 9 months elapsed, of which the squadron conducted full-fledged training for only 40 days during the S.O. Makarova. Such an attitude to the teachings, of course, had an extremely negative effect on the ability of the gunners to hit the target. After such a break, one should not be surprised that the battleships of the 1 th Pacific squadron shot out four times worse than the Japanese, but that the Russian commanders even got into someone else.

Gaps in combat training resulted from the general passivity of the squadron (again, excluding the brief period of the command of S.O. Makarov). You can understand VK Witgefta, who was afraid of taking a squadron to an external raid — everything was filled up with mines so that every way out to the sea was fraught with mortal risk. Suffice it to recall that the 10 of June, the battleships, having entered the outer raid, despite the preliminary trawling, stood exactly on the mine can (between the ships they caught the 10-11 min) and only a miracle no ship was blown up. But the limit of miracles for that day was obviously exhausted, so that on his return, “Sevastopol” was blown up by a mine.

Indeed, the withdrawal of the squadron under such conditions was fraught, but who is to blame for the fact that the Japanese were completely free to manage on Arthur's external raid? The Russian squadron possessed an inaccessible to the Japanese position (internal raid) of sufficiently powerful coastal batteries, and any damaged ship could easily be delivered for repair. In contrast, the Japanese had only a flying base and a landing site in Bitszyvo, which should have been guarded. They had more ships, but the possibilities for repair and coastal defense were much less, and therefore, with proper preparation, our OSSA had to throw mines at night and threaten torpedo attacks on Japanese ships, retreating and remaining inaccessible during the day under the cover of high-speed cruisers. Alas, with the exception of Stepan Osipovich Makarov, who alone remembered that the best defense was an attack, our admirals did not think about the attack. They did not think of their active actions to impose their will on the enemy and force him to defense. On the contrary, the utterly unthinkable and unjustifiable war of “Keep and not to risk” was declared, and we owe it to him that the 1 Pacific Pacific squadron could not control not just the Yellow Sea, but at least the outer raid of its own harbor.

The real reason for the defeat of the Russian squadron is not at all in the fact that she did something wrong in the July 28 battle. On the contrary, Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft commanded surprisingly sensibly, he took full advantage of Heihatiro Togo’s endless mistakes, repeatedly putting the latter in a very unenviable tactical position. But all this could not compensate for the gaping and almost nine-month failure in combat training, and therefore it can only be noted with sadness that the Russians had lost the battle in the Yellow Sea before it began.

This concludes the description of the July 28 battle of 1904 or the battles in the Yellow Sea (at Shantung), and the last thing that remains is to disassemble the possibilities that VK did not use. Witgeft immediately before and during the battle. This will be devoted to the last article of this cycle.

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 1: Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft and Kheyhatiro Togo
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 2. Squadron received by V.K. Vitgeft
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 3: V.K. Witgeft takes command
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 4. Armadillos in the ranks, or altercations about the fate of the squadron
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 5. Last preparations
The battle in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part 6: The beginning of the battle The battle in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. The part 6: The beginning of the battle
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 7: The amazing maneuvers of the Japanese admiral
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 8. Finishing the 1 phase
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 9. Respite and resumption of combat
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 10. The death of V.K. Vitgefta
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 11. Was there a panic?
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part 12: Prince Ukhtomsky's retreat
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  1. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 13 December 2016 07: 07
    +8
    Unfortunately, but the author is 100% right in determining the causes of the defeat in the battle of the Russian Navy on July 28.07. It is defeat, because if you follow the logic, then the battlefield remains behind the enemy. Later analogies come to mind in the case of the Battle of Jutland, where the Germans seemingly formally inflicted more damage on the British both in ships and in people, but only Grand Fleet hosted the North Sea in the morning. Therefore, when the Russian squadron (no matter for what reasons) turned to Arthur, Togo realized that he had won ... request
    Combat training is relevant at all times, and even if it was hypothetically assumed that it would be at the level of 1903, even with the worst qualities of Russian shells, with more backward SUAO, the number of hits would be several times greater, which would undoubtedly lead to others results. But alas, history does not know the subjunctive mood ....
    Regarding the breakthrough of "Askold". Reitenstein did what his conscience and sound mind told him based on the state of his squadron's ships. Therefore, it is not a fact, if the cruiser had more severe damage, he would have taken such a risk. All the same, the characteristics of the cruisers lay in a different plane due to their purpose and they did not have such resistance to hits as the EBR. Therefore, the result is natural - speed is speed. Who could, that fellow.
    Article chic five good Virtually nothing to argue request
    But with "if only" I think we'll tinker drinks , we have sofa admirals, and I myself have my opinion on this subject lol
    Yours faithfully, hi
    1. avt
      avt 13 December 2016 13: 17
      +1
      Quote: Rurikovich
      But with "if only" I think we'll tinker

      Bullshit question! Oleg won today completely understood, once again, in aircraft carriers and in general he will have tactical aircraft flying all over the Earth soon. bully And then some kind of "forgotten serial" with a meticulous analysis of the historical event. By the way - as always on the level. good quite worthy.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        13 December 2016 13: 57
        +5
        Quote: avt
        Oleg won today completely understood, once again, in aircraft carriers

        I'll show him the aircraft carriers ... If someone explains to me how now, having received the status of "journalist" on the topvar, I can post articles ... the rules have changed, the old fashioned way is not working.
        Interestingly, the assignment of this status is an encouragement, or an insult? laughing
        Quote: avt
        By the way - as always at the level

        Thank you!
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 13 December 2016 17: 53
          +1
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          If someone explains to me how now, having received the status of "journalist" on the topvar, I can post articles ... the rules have changed, the old fashioned way does not work.

          Only the person who introduced these rules can explain yes All roads lead to them request
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          I will show him aircraft carriers ...

