On the tank vdarila disc
For the first time tanks were used in the battle on the Somme in 1916.
Campaigns 1917 — 1918 on the French front is a tank triumph.
The tank allowed to effectively break through the tactical defense of the enemy, minimized the loss of infantry. But never a tank tactical breakthrough during the years of World War II was not transformed into an operational breakthrough. The Germans learned how to fight tank factor - for example, in the battle of Cambrai, German assault units not only eliminated the consequences of a tank attack, but also achieved impressive tactical successes.
At the end of the First World War, tanks had a significant impact on the course and outcome of a number of major battles - especially in Cambreux in November 1917 and in Soissons and Amiens in July and August 1918.
In the battle of Cambrai, the British, quite unexpectedly for the enemy, brought 378 tanks into battle and, having lost less than 4's thousand people and 100 tanks, achieved the same tactical successes (advancing 13 km along the front and 9 km deep into the German defense) , as well as for the four-month battle in Flanders (June - November 1917), where their losses reached 400 thousand people.
The overwhelming majority of casualties in tanks during the world war were carried by the allies from enemy artillery fire.
Fig. 1. The French infantry tank CA-1 Schneider - the victim of a direct hit by a German projectile. A projectile hit the fuel tank led to the death of the tank along with the crew. Photo: Steven J. Zaloga. French tanks of World War I. - London, 2010.
The most terrible enemy of tank armor was an armor-piercing projectile (they were equipped with the first anti-tank guns, of which part of the ammunition was formed in the arsenal of field guns used for anti-tank defense). Such a projectile, possessing the appropriate body hardness, hitting the tank’s armor, will not crack, but, retaining the striking force, will pierce the armor and explode inside the tank. If an armor-piercing projectile explodes when it hits an armor, its effect will be negligible. Accordingly, the fuse mechanism not only must be durable, but also act with delay.
The armor penetration of the first anti-tank guns was such that during the shooting range of 1 000 and 20-mm gun, 90-armor penetrated the 20-mm armor at the angle of the projectile's meeting angle, and 57-mm armor.
At an angle of meeting the projectile with armor less than 45 — 30 °, the projectile will slide along the surface of the armor of the tank. When the projectile strikes the armor, the degree of sharpening of the projectile head also matters.
Given that the anti-tank artillery was only in its infancy, the main burden of fighting with tanks lay on field artillery guns.
A direct hit by a high-explosive projectile field gun was also deadly for the tank. But the effect of high-explosive shell fragments on tank armor is much weaker than the action of an armor-piercing projectile. For example, a 75-mm high-explosive projectile with a 6,5 kg projectile weight and a explosive charge weight of about 0,6 kg could pierce armor with a thickness up to 20 mm and an 105-mm projectile with a weight of explosive charge up to 1,6 kg with fragments piercing about 50 g with a fragment armor thickness up to 25 mm. But this is provided that the projectile is broken in the immediate vicinity of the tank and at the angle of the meeting of the fragment with the armor in 80 - 90 °. The enormous speed of the fragments of the projectile near the explosion point decreases very rapidly as they are removed from this point, and already at a distance over 15-m the fragments of the high-explosive projectile cannot penetrate the tank’s armor. That is why, if the anti-tank guns worked on the point-to-point tanks, then the density of its fire was of paramount importance for firing field artillery.
A field artillery division could place an anti-tank fire barrage on an 300-wide combat area. On an area of this width, there can be no more than 10 - 15 tanks at the same time, and if one takes into account depth separation, no more than a battalion of tanks can move in such a lane. The zone of continuous destruction for the high-explosive projectile, depending on the caliber, was as follows: 76-mm - 40 m, 107-mm - 84 m, 122-mm - 144 m, 152-mm - 264 m.
Thus, in order to disable the tank during the First World War with the help of field artillery fire, it was necessary either to hit the high-explosive projectile directly into the tank or to break the projectile in its immediate vicinity.
Fig. 2. Burnt French light tank Renault FT. Photo: New York Public Library.
The magnitude of the loss of tanks in the offensive is directly dependent on the speed of their movement at the moment of approaching the front edge of the enemy’s defense and on the presence of engineering structures that could narrow the front of the tank attack. Artillery fire on advancing tanks, as a rule, opened from a distance of about 1500 m, and at a distance of 500 - 700 m, it was the most effective.
The losses of the French tanks in the battle of Soissons were as follows:
- July 18 1918 from the 342s of the attacking tanks was lost 102 (including 62 - from artillery fire) - 30% of the grouping;
- July 19 1918 from the 105 of the attacking tanks was lost 50 (all from artillery fire) - 47,6% of the grouping;
- July 20 1918 from the attacking tanks 32 was lost 17 (all from artillery fire) - 53,1% of the grouping;
- July 21 1918 from the 100 attacking tanks was lost 32 (all from artillery fire) - 32% of the grouping;
- July 23 1918 from the 82's attacking tanks was lost 48 (all from artillery fire) - 58,6% of the grouping.
Thus, the Soissons battle cost the French in 249 tanks (from 661 participating in the operation), and 209 of them are victims of artillery fire. Losses accounted for 37,6% of the grouping.
In the battle of Amiens in August 1918, the British from the 415 of the tanks brought into battle lost 169 - that is, 40% of the grouping.
Fig. 3. Destroyed by artillery fire British tank MK II. German photo. David Flether. The British tanks 1915-19. - Crowood Press, 2001.
Thus, the total losses of the Allied tank groups on the French front during the First World War during the offensive amounted to 40% of their combat strength. Of course, these 40% of failed tanks were not lost forever: most of them returned to service after the restoration. The irretrievable loss of tanks was: 7,2% for the French tank units and 6,2% in the British tank corps.
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