Military Review

Peresvet type battleships. Great mistake. 4 part

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Unfortunately, neither “Peresvet” nor “Oslyabya” became those “battleships-cruisers” that the Navy Department wanted to receive. Errors in their design and construction led to the fact that these ships, due to the relatively short range, could not perform the functions of ocean raiders. And yet it is impossible to say that Peresvet turned out to be quite a failure of the ships - they also had some advantages.

We can only welcome the fact that during the discussion of the project, the admirals stopped at an increased (for our fleet) speeds of 18 knots. As a matter of fact, at the time of laying down the “Relight”, this was not a big break even for the battleships - the French were building the eighteen-node Charlemagne, and indeed, from the very beginning of the 1890s, they had been trying to provide such a move to their squadron battleships. The Germans expected to get 17,5 knots from the Kaisers, and the first class British armadillos of the Majestic type were to develop 1 knots with natural draft, with at least 16 expected from them with forced blasting. In fact, some “Majestics” managed to exceed 17 bonds with forced blasting. Well, by the time Peresvet entered service, it was precisely 18 knots that became the speed standard for the line ship, so at least our cruiser armadillos had sufficient speed to interact with the latest armadillos. The high side and the forecastle provided good seaworthiness and conditions for the operation of artillery during unrest.

Of course, in terms of strength and protection, Peresvet was quite mediocre ships, whose fighting qualities only slightly exceeded those of the British battleships of the 2 class. They approximately corresponded to the German squadron battleships, but this can hardly please us, because the capabilities of the Kaiser Friedrichs, with their non-optimal armor protection scheme, and only 240-mm artillery of the main caliber (and far from the best characteristics) more likely corresponded to 2. class of British battleships, rather than 1 th.

But, on the other hand, Peresvet were much cheaper than full-fledged battleships. According to the “General Marine Report for 1897-1900 years” “successor” of “Peresvetov”, the squadron battleship “Victory”, laid down at the Baltic plant in 1898 g, should have cost the treasury 9 535 924 rubles. (in fact, it turned out to be a bit more expensive, 10,05 million), while it was pledged two years later at the same enterprise “Alexander III” (like “Borodino”) was estimated at 13 978 824 rubles. In other words, two battleships of the Borodino type had a cost approximately like the Victory 3. The contrast with the ships laid in foreign shipyards was also quite striking - according to the same “Report”, the cost of building the “Tsarevich” was determined in 14 004 286 rubles, and even the cheapest of all the newest Russian battleships, Retvizan, cost 12 553 277 rub., Also had to become more expensive than the "Victory".

At the same time, being significantly cheaper than full-fledged battleships, Peresvet ships were able to stand in line. Peresvet itself showed good stability in 28 battle in July 1904 g in the Yellow Sea - then 40 shells hit the ship, including 11 - 305-mm, 1 - 254-mm, and one more 254-mm or 305-mm, and the rest - a smaller caliber. Let us dwell a little more on the damage of the armadillo.


"Relight" after the battle 28 July 1904 g

9 shells got into the vertical armor of the hull and, in general, she coped well with the challenges she faced. The 305-mm armor-piercing projectile hit the edge of the 229 mm plate of the armor belt, perhaps, caused the greatest damage: it could not pierce it, but the hard (hardened) layer went cracked and the soft part was bent. The tightness of the side was broken, so that 160 tons of water entered the ship. Three projectiles (of which two were caliber 6-10 dm and another of unknown caliber) hit the 178 mm belt, armor was not broken, but as a result of one of the hits 5 frames and the bulkhead were dented. The shells hit the 178 mm armor plates damaged the copper and wood plating, but this did not lead to a leak and had no effect on the ship’s combat capability. The 102 mm belt took the blows of one 305-mm and two 152-mm projectiles, and the latter did not cause any damage to the armor plates, but at the point of impact the twelve-inch armor broke up - however, the projectile did not enter inside and did not do any other damage. Another 305-mm projectile struck the armored belt under the lower casemates (it is unclear whether it was the 229 mm or the 102 mm belt), but the armor was not broken, although a shell fragment destroyed the 152-mm cannon. One projectile of unknown caliber landed in the casemate’s armor, but could not penetrate it, and this hit did not produce any other consequences.

The main caliber towers had 3 hits. The stern turret was surprisingly small - only one, and most likely small-caliber projectile (this is 75-152-mm, but still, rather, 75-mm) hit the roof of the tower and slightly bent it, fragments penetrated through the viewing slots the commander, why the latter (bent at the moment of hitting) was wounded in the arm. The nasal one suffered much more: one 10-12 dm projectile struck the hinged cover over the right cannon, while the tower did not receive serious damage, but the piercing commander and two commanders who had penetrated into the fragments and injured the other servants. The second projectile (305-mm) also did not pierce the armor, but the mamerinet was bent so that the rotation of the tower turned out to be extremely difficult (the 10 man had difficulty turning it). Not least, the fire control cables and the negotiation tube in the nose tower were broken.

In general, the damage to the nose tower well demonstrates how hard the ship can be damaged, even if its armor was not pierced. The installation of the main-caliber nose guns lost its centralized fire control, it jammed, and the commanders suffered heavy losses. Here we can talk about the almost complete loss of combat effectiveness: of course, the tower could still occasionally shoot "somewhere in the wrong direction", but without a commander and central fire control it was unlikely to have a chance to get into the enemy. On the other hand, if there were no armor, the tower would have been irreparably damaged, and the calculation would most likely have been killed, and the flames could have reached the cellars ... The role of armor in sea battles of the Russian-Japanese war is extremely important, but you should always remember that the battleship could lose its combat capability, even if its armor was not penetrated.

The next example of the above is the only hit in the conning tower, more precisely, in the traversing of the aft conning tower, where a shell of an unidentified (but most likely large) caliber struck. From this blow, the wheelhouse did not suffer at all, the armor fully fulfilled its purpose, but fragments of the projectile crushed the engine hatch and put one of the battleship’s machines out of operation, and only after about half an hour it was able to be put into action. Fortunately for Peresvet, the Russian squadron was on very moderate 13 nodes, which the ship could keep even with two working machines, but had it been different - the ship would have been forced to leave the battle line, with all the ensuing consequences. Another extremely unpleasant hit hit the foremast - 305-mm projectile exploded right in it and knocked out the rangefinder Barr and Strouda, which obviously affected the accuracy of the battleship.


One of the holes of the battleship Peresvet

The rest (more than twenty) hits occurred in the unarmored parts of the ship, but only two of them had a really serious impact. The 305-mm projectile landed almost on the waterline to an unprotected nasal tip, in the galvanic workshop area. Nevertheless, the ship was lucky - in spite of the fact that the bulkheads and the door to the workshop were distended, and the water that poured through the hole washed out everything overboard, yet there was no extensive flooding - it can be considered a miracle that there were no holes in the bulkheads surrounding the compartment . In addition, it turned out that the karapasnaya deck was not pierced, the tightness was not broken, why the water did not go down, and well-established bulkheads limited its distribution horizontally. As if the pre-war calculations, which relied on the ability of the armored decks and sealed compartments to protect the unarmored ends of the ship, were fully confirmed, but ... the second hit of the 305-mm projectile around the same place led to much more trouble. Water penetrated everywhere - in the turret section, bomb cellars and submarine torpedo tubes. In essence, the 25 people who were supplying projectiles and charges to the nasal 254-mm tower were captured by water — they could only get out through the feed pipes. The battleship itself, picking up with the nose of the water, held out in the best way. After shifting the rudder, the ship slowly tilted towards the 7-8 hail in the opposite direction, and kept this roll until the next rudder shifted to another side - the fault was that the water spilled in the nasal compartments of the residential deck and flowed toward the roll. However, when the commander of the ship ordered to counter-flooding the double bottom compartments of the battleship (except for the bow ones), the Peresvet regained its navigability.

In that battle, Peresvet received the greatest number of hits from all the Russian ships, but it was not going to sink or explode, or even just leave the system. Nevertheless, two hits of 305-mm shells into the bow, unarmored part seriously threatened the combat capability of the ship. Fortunately, at that time everything went well, and the crew coped with the problems.

But "Oslyabya" no luck. It is not known how many shells the ship received before its death, however, judging by the available data, there were only three twelve-inch shells - however, they pleased so “in place” that they led to the death of the battleship. It should be borne in mind that, unlike Peresvet and Pobeda, Oslyabya was very badly built, and it is possible that the quality of construction affected its premature death. Interestingly, the coal transshipment from the list of possible causes of the death of this ship, most likely, should be deleted - before the battle, the coal supply did not exceed the normal one.

On the whole, it can be assumed that Peresvet could, without prejudice to their combat capability, make a significant number of hits, but they were extremely dangerous for severe damage to the extremities, if they were inflicted in a short period of time, as happened with Oslyaby. On the other hand, it was a common weak point of many old battleships who did not have a full reservation of the waterline - it can be assumed that the survivability of Peresvet in this respect did not differ fundamentally from the same Poltava, Sevastopol or Fuji. And, of course, they couldn’t withstand the fire impact that the Borodino-type battleships at Borodino in Tsushima suffered - they would have died many earlier.

As for firepower, we have already said that the average caliber of squadron battleships - rapid six-inch guns - turned out to be, if not completely useless, then absolutely insufficient to cause any serious damage to armored ships. First of all, this was due to the low accuracy of medium caliber shooting. So, for example, in a battle in the Yellow Sea, the 1 and 3-y combat troops of the Japanese, together with the armored cruiser “Asama”, jointly launched 603 twelve-inch shells and 4095 six-inch shells, the latter were released almost 6,8 times more. But according to the results of the battle, the 57 of twelve-inch shells hit the Russian ships; four more hits had an undefined caliber 254-305-mm, but the “identified” 152-mm hits were only 29. However, 51 was also hit by shells, the caliber of which could not be determined, but even if they were all written in six-inch ones (which is wrong, as some of them could be 203-mm and 76-mm, and even the same 305- mm), then and on 57-61 305-mm projectiles hit only six-inch 80.

At the same time, the relatively low power of 152-mm projectiles did not allow serious damage to the armored ship, and we can conclude that the presence of the entire 11 six-inch carriage from Peresvet, of which only the 5 could participate in the onboard salvo Russian, English and Japanese battleships in the number of such guns in the side salvo reached 6-7, did not seriously affect the firepower of the ship.

But the lightweight main caliber is another matter. The mass of the British 305-mm projectile guns exceeded the Russian 70-mm projectile by more than 254%, which had the most significant effect on the weight of the explosive in the projectile and, therefore, on its striking effect. The mass of explosives in the British armor-piercing projectile reached 11,9 kg, while in Russian 254-mm armor-piercing - only 2,9 kg, and high-explosive only 6,7 kg. At the same time, despite their rather high ballistic qualities, 254-mm guns, mounted on Peresvet and Oslyab, were lost in armor penetration by British 305-mm guns with 35 caliber barrels mounted on Majestic and Canopus battleships ", And the improved 254-mm guns, which the battleship Victory received, were still inferior in armor penetration to the newest English twelve-inch 40 caliber. Thus, in a long-range battle, the Peresvet high-explosive shells would be inferior to the modern English 305-mm battleship due to the weakness of the damaging effects of 254-mm shells, and in a short distance the Russian armor-piercing shells would have lower armor penetration and much weaker armor action .