          Steeply lol Kaptsov without numbers does not accept what Any attempt to find out something ends with one - "Numbers." Without numbers, dialogue will not work, as well as without flowers and champagne, Madame will not see a bed wassat laughing
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            13 December 2016 18: 04
            +5
            In general, I waved my hand at everything and posted an aircraft carrier article through the admin panel. What will happen - I don’t know how it works - is unclear, no one wants to explain, Vadim wrote that he threw everything in the box to me, but there is nothing in the box. In general, either I’ll be banned forever here, or the article will be published after all ... or both laughing
            And the numbers ... the numbers in the article I guarantee, and such that it will be very difficult for Oleg to object ... in general, come on in - I guarantee you some healthy laughs drinks
            1. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich 13 December 2016 18: 12
              +1
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              And the numbers ... the numbers in the article I guarantee, and such that it will be very difficult for Oleg to object ...

              I believe you yes but will Kaptsov believe ..... winked He is among the numbers aki fish in water laughing Hard to have wink

              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              in general, come in - some time for a healthy laugh, I guarantee you

              Always with two hands "for" good drinks
              and I hope that you can still publish your material. hi Such a topic, such a wide range of opinions that already captures repeat
      2. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 13 December 2016 18: 03
        +2
        Quote: avt
        Oleg won today completely understood, once again, in aircraft carriers

        Shaw, again ??? belay He "raged" on Sunday wassat
        Quote: avt
        and in general he will have tactical aircraft all over the Earth flying soon.

        Not one thing - there is a whole sect yes request fool
        Quote: avt
        And then some kind of "forgotten series" with a meticulous analysis of the historical event

        So it is not interesting - the digital is small, there is nothing to complain about. And the construction of causal relationships does not roll - you need to think right away wassat
        hi
        1. avt
          avt 13 December 2016 18: 39
          0
          Quote: Rurikovich
          Shaw, again ??? He "raged" on Sunday

          Come on ? Surely they didn’t read today how tactical aviation plows with air tankers in a non-stop way, to the evil of aircraft carriers around the Earth? bully
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 13 December 2016 19: 34
            +1
            Quote: avt
            Come on ? Surely they didn’t read today how tactical aviation plows with air tankers in a non-stop way, to the evil of aircraft carriers around the Earth?

            Well, I was at work a day wink But I have already seen the article, now in the shower, then "Novosti" and I think at 9 pm or so in Minsk, we will go over this burning topic wassat drinks
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      13 December 2016 16: 49
      +1
      Quote: Rurikovich
      But with "if only" I think we'll tinker

      Yes, of course :)))) This is not a story, there is much more room for debate :) drinks
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Because it’s not a fact, if the cruiser had more severe damage, he would have taken such a risk.

      I certainly wouldn’t have gone - just as I hadn’t gone to the damaged Askold in Vladivostok
    3. 27091965
      27091965 16 December 2016 21: 05
      +1
      Quote: Rurikovich
      It is defeat, because if you follow the logic, then the battlefield remains behind the enemy.




      Different times, different views.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        17 December 2016 10: 59
        +1
        Quote: 27091965i
        Different times, different views.

        Nothing like that :))) Lieutenant Kedrov, fought on Cesarevich on July 28 — he didn’t return to Arthur, he doesn’t know about the injuries sustained by the squadron’s ships, he was busy with his duties during the battle, apparently he couldn’t observe other ships.
        The severe damage to "Peresvet", "Poltava", "Sevastopol" is well documented, what is Kedrov's opinion against their background? As for Japanese losses and damage - well, everyone was firmly convinced of that, it always happens in battle.
        EMNIP, when the Americans tried to question the Russian cruisers about the shells of WOK officers, they sincerely believed that their shells inflicted terrible damage on the Japanese, which is why the Americans are interested. In fact, Russian shells inflicted miserable damage, and American interest was connected with this.
        In general, the saying "lying like an eyewitness" has not been canceled :)))
  2. Rotmistr
    Rotmistr 13 December 2016 10: 09
    +18
    And the chances were good. Especially when maintaining a single command. The article is great, thanks
    1. Cartalon
      Cartalon 13 December 2016 12: 02
      0
      After reading the cycle, the impression was that there was no chance, if the Russians had gone for a breakthrough, the next day Togo would have been pulled up by a detachment of Kamumira and Tsushima would have happened a year earlier.
      1. D. Silver
        D. Silver 13 December 2016 22: 39
        0
        Quote: Cartalon
        After reading the cycle

        Well, if you believe everything written ...
        Quote: Cartalon
        go Russians on a breakthrough the next day

        So they broke on the first day.
        Quote: Cartalon
        Togo would be pulled up by a detachment of Kamumira

        Kamimura’s detachment consisted of armadillos incapable of linear battle with EDB class ships. Those. there was no sense from him for the Japanese against ships from PA.
        Quote: Cartalon
        and Tsushima would have happened a year earlier.

        Don't confuse the power of 1TOE and Tsushima's scow. 1 TOE was stronger than Tsushima's ships on the head. Or even two. Or three, I certainly didn't.
        Although, of course, such a rout would not have happened. But the weakness of technology and the complete incompetence of personnel developed. From this, and such a result is obtained.
    2. D. Silver
      D. Silver 13 December 2016 22: 31
      0
      Quote: Rotmistr
      And the chances were good. Especially when maintaining a single command.

