On the tank vdarila disc

44
What were tank Allied losses on the French front of World War I? This article is devoted to the topic of losses in offensive battles from German artillery fire of tanks of the main tank powers of the World War II, Great Britain and France, in the light of the experience of the First World War. It analyzes the features of tank losses and indicates the numbers of total and irrecoverable losses in the tank units of the Allies.

For the first time tanks were used in the battle on the Somme in 1916.



Campaigns 1917 — 1918 on the French front is a tank triumph.

The tank allowed to effectively break through the tactical defense of the enemy, minimized the loss of infantry. But never a tank tactical breakthrough during the years of World War II was not transformed into an operational breakthrough. The Germans learned how to fight tank factor - for example, in the battle of Cambrai, German assault units not only eliminated the consequences of a tank attack, but also achieved impressive tactical successes.

At the end of the First World War, tanks had a significant impact on the course and outcome of a number of major battles - especially in Cambreux in November 1917 and in Soissons and Amiens in July and August 1918.

In the battle of Cambrai, the British, quite unexpectedly for the enemy, brought 378 tanks into battle and, having lost less than 4's thousand people and 100 tanks, achieved the same tactical successes (advancing 13 km along the front and 9 km deep into the German defense) , as well as for the four-month battle in Flanders (June - November 1917), where their losses reached 400 thousand people.

The overwhelming majority of casualties in tanks during the world war were carried by the allies from enemy artillery fire.

On the tank vdarila disc

Fig. 1. The French infantry tank CA-1 Schneider - the victim of a direct hit by a German projectile. A projectile hit the fuel tank led to the death of the tank along with the crew. Photo: Steven J. Zaloga. French tanks of World War I. - London, 2010.

The most terrible enemy of tank armor was an armor-piercing projectile (they were equipped with the first anti-tank guns, of which part of the ammunition was formed in the arsenal of field guns used for anti-tank defense). Such a projectile, possessing the appropriate body hardness, hitting the tank’s armor, will not crack, but, retaining the striking force, will pierce the armor and explode inside the tank. If an armor-piercing projectile explodes when it hits an armor, its effect will be negligible. Accordingly, the fuse mechanism not only must be durable, but also act with delay.

The armor penetration of the first anti-tank guns was such that during the shooting range of 1 000 and 20-mm gun, 90-armor penetrated the 20-mm armor at the angle of the projectile's meeting angle, and 57-mm armor.

At an angle of meeting the projectile with armor less than 45 — 30 °, the projectile will slide along the surface of the armor of the tank. When the projectile strikes the armor, the degree of sharpening of the projectile head also matters.

Given that the anti-tank artillery was only in its infancy, the main burden of fighting with tanks lay on field artillery guns.
A direct hit by a high-explosive projectile field gun was also deadly for the tank. But the effect of high-explosive shell fragments on tank armor is much weaker than the action of an armor-piercing projectile. For example, a 75-mm high-explosive projectile with a 6,5 kg projectile weight and a explosive charge weight of about 0,6 kg could pierce armor with a thickness up to 20 mm and an 105-mm projectile with a weight of explosive charge up to 1,6 kg with fragments piercing about 50 g with a fragment armor thickness up to 25 mm. But this is provided that the projectile is broken in the immediate vicinity of the tank and at the angle of the meeting of the fragment with the armor in 80 - 90 °. The enormous speed of the fragments of the projectile near the explosion point decreases very rapidly as they are removed from this point, and already at a distance over 15-m the fragments of the high-explosive projectile cannot penetrate the tank’s armor. That is why, if the anti-tank guns worked on the point-to-point tanks, then the density of its fire was of paramount importance for firing field artillery.

A field artillery division could place an anti-tank fire barrage on an 300-wide combat area. On an area of ​​this width, there can be no more than 10 - 15 tanks at the same time, and if one takes into account depth separation, no more than a battalion of tanks can move in such a lane. The zone of continuous destruction for the high-explosive projectile, depending on the caliber, was as follows: 76-mm - 40 m, 107-mm - 84 m, 122-mm - 144 m, 152-mm - 264 m.