All this, of course, does not mean that the Russian 254-mm guns were safe for the squadron battleship. By no means. In addition, a small amount of explosives in Russian shells was to a certain extent compensated for by its quality - if the British used to equip their shells with gunpowder, then the Russians - with pyroxylin. But still, the twelve-inch guns had a significant advantage and one can only regret that when designing the Peresvet, the admirals sacrificed to other qualities the main caliber of these ships ... Of course, their reasons can be understood. First, the 254-mm cannon turret weighed significantly less than a similar turret with 305-mm cannons, and saving weights was very important for reducing the displacement and cost of the ship. Secondly, we must not forget that Peresvet was made high-breasted, with a high forecastle, so that the nose tower gave a great upper weight - for reasons of stability, it was better to be easier. And finally, thirdly (and this was the most important), the Russian 254-mm gun had superiority over the 240-254-mm artillery systems of their potential opponents - the German squadrons, and the English 2-class battleships. Thus, the decision to ease the main caliber of Peresvetov suggested itself ...

As always, the cunning of Albion are to blame for everything. In fact, the English shipbuilders chose a completely different path for their “second-class” battleships: having built a Centurion-type ship 2, they were not satisfied with the 254-mm artillery, finding it too weak. Therefore, the third British battleship 2 rank, "Rinaun" was supposed to get a full-fledged 305-mm guns, but their development was unexpectedly delayed, causing the British, with a wave of their hand, hoisted on him old, but industry-developed 254-mm guns, similar to stood on the "Centurion."

If the British observed the development schedules of their new twelve-inch unit, then it would be the main caliber of Rinaun, and the latter would have been taken as the “starting point” when designing Peresvet! There is no doubt that if Rinown had 305-mm artillery, the Russian admirals would have demanded a gun of the same caliber for Peresvet.

Interestingly, the General-Admiral, Grand Duke Alexey Alexandrovich himself thought about this. Of course, this statesman devoted too little time to state affairs in general and the fleet in particular, preferring foreign recreation and entertainment, which made the unpleasant nickname “7 pounds of the most august meat” completely deserved. But in this case, he came up with a quite reasonable initiative: 1898 g, in the year of the “Victory” bookmark, he asked the sailors whether it was impossible to replace 254-mm guns with 305-mm. Unfortunately, this was not the slightest opportunity.



It was already quite clear that Peresvet would turn out to be pretty overloaded. And therefore, in the Victory project, the main emphasis should be placed not on the improvement of its combat qualities by strengthening the artillery, since such improvements would require additional weight, but on the contrary, an all-out saving of weights. As a result, Victory was limited to improved, heavier, but still only 254-mm guns, and also widely used Krupp armor, instead of armor, hardened by the method of Harvey, which gave an increase in protection for the same thickness (and, therefore, mass ) armor plates. In addition, they removed the wooden and copper underwater cladding, as it was then believed, to protect the ship from fouling, reduce the height of the residential deck, abandoned the aft log house. As a result of the above, “Victory” got off with a minimum overload relative to its predecessors: only 646 t, against 1136 t “Peresvet” and 1734 t “Oslyab”.

Undoubtedly, Pobeda became the most advanced ship of the series - more powerful main-caliber guns, more robust Krupp protection, about the same speed, but less overload, thanks to which it was possible to increase coal reserves and thereby bring the estimated range of the 10 nodes to 6080 miles . All this allows us to consider Victory not the third ship in the Peresvet series, as is usually done, but the first ship of a new type: and yet, despite all the above-mentioned advantages, the construction of Victory should be considered a mistake. It was already quite clear to 1898 in Japan that Japan is gaining strength in Far Eastern waters, which forms its sea power on the basis of large squadron battleships, which are quite appropriate and, perhaps, even superior to British battleships of the 1 class. At the same time as England for service in the Far Eastern waters lays powerful battleships like "Canopus". The confrontation of the ships listed above required much more serious combat qualities than those possessed by the Victory.

The British began to build a series of battleships of the Canopus type, intended for service in Asian waters, the year after the tabs of Peresvet and Oslyabi. Six British ships were laid in 1896-1898 and entered service in 1899-1902 - it was with these ships that Peresvet in the Far East would have had to meet if there was a war with Great Britain.

Unlike the Rinaun, the Canopus, like the Peresvet, received the Belleville boilers progressive for that time, with which the newest British ships were able to develop 18 ties (and some ships of the series - and more) without forced blowing i.e. in speed, the Canopuses were at least as good as Peresvet. Their booking was a little less powerful, but more rational. The very high, 4,26 m, armor belt towering above the waterline on the 2,74 m consisted of 152 mm Krupp armor plates, which (according to English tests) was equivalent to about 198 mm Harvey armor. Peresveta carried the 229 mm, but it was Garvey’s armor .... On the Canopus, the British provided for a high belt covering the nasal tip - it was very thin, only 51 mm and did not guarantee, of course, the protection of the extremities from the enemy’s heavy projectiles.



In the 28 battle of July 1904 of Retvizan, whose extremities had the same thickness of protection, received an extremely unpleasant 10-12 dm projectile in 51 mm of armor in the bow from a long distance. Apparently, the projectile was high-explosive and did not pierce the armor, but the plate cracked and deformed, the tightness of the bead was broken, and the water flowed into the body. Of course, if the nose of the Russian battleship had no armor at all, the explosion of the high-explosive projectile would have created a much larger hole, and even worse - the fragments could damage the internal watertight bulkheads, thereby causing more extensive flooding than it actually did. You can say that 51 mm armor could not protect the ship from trouble, but it still significantly minimized the possible damage - even from a large-caliber projectile.

The Canopus armored deck with bevels within the citadel had a thickness of 51 mm, which approximately corresponded to, or was slightly larger than that of Peresvet. The latter had 38,1 mm on a steel base in 12,7 mm, respectively, the total thickness of the armor was 50,8 mm. It is not known how the British considered their 51 mm, i.e. did they ignore the thickness of the steel substrate or did the 51 mm indicated by them include it as well, but in any case, the bevels of the English battleship were not at least inferior to those of Peresvet. On top of the citadel, the British placed another additional armored deck in 25 mm (most likely an inch thick). There was a slight mystification - the British heard about French experiments on howitzer use in naval combat and feared that against the shells falling almost vertically from their 51 mm deck would not be enough. Accordingly, they put the upper armored deck so that it would ensure the exploding of the shells, then the lower armored deck would have to reflect the fragments, which she was quite capable of. In fact, the French experiments with howitzers were completely unsuccessful, so the precaution of the British was superfluous. The traverses and barbets of the British battleships defended themselves better than those of Peresvet, but in general, the protection of Russian and English battleships can be considered comparable.

But the main caliber - no. The Canopus received 305-mm / 35 guns, whose armor penetration exceeded the Peresvet and Oslyabi 254 guns (perhaps roughly corresponding to the Victory artillery), although the power of the English projectile was much higher. In the aggregate of the fighting qualities, the Canopus, perhaps, did not have a decisive superiority over Peresvet, but it was still stronger (about the same amount as Peresvet was stronger than the Rinaun). Another thing - laid in 1898 g "Victory". Due to the quality improvement of the armor (the transition from Harvey to Krupp) and the installation of several more powerful 254-mm cannons, the Victory can still be considered equal to the Canopus. But in 1898, when the construction of the last Peresvet began, the British laid a series of three Formideable-style ships. Their citadel formed armor plate thickness 229 mm (Krupp armor), nasal tip were covered 76 mm bronepoyasom and aft - 38 mm, though armadilloes carried latest 305-mm / 40 implements superior in armor penetration 254-mm "Win" cannon. At the same time, the British battleships showed 30 - 4 knots at rated power with an 5 / 16,8 full-time test with full-power 17,5 / 18,2 and reached 900 knots when forcing. And this is despite the fact that the mass of coal approximately corresponded to that of Pobeda (2000 in normal and XNUMX in full displacement). These ships were also intended to operate in the Far East, and were significantly superior in their fighting qualities to the Victory battleship.

However, the Russian Empire had no choice - by stopping the development of classic squadron battleships, which the ships of the Poltava series were at the time of their laying-in, the Navy relied on lightweight cruisers, which were to successfully solve the problems of defense of the Baltic and cruising war in the ocean. And now the Naval Department simply did not have a project of a modern squadron battleship capable of equal combat with Japanese ships of the same class!

The concept of building "battleships-cruisers" was logical, economically justified, but it contained only one (but fatal) error. The versatility of the “battleships-cruisers” was “bought” at the cost of reducing their combat qualities to the level of battleships of the 2 class. It seemed reasonable at the time of laying the Peresvetov, since among their likely opponents were not considered more powerful ships. But one should have guessed that such a concept would be viable until some country decides to counterfeit Peresvet with full-fledged squadron battleships with which cruiser-battleships are no longer able to fight. After all, it would be enough for the Germans to go on to build full-fledged 1 class battleships - and the fleet made up of ships like the Peresvet lost control of the Baltic even in the unlikely event if they could manage to equal the German Navy in the number of keels. As soon as Japan began ordering battleships of the 1 class in England, the Peresvets immediately lost the ability to “rationalize” this Asian country on their own, without reinforcement of the first-class battleships. It was enough for the Royal Navy to design high-speed armadillos with 305-mm guns for service in the Far Eastern waters - and the Peresvet from the position of ocean hunters immediately moved to the “game” column. Although in fairness, we note that the “game” from Peresvet turned out to be quite toothed and capable of pretty much fooling the “hunter”.

We can say that in those years, Great Britain created a certain standard of sea power - a squadron battleship of the 1 class with a displacement of 15 000 tons. Such a ship was the top of the "food pyramid" at sea - being able to fight at least on equal terms with any military the ship of the world, such a battleship was not yet overly large and expensive for serial construction, and the offensive, defensive and seaworthy qualities in it merged harmoniously enough. And the rejection of the construction of ships capable of equal "transfer" with the British fifteen thousand, was, alas, a very gross mistake, no matter how well-intentioned it was dictated.

And this is science for us, for today. No matter how desirable, no matter how profitable it is to create ships that are weaker than those that our potential adversaries have, no matter how much affection the corvettes and frigates cause, “almost the same” as the destroyers of “sworn friends”, but the implementation of such a strategy will only lead to the fact that the underfinanced by the ruble during the creation will be in full, with large percentages paid for with the blood of the crews forced to fight against a more powerful opponent.

Of course, the attempt of the Russian fleet to realize the concept of cruising warfare by imparting raider capabilities to linear forces is extremely interesting. However, such an attempt could have a chance of success only if the Russian Empire had created 1-class battleships capable of such operations. In other words, for the successful implementation of the concept of “battleships-cruisers”, it was necessary to create not Peresvet, but ships, in everything similar to fifteen thousand British squadron battleships, but also capable of pirating in the ocean for a long time. But such ships a priori would have to become larger and more expensive than their English "counterparts", to which the constrained Russian Empire could not go ...

Interestingly, only Nazi Germany subsequently managed to achieve something similar - by building Bismarck and Tirpitz, the Germans got a pair of almost perfect anti-English raiders. Each of these ships at least was not inferior (and actually even superior) in combat power to its main opponent - the latest British battleship such as "King George V", but also had superiority in range. Nevertheless, the German battleships were a little late with birth - raiding single large ships in the era aviation could not be successful for a long time.

Sometimes “Peresvety” is called the forerunner of the battle cruisers, but this is a completely erroneous opinion. First, the battlecruisers were still created for service in the linear squadrons and did not dispute the need for battleships. Peresveta, in the opinion of their creators, should have become a class that will replace the classic battleships in the Russian fleet (in the Baltic and the Far East). Secondly, we must not forget that the battle cruiser is a ship that has the same main caliber as the battleship, but a higher speed, for which it has to pay either with a weakened protection, or with a greater displacement than the battleship. Peresveta had no equal caliber with modern battleships, and if you really try to look for the forerunners of battle cruisers among the battleships of the beginning of the 20 of the 20th century, then the British Canopus are much better suited to this role - although, strictly speaking, the battle cruisers also have no relationship.