      Yes, stay Witgeft alive, everything could turn out differently. And at least a certain number of ships would come to Vladik. In fact, the Japanese linear forces of 1 TOE were not much superior in strength. In terms of technology.
      But in Russia there was a huge problem with the personnel of the army and navy. From top to bottom. It was laid down by the military reform of 1873, but began to manifest itself somewhat later, already at the very end of the 19th century. Here, perhaps, just the dead Vitgeft was the bright spot in this problem. He was gone, and 1 TOE was gone.
  3. unknown
    unknown 13 December 2016 10: 56
    0
    1. Well, finally, some kind of miracle: "Yakumo" could not go more than 16 knots.
    Let me remind you: all Japanese armored cruisers were slow.
    Even the best of them did not have a speed of more than 17 knots for a long time. This stemmed from the features of the project: in fact, not high-speed contours, more characteristic of battleships; completely unnecessary overloading by armor; which, together with a limited displacement, led to the installation of re-lightweight CMU. If we add here that, most likely, the Japanese stokers, like the Commendors, were inferior in body weight to the Europeans, then it is obvious that the Japanese armored battleships were not any "forerunners" of battle cruisers. An unsuccessful project that left a good memory of itself only as a result of incredible luck. As one character used to say: "Marketing".
    2. Oddly enough, the Japanese assessed the Russian armored formations of the first rank somewhat differently. The Japanese armored decks turned out to be poorly adapted to real conditions: they were poorly seaworthy, had insufficient range and poor stability, lost speed at the slightest excitement and became "wet", which practically deprived them of the opportunity to use artillery, did not hold the "blow" well, receiving serious damage from one or two shells of large, or even medium caliber.
    Russian ships had a displacement, which the British assessed as the smallest acceptable for operation in the ocean. To this displacement, both British and German cruisers PMV were pulled up. Caliber 6 "by the end of WWII had also become the standard. They only lacked a belt, but the carapace also reliably protected the mechanisms.
    What can I say: the winners write the story - the good ships were slandered, and the bad ones were put on a pedestal.
    I have already written about fire performance more than once: of course, now this is perceived with hostility, this is normal, the rigidity of thinking, but the grains are already thrown and the sprouts are already visible.
    3. Very amused moments related to the state of the sea. It turns out that it really interfered with the Russians, and the Japanese, on the contrary, helped.
    A number of authors point out that only the ABSOLUTELY calm state of the sea allowed Mikasa to apply the plaster and stop the leak. As if the battle took place in different seas.
    4. The sea, of course, was left to the Japanese. And, of course, they did not receive any damage. But, for some reason, got up for repairs. Which, barely had time to complete the arrival of the second squadron.
    By the way, there is little information about the operation of the CMU of the Japanese battleships.
    They also entered service simultaneously with the "Canopus" and "Formidables".
    The Canopuses were the first English battleships with Belleville cauldrons. Immediately manifested "childhood diseases" of the KMU, from which they could not get rid of during the entire service. The next episode had similar problems.
    Only "Duncans" became problem-free. Did the Japanese have problems with the CMU? How did this affect, in particular, speed?
    5. Fire control systems were primitive on both sides. Rangefinders issued the distance relatively correctly only up to 40 cable. How did the battle take place over long distances, if even after the war the exercises were carried out at shorter distances. The exception is only the German fleet, but did the Japanese use the German experience?
    6. Togo was able to prove himself only in Tsushima. "Furoshiki" showed themselves only in Tsushima. Admiral of one fight, shells of one fight. The description of the battle in the Yellow Sea is similar to the description of the attempt to break through the Server. Poorly written literary version. The winners write history.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      13 December 2016 13: 29
      +3
      I’m wondering - well, aren’t you really tired? :))) From article to article, you open our eyes, referring to the facts that have long been refuted
      Quote: ignoto
      Let me remind you: all Japanese armored cruisers were slow-moving. Even the best of them did not have a speed of more than 17 knots for a long time.

      Actually 17 knots for a long time is a very good result. For example, the same "Victory" in 1903 could go no more than 15,7 knots for a long time. The Vladivostok cruisers had about the same speed, because they went to war with a maximum of 19 knots, and for a long time - 2 knots less, and even then, it's good if
      Quote: ignoto
      This stemmed from the features of the project: in fact, not high-speed contours, more typical for battleships

      Have you ever looked at the drawings of Japanese cruisers? But so, if anything, "Bogatyr" is a reduced Yakumo
      Quote: ignoto
      If we add here that, most likely, the Japanese stokers, like the Commendors, were inferior in body weight to the Europeans, then it is obvious that the Japanese armored battleships were not any "forerunners" of battle cruisers.

      In general, I came across a lot of evidence that the Japanese cruisers were not the forerunners of the linear, but here is the average mass of the Japanese ...
      Those. if instead of the Japanese there were a crew of healthy Norwegians, would the Asama be a battle cruiser? laughing And if you equip the crew with sumo wrestlers - so go Yamato even more equal? laughing
      Quote: ignoto
      Unsuccessful project

      Why is it unsuccessful? Quite ordinary, not without flaws, but also not without advantages. Japanese DBKR does not need to deify and do not trample in the mud. But the concept of the DBKR for the battle in the line - yes, it is vicious
      Quote: ignoto
      Oddly enough, the Japanese somewhat differently evaluated Russian armored decks of the first rank

      Who exactly?
      Quote: ignoto
      Russian ships had a displacement, which the British rated as the smallest acceptable for action in the ocean.

      But, crap, the Germans did not know about it and did their best to pirate cruisers one and a half times smaller than our six thousandths
      Quote: ignoto
      Both the British and German PMV cruisers pulled up to such a displacement.

      Only one word is missing - armored cruisers PMV. The then lungs had an armored belt
      Quote: ignoto
      They lacked only a belt, but the Karapas reliably protected the mechanisms.

      A Varangian with 5 holes in the area of ​​the waterline and Askold, whose speed went up to 15 knots after being damaged by shells that did not hit the ship, do not agree with you
      Quote: ignoto
      the winners write the story - the good ships were slandered, and the bad ones were put on a pedestal.

      This statement is largely true, but can not be attributed to the Russian armored 1st rank
      Quote: ignoto
      About fire performance, I have repeatedly written

      And you have just as many times been denied.
      Quote: ignoto
      it's normal, rigidity of thinking,

      Something you have dragged on
      Quote: ignoto
      but the grains are already cast and the sprouts are already visible

      Well, let's hope :)
      Quote: ignoto
      Very amused moments related to the state of the sea. It turns out that it really interfered with the Russians, and the Japanese, on the contrary, helped.