Thus, in order to disable the tank during the First World War with the help of field artillery fire, it was necessary either to hit the high-explosive projectile directly into the tank or to break the projectile in its immediate vicinity.


Fig. 2. Burnt French light tank Renault FT. Photo: New York Public Library.

The magnitude of the loss of tanks in the offensive is directly dependent on the speed of their movement at the moment of approaching the front edge of the enemy’s defense and on the presence of engineering structures that could narrow the front of the tank attack. Artillery fire on advancing tanks, as a rule, opened from a distance of about 1500 m, and at a distance of 500 - 700 m, it was the most effective.

The losses of the French tanks in the battle of Soissons were as follows:

- July 18 1918 from the 342s of the attacking tanks was lost 102 (including 62 - from artillery fire) - 30% of the grouping;

- July 19 1918 from the 105 of the attacking tanks was lost 50 (all from artillery fire) - 47,6% of the grouping;

- July 20 1918 from the attacking tanks 32 was lost 17 (all from artillery fire) - 53,1% of the grouping;

- July 21 1918 from the 100 attacking tanks was lost 32 (all from artillery fire) - 32% of the grouping;

- July 23 1918 from the 82's attacking tanks was lost 48 (all from artillery fire) - 58,6% of the grouping.

Thus, the Soissons battle cost the French in 249 tanks (from 661 participating in the operation), and 209 of them are victims of artillery fire. Losses accounted for 37,6% of the grouping.

In the battle of Amiens in August 1918, the British from the 415 of the tanks brought into battle lost 169 - that is, 40% of the grouping.


Fig. 3. Destroyed by artillery fire British tank MK II. German photo. David Flether. The British tanks 1915-19. - Crowood Press, 2001.

Thus, the total losses of the Allied tank groups on the French front during the First World War during the offensive amounted to 40% of their combat strength. Of course, these 40% of failed tanks were not lost forever: most of them returned to service after the restoration. The irretrievable loss of tanks was: 7,2% for the French tank units and 6,2% in the British tank corps.
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  1. cap
    +2
    11 November 2016 06: 22
    A tank on the battlefield is a serious weapon, the vanguard of ground operations, and an indispensable means of supporting infantry. The updating and modernization of armored vehicles that is currently taking place in our, and not only, armies of the world is a very important and telling factor.
    Which on the one hand pleases and on the other .... makes you think.
    1. +10
      11 November 2016 07: 14
      thanks cap, an interesting article like that.
    2. +2
      11 November 2016 12: 38
      Quote: cap
      A tank on the battlefield is a serious weapon, the vanguard of ground operations, and an indispensable means of supporting infantry.

      Have you just quoted the charter of the Red Army 1937-1939? according to which the main role was assigned to the infantry?

      But isn't it the other way around? Infantry is a means of supporting tanks.
      In general, with WWII, a tank is the main strike weapon in an offensive, and even in anti-tank defense, a tank is the best means.
  2. +6
    11 November 2016 07: 27
    The WWI gunners were not taught to shoot at a moving target, in my opinion, there was not even a theory. In addition, then the guns were all on a single-beam carriage, and the angle of horizontal guidance was usually + -3 °. And the moving tank constantly went beyond the angles of fire from the gun. So it’s even surprising that German gunners destroyed up to half of the attacking tanks.
    1. +4
      11 November 2016 11: 57
      Quote: Comrade_Stalin
      In addition, then the guns were all on a single-beam carriage, and the angle of horizontal guidance was usually + -3 °.