In conclusion - a couple of words about comparing ships of the “Peresvet” type with the armored cruisers of Japan. By and large, neither one nor the other was intended to stand in a line against full-fledged squadron battleships, but those and others were forced to do so. However, the Japanese armored cruisers could not be considered equal to Peresvet - and the matter is not weakened, the 178 mm armor of the Japanese ships, especially since Asama and Tokiwa were protected by Harvey’s armor, and other armored cruisers received Krupp armor plates. But the 203-mm main caliber of the Japanese ships was too weak to inflict decisive damage to well-defended ships with a displacement of 10 thousand tons and more - just recall the Korean Strait battle when Russia and Thunderstorm Jessen fought against the enemy twice in two hours. The battle came out extremely fierce, Kamimura made every effort to defeat the Russian ships, but both Russian armored cruisers did not receive any life-threatening damage - despite the fact that they were protected worse than Peresvet. Analysis of the damage inflicted by 203-mm projectiles, clearly indicates that for the battleships this caliber was not a big threat. But the 254-mm guns of Peresvetov were fully capable of inflicting decisive damage on any ship of Admiral H. Kamimura, or on the Nissin with the Kasuga. The Japanese ships were very powerful and well protected, but only armored cruisers, and they could not withstand Peresvet, which had combat capabilities of an 2 class battleship, of course, first of all due to the very powerful Russian 254-mm guns.

Interestingly, the statistics hit ten-inch "Peresvetov" raises doubts about the accuracy of these guns. In the battle at Shantung, the Russian battleships used 344 305-mm projectile and 224 - 254-mm, but 305-mm guns made 12 hits, and 254-mm - only four. It turns out that the firing accuracy of the twelve-inch guns is much higher than the Peresvet 254-mm guns - 3,49% hits against 1,78%. Sometimes you hear the opinion that the almost double superiority of 305-mm guns as a percentage of hits indicates some structural defects of the 254-mm guns (or their installations) that did not allow firing with the same accuracy as 305-mm. This opinion, of course, has the right to life, because it is confirmed by the actual results of the shooting, but one more thing to consider. Training gunners "Victory" and "Peresvet" was much worse than the "Retvizana", "Sevastopol" and "Poltava", as he wrote S.I. Lutonin on artillery exercises 1903 g:

““ Poltava ”, taking the first prize, knocked out 168 points, followed by“ Sevastopol ”- 148, then“ Retvizan ”- 90,“ Peresvet ”- 80,“ Victory ”- 75,“ Petropavlovsk ”- 50.”


If we assume that Tsesarevich fired no better than Petropavlovsk, and that the number of points is proportional to the accuracy of the ships, then the 4 “twelve-inch” battleship (taking into account the actual expenditure of projectiles in July 28 battle for each battleship) would have to provide 8-9 hits 305-mm against 4 hits "Victory" and "Peresvet". In other words, a significant discrepancy in the number of hits may be based on the bad preparation of the gunnery-cruisers' gunners, and not at all the hardware of their guns.

But, in addition, we must not forget that the Russian 254-mm high-explosive projectile ... could well be much more powerful than the Russian twelve-inch. This “cute” naval anecdote is related to the fact that the amount of explosives in the domestic ten-inch projectile slightly exceeded that of the twelve-inch - 6,71 kg versus 5,98 kg. What is even worse is due to the lack of pyroxylin, domestic 305-mm shells were filled with smokeless powder, while 254-mm were filled with pyroxylin. This is reliably known for the 2 Pacific squadron, but according to Lieutenant V.N. Cherkasov, senior gunner Peresvet, a similar situation was in Port Arthur. And in this case, the 254-mm high-explosive projectile had the advantage not only in mass, but also in the power of the explosives contained in it.

The caliber of the projectile caught in the ship is determined by fragments, but this is not always possible: for example, getting into the 178 mm “Mikasa” plate when the plate was damaged, but still did not let the projectile go inside. Then it remains only to assess the power of the gap and determine the caliber from it. The Japanese, as reasonable people, understood that the 305-mm projectile, in any case, should be more powerful than the lighter 254-mm. It would hardly have occurred to them that the Russians have the opposite ... And therefore, it cannot be excluded that some Russian hits with high-explosive 254-mm shells are ranked by them as twelve-inch.

By virtue of the foregoing, the author of this article has no reason to believe that the Peresvet and Pobeda 254-mm guns had a lower firing accuracy than the other Russian battleships 305-mm guns. And that meant the extremely unenviable position of any “asamoid”, one-on-one against “Peresvet” - with a comparable level of training for the commandors, of course.

List of used literature:
1. V. Polomoshnov “Fight 28 July 1904 (the battle in the Yellow Sea (the battle at Cape Shantung))
2. V.B. Mujenikov "Battleships type" Kaiser ""
3. V. Maltsev, “On the Question of Accuracy of Shooting in the Russian-Japanese War” Part III-IV
4. V.N. Cherkasov “Notes of the artillery officer of the battleship Peresvet”
5. V.Krestyaninov, S.Molodtsov "Armadillos of type" Peresvet ". “Heroic Tragedy” ”
6. V.Krestyaninov, S.Molodtsov "Squadron battleships like" Peresvet "
7. O. Parks «British Empire's battleships. Part IV: His Majesty Standard
8. O. Parks «British Empire's battleships. Part V: At the turn of the century "
9. R.M. Melnikov "Squadron battleships like" Peresvet ""
10. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 Fleet actions. Documents. Division III 1 Pacific squadron. Book One. Actions on the southern maritime theater of war. Release 6 th. Fight 28 July 1904 g
Author:
Articles from this series:
Armadillos of the Peresvet type. Wonderful mistake. Part of 1
Armadillos of the Peresvet type. Wonderful mistake. Part of 2
Armadillos of the Peresvet type. Wonderful mistake. Part of 3
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  1. Slug_BDMP
    Slug_BDMP 23 November 2016 20: 29 New
    +5
    I haven’t read the article yet, but I hope it will be as interesting as the rest of Andrei’s materials.
    And now I want to ask: what does she do in the "Armament" section? In my opinion, her place is in the "Military Archive", as well as in all materials related to technology related to the period, well, say, before 1945.
    (The question is more moderators than the author)
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Vadivak
      Vadivak 23 November 2016 21: 42 New
      +2
      Quote: Slug_BDMP
      And now I want to ask: what does she do in the "Armament" section? In my opinion, her place is in the "Military Archive", as well as in all materials related to technology related to the period, well, say, before 1945.
      (The question is more moderators than the author)


      In my opinion, this type of ship is still more a weapon than a technique
      1. Mooh
        Mooh 24 November 2016 02: 24 New
        +6
        "Military archive", just like "history", from decent people few people read. It so happened that the overwhelming majority of informative materials on this site are in the "weapons" section. The rest of the sections are mostly propaganda. Accordingly, the audience is different.
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 24 November 2016 18: 45 New
          +1
          Quote: MooH
          The remaining sections are mostly propaganda. Accordingly, a different audience is going to

          Aha yes In "analytics" and "news" only star gatherers hang out, and in "arms" with "history" are true connoisseurs ... winked But the site has the word "review" in the name, so the founders themselves decide what it should be request So far I am mostly satisfied. In places and wonderful materials come across and interesting people fellow
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            24 November 2016 19: 57 New
            +1
            Quote: Rurikovich
            In places and wonderful materials come across and interesting people

            It is a pity that interesting materials are becoming less and less, and people ... how many have left the site - not to count. I’m talking about VAF for example (it’s ancient now). Sometimes it comes, but less and less.
          2. Mooh
            Mooh 24 November 2016 20: 28 New
            0
            Quote: Rurikovich
            Quote: MooH
            The remaining sections are mostly propaganda. Accordingly, a different audience is going to

            Aha yes In "analytics" and "news" only star gatherers hang out, and in "arms" with "history" are true connoisseurs ... winked But the site has the word "review" in the name, so the founders themselves decide what it should be request So far I am mostly satisfied. In places and wonderful materials come across and interesting people fellow


            I stopped reading "history". There is less free time and there is now such a thing that you can't comment on without a mat. But I found at the same time three or four parts from the cycle "battle in the yellow sea" and I tell you, in a row it reads much better than with breaks and running ahead from the comments.
          3. Comrade
            Comrade 25 November 2016 05: 20 New
            0
            Quote: Rurikovich
            In "analytics" and "news" only star gatherers hang out

            Andrei, why the hell are they?
            1. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich 25 November 2016 17: 43 New
              0
              Quote: Comrade
              Andrei, why the hell are they?

              Dream of becoming marshals wink winked
              1. Comrade
                Comrade 26 November 2016 03: 10 New
                +1
                Quote: Rurikovich
                Dream of becoming marshals

                Bad is the soldier who does not dream of becoming a marshal.
                1. Rurikovich
                  Rurikovich 26 November 2016 07: 21 New
                  0
                  Quote: Comrade
                  Bad is the soldier who does not dream of becoming a marshal.

                  The question is not in achieving the goal, but in what ways it is achieved smile
                  1. Comrade
                    Comrade 27 November 2016 04: 18 New
                    0
                    Quote: Rurikovich
                    The question is not in achieving the goal, but in what ways it is achieved

                    Sorry, if I ask a stupid question, then I'm a new person. Chin Marshall they want to show off for the sake of, or does it give any privileges?
                    1. Rurikovich
                      Rurikovich 27 November 2016 09: 35 New
                      +1
                      Quote: Comrade
                      Sorry, if I ask a stupid question, then I'm a new person. Chin Marshall they want to show off for the sake of, or does it give any privileges?

                      Here the question lies in the plane of human psychology, and I am almost sure that systems that assume in their development some bonuses in order to stimulate demand, later become hostages of their ideas. So it was with this site in terms of "ranks". The administrators slightly changed the rules of the game, its human nature is still stubborn and the cherished "marshal" rank can be obtained only there, where there is the greatest demand for comments and those sections that are the first on the site. yes The vast majority hi
                    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      27 November 2016 16: 00 New
                      0
                      Quote: Comrade
                      Chin Marshall they want to show off for the sake of, or does it give any privileges?

                      Generally speaking, yes. Previously, the pros and cons put up by the marshal were more significant than the pros / cons of other officers and ordinary staff :))) Now I don’t know:
                2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  26 November 2016 11: 15 New
                  +2
                  Quote: Comrade
                  Bad is the soldier who does not dream of becoming a marshal.

                  It's right. But generally speaking, from the words of a person who understood something in military affairs: "the marshal's rod is in a soldier's knapsack," but he did not say anything about comments on the forums ... laughing drinks
          4. Monarchist
            Monarchist 26 November 2016 13: 15 New
            0
            Rurikovich, for example, I am interested in the history, armament section, but there is not always enough time (at work you will catch a moment on the tablet), and free days are one or the other and again little time.
            1. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich 26 November 2016 13: 54 New
              0
              Quote: Monarchist
              Rurikovich, for example, I am interested in the history, armament section, but there is not always enough time (at work you will catch a moment on the tablet), and free days are one or the other and again little time.

              I sympathize winked I have a wagon, so I have a lot to see. Another thing is that I want to comment a little request
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2016 19: 17 New
      0
      Quote: Slug_BDMP
      Question to moderators rather than to the author

      I have nothing against the section "Armament", but in any case, it is the moderator who determines the heading of the article
      Quote: Slug_BDMP
      I haven’t read the article yet, but I hope it will be as interesting as the rest of Andrei’s materials.