      And what made you so amused? Have you ever been to the sea? You do not understand the difference when the wind brings you smoke and gases from a shot in the face, or blows them towards the enemy? And when you have damage from the side on which the wave hits, or damage from the opposite side - does this also tell you anything?
      Quote: ignoto
      A number of authors point out that only the ABSOLUTELY calm state of the sea allowed Mikasa to apply the plaster and stop the leak.

      Naturally, because Mikasa received this damage in the afternoon, before the swell rose. I can add to you conspiracy theories - Retvizan, having received a hole in his nose in the first phase of the battle, had no problems with flooding until the very evening, his nose began to sit closer to the Cesarevich’s failure. The swell rose, that’s because witchcraft is what, not experienced at sea laughing
      Quote: ignoto
      The sea, of course, was left to the Japanese. And, of course, they did not receive any damage. But, for some reason, got up for repairs. Which, barely had time to complete the arrival of the second squadron.

      Again,. The Japanese were repaired after the battle on July 28 near the Elliot Islands and it took exactly 3 days. The Japanese left Elliott only after the death of 1TOE and there, yes, they got up for repairs - for about a month and a half, no more. The same Mikasa in February with might and main participated in the shooting. And leave the tales of eight-month downtimes of the Japanese fleet to children of primary school age
      Quote: ignoto
      Did the Japanese have problems with the CMU? How did this affect, in particular, speed?

      Well ... It did, of course. The same "Slava" with the boilers brought up easily kept 16 knots of squadron speed, the Japanese, despite the fact that their battleships were faster than Slava according to their passport, usually kept no more than 15 knots
      Quote: ignoto
      Rangefinders issued the distance relatively correctly only up to 40 cable

      Farther
      Quote: ignoto
      How did the battle take place over long distances, if even after the war the exercises were carried out at shorter distances.

      That is, do you think that if you are taught to shoot from a rifle at 150 m, then at 200 m it makes no sense to shoot you and you won’t get to anything? :)))
      Quote: ignoto
      Poorly written literary version. Winners write the story

      Your errors are your right, but why are you imposing them on us? You don’t even enter into discussions practically, just post the same thing
      1. Silvio
        Silvio 13 December 2016 14: 30
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        That is, do you think that if you are taught to shoot from a rifle at 150 m, then at 200 m it makes no sense to shoot you and you won’t get to anything? :)))

        They usually learn to shoot at different distances in order to take into account the target’s movement at a distance and the wind speed, which means to work out the corresponding skill. A boxer effective in close combat may not be medium or long range. Probably shooting at 40 and 60 cab. has some differences. Here's what interests me: if the main thing in naval combat is 12-inch shooting, then how under the tsar the gunners of large caliber armadillos, battleships were trained? There were also groups of training ships, Aurora, Pallas after REV for example. They were equipped with training teams of commandants of the corresponding calibers and practiced training firing. It’s stupid to drive all the ships, developing their resource and fuel, so they often stood near the wall. I did not hear that battleships went in textbooks. And if Makarov bequeathed to drive armadillos, did this mean that there were no training ships for the main caliber of the 1TE commandos of the main calibers of armadillos?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          13 December 2016 16: 47
          0
          Answered below
      2. D. Silver
        D. Silver 13 December 2016 23: 47
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Actually 17 knots for a long time is a very good result. For example, the same "Victory" in 1903 could go no more than 15,7 knots for a long time.

        You do not confuse the pelvis from the Baltic Shipyard, and even in Russian operation, with products from leading shipbuilding companies in the world. In Japanese operation, under the supervision of foreign instructors.
        In addition, you refer to knowingly false information. And I even know which one.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But so, if anything, "Bogatyr" is a reduced Yakumo

        You like to joke, as I look (a joke is quite famous in RuNet). The body is about 0,460 full. The fullness of the Yakumo hull is approximately 0,524. Those. Between them there is NOTHING COMMON. NOTHING AT ALL.
        If the numbers do not tell you anything, then this is like a bomber and a fighter. Bomber, this is Yakumo. Moreover, not in size, but in contours. If you really want to connect the Hero with something, connect with Iwate. This one is at least something like an attack aircraft.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        and Askold, whose speed went up to 15 knots after damage from shells that were not near the ship (did not hit the ship)

        Write already 5 nodes. Better yet, 1,5 knots. So that the "catastrophe" was immediately visible.
    2. D. Silver
      D. Silver 13 December 2016 23: 29
      0
      Quote: ignoto
      Well, finally, some kind of miracle: "Yakumo" could not go more than 16 knots.
      Let me remind you: all Japanese armored cruisers were slow.
      Even the best of them did not have a speed of more than 17 knots for a long time. This stemmed from the features of the project: in fact, not high-speed contours, more characteristic of battleships; completely excessive overload of armor; which in a compartment with limited displacement led to the installation of lightweight CMU.