      Field 77-mm guns FK 96 and FK 16 horizontal guidance angle of 8 degrees (+ -4 deg)


      Unless you are talking about the 15-pound field gun of Erhard Concern
      she really had at first one bed and + -3 degrees of horizontal aiming.
      However, it soon became clear that such a bed limits the elevation angle and, consequently, the firing range, so Erhard's guns later became equipped with sliding support beds. They consisted of two tubular bipod, which departed from the cradle carriage for the breech at its maximum rollback. By means of a fitting, the supports were connected at right angles, and one support bed departed from the connection point, which ended with a coulter and a towing ring. As a result, the design combined the lightness of the support frame and the ability to lift the gun barrel to the maximum possible angle.
      http://zonwar.ru/artileru/pol_art_1mv/15f_erdhard
      .html
      1. 0
        11 November 2016 12: 23
        Well, + -3 or + -4 ° - the difference is small.
  3. +4
    11 November 2016 08: 04
    Hmm .. interesting statistics..very..thank you ..
  4. +1
    11 November 2016 08: 35
    involuntarily recalled (affairs of bygone days giving a deep antiquity) hi
  5. BAI
    +2
    11 November 2016 10: 12
    With the First World War, the tactics of the massive use of tanks began. Guderian did not come up with anything new.
    1. +6
      11 November 2016 12: 14
      Quote: BAI
      With the First World War, the tactics of the massive use of tanks began. Guderian did not come up with anything new.


      Guderian’s merit in another is not the idea of ​​the widespread use of tanks, but the development of tactics for using tank masses: concentration of the strike, LF breakthrough, introduction of reserves and deep coverage of the rear, encirclement, blocking of the encircled group, defeat.

      Those. while in the WWII they were oriented toward the displacement of enemy troops and the seizure of territory, then in WWII they focused on the rout of troops by cutting them off from reserves and supplies, which sharply reduced resistance and defense. Bypassing the resistance nodes and blocking and defeating the encircled troops by the approaching infantry units.

      In World War II, the infantry lagged behind the tanks by several hundred kilometers - near Smolensk Guderian had to wait for the infantry for up to 2 weeks and maintain the encirclement with a rare chain of tank forces, which facilitated the seepage of a significant part of the Soviet forces from the encirclement.
      Vinnytsia catastrophe - here the environment was already dense, the encircled groups were cut into pieces and eliminated individually. Apparently their commanders also believed that Guderian did not come up with anything new ...
  6. jjj
    +5
    11 November 2016 10: 40
    Yes, hundreds of tanks in the First World War ... Who would have thought.
    Guderian did not come up with massive use, but using tank wedges in a narrow area and breaking through to the rear without the support of infantry and convoys. Our responded to this with the massive use of mobile tank groups with a landing and support for self-propelled guns
    1. cap
      +3
      11 November 2016 11: 05
      Quote: jjj
      Yes, hundreds of tanks in the First World War ... Who would have thought.
      Guderian did not come up with massive use, but using tank wedges in a narrow area and breaking through to the rear without the support of infantry and convoys. Our responded to this with the massive use of mobile tank groups with a landing and support for self-propelled guns


      Guderian studied at our academy.
      As for Guderian’s tank wedges against our defense, this is a difficult and bloody lesson learned by our Red Army during the first period of World War II. For a long time, and not in a commentary, to tell (on this occasion you can read a lot of literature) how the combat manuals on the use of artillery against tanks changed from the beginning of the war until 1945.
      Guderian's "luck" at the first stage of the Second World War was that he knew about the linear positioning of artillery along the front, according to the combat regulations of the Red Army. Hence, practically flashing our defense. Then changes in the military regulations followed, but .... history does not know the subjunctive presentation.
      And still we won. The strength of the spirit of the Soviet soldier was stronger than the tanks of the Fuhrer and his field marshals. hi
      PS The anti-tank rifle was designed and put into production in ... 3 (three) months!
      1. +6
        11 November 2016 12: 18
        Quote: cap
        Guderian studied at our academy.

        In which and when?
        If you are talking about the Kama school, it’s more likely that our students were taught by the Germans. And Guderian visited her only once, in 1932 with an inspection.
        By the way, high-speed Heinz met with one of our graduates of "Kama" in Brest in 1939.
        Quote: cap
        PS The anti-tank rifle was designed and put into production in ... 3 (three) months!