      Thank!:)
      1. Mooh
        Mooh 24 November 2016 20: 30 New
        0
        I have nothing against the section "Armament", but in any case, it is the moderator who determines the heading of the article

        Apparently by rotating on the table a recently used bottle :)))))
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 24 November 2016 20: 54 New
          0
          Quote: MooH
          Apparently by rotating on the table a recently used bottle :)))))

          See wink offended - soldered something for the most pamper wassat repeat
          1. Monarchist
            Monarchist 26 November 2016 13: 19 New
            0
            Rurikovich, in my opinion Vadim doesn’t use a bottle very much (not noticeably based on materials).
            1. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich 26 November 2016 13: 55 New
              0
              Quote: Monarchist
              not a bottle

              It was about moderators wink
  2. Ulan
    Ulan 23 November 2016 20: 49 New
    +8
    I am grateful to the author for such a detailed study. I learned a lot of new and interesting things for myself. For example, he believed that all three ships of the series are no different from each other. However, "Victory" was different.
    In general, thanks.
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 23 November 2016 21: 18 New
      +5
      Quote: Ulan
      I am grateful to the author for such a detailed study. I learned a lot of new and interesting things for myself. For example, he believed that all three ships of the series are no different from each other. However, "Victory" was different.
      In general, thanks.

      "Victory" was also prettier for the first two thanks to the more graceful forms of the stem and arch yes personally in my opinion hi
      1. Ulan
        Ulan 24 November 2016 18: 14 New
        +1
        I also drew attention to this, although perhaps this is only an impression.
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 24 November 2016 18: 20 New
          +2
          Quote: Ulan
          although perhaps this is just an impression.

          No not an impression yes

          "Pobeda" had excellent extremities, different from the first two, the inclination of the hull in the middle part and more complete contours hi
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2016 19: 17 New
      0
      Quote: Ulan
      In general, thanks.

      You're welcome! I am glad that there are people who care about the marine theme
  3. Bormanxnumx
    Bormanxnumx 23 November 2016 21: 11 New
    +2
    But Oslyabya was not lucky. ... It should be borne in mind that, in contrast to Peresvet and Victory, Oslyabya was very badly built, and it cannot be ruled out that the quality of construction affected its premature death.

    It is quite possible that it is not the quality of construction that is to blame, but the short period of time during which Oslyabya received hits - the team did not have time (could not) promptly respond to the damage received.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2016 19: 21 New
      0
      Quote: BORMAN82
      It is quite possible that it is not the quality of construction that is to blame, but the short period of time during which Oslyabya received hits

      Hardly. The fact is that Peresvet received similar damage - two XNUMX-inch rounds in the unarmored bow end, both hitting almost simultaneously.
      But there are several options:
      1) I believe that in Tsushima, the Japanese used much more powerful high-explosive shells than in the July 28 battle
      2) Perhaps it turned out that either the fragments of the shells severely destroyed the bulkheads, or this was made by shells of lighter caliber, which are also numerous in the nose. It was harder to localize from this flooding
      3) Possible construction marriage Oslyaby, i.e. her bulkheads did not hold what could hold bulkheads Peresvet But guess - I do not have the facts, alas
  4. Denimax
    Denimax 23 November 2016 22: 05 New
    0
    It looks like the farther into the forest the thicker the specialists. Not mastered.
    I can imagine more if such a hull is sharpened for cars, squeeze the speed of armored planks at 22 knots or more. Weapons give, as in the calibers are not widely used, namely 9 inches and 107 mm.
    There would be a very involved armored ship.
  5. Bormanxnumx
    Bormanxnumx 23 November 2016 22: 26 New
    +1
    Quote: Denimax
    give weapons, as with calibers that are not widely used, namely 9 inches and 107 mm.
    There would be a very involved armored ship.

    The point is to install on a colossus with a displacement of 14000 tons. slow-firing old junk with cap-loading - to get a semblance of "Russia" only with outdated weapons?
    1. Denimax
      Denimax 23 November 2016 22: 56 New
      0
      The meaning is big. You can use the case for cars. 9-inch guns can be arranged according to the 2 x2 and 2x1 scheme. A heavy volley will be provided. 107 mm will beat off the entire hunt and destroyers. Therefore, I say that in vain they abandoned these calibers (although they were, they themselves loved the Englishman directly).
      It was necessary to develop!
      1. Bormanxnumx
        Bormanxnumx 23 November 2016 23: 43 New
        +1
        Taking into account the "dull" rate of fire of 9 "guns and 126kg of a projectile (the British 9,2" shell is 174kg), five guns per side will not provide a firing performance commensurate with 2x2 10 ". It is also very doubtful that replacing 10" with two double and two single 9 "turret mounts will give such a groundwork in displacement that will provide a speed of 23 knots and an acceptable range. Regarding the average caliber, then it would be more logical to install 120 Kene, and not 107mm-rapid-fire + shell weight is almost twice as much.
        1. Denimax
          Denimax 24 November 2016 00: 32 New
          0
          9 inches is taken from the gunboats, as are 107 mm. Which is not developed on them and remained. The reserve of speed implies the rejection of the SA 6 inches, and the replacement of 107 mm. You can still reduce the thickness of the armor, and cover thinner in a circle. The French and Italians seem to have built high-speed railways at the PM and over 10 tons. Why not?
        2. Monarchist
          Monarchist 26 November 2016 13: 26 New
          0
          I am not selenium in artillery, but a 120mm Kene is preferable (Shirokorad seems to be positive about them)
  6. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 23 November 2016 22: 40 New
    +4
    Greetings, Andrei Nikolaevich hi
    Article plus good yes drinks
    I agree with you in many respects, because this material for me personally logically explains the pros and cons of this type of ship in the RIF. And they are a consequence of the concept of using these ships. At the time of design, they met the requirements that were required of them. But only at the time of design and bookmarking. winked Because the likely opponents had their own views on the use of their ships, including the fight against the "Peresvet" under construction. request So everything that happened later when it entered service turned out to be the usual flow of facts from the development of technical thought of that time and the sluggishness of domestic shipbuilding capacities. Upon entry into service, they no longer met the requirements of the time at all (precisely at the time of entry into service). Say what you like, but real EBRs were more powerful, and not slower in speed, therefore, a bold cross was put almost automatically and on possible raiding. You yourself understand perfectly well that the protection of the extremities plays an important role in the overall protection of the ship, but whatever one may say and by the ears, it is not up to par with ships of this type ... Armament - yes, I agree, with normal 254-mm shells guns can still compete with 12 ". Maybe they won in price compared to real EBRs, but on the battlefield they do not ask the price of the ship winked
    So "overexposures" still leave extremely conflicting feelings. And it may be true that if their admirals were used as an "antidote" to the BrKr of the Japanese fleet, they would have shown themselves better request But then again, my personal opinion ...
    The whole cycle is five good For thinking people, it will become clear why they have such "overexposures", for upart even God is not the last resort. I personally liked it drinks
    Looking forward to the next articles. hi
    1. avt
      avt 24 November 2016 09: 28 New
      +3
      Quote: Rurikovich
      At the time of design, they met the requirements that were required of them. But only at the time of design and bookmarking.

      Yes, fullness. According to this criterion, all ships lose to the next one. Even though the Aglitsk samples were actually taken as the basis for the project, they planned to use it in the cruising version. BUT here and this Andrei correctly noticed, although he attributed it to design flaws, the ships were not used according to the scheme they had planned. Well, to shorten the commentary, they were put in line as a full-fledged battleship, having corroded them with the cruisers planned for interaction. Well, what do you want after that? After all, even a good project, "Tsesarevich-Borodino", due to errors in the strategic deployment of forces and means, dangled like a "Flying Golandets" on the Ocean, But when the remaining two battleships fell into the conditions under which they were actually designed - to work with reliance on the network coastal bases, then they quite withstood battles in battleships as part of the forces and means of the diverse Baltic Fleet. There are no all-powerful, "lonely cowboys" ideally tailored. There are always weaknesses, especially when they put them in unfavorable conditions of battle. "Yamato" with his last campaign, perhaps the top of it.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 24 November 2016 18: 01 New
        +1
        Quote: avt
        By this criterion, all ships lose by following them. Even though they really took Aglitz samples as the basis of the project, they planned to use it in the cruising version.

        So I have repeatedly said that the ship needs to be used in the way they were intended wink then you won’t have to be surprised at unexpected results yes What the project was based on and what ideas were used to use what they planned to build, the author painted very well at the very beginning. And the fact that the ships got without modernization potential, these are questions generally to the fleet construction system, and not to individual samples. ..
        Quote: avt
        put in line as a full-fledged battleship, disconnecting them from the cruisers planned for interaction

        Well, here you have not discovered America fellow

        Quote: avt
        After all, even a good project "Tsesarevich-Borodino" due to mistakes in the strategic deployment of forces and means, dangled like a "Flying Golandets" across the Ocean,

        So they were built according to the program to strengthen the Far East request Another thing is that the aggravation with Japan was planned no earlier than 1905, then they would have managed to form the core of the fleet. And since the Japanese decided not to wait for gain and attacked a year earlier, in the end they got what happened. And so the Japanese simply believed in themselves and got rid of in parts. It’s easier to swallow in pieces than all at once winked It was the unwillingness to wait for the strengthening of the Russians by the ships under construction that served as one of the reasons for such a turn of events that did not suit Russia at all. But ... It was not for Russia to decide when to attack the Japanese repeat
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2016 19: 29 New
      +1
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Greetings, Andrei Nikolaevich

      And greetings to you wholeheartedly! drinks
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Upon entry into operation, they absolutely did not meet the requirements of the time (exactly at the time of entry into operation).

      And who can argue ... It was hard for them to compete with the Canopus, but with the Formidebl ... oh-wey, as they say in Odessa ... Well, in fact, in general, they had to fight against Asahi and Sikishima.
      Therefore, he wrote that you never need to build weaker ships than potential rivals.
      Quote: Rurikovich
      And it may be true that if their admirals were used as an "antidote" to the BrKr of the Japanese fleet, they would have shown themselves better

      So there were no battleships. Well, how to fight if we have 7 EBRs with Victory and Peresvet against 6 Japanese ones? But God himself ordered the Thunderbolt to be done in the image and likeness of "Victory". And if he were like "Victory" I would have looked at Kamimura in the Korea Strait ...
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Maybe they won at a price compared to real EDBs, but they don’t ask the price of a ship on the battlefield

      That's for sure. And from a lower price, which is typical, slipways no longer become.
      Quote: Rurikovich
      The whole cycle is five

      Thank you! drinks
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 24 November 2016 21: 09 New
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Well, how to fight, if we have 7 EDBs with Victory and Relight against 6 Japanese?

        Well, to the battle in the Yellow Sea in the ranks of the opponents thinned wink - it became 4 EBR plus 4 BrKr for the Japanese against 4 EBR and 2 heroes of this cycle for the Russians. And if you take into account that in the Yellow Sea "Asama" tried to catch up with the main forces and did not participate de facto before the denouement, then in contrast to the two "overexposures" there were three classic Japanese armored cruisers. Quite capable, as it seems to me request winked All the same, there is a difference - to get 12 "suitcases or 8" gifts, against which the resistance would be higher winked
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But God himself ordered the Thunderbolt to be done in the image and likeness of "Victory". And if he were like "Victory" I would have looked at Kamimura in the Korea Strait ...

        "Stormbreaker" is "Stormbreaker". But with more aggressive intentions for reinforcement and brains for planning and deciding support on the way), the Oslyaby could not be returned home, but driven to the Far East. The main forces were occupied by Arthur, and Kamimura was "caught" by the VOK. Therefore, with the observance of measures to ensure disinformation for a safe campaign and high-quality planning, this battleship-cruiser could get to Vladivostok, then Kamimura's head would really hurt yes
        I don’t know, I didn’t really ask this question why Oslyabya was returned to the Baltic. what Maybe malfunctions in long-term construction were in the power plant, maybe something else ... request
        This is of course an alternative, but personally, at that time, I would be for such "entropy" for the Japanese repeat Strengthen - so strengthen, fight - so fight soldier
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2016 16: 49 New
          0
          Quote: Rurikovich
          Well, to the battle in the Yellow Sea in the ranks of the opponents thinned

          So then to the fight in the WM :))) But who knew that this would happen? It would have been necessary to deploy Peresveta in Vladivostok even before the war.
          Quote: Rurikovich
          counterbalance to the two "overexposures" were three classic Japanese armored cruisers. Quite capable, as it seems to me

          Definitely. and if some people were engaged in military and political activity from the bottom of their hearts, instead of standing on an internal raid, everything could have come out very differently :)))
          Quote: Rurikovich
          "Stormbreaker" is "Stormbreaker". But with more aggressive intentions for amplification and brains for planning and deciding support on the way), it was possible for Oslyaby not to return home, but to drive to the Far East

          The alternative would be great. If the Stormbreaker is built according to the "victorious" one, then with the arrival of Oslyabi, the VOK has two "Peresvet", two large airborne missiles, and two large armored decks. Four asamoids do not shine here, they need everything 6.
  7. Happyendl
    Happyendl 23 November 2016 23: 45 New
    +1
    Worse still, due to the lack of pyroxylin, domestic 305 mm shells were equipped with smokeless powder, while 254 mm were equipped with pyroxylin.