      This is not the first time I've been reading this from you. You can answer once, who told you these nonsense? Where did you get them?
      You, for starters, master at least some simple program for calculating the speed of a ship. And then you will immediately stop writing nonsense.
      Normally the Japanese armored cruisers walked. Everyone, even the Garibaldians.
      And why should they walk badly? They didn’t shine with some kind of super-power boosted machines; everything was rather mediocre in terms of boosting. So, reliable.
      Why do you repeat the same nonsense over and over again?
      Elsviks (there were 4 of them, 2 new and 2 old) were a little more hiker, tk. had a smaller completeness of the corpus. But on the other hand, they were more voracious. And their bodies were the "lightest". Those. they were more "cruisers" than the rest.
      The Garibaldians were a compromise option. In addition, they were citadel, i.e. "real" battleships.
      Yakumo and Azuma are interesting in that they were built as one and the same thing, but by shipbuilders of different schools. In terms of performance characteristics, the "Frenchman" has better performance. But the "German" could well take on reliability, as was the case with the German ships in the RIF. These two are more "real battleships" by their contours than all the other Japanese armored cruisers. Although they are also far from the indicators of the contours of the EDR class 2 (for example, Pobeda).
      Fortunately, all Japanese armored cruisers (except for the Garibaldians) had one serious jamb, these are absolutely dead cannons of the Civil Code. The Garibaldians look much more balanced than everyone else. In general, they were scolded in vain, they were beautifully made, competently.
      Quote: ignoto
      The Japanese armored decks turned out to be poorly adapted to real conditions: they were poorly seaworthy, had insufficient range and poor stability, lost speed at the slightest excitement and became "wet", which practically deprived them of the opportunity to use artillery, did not hold the "blow" well, receiving serious damage from one or two shells of large, or even medium caliber.

      And were these bad ?!
      American (Kramp and Union Works), British (Armstrong in 3 forms), the Japanese copy of Armstrong, is this all substandard? It’s even strange to read you. Especially considering the fact that the best EDB and the best trade fighter cruiser in the RIF were also from Kramp.
      Quote: ignoto
      I have already written about fire performance more than once: of course, now this is perceived with hostility, this is normal, the rigidity of thinking, but the grains are already thrown and the sprouts are already visible.

      Yes, I read. This is when the effectiveness of the tank you evaluated by the rate of fire of his machine gun. Figuratively speaking. A very original approach, I must say. The only pity is wrong.
      Quote: ignoto
      only the ABSOLUTELY calm state of the sea allowed Mikasa to apply the plaster and stop the leak

      Why, just a plaster? Write already, "4 ships were rigidly coupled in pairs on the sides and thus did not allow Mikasa to drown." Sounds great, readers will have a spiral in the goiter.
      Quote: ignoto
      By the way, there is little information about the operation of the CMU of the Japanese battleships.

      We’ll write right away - they broke constantly. Why not? Since the armored cruisers broke, why didn’t the armored cruisers break?
      Well, at least Poltava, Petropavlovsk and 3 Saints (British cars were also standing there) worked flawlessly.
      There was nothing to break there. Completely non-forced cars stood on the Japanese EDB.
      Quote: ignoto
      Togo was able to prove himself only in Tsushima

      Than? Only one more, the Japanese Christmas, could have ruined the Japanese victory at Tsushima. Together with Russian crews on Japanese ships.
      After the military reform of 1873 the Russian army and navy gradually lost their combat effectiveness to a large extent. In the future, the Red Army and the SA this also applies.
      Quote: ignoto
      "Furoshiki" showed themselves only in Tsushima.

      Do not grind nonsense.
  4. Silvio
    Silvio 13 December 2016 14: 36
    0
    The percentage of large-caliber shells hit by Russian ships was 1,1 times lower than that of Japanese, by the average caliber, the Japanese were 1,5 times more accurate. And this is despite the fact that:


    You yourself cited hit data with the main calibres 12:57. Here, not the 10% percent worst hit rate, but the whole 500%
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      13 December 2016 15: 05
      0
      Quote: Silvio
      You yourself cited hit data with the main calibres 12:57.

      In the battle on July 28, afteralmost 9 month downtime
      Quote: Silvio
      The percentage of large-caliber shells hit by Russian ships was 1,1 times lower than that of Japanese, by the average caliber, the Japanese were 1,5 times more accurate

      In the battle of January 27, simple - roughly 3 of the month
      1. Silvio
        Silvio 13 December 2016 15: 44
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In the battle on January 27, simple - about 3 months

        Shot with a standard 12-inch shell is expensive fun. Even tankers who did not paint fences in the service can boast of 5-7 full-time shots. I can’t believe that under the tsar, from the main caliber, an armadillo was fired at in training firing like a bottle from a gun. Do not overestimate the importance of infrequent training firing. It is even less likely that for the whole 1 TE there were not 2 dozen experienced artillery officers to complete the calculations of Ch. caliber EDB. And who, then, were trained at naval schools? It is also doubtful that all the commandants of ch. EBR calibers were of the same draft term and all at once went into stock. I do not exclude the possibility that, by a ludicrous accident, sailors with hoarse voices, deaf people and eggs as large as spiky watermelons were called up to the naval ensemble of songs and dances. Something was wrong at the conservatory. What does it have to do for 3 months standing at the wall.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          13 December 2016 16: 47
          +2
          I reply immediately to all comments
          Quote: Silvio
          A boxer effective in close combat may not be medium or long range.

          It can not, if we are talking about the boxing distance.
          Quote: Silvio
          Probably shooting at 40 and 60 cab. has some differences.

          It has. With increasing distance, it is more difficult to determine the course and speed of an enemy ship, the distance to it, and more difficult to distinguish the fall of their own shells. Those. There is no fundamental difference, it just becomes more complicated.
          Quote: Silvio
          I did not hear that battleships went in textbooks.

          And in vain :) Because the commandants before the REV were taught on the ships of the training squad, where all 3 coastal defense battleships went with their pretty decent 254 mm main caliber. The commandants underwent initial training on them, which then continued on warships.
          Quote: Silvio
          Shot with a standard 12-inch shell is expensive fun. Even tankers who did not paint fences in the service can boast of 5-7 full-time shots. I can’t believe that under the tsar, from the main caliber, an armadillo was fired at in training firing like a bottle from a gun.