    Clarity should be made, since pyroxylin is a kind of smokeless powder. It turns out butter butter ...
    I do not agree with all the allegations of the author, but in general the article deserves a fat plus.
    1. Bormanxnumx
      Bormanxnumx 24 November 2016 00: 21 New
      +2
      Perhaps this is pyroxylin powder is a special case of pyroxylin, and not vice versa :) Much depends on the nuances - for example, a checker for early RS M-13 engines pressed from pyroxylin powder does not explode and its combustion differs from similar powder having a "bulk appearance".
      1. Happyendl
        Happyendl 24 November 2016 00: 33 New
        0
        That is, in addition to using smokeless powder as a propellant, it can also be used as a blasting explosive, for which the charge density is adjusted to a value corresponding to detonation.
        1. Mooh
          Mooh 24 November 2016 02: 33 New
          0
          The issue was discussed in relation to Tsushima. The respected author believes that the blasting and explosiveness of pyroxylin is significantly higher than that of "smokeless powder". I disagree with him, but none of us can give serious arguments due to the lack of reliable historical sources such as explosive test reports.
          1. unknown
            unknown 24 November 2016 10: 04 New
            0
            The explosiveness of pyroxylin is 14 times higher than that of black powder, and 1,45 times higher than that of shimosa. Methods exist, tests were carried out.
            The British, in Jutland, black powder in their shells was enough. According to the results of the battle of high-explosive shells, 10 pieces per gun were left.
            1. Mooh
              Mooh 24 November 2016 13: 09 New
              0
              The explosiveness of pyroxylin is 14 times higher than that of black powder, and 1,45 times higher than that of shimosa. Methods exist, tests were carried out.

              Are there any protocols? Do you have data for 1904-5 on the composition and manufacturing technology of smokeless marine powder in RI?
              1. Alex
                Alex 13 September 2017 19: 34 New
                +1
                Hello to all old (and not so) acquaintances! hi

                I saw a dispute about explosives and could not stand it. Pyroxylin as an explosive in shells is basically nitrocellulose itself. But smokeless powder - it can be NK itself, and a solid solution of nitrocellulose in nitroglycerin. Both that, and that can be used both as throwing, and as a brisant explosive, but there are traditions and technology. In particular, a mixture of KG with NK is more preferable as a propellant, pure NK - as brisant.
  8. jonht
    jonht 24 November 2016 02: 12 New
    +1
    Thank! As always informative.
  9. Comrade
    Comrade 24 November 2016 03: 25 New
    +5
    Hello Andrey ! A good, successful cycle turned out, I read with great interest and pleasure, thanks +! However, there are several discussion points.
    withstand the fire impact, which suffered the battleships of the type "Borodino" in Tsushima, "Relight" could not - they would have died much earlier

    Much, if not all, depends on the distribution of hits. "Oslyaba" three 12 "shells inflicted fatal damage, and" Peresvet "and eleven 12" shells did not care, the ship kept both speed and place in the ranks. "Prince Suvorov" received up to ten 12 "shells and left the formation helpless, “Eagle” received several “suitcases” more for the whole battle, but it worked out well.
    The artillery training of Pobeda and Peresvet was much worse than that of Retvizan, Sevastopol and Poltava, as S.I. wrote. Lutonin on the 1903 artillery exercises:

    Dear colleague, the total number of points tells us little about the level of individual training of gunners of the main caliber guns, since this is the sum of the points received by armadillos for firing from guns of several calibers.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2016 19: 47 New
      +2
      Greetings, dear Valentine!
      Quote: Comrade
      A good, successful cycle turned out, read with great interest and pleasure, thanks +!

      It's your fault, honest noble word! They infected me with interest in the REV :)))) By the way, did you happen to pay attention to the list of used literature? hi
      Quote: Comrade
      Much, if not all, depends on the distribution of hits. "Oslyaba" three 12 "shells inflicted fatal damage, and" Peresvet "and eleven 12" shells did not care, the ship kept both the course and the place in the ranks

      Of course, the distribution of hits plays a decisive role, but Peresvet does not have a single place where he was protected better than Borodino, but there are more than enough places where he is protected. Therefore, if Suvorov went out of action from 10 Chumodans, then 10 Chumodans in the same places of Peresvet would have knocked out the latter either earlier, or with worse damage.
      Quote: Comrade
      Dear colleague, the total number of points tells us little about the level of individual training of gunners of main guns

      Well, why?
      Quote: Comrade
      since this is the sum of points received by armadillos for firing from a few caliber guns.

      Dear colleague, in my humble understanding, the number of points on firing is the aggregate characteristic of the artillery service of the ship, including the main guns.
      Rangefinders must correctly determine the distance to the target, the head-master according to the tables and, taking into account the movement of their own ship and the target, calculate corrections to the sight, all this must be passed on to the gunners, they must set corrections, "choose" anticipation for excitement, etc. The same is true in battle - the commando's main command line is just an element of the fire control system, and the state of the system as a whole affects its hits. Therefore, I believe that the level of the gunners of a particular ship is comparable to myself, regardless of what kind of weapons they are servicing. In addition, as far as I remember, the gunners of our battleships in the towers changed during the battle - they could not stand the gas pollution. Although not at all ...
      In general, I believe that the quality of the commandants depends on the quantity and quality of artillery, and they, in theory, are conducted (or not conducted) for artillery of all calibers. Therefore, it’s quite difficult for me to imagine a situation where the six-inch commandos are all Hawkeye and GK are mazilas. Unfortunately, I have no evidence (other than logical) of this theory. request
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 25 November 2016 03: 51 New
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        It's your fault, honest noble word! Infected me with interest in the REV

        Yes, it really hurts an interesting topic :-)
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        By the way, you, by chance, did not pay attention to the list of used literature?

        What can I say? I must admit, I am very pleased that you paid attention to my work and found it possible to use it in your cycle.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        if Suvorov failed from 10 chumodanov, then 10 chumodans would have knocked out the last in the same places of Relight either earlier, or with worse injuries.

        Not necessarily, these are different ships, let's remember how it was on the Suvorov. In the thirty-four minutes that have passed since the opening of fire on it, the flagship received about eight to ten 12 "shells. Rozhestvensky decides to change course by turning four points to the left, but at that moment his steering gear interrupts with another shell, and the ship lost control rolled 16 points to the left, and at the same time the telegraph to the left car was damaged, which made it impossible for the ship to be controlled by machines.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        in my humble understanding, the number of points in firing is a cumulative characteristic of the artillery service of the ship, including the main guns.

        This is true, but armadillos most likely fired a different number of shells, which means that even if the percentage of hits was the same, the number of points would be different. It is very desirable, of course, to clarify the issue, take a look at the consumption of shells by caliber and the percentage of hits.
        By the way, we can recall the effectiveness of the firing of coastal defense battleships in Tsushima. Eleven 10 '' barrels, senior gunners, optical sights, two Barr and Stroud rangefinders per ship, plus Belgian rangefinders, hundreds of shells fired, and a maximum of one or two hits. After all, something was really wrong with our ten-inch models.
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 25 November 2016 06: 36 New
          0
          Quote: Comrade
          By the way, we can recall the effectiveness of the firing of coastal defense battleships in Tsushima. Eleven 10 '' barrels, senior gunners, optical sights, two Barr and Stroud rangefinders per ship, plus Belgian rangefinders, hundreds of shells fired, and a maximum of one or two hits. After all, something was really wrong with our ten-inch models.

          I remember one hundred Andrei once said that the trinity of the BRBO went to the Far East with the guns already shot. I’ll erase it, but it seems to me the point is this. The ships were training and were used more often than military ones ... Maybe this is the reason request
          1. Comrade
            Comrade 26 November 2016 03: 35 New
            +2
            Quote: Rurikovich
            I remember one hundred Andrew once said that the trinity of the BRBO went to the Far East with guns already shot.

            According to the MTK norms, the survivability of the barrels for 10 '' guns was 200 rounds per barrel. I have at hand some information on the "Admiral Ushakov", which makes it possible to judge the degree of wear of the main caliber guns of this battleship. Since 1898, the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov" was annually included for three weeks in the Training Artillery Detachment to improve the training of artillerymen. As a result, as of 1902, 195 practical shots (with the warheads reduced by half) and 84 combat shots were fired from the main caliber guns of the "Admiral Ushakov". In preparation for the march on the battleship, several dozen firings were carried out, in which 10 more shells were fired from only 140 '' guns of the battleship. Unfortunately, I do not know how many of them are practical and how many are combat ones. Artillery training did not stop during the campaign. On March 27, 1905, four high-explosive shells were fired at once from each main battery gun in the Gulf of Aden. On April 11, live fire was repeated, and 10 '' guns fired four more live rounds. So, at the beginning of the Tsushima battle, the main guns of the "Admiral Ushakov" fired 451 shots, but this does not take into account the shells fired in 1903. If the consumption of shells in 1903 is taken equal to the 1902 indicator, then another 451 shots will be added to 53 ... In total, this will amount to 504 shots, while the aggregate MTK norm for them is 800 shots. However, we know for sure that out of these 504 shots, at least 195 were practical.
            In other words, even assuming the unbelievable that all the other shots were live, from the allotted norm in 800 combat shots (for four guns) at the start of the Tsushima battle, a maximum of 309 combat shots were fired from four guns, i.e. less than half.
            This means that the average 10 '' gun of "Admiral Ushakov", at the rate of two hundred live shots, by May 14, 1905 made 77 (maximum) live shots and 49 (minimum) training shots. But most likely, there was a different ratio between combat and training shots, in favor of training.
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2016 17: 11 New
          +1
          Quote: Comrade
          Not necessarily, these are different ships,

          So still, the internal structure is quite comparable. In principle, of course, you can try to determine, with a precision of a comma, what consequences Peresvet would have if he stood in the place of Suvorov, but we don’t know exactly where the hits were.
          Quote: Comrade
          This is true, but armadillos most likely fired a different number of shells, which means that even if the percentage of hits was the same, the number of points would be different. It is very desirable, of course, to clarify the issue, take a look at the consumption of shells by caliber and the percentage of hits.

          Yes, I do not argue. Nevertheless, I remain of the opinion that the number of points to a certain extent reflected the quality of the artillery training.
          Quote: Comrade
          By the way, we can recall the effectiveness of firing battleships of coastal defense in Tsushima.

          Oh well them :))))) Mazil :)))))
          Quote: Comrade
          Eleven 10 '' barrels, old-time gunmen, optical sights, two Barr and Stroud rangefinders per ship, plus Belgian rangefinders, hundreds of shells fired, and a maximum of one or two hits

          Dear Valentine, I did not understand about the commandors. After all, the ships were used as a training manual, where did the artillery team from the old men come from? At the beginning of the war, ships stood in reserve. Then they prepared trainers for 2TOE. If someone was put before leaving as part of the 3TOE, they were not trained properly either before the exit or on the campaign. I am wrong?
          And then - if only the quality of the guns (without taking into account the shooting) were to blame for the disgusting results of the BRBO firing - then with such a result Peresvet July 28 would not have gotten anywhere. Again - BRBO played the role of an artillery gun and an experienced artillery squad for a long time - and didn’t anyone pay attention to the fact that you can’t get anywhere from their guns? Agree, this is at least strange.
          1. Comrade
            Comrade 26 November 2016 03: 55 New
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            In principle, of course, you can try to determine, with a precision of a comma, what consequences Peresvet would have if he stood in the place of Suvorov

            Dear colleague, unfortunately, I am so loaded with work that I am not at all ready for full-fledged discussions. I cut out literally minutes every day so that work on a small note is gradually moving forward. There will be something interesting.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Nevertheless, I remain of the opinion that the number of points to a certain extent reflected the quality of the artillery training.

            I agree with you.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            I did not understand about the commandors. After all, the ships were used as a training manual, where did the artillery team from the old men come from? I am wrong?

            They are absolutely right. I meant that these were not draftees or reserve men.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Again - BRBO played the role of an artillery gun and an experienced artillery squad for a long time - and didn’t anyone pay attention to the fact that you can’t get anywhere from their guns?

            So after all they shot in greenhouse conditions, so there were hits.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 November 2016 11: 28 New
              +1
              Quote: Comrade
              Dear colleague, unfortunately, I am so busy with the work that I’m completely unprepared for full-fledged discussions

              I understand you perfectly :)
              Quote: Comrade
              I cut out literally minutes every day so that work on a small note is gradually moving forward.

              Are looking forward to!
              Quote: Comrade
              So after all they shot in greenhouse conditions, so there were hits.

              Well, as in the greenhouses ... Rozhdestvensky did not disdain to shoot at 30 kb :)) And then - cases of low-quality materiel were noted, as far as I remember. So EMNIP on Ushakov’s bow tower was some kind of document that indicated an unacceptable horizontal spread. But this is a specific defect in a particular installation.
              Quote: Comrade
              In total, this will amount to 504 shots, despite the fact that the total MTK rate for them is 800 shots. However, we know for sure that of these 504 shots, at least 195 were practical.

              I can offer one more version - it cannot be ruled out that the problems of the BRBO installations were not only and not so much in the shooting of the guns, but in the re-lightweight installations, carriages, if you like. They seem to have become loose over time (something similar was noted on Ushakov). Those. the more shots were fired, the more the structure loosened and the more the median deviations grew. At the same time, the Peresvet's guns did not come close to having the shot that the BRBO had, and the Pobeda had more serious settings.
              In addition - poor training of the commandants, a place in the tail of the detachment, long distances to the Japanese, and maybe some confusion about the definition of hits (because a 10-dm projectile with pyroxylin burst harder than a 12-dm high explosive with gunpowder) - here is an explanation of the quality of the BRBO shooting in Tsushima
              1. Comrade
                Comrade 27 November 2016 04: 11 New
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Well - in the greenhouse ... Rozhdestvensky did not disdain to shoot at 30

                Sorry, I got excited about "greenhouse conditions".

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                In addition - poor training of the commandants, a place at the tail of the squad, long distances to the Japanese,

                This is nothing, remember that our most successful shot in Tsushima was made from "Emperor Nicholas I".
      2. Comrade
        Comrade 25 November 2016 04: 05 New
        +1
        Andrei, please excuse me, of course, Rozhestvensky wanted to turn not to the left, but to the right.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          26 November 2016 11: 29 New
          0
          Quote: Comrade
          Of course, Rozhdestvensky wanted to turn not to the left, but to the right

          And who knows, maybe to the left .... he kept his thoughts to himself laughing drinks
  10. Ural resident
    Ural resident 24 November 2016 09: 36 New
    +1
    Thank you for the article
    From all that I know about the naval part of the Russo-Japanese war, I cannot understand one thing:
    in all naval battles with an equal number of shells fired — our ships received several times more hits than the Japanese — maybe this is generally the cause of the defeats?
    When comparing ships, it seems that they have equal opportunities, yes, we have fewer explosives, weather conditions, the position is not the same, but how does it turn out that ours mostly hit by, and in return the shells went down with amazing accuracy? And this is in almost all battles ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2016 19: 50 New
      0
      Quote: Resident of the Urals
      in all naval battles with an equal number of shells fired — our ships received several times more hits than the Japanese — maybe this is generally the cause of the defeats?

      Not at all. In Tsushima, in the beginning of the battle, in the first 40–45 minutes we probably didn’t concede in terms of the number of hits to the Japanese. Then our battleships from the Japanese strikes began to lose the SLA, and the Japanese did not, as a result of which our fire was weakened, but they were not. The answer has to be sought as shells.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 24 November 2016 21: 35 New
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Then our battleships from the Japanese strikes began to lose the SLA, and the Japanese did not, as a result of which our fire was weakened, but they were not.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The answer has to be sought as shells.

        Or maybe more in tactics winked I would also accept the version about shells, if the opponents walked at the same speed and fired, as in the "classic" - the flagship for the flagship, the second for the second, and so on. Then yes - after a while, the advantage in the quality of shells would make itself felt request And so the advantage in speed, the choice of position and the concentration of fire on the head gives more guarantee that the enemy will be put out of action faster than the best quality of the shells. Indeed, formally, the battle came down to the confrontation of the Japanese main forces against 2-3 head ships yes Therefore, what kind of qualitative confrontation can be discussed request Yes, I believe that if the Japanese did not have such tactical advantages, the Borodinians, thanks to their proven survivability and better accuracy than those of the Arthurians, could really resist if all the ships of the 2nd squadron, and not only those, took part in the defense which were in the "focus" of Togo. Then the load on the head would be less and the Japanese would not have made a pogrom in the allotted time ...
        So the quality of the shells, in my opinion, is not the main reason. This is a companion. The main one is a lost tactic due to the low speed, which led to the inability to adequately respond and change anything.
        Again, my personal opinion hi
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2016 17: 19 New
          0
          Quote: Rurikovich
          Or maybe more in tactics

          Dear Andrey, tactics are good when they affect the number of hits in the enemy, do you agree? :))) And Mikasa snapped these same shells in the first 37 minutes quite well - 6 * 305 mm and 17 * 152 mm. So what? And at least henna.
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 25 November 2016 18: 09 New
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            And Mikasa snapped these same shells in the first 37 minutes quite well - 6 * 305 mm and 17 * 152 mm.

            Some people said that 6 "is of little use in creating damage for the EBR wink Now, if 17 -12 "hit, then due to the amount they can do what they did on Mikasa" wink Well, in the first 37 minutes, we achieved so many hits, but then what? This is not the hit of the entire squadron, namely the head 2-3 battleships at the beginning of the battle, which in the tie had the "good fortune" to shoot at the flagship of Togo. Well, further, according to the laws of dialectics, quantity turns into quality. It is much easier to shoot at a crawling turtle move, as in an exercise, than at a much faster enemy, who, due to superiority in speed, dictates the conditions of battle, puts his ships in such a way as to create overweight ...
            Yes, Andrei, well, the tactics didn’t stop working after the first 37 minutes of the battle. smile The Japanese clearly knocked out the main ships throughout the battle yes
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 November 2016 11: 31 New
              0
              Quote: Rurikovich
              Yes, Andrei, well, the tactics didn’t stop working after the first 37 minutes of the battle.

              The tactics didn’t stop, but the Russian SLAs, alas. And without them, at least tactics, at least strategy ....
              Quote: Rurikovich
              Some people said that 6 "is of little use in creating damage for the EBR

              Of course. But at least something they had to hurt!
              1. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 26 November 2016 16: 13 New
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                But at least something they had to hurt!

                Absolutely right.... yes But then our ships sank request ....
      2. unknown
        unknown 25 November 2016 09: 55 New
        0
        The Japanese in the Yellow Sea used both high-explosive shells and armor-piercing. Like ours. In Tsushima, the Japanese used "miracle shells". But, no one has adopted this experience. Quite the opposite. The British switched to black powder, and the Germans continued to improve the armor-piercing projectile.
        After Jutland, in the ammunition of the English battleships there were 10 high-explosive shells per gun.
        The Japanese themselves forgot about their "invaluable" experience, and they approached WWII only with armor-piercing shells.
        So was there experience and "miracle shells"?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2016 17: 23 New
          0
          Quote: ignoto
          The Japanese in the Yellow Sea used both high-explosive shells and armor-piercing shells.

          This is certainly true.
          Quote: ignoto
          In Tsushima, the Japanese used "miracle shells". But, no one has adopted this experience.

          Why - not adopted? What about the British?
          Quote: ignoto
          The British switched to black powder

          They were on it, as I recall. But the fact is that according to the results of Tsushima (although most likely - including the results of Tsushima), the English fleet abandoned armor-piercing shells as the main means of fighting at sea, and relied on semi-armor-piercing, exploding with minimal slowdown. Because of what, in fact, the British did not win Jutland - they shoot full-fledged armor-piercing ...
          Quote: ignoto
          The Japanese themselves forgot about their "invaluable" experience, and they approached WWII only with armor-piercing shells.

          Tell me too ... Where is Tsushima, and where is WWII? :))))
    2. unknown
      unknown 25 November 2016 10: 04 New
      +1
      Just the literary version of that war was written like that.
      "Mikasa" was not damaged in the Yellow Sea, but then, for some reason, it was repaired for about eight months. I barely made it to Tsushima. It's good that friends in St. Petersburg were trying to slow down the 2nd squadron with all their might.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        26 November 2016 11: 41 New
        0
        Quote: ignoto
        "Mikasa" was not damaged in the Yellow Sea, but then, for some reason, it was repaired for about eight months.

        After the battle, Mikasa underwent a superficial repair at about. Elliot was there as part of the squadron almost until the end of the year. He left at Kure only on December 23, 1904. On February 1, 1905, the battleship re-entered service, in mid-February he participated in firing with might and main
  11. unknown
    unknown 24 November 2016 10: 43 New
    +2
    1. I agree that the reason for the death of "Oslyabi" is in many respects connected with the construction overload. Although, I doubt that it was more than that of "Peresvet". But, that was enough.
    2. Comparison with Japanese armored cruisers. My favorite "miracle Yudo". Overloading armor, armored, that is, not high-speed contours, relieved by the CMU, stokers, who, like the rest of the Japanese sailors, were inferior in mass to the Europeans from 10 to 20 kg - as a result: the speed of 20 knots only on tests (English "acceleration" teams), and in real life from 15 to 17 knots for a long time. The armament also did not correspond to the tasks: the fire performance was at the level of the Russian cruisers with a displacement of 6000 tons. The ships that did not show themselves in any way, so "served their number." Two or three battleships, even of the Fuji type, would be much more useful.
    3. In terms of the ratio of battleships in the theater, at the beginning of the RYA, the Russians lacked one or two ships. At the same time, both "Alexander III" and "Oslyabya" were already in service, and they could be transferred to the theater before the start of the war.
    I think that there was no need to wait for the revision of the "Tsarevich" project and build a series on it. One battleship would be enough. And so, time was lost, and the project was ruined.
    The project was "Victory". Lay, and build, as quickly as possible.
    And then, transfer to the theater, while the first squadron is still capable.
    On battleships, parity, and "Asams" "Victories" is not a competitor.
    And the project had modernization reserves: KMU - almost 2000 tons, and modern armadillos - about 1400 tons. And this is a decrease in construction overload, and, if desired, a belt at the extremities.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2016 19: 51 New
      0
      Quote: ignoto
      And the project had modernization reserves: KMU - almost 2000 tons, and modern armadillos - about 1400 tons.