          That's right, that is not believed. There were not so many caliber firing, but the barrels were used in bulk. A small-caliber 47 mm rifle barrel or even a rifle barrel was inserted into the barrel of a large gun, and forward .. Moreover, if the number of caliber shots in the campaign could really be at the level of 10 or even less per gun, then the bullet consumption for stem firing was measured in thousands per ship. (The eagle, on the way to Tsushima, used up the EMNIP about 10 thousand rounds of ammunition for stem firing)
          And for the commandants this is a serious science. The officer commands the values ​​of the sight, and. only if the gun was correctly guided hit occurred, while the calculation learned to make adjustments for pitching. At anchor you can’t train all this
          In addition - here is to take the same rangefinders. When ships are at sea, they don’t have to shoot to train - they just take the distance to any coastal landmarks or squadron ships, and learn. But standing at anchor in the bay cannot do this.
          Quote: Silvio
          Do not overestimate the importance of infrequent training firing.

          It’s worth it to at least slightly familiarize yourself with the issue, and only then make such categorical judgments
          Quote: Silvio
          It is even less likely that for the whole 1 TE there were not 2 dozen experienced artillery officers to complete the calculations of Ch. caliber EDB.

          20 experienced artoficers - probably there wouldn’t have been so many on the whole RIF, except for taking the Black Sea.
          The fleet sharply added in number, where will the officers come from? Are they mushrooms for you? There
          And so, for reference, the Poltava 12-inch aft turret was commanded not even by the midshipman - the conductor. At the same time, take an interest in the shortage of officers at 1TOE - it will be interesting, I guarantee it :)
          Quote: Silvio
          It is also doubtful that all the commandants of ch. EBR calibers were of the same draft term and all at once went into stock.

          Not all - but a significant part, and - the best, because the most experienced, and young people took their place
          Quote: Silvio
          Something was wrong at the conservatory

          I don’t know, not a specialist in conservatories
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 13 December 2016 18: 00
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            In addition - here is to take the same rangefinders. When ships are at sea, they don’t have to shoot to train - they just take the distance to any coastal landmarks or squadron ships, and learn. But standing at anchor in the bay cannot do this.

            Why not? It is possible to conduct exercises with measuring the distance to the ships or coastal landmarks included in the base and at anchor. At the same time, rangefinders can be aligned.
            How did Glebich in his "Varyag-winner" have ...
            And, by the way, about range finders - how the Korean will return, to conduct reconciliation and training in determining distances, and if the chronicles do not lie, then from head to tail it was one and a half times more than from tail to head! *
            * The distance to “Asama” at the moment of fire was defined on the “Varangian” at 45 cable, and on the “Asama” to the “Varangian” at 35, judging by the fact who got in, the Japanese were more accurate.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              13 December 2016 18: 07
              +1
              Quote: Alexey RA
              Why not? Conduct exercises with measuring the distance to the ships included in the base

              So in order for ships to enter Port Arthur harbor, they need to leave from there laughing At least occasionally :)))
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 13 December 2016 19: 09
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                So, in order for ships to enter Port Arthur harbor, they need to get out of there laughing At least occasionally :)))

                Then let them train on cats ... that is, on "merchants". smile
          2. D. Silver
            D. Silver 14 December 2016 00: 16
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            the commandants in front of the RYA were taught on the ships of the training detachment, where all 3 coastal defense battleships went with their pretty decent 254-mm main caliber. The commandants underwent initial training on them, which then continued on warships.

            But you certainly did not serve in the army. Just write such things.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            they just take the distance to any coastal landmarks or squadron ships, and learn. But standing at anchor in the bay cannot do this.

            Do not take a landmark on the coastal facility?
            It is in the bay that you will do it. Because only there can be a verified distance to previously measured landmarks.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Eagle on the way to Tsushima spent EMNIP about 10 thousand rounds of ammunition for stem firing

            Nonsense is everything, stem these firing. A small part of this workout.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            And so, for reference, the Poltava 12-inch aft turret was commanded not even by the midshipman - the conductor.

            Conductor, for independent command, this word is much better than midshipman. He could at least know something. Midshipman did not know anything for sure.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Not all - but a significant part, and - the best, because the most experienced

            Where did these "best" experiences get? In the pubs of St. Petersburg?
            You, if you did not serve in the army, at least do not write about what you have no idea.
            1. Silvio
              Silvio 15 December 2016 08: 39
              0
              Quote: D.Silver
              You, if you did not serve in the army, at least do not write about what you have no idea.


              Now there is a galaxy of directors making films about the war. These cultural figures not only did not fight, but did not even serve in the troops, which cannot but affect their "creativity". Therefore, a floating movie about smersh and barriers can never be compared with the creators of the best films of the 60-70s, those directors saw and felt the war with their own eyes. On this historical topic, it would be good to know the opinion of old experts in naval artillery.
        2. D. Silver
          D. Silver 14 December 2016 00: 08
          0
          Quote: Silvio
          It is even less likely that for the whole 1 TE there were not 2 dozen experienced artillery officers to complete the calculations of Ch. caliber EDB.

          Just as likely. After all, there was not a single commander, except for Witgeft. And there were obvious problems with the mechanics. Where do competent gunners come from?
          Do you recall Ushakov's "fight"? Much clearer.
          Quote: Silvio
          And who, then, were trained at naval schools?

          Have you served in the army? In the Soviet?
          Quote: Silvio
          It is also doubtful that all the commandants of ch. EBR calibers were of the same draft term and all at once went into stock.

          Here, I agree. From my own experience, I can say unequivocally that demobilization / conscription does not affect the combat capability of a unit in any way. From the word "absolutely".
          1. Silvio
            Silvio 14 December 2016 06: 17
            0
            Quote: D.Silver
            Just as likely. After all, there was not a single commander, except for Witgeft. And there were obvious problems with the mechanics. Where do competent gunners come from?
            Do you recall Ushakov's "fight"? Much clearer

            In Soviet military schools, they prepared cranks for the letter M. Probably, things were not better with the tsar. A common phrase used by the newly-minted lieutenant in the regiment: forget what you were taught for 4 years, start learning how to serve. For the entire time of training, students of some higher educational institutions could not dig a single trench, not conduct a single lesson in military medical training, but political classes were regular. Probably the shabby level of technical training of officers of the RIF and the RYAV was confirmed.
            Quote: D.Silver
            From my own experience, I can say unequivocally that demobilization / conscription does not affect the combat capability of a unit in any way. From the word "absolutely".