      Right. Only for this, it would be necessary to change the three-shaft power plant to a two-shaft one - it’s easier to design new ships
      1. unknown
        unknown 25 November 2016 10: 00 New
        0
        Not a fact.
        The Germans have traditionally used a three-shaft.
        On the same "Askold" - three-shaft.
        Mass of KMU-1270 t. Power - up to 23500l.s.
        By the way, in order to cover the extremities, on Pobeda it was enough to reduce the belt thickness to 178 mm.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2016 17: 27 New
          0
          Quote: ignoto
          On the same "Askold" - three-shaft.
          Mass of KMU-1270 t. Power - up to 23500l.s.

          Well, the EDB screws are a little larger, the shafts are a little more genuine, therefore, by definition, the CMU of the armored cruiser cannot have the weight :))) And then - on Askold there were completely different boilers - Schulz-Tornicroft, jumping on them at the time of the Victory bookmark is too much great alternative. It is theoretically possible, but practically adopt a new unproven type of boilers ...
    2. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 24 November 2016 22: 19 New
      0
      Quote: ignoto
      I think that there was no need to wait for the revision of the "Tsarevich" project and build a series on it. One battleship would be enough. And so, time was lost, and the project was ruined

      Hmm ... The "Tsarevich" did not have any protection from the PMA, the "Borodino", albeit due to the thinner side armor, received the protection of the PMA, and therefore an even larger area of ​​the armored side. Even relatively thin armor has weight against high explosive shells. So it's not a fact that "Borodino" was weaker than "Tsarevich" wink The point here is rather in the quality of construction and compliance with all kinds of shipbuilding standards, as well as in many subjective factors affecting the survivability of the ship yes
      Quote: ignoto
      "Alexander III" and "Oslyabya" were already in the ranks, and they could be transferred to the theater before the start of the war.

      They tried - yes, "Oslyabya" did not reach its destination before the start of the war and was returned to the Baltic
      Quote: ignoto
      The armament also did not meet the objectives: fire performance at the level of Russian cruisers with a displacement of 6000 tons.

      Again in that steppe winked How can the fire performance be at the level of "six-thousanders" if against 7 barrels per side in 6 "Askold" the same "Asama" has the same 7 barrels in 6 "plus another 4 in 8"? Okay, the rate of fire of the main battery is less than that of the SK But it is not necessary to say that 7 barrels in 6 "Askold" shoot twice as fast as 7 barrels in 6 "Asams", which also adds 8 "main guns" through a volley. In general, 6000-ki were built in contrast to 4000-kam Japanese of the "Takasago" type, which had 2-8 "and 5-4,7" on board. So here, yes, the caliber is chosen adequate to resist these ships. But why compare things that don't need to be compared? "Varyag" otgrёb from the same "Asama", "Askold" escaped due to the quality of German cars and high speed (and I am more than sure that if this speed had not been, "Askold" would have got rid of Yakumo in full yes
      1. unknown
        unknown 25 November 2016 09: 35 New
        0
        One of the components of fire performance is the rate of fire.
        Russia. Kane guns had a real rate of fire from 6 rounds per minute (feed allowed) for separate loading.
        Japan.
        1. Armstrong's early patents. According to D. Brown, the real rate of fire achieved by the Japanese-4 stood at a minute.
        2. The use of cord marks Mk 1-30 for charges, which contributed to a strong burnout of the barrel and forced to limit the rate of fire.
        3. The mass of Japanese sailors was lower than that of northern Europeans. The difference is from 10 to 20 kg. Shell 6 "was heavy for the Japanese. When the opportunity arose, they switched to 140mm caliber. By the way, the British created a gun of this caliber at the Greek request, for them 6" was also heavy.
        4. The loading of 8 "guns is archaic. The feed is designed for light projectiles weighing 95 kg.
        Result: in Chemulpo, Asama released 27 8 "and 103 6", and Varyag - 425 6 ".
        "Askold" with the destroyed first pipe could not show full speed, maximum 20 knots.
        Japanese armored cruisers are completely stupid ships, neither this nor that.
      2. unknown
        unknown 25 November 2016 09: 43 New
        0
        About high-explosive shells.
        In the Yellow Sea, both of them used high-explosive shells and armor-piercing shells. In Tsushima, the Japanese used, allegedly, used an ultra-high-explosive high-explosive shell.
        But, for some reason, the British switched to black powder for equipping shells larger than 6 ", and the Germans began to improve the armor-piercing projectile.
        After Jutland, high-explosive shells in the ammunition of British battleships remained in the amount of 10 pieces per gun.
        The Japanese never again used their "miracle shells", and in general they approached WWII only with armor-piercing ones. Although, logically, for an all-or-nothing booking scheme, a high-explosive shell is more terrible. So, did the Japanese "miracle shells" exist in nature?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2016 17: 27 New
          0
          To this I answered above :)
          1. unknown
            unknown 27 November 2016 13: 08 New
            0
            Did not exist.
            It's obvious.
      3. unknown
        unknown 25 November 2016 09: 49 New
        0
        In Chemulpo: "Asama" - 27 8 "and 103 6". "Varyag" - 425 6 "
        Rate of fire, you know.
        Japan: low rate of fire of the early Armstrong guns, unsuccessful cord charges. Forcing to further reduce the rate of fire due to severe burnout, lack of Japanese body weight (as a result, the transition to the caliber of 140 mm).
        None of the Japanese armored cruisers did not scrub, unsuccessful ships, dead ends.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2016 17: 28 New
          +1
          Quote: ignoto
          In Chemulpo: "Asama" - 27 8 "and 103 6". "Varyag" - 425 6 "

          Yes, Varyag did not release 425 6 ":)))
          1. unknown
            unknown 27 November 2016 13: 07 New
            0
            Of course. I already wrote that I love academics. No facts can change their point of view. Rigidity of thinking is called. But issued as fidelity to principles.

            Of course, everything was bad for the Russians, but everything was good for the Japanese.

            Facts :
            1. Armstrong's guns of early patents, the maximum recorded rate of fire is 6 "- 4 rounds per minute.
            2. The unsuccessful corditon of charges, which the British have already abandoned.
            3. A smaller mass of Japanese sailors and the transition to a caliber of 140mm
            4. Unsuccessful delivery of 6 "and 8" guns.

            Especially, I am pleased with the assessment of 6000t cruisers. in literature. Everyone noted that it was a mistake.
            As an example, they like to cite the Germans, who built either armored or small cruisers of rank II. But, at the same time, they somehow do not notice that these cruisers have grown to almost 6000 tons with 6 "artillery. The British have the same thing. The British generally believed that 6000 tons is the minimum for an ocean cruiser.
            The Japanese, after the REV, having received trophy ships, came to similar conclusions.

            Sometimes, it’s useful to think about comparing information from different sources.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              27 November 2016 16: 49 New
              0
              Quote: ignoto
              1. Armstrong's guns of early patents, the maximum recorded rate of fire is 6 "- 4 rounds per minute.

              What's the point? All the same, the combat rate of fire is much lower than the indicators of both Kane and Armstrong.
              Quote: ignoto
              The unsuccessful corditon of charges, which the British have already abandoned.

              Nevertheless, it seemed that there were no special problems with the gap of the Armstrong six-inch. There EMNIP had problems with the number of shots to shoot the guns.
              Quote: ignoto
              A smaller mass of Japanese sailors and the transition to a caliber of 140mm

              Yes, but the Japanese solved the problem by storing shells near the guns, and we could not punish them for it.
              Quote: ignoto
              Poor delivery of 6 "and 8" guns.

              And what was wrong with the six-inch?
              Quote: ignoto
              Especially, I am pleased with the assessment of 6000t cruisers. in literature. Everyone noted that it was a mistake.

              Because this is a mistake.
              Quote: ignoto
              As an example, they like to cite the Germans, who built either armored or small cruisers of rank II. But, at the same time, they somehow do not notice that these cruisers have grown to almost 6000 tons with 6 "artillery.

              I didn’t understand anything :))) Who grew up to whom? When?
              The Germans have the first high-speed cruiser, exceeding 5 thousand tons complete displacement - this is the series "Magdeburg" 1910 bookmarks - and they had an armored belt. And we have cruisers under 7 thousand tons of normal no belt displacement.
              Quote: ignoto
              The English have the same thing. The British generally believed that 6000t is the minimum for an ocean cruiser.

              The Germans did not agree with them and perfectly pirated in the ocean on the "Bremen" in 3200 tons of normal displacement.
              We had six thousandths
              Varangian - 5 922 967 rub
              Askold - 5 196 205 rubles.
              "Bogatyr" 5 rubles. And "Oleg", built at domestic shipyards - in general 509 rubles!
              Despite the fact that the Bayan, which any six-thousandth winged like a bull to a sheep - 6 964 725 rubles.
        2. Comrade
          Comrade 26 November 2016 04: 43 New
          +2
          Quote: ignoto
          "Varyag" - 425 6 "Rate of fire, you know.

          In addition to the expenditure of shells, Rudnev indicated in the report that "the cruiser "Takachiho" was damaged, which received a hole; The cruiser took 200 wounded and went to Sasebo, but the plaster burst on the road and the bulkheads could not stand, so the Takachiho cruiser sank into the sea. The destroyer sank during the battle"Do you want to prove that the Takachiho did not sink as a result of the damage allegedly caused by the Varyag? And what is the phrase from the report"one destroyer was also sunk, which was subsequently confirmed"also has no foundation?
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 26 November 2016 14: 09 New
            +1
            Quote: Comrade
            Quote: ignoto
            "Varyag" - 425 6 "Rate of fire, you know.

            In addition to the expenditure of shells, Rudnev indicated in the report that "the cruiser Takachiho suffered a hole; the cruiser took 200 wounded and went to Sasebo, but the expensive plaster broke and the bulkheads could not withstand, so the cruiser Takachiho sank into the sea. sank during the battle. " Do you want to prove that "Takachiho" did not sink as a result of damage allegedly caused by "Varyag"? And that the phrase from the report "also sunk one torpedo boat, which was later confirmed" also has no basis

            About three years ago I read Chornovil's "Review of the battle at Chemulpo". Made me think about a lot. And what is interesting, now this material is not available on the net. request It can be seen, spoils the myth of a heroic battle. In vain did not download what
            Personally, I am always for an honest analysis, albeit destroying myths and not popular with many, but fair. This is the only way to understand the true causes of victory or defeat.
            I wonder if there is enough courage for such material to appear on the basis of real documents, archives, reports, views of the Japanese ???? winked Maybe impartial documents would dot the i's ...
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 November 2016 16: 06 New
              +1
              Quote: Rurikovich
              About three years ago I read Chornovil's "Review of the battle at Chemulpo".

              And Valentin and I criticized him to the nines :)))) More precisely, Valentine criticized - from me there were a couple of secondary thoughts and literary design :)))
              Quote: Rurikovich
              It can be seen, spoils the myth of a heroic battle. In vain did not download

              Not in vain. Cheating comrade, oh cheating ...
              Quote: Rurikovich
              Personally, I am always for honest analysis, albeit destroying myths and not popular with many, but fair

              This, it seems, has not yet been written. But still, his results will be much closer to the canonical version than to the abacus / chornovil hypotheses
              1. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 26 November 2016 16: 20 New
                0
                [quote = Andrey from Chelyabinsk] And Valentin and I criticized him to smithereens :)))) More precisely criticized Valentin - I had a couple of secondary thoughts and literary design :)))

                I agree. But the point is that there was an opinion that is different from the official one, which made me doubt, and therefore, there is an interest in the topic and a desire to find out the truth ...
                [quote = Andrey from Chelyabinsk] Not in vain. Cheating comrade, oh cheating ... [/ quote]
                I will not argue, but you do not agree with 1105 shells fired in 14 minutes and sunk "takachiho" and torpedo boat wink
                [quote = Andrey from Chelyabinsk] This, it seems, has not yet been written. But still, his results will be much closer to the canonical version than to the hypotheses of the abacus / chornovil [/ quote]
                Or maybe you will risk wink There must be a truth buried somewhere yes Then the myths will stop walking and you won’t have to think about Chornovil ... winked And because my passion for psychology does not allow me to calmly believe what I am convinced of without objective evidence hi
              2. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 26 November 2016 16: 23 New
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                And Valentin and I criticized him to the nines :)))) More precisely, Valentine criticized - from me there were a couple of secondary thoughts and literary design :)))

                Oh yes ... And where to read? For interest
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  26 November 2016 21: 44 New
                  0
                  Quote: Rurikovich
                  Oh yes ... And where to read?