            The combat efficiency is affected by a reduction in service life, as not only is training time reduced, but also a greater number of draftees are required. I have to take on the service of everyone, including and illiterate with defective military age. This happened in SA during the transition from a 3-year to a 2-year service life. When the service life is longer, it is possible to choose the best, and with a reduction in service life, you have to take what is.

            But under the tsar, they served in the fleet for 7 (!) Years, and the transfer to the reserve of a small part of conscripts did not affect the combat effectiveness, definitely.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              14 December 2016 09: 35
              0
              Quote: Silvio
              But under the tsar, they served in the fleet for 7 (!) Years and the dismissal of a small part of conscripts did not affect the combat effectiveness, definitely

              EMNIP 1500 people. Well, a very small part
              1. Silvio
                Silvio 14 December 2016 16: 55
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                EMNIP 1500 people. Well, a very small part

                To answer whether it is a lot or a little, you need to know the number of all sailors in the RIF, not only ship, but also coastal. Is it worth rubbing about this nonsense with those laid off in reserve. There was no proper quality of crew training, as well as shooting skills and performing maneuvers in the ranks, neither before, nor after. I did not impress the RIF with my achievements, although it cost the treasury a pretty penny. In the Baltic at 1 MV, two English submarines did more rustling on enemy communications than the entire BF.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  14 December 2016 18: 09
                  +1
                  Quote: Silvio
                  To answer whether it is a lot or a little, you need to know the number of all sailors in the RIF, not only ship, but also coastal.

                  And what does the RIF have to do with it? I’m not talking about the RIF, but I’m talking about 1TOE specifically.
                  Quote: Silvio
                  There was no proper quality of crew training, as well as shooting skills and performing maneuvers in the ranks, neither before, nor after. I did not impress the RIF with my achievements, although it cost the treasury a pretty penny. In the Baltic at 1 MV, two English submarines did more rustling on enemy communications than the entire BF.

                  Well, it’s clear, but I was waiting for when it finally bursts through you :)))
                  1. Silvio
                    Silvio 14 December 2016 18: 39
                    0
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Well, it’s clear, but I was waiting for when it finally bursts through you :)))

                    And here you do not have to be 7 spans in the forehead. All these problems were then, they are relevant now. You have to be objective.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      14 December 2016 20: 22
                      +1
                      Quote: Silvio
                      And here you do not have to be 7 spans in the forehead

                      I agree. To repeat the usual cliches, really 7 spans in the forehead do not need to be.
                      1. D. Silver
                        D. Silver 14 December 2016 20: 53
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        I agree. To repeat the usual cliches, really 7 spans in the forehead do not need to be.

                        It is strange to hear such a self-critical statement from the main distributor of Runet gossip and cliches.
                        You have recognized your problems, so you are on the path to recovery.
          2. Army soldier2
            Army soldier2 15 December 2016 13: 21
            0
            Quote: D.Silver
            From my own experience, I can say unequivocally that demobilization / conscription does not affect the combat capability of a unit in any way. From the word "absolutely".

            You, my friend, probably served in political workers, or in the material support battalion.
            Do not agree with the author? Please us with your creativity, remember how reports on party activists were written.
            1. D. Silver
              D. Silver 15 December 2016 16: 23
              0
              Quote: Army 2
              You, my friend, probably served in political workers, or in the material support battalion

              Grandma Wanga won't come out of you. Even if you do a sex change operation.
              Quote: Army 2
              Do not agree with the author?

              I do not agree.
              Quote: Army 2
              Please us with your creativity

              I do not want.
              Quote: Army 2
              Remember how reports on party activists wrote.

              I didn’t write.
  5. D. Silver
    D. Silver 13 December 2016 22: 16
    0
    "And again ... delirium continues."
    The author is restless in his indefatigable and, most importantly, illiterate (on this subject) fantasies. In this, he even surpassed the fantasies of one not quite educated ship storekeeper (bailer). Already 13 parts have already sprinkled. And threatens yet.
    I will not dwell on all the "text". But some "pearls" of this kind are worth:
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Why didn't Retvisan follow Askold?

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    “Askold” and “Novik” faced a hot affair: in front of them was the armored “Yakumo” and the 3rd combat detachment consisting of the three best armored cruisers of the Japanese - “Chitose”, “Kasagi” and “Takasago”. In addition, in the immediate vicinity was the 6th combat detachment - three more small armored cruisers. All this was more than enough to stop and defeat the Russian ships. Nevertheless, the Japanese failed to do this, and the reasons for how this could be completely unclear.

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    It can be assumed that the following happened. It is known that the Yakumo had big problems with speed, and according to some accounts, it was difficult to hold 28 knots in the July 16 battle.

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    the courage of Rear Admiral K.N. Reicenshtein is not subject to any doubt. He could not know about problems with boilers and (or) Yakumo cars and should have considered that he was going into battle against the high-speed armored cruiser

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Of course, the decision of N.K. Reicenshtein left the squadron, rushing to breakthrough on its own, at that moment was controversial, but further events confirmed its correctness. The first Pacific squadron did not enter the second breakthrough and was buried alive in the harbors of Port Arthur, while the actions of Rear Admiral saved Askold for Russia.

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    two large ships separated from the squadron and went to Vladivostok - at 20.00–20.05 “Tsesarevich” and “Diana” decided not to return to Arthur

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    "Tsesarevich" did not have coal to go to Vladivostok. "Askold" on the morning of July 29 could not give more than 15 knots of the course - this is how the damage suffered by the cruiser during the breakthrough affected it.