                  Axis tutochki :))) http://alternathistory.com/k-voprosu-o-panike-na-
                  varyage-v-boyu-27-yanvarya-1904-g
                  Generally speaking, the article was banterous and was posted as part of a polemic with Passer-by / Hotel and other and other, which was noted in the discussion here. But, since he firmly stood on Chornovil’s positions, then ....
                  1. Rurikovich
                    Rurikovich 26 November 2016 21: 55 New
                    0
                    I will definitely read and say what I think hi
                    It’s better to have another version of events. wink
                    thanks for the info hi
                    I’m just saying that lately in different areas that interest me, information has been given in different ways and every time I want to get to the bottom of the truth. And the paths to it are thorny and intricate, so you have to shun confidence in different sources and options for the events described .... But everyone has their own right to life winked
                    So think about who to believe .... winked hi
                    1. Rurikovich
                      Rurikovich 26 November 2016 22: 16 New
                      0
                      Offset good
                      Thanks, read yes Let your version with Valentine not give answers to [/ b] all [b]questions
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        26 November 2016 22: 38 New
                        +1
                        Quote: Rurikovich
                        Let your version with Valentine not give answers to [/ b] all [b] questions

                        That is why I am writing that an honest analysis has not yet been written :))) We have considered only a few questions - but there are still a lot left. Nevertheless, our article illustrates well how "well" Chornovil works with information.
                        By the way, about the speed of the Varangian and the ability to go another route - also a lie
                        Quote: Rurikovich
                        I’m just saying that lately in different areas that interest me, information has been given in different ways and every time I want to get to the bottom of the truth.

                        Dear namesake, the road will be mastered by the going! hi drinks By the way, I remember Fidel ... a glass of beer ... just from the movie, with 28 Panfilov’s ...
                        Quote: Rurikovich
                        So think about who to believe ....

                        "Stirlitz, you can't trust anyone ... I can!" laughing
                      2. Rurikovich
                        Rurikovich 26 November 2016 22: 45 New
                        0
                        questions, but at least gives me another reason to think about the topic in general! good Of course, my logical perception of events and their development options suggests drawing conclusions from a variety of assumptions, which means that logic and common sense allow me to believe in something that I will believe more than what they force me into ...
                        So, despite your banter, it would be very interesting for you and Valentin to master the epic about "Varyag" because your point of view is the most logical and plausible, I think so. Of course, there will be a wave of criticism - how so, the bright image of the drowning man of Japanese cruisers and destroyers is crumbling, but it seems to me that such material will be useful to us, connoisseurs of a truthful (logical and sound) history, even if only one of its moments (regarding RYAV)
                        Personally, I would be “for” with both hands, even such material would be comparable in volume to the “Shangtun” cycle, if not more - the topic is too sharp wink
                        Again, this is just my subjective opinion. After all, the myth of that battle is very tenacious winked Yes, thanks to you and Valentin, the topic of RYAV is interesting (to me, for sure - interesting points appear that are different from what they taught at school wassat or from brief and mean references in directories ...
                  2. Comrade
                    Comrade 27 November 2016 03: 42 New
                    +2
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    the article was mockery and was posted as part of a polemic with Passerby / Hotel and other and other, which was noted in the discussion here

                    With your permission, dear colleague, I note for the uninitiated that we are talking about the forum member Nikolai, one of whose nicknames here is rjxtufh.
                    1. Rurikovich
                      Rurikovich 27 November 2016 09: 41 New
                      +2
                      Quote: Comrade
                      With your permission, dear colleague, I note for the uninitiated that we are talking about the forum member Nikolai, one of whose nicknames here is rjxtufh.

                      Tea guessed lol wink hi
                      Apparently you have with him, as in "Highlander" - the battle has been going on from time immemorial winked
                2. saigon
                  saigon 29 November 2016 19: 31 New
                  0
                  Dotsenko - (Legends and myths of the Russian fleet) there are many interesting things about the battle of Varyag
            2. Comrade
              Comrade 27 November 2016 03: 51 New
              +1
              Quote: Rurikovich
              Personally, I am always for honest analysis, albeit destroying myths and not popular with many, but fair

              Some myths of the times of the Russian-Japanese period have taken root to such an extent and put down such roots that questioning them is almost the same as denying the law of universal gravitation. For example, the myth about the fatal overload of battleships of the "Borodino" type.
            3. unknown
              unknown 27 November 2016 12: 39 New
              0
              Yes there is such material. On the same alternative. Back in 2012, placed.
          2. unknown
            unknown 27 November 2016 12: 49 New
            +1
            I don’t have much trust in domestic sources. And even more so, to the Japanese.
            I have already voiced my position on the description of the REV. This is a literary hoax written by the winners. On the basis of real events, the course of which is unknown, at least two versions were written, one formed the basis for the traditional description of the strategic nuclear forces, and the second formed the basis for the Spanish-American war.
  12. Taoist
    Taoist 24 November 2016 12: 32 New
    +2
    The trouble with our fleet is the eternal uncertainty of strategy. Namely, it issues technical requirements for tactics, etc. tool for its implementation. + our eternal non-binding in terms. So it turns out that they did it, but by the time they did it, "the concept has changed."
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2016 19: 54 New
      0
      Quote: Taoist
      The trouble of our fleet is the eternal uncertainty of strategy

      Not without this ... Torn between the theory of supremacy at sea and cruising war - well, please shave ... drinks
  13. Bormanxnumx
    Bormanxnumx 24 November 2016 14: 58 New
    +1
    Quote: ignoto
    The explosiveness of pyroxylin is 14 times higher than that of black powder, and 1,45 times higher than that of shimosa.

    According to Trautsl’s test, the pyroxylin concentration is 237 cm³, shimose (trinitrophenol) 310 cm³ and the pyroxylin is inferior to shimose at a concentration of 1.31 times. Regarding the high explosiveness of smoky gunpowder, it is taken 0.3 of the high TNT (for TNT, the high is 285 cm³), somewhere 86 cm³. It turns out that pyroxylin smoke powder is 2,75 times higher.
    All these figures are easily found in the reference literature which is freely available.
    1. Bormanxnumx
      Bormanxnumx 24 November 2016 15: 37 New
      0
      Instead of "pyroxylin" I ask you to read "pyroxylin", otherwise T9 "helped" me a little.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2016 19: 52 New
      +1
      Quote: BORMAN82
      All these figures are easily found in the reference literature.

      Yes, but here everything is waiting for the question is not so much about smoky as about smokeless pyroxylin gunpowder, but on this subject I haven’t found anything that could definitely solve the discussion request
    3. unknown
      unknown 25 November 2016 09: 16 New
      0
      There are other data, according to the same method: the pyroxylin high-density is 420 cm3, and the chimose (fused with dinitronaphthalene picric acid) -290 cm3
  14. doktorkurgan
    doktorkurgan 24 November 2016 16: 54 New
    +3
    Great analysis, what to say.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2016 19: 51 New
      0
      Thank you so much! drinks
  15. Wolka
    Wolka 25 November 2016 11: 20 New
    +1
    very interesting for the most complete understanding of the real causes of the defeat of the RI fleet during the Russo-Japanese War, thanks to the author
  16. Retvizan
    Retvizan 26 November 2016 15: 21 New
    +2
    it turns out that in addition to the mess in command, and the technical condition, we also chose the wrong strategy during the construction .... and were torn between all factors.
    there’s such a thing, you don’t know what to prepare for. So many possible theaters with different characteristics and so many potential enemies with their own characteristics ... And you won’t put up universals (any station wagon is worse than a specialist in a particular place) and you need to build specialists for everyone ... And there will be no reserve ..
    Some kind of trouble .. Moreover, the system error is not the first century ...
  17. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 26 November 2016 23: 07 New
    0
    Andrey from Chelyabinsk,
    Below your answer is my opinion about your "battles" with Chornovil hi
    I hope you liked the film, I posted my opinion in Opinion about 28 Panfilovites, I hope I will watch it in the near future - in our wilderness such films do not reach the cinema very quickly, it's easier to wait on the Web wassat
    I already drank my beer with a taranochka (though a little oversalted, but it went off with a bang with the Kristallovskaya Aleksandryna)drinks , including for Fidel winked So in many ways we are in solidarity wassat
  18. Comrade
    Comrade 28 November 2016 04: 13 New
    0
    Quote: Rurikovich
    About three years ago I read Chornovil's "Review of the battle at Chemulpo". Made me think about a lot. And what is interesting, now this material is not available on the net. Apparently spoils the myth of the heroic battle.

    You know, Andrei, I made a funny discovery for myself. It turns out that Rudnev's stories about the allegedly sunk "Takachiho" aroused doubts even then, during the Russian-Japanese war. I have an article from the old newspaper "Straiht Times" dated May 30, 1904, downloaded from the newspaper archives. Called "Fantastic the history of a Russian officer. "And there are listed the main theses of Rudnev's report. A sunk cruiser and destroyer, etc. Here, in confirmation of my words, are the first lines of the article.
  19. Dar weter
    Dar weter 9 December 2016 19: 10 New
    0
    Andrey, "Formidebla", although they were built with an eye on the "Sikisima" (as the strongest LC in the world at that time), were intended for service in European waters. For the eastern stations, the next series was built - "Duncans". The booked ones are slightly weaker. It does not change the essence, these are also full-fledged LCs of the 1st class.

    Not only against the "Peresvetov": in the Far East, the line fleet of Japan was born, it was the main threat, plus, of course, the "Peresvets" under construction and the single (so far) campaigns of the Russian LK ("Navarin", "Nikolai"), confirmed the possibility of inter-theater maneuver of the Baltic Fleet's linear forces, plus the (still uncertain) oceanic ambitions of Germany and the USA. In the Far East, where only recently single cruisers and Chinese gunboats were grazing, it became very crowded, and the British, who had the opportunity to bake the LK like pies, crushed everyone with a broad gesture, ensuring by 1904-1905 a "double standard" in the Far Eastern waters - 6 " Kanopusov "+ 6" Duncans ".

    It was this ability of the British to mix the pieces on the board that ours did not take into account. The one that will not be in the Far East battles of piece 2 class LKs and cruisers, but there will be an English battleship in Weihaiwei. And suddenly the line fleet of Japan instead of the armored decks and airborne missile launchers assigned to it by status, but not weak, like the German one, but from the "maximum" 15-thousanders.

    The "Peresvets" were not counted on for such, just as the entire 20-year-old was not calculated, and ours were still trying something, there was a new program and completely different ships, and it seemed that they almost succeeded.

    If there weren’t that wars, "Peresvets" would still look good in the Baltic, in line, opposite the "Kaisers" and even the later built "Wittelsbachs" - the path of the Germans to the "standard" LC were no less miraculous than ours.
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  21. masterovoy
    masterovoy 5 July 2017 12: 42 New
    0
    Studying the materials of the combat training of the fleet of the time of the creation of the armored fleet of Russia, I came to the conclusion about the unsatisfactory preparation of the Russian sailors of that time for naval combat, concentrated fire control, the transfer of target designation, maneuvering ships, the complete lack of interaction of forces in battle and disgusting communications. First of all, this concerns the command personnel of fleets and formations.