    1. And why did Retvisan have to go after this Reitsen, you know, with matte? Who was it that the commander of Retwisan had to carry out his orders? And the author did not try to compare the speed of Askold and Retvisan?
    Instead of this obvious thing, the author rushed to fill in the voids in the text with some imaginary holes of Retvisan. Which, if he didn’t invent it himself, he subtracted it from some dreamers. Which around this story is more than enough.
    Only Novik could catch up with Askold with his speed and stay close to him. Here they are together from the battlefield and unscrewed. "Save yourself who can." Calling the flight from the battlefield a "breakthrough" is somehow incorrect. But the author for some reason, observing an old tradition, calls it that. Although he perfectly understands that there could be no "breakthrough" without the very fact of a breakthrough. And there was not.
    2. What is unclear to the author? Doesn’t he know the speed of Japanese ships too? Why such a strange perplexity? They simply did not catch up. Because they did not have such a technical opportunity.
    3. If the author does not understand anything about the ships of that era, then I propose to him to solve the following simple mathematical problem - who will have a higher speed, a ship with a power-to-weight ratio of 1,5 slugs per ton (Yakumo), 3,3 slugs per ton ( Askold) or 6,2 ils per ton (Novik)? The answer is obvious. But, as it turned out, not everyone. From this, the author continues to broadcast to us nonsense about the "Yakumo problems". Which even theoretically had no chance to catch up with Askold and Novik. This also applies to the rest of the Japanese cruisers.
    However, instead of briefly writing the obvious, the author rants about "cowardly Japanese admirals" who, for some reason, were afraid of these fugitives. And the author pompously calls the shootout of fugitives with the Japanese at long distances an inappropriate term "battle".
    4. This is the apotheosis. Black is passed off as white. A person whose place in a normal fleet under normal government would have been only on the yacht is called "courageous." And only now it becomes clear why the author needed the imaginary "problems with the Yakumo boilers". That's just to confirm his falsifications. I will not even comment on this nonsense.
    5. For Askold and Novik, with their power availability, there were no obstacles to independent departure to Vladivostok. And they were not tied to the squadron in any way. And they had no need for "breakthroughs". They had no competitors in the YaIF in terms of speed.
    Well, as for salvation ... Askold and Novik are not the ships that needed salvation by internment. Therefore, do not invent nonsense.
    6. "We decided not to return" !!!! PPTs. Collective farm "Light udder". But what about the order of Commander Ukhtomsky? Have they forgotten where the vice admiral is?
    Another deserter (commander Tsesarevich). After that, 1 TOE also ceased to exist as a combat unit. Because without Tsesarevich, there was nothing to catch her against the Japanese. And here is the same story as Askold and Novik - those ships that could catch up with Cesarevich could not do anything to him. And those who could do could not catch up. That’s the whole story.
    But the actions of Commander Diana can only be welcomed. Here he really, hiding behind the Cesarevich, saved his little-for-nothing gouging for the RIF. Though rubbish, it cost money.
    7. You can be abused. The Tsarevich had no coal. And where did he go at all, the author does not know? Why did he suddenly have no coal? If the author habitually wants to "sculpt a humpback" about pipes, a drop in thrust, from which "an awful lot of coal was consumed," then, just in case, I immediately inform him that the efficiency of the stroke only increases from damaged pipes. Yes Yes.
    And Caesar burned the coal at night. When in fear vomited at full steam in Qingdao. Instead of walking at night in an economical move. He could have left Qingdao not in Vladik, but, like Diana, to the south. But he didn’t want to. It was so risky, and in Qingdao it was so safe ...
    With Askold it’s even more interesting. From the battlefield, he vomited at a speed far beyond 20 knots. And then suddenly some damage was found that supposedly did not allow him to go more than 15 knots. And after all, how successfully everything coincided. It’s not then that they were found, these alleged damages, namely, later ...
    In other words, they were still "heroes."
    I will stop commenting, there is nothing. Yes, and tired. Such "articles", in principle, are not even worth attention.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      14 December 2016 09: 36
      +1
      Quote: D.Silver
      I stop commenting, nothing

      Sorry. I always have a lot of fun reading your attempts :)
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 14 December 2016 10: 10
      0
      Quote: D.Silver
      If the author does not understand anything in the ships of that era, then I suggest that he solve the following simple mathematical problem - whoever has more speed, a ship with an energy ratio of 1,5 ls per ton (Yakumo), 3,3 ils per ton (Askold) or 6,2 silt per ton (Novik)?

      Good question - especially considering the Kent's 25 knots at 2,8 hp. per ton. smile
      1. D. Silver
        D. Silver 14 December 2016 10: 39
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Good question - especially considering the Kent's 25 knots at 2,8 hp. per ton. smile

        Even a ship with the contours of a destroyer cannot show 25 knots at 2,8 ILS. Not that cruiser. Use reliable sources of information. Moreover, the speed of Kent in the main directories is indicated as 23 knots.
  6. jonht
    jonht 14 December 2016 08: 01
    +1
    Great cycle, I always read your articles with pleasure, thanks!
  7. Jääkorppi
    Jääkorppi 23 December 2016 12: 38
    0
    Sumptuously! This is how, carefully, with reference to sources and competent analytics, historical research should look like! Once again, confirming the saying: smart generals are studying tactics, ingenious ones are studying strategy, and winners are studying logistics !!
  8. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 11 May 2017 15: 43
    0
    Shortly before entering the reserve, many senior servicemen of the commandants left the squadron (demobilization of 1903), they were replaced by "young soldiers", whose training time was almost gone.


    In general, the GK towers are commanded by officers, rangefinding posts - officers, the calculation of the lead by distance, is carried out by artillery officers - that they, too, were "demobilized" in 1903?
    This assumption does not hold water.
    The medium-caliber batteries are also commanded by an officer, he also provides data on the tools - elevation and lead angle. Except that the guidance of the anti-mine caliber is not carried out by officers.