        Yeah ... and suffered with them for 3 years.
        ... a comparative firing from PTRS and PTRD showed that extraction from these guns is also unsatisfactory. A quarter automatic PTRD on 5 shots never worked, the release was carried out manually. For the “automatic” one (quotation marks in this case are very appropriate) the PTRS emitted shells using a ramrod, and in the second shot it was not possible to extract the shell at the firing position
        © PTR tests at ANIOP, end of summer 1942
        And my favorite document:
        NPO-USSR
        Main Artillery Directorate
        Red Army
        Office of Small Arms
        3 June 1942 year
        Heads of artillery fronts, districts and armies.
        On the subject: The use of 14,5 mm anti-tank rifles.

        According to reports from the fronts, districts and armies, cases of refusal in the work of Degtyarev and Simonov anti-tank rifles have recently become more frequent.
        ...
        The practice of using PTR in the troops, especially in summer conditions, shows that even if the rules for preparing shotguns for shooting in accordance with paragraph 1 are observed, shotguns that do not provide free extraction can be found.
        To eliminate delays in reloading the rifle arising in this case, allow the troops to use a wooden mallet. ”

        For quotes - many thanks uv. Andrey Ulanov AKA kris_reid
        1. +1
          11 November 2016 12: 30
          Quote: Alexey RA
          In which and when?
          If you are talking about the Kama school, it’s more likely that our students were taught by the Germans. And Guderian visited her only once, in 1932 with an inspection.
          By the way, high-speed Heinz met with one of our graduates of "Kama" in Brest in 1939.


          Ah well done - correctly wrote. I support 100%.
        2. +5
          11 November 2016 12: 40
          As far as I remember, the problem with PTR Simonov Dyagteriev was not so much in their design flaws as in the culture of production. Moreover, their release was organized in an emergency. I had to talk with a WWII veteran, an armor-piercing gunner. He fought in the middle of 42 g. He told. that the training regiment used PTR of the first series. He said that there was a lot of hemorrhoids. But, before being sent to the front, they were given brand new guns. He fought with him (Degtyarevsky) for two years until he was wounded. I remembered that on the Taman Peninsula, in the swamps, it worked normally.
          1. 0
            11 November 2016 13: 43
            Quote: The cat is half-educated
            As far as I remember, the problem with PTR Simonov Dyagteriev was not so much in their design flaws as in the culture of production.

            Everything turned out there.
            From a letter from GAU about reports from the front about massive failures of the PTRD - that the PTRD did not go through the full cycle tested, and for those comments that were made on the previous part, Comrade Degtyarev put a big and fat one and sent the gun into production "as it was" ...
            © kris-reid
            In the comments of Ulanov, they wrote that perhaps the main reason for the problems with the extraction was too thick sleeves, which were inflated tightly.
            First of all, a thin sleeve is extracted better than a thick one. Tolstaya deformed tightly, and thin - managed to narrow.
            But - thin could break. With consequences for designers, technologists ... Therefore, sleeves for PTR came with positive tolerances in both design and production ...
      2. +1
        11 November 2016 12: 27
        Quote: cap
        PS The anti-tank rifle was designed and put into production in ... 3 (three) months!


        And could, based on the results of the Winter War, draw conclusions and pre-design and produce PTR.
        Moreover, the Finns very effectively used the PTR Lahti L-39 - the Finnish anti-tank rifle used by the Finnish army during the Soviet-Finnish war and later during the Second World War. Adopted in 1939. It had excellent indicators of accuracy and armor piercing for its time, but it was too heavy
        1. +3
          11 November 2016 13: 18
          Quote: DimerVladimer
          And could, based on the results of the Winter War, draw conclusions and pre-design and produce PTR.

          Ahem ... actually, the conclusions on the PTR before the Second World War were made twice.
          The first time - in 1939, following the results of the Polish campaign. They took the Polish 7,92 mm PTR UR, fired at the T-26 with mannequins - 38 penetrations, one mannequin was wounded, vital parts of the tank were not hit. Conclusion - small-caliber PTR are not needed.
          The second time - in 1940. In 1939 they made 14,5 mm PTR of Rukavishnikov, put into service. And a year later they decided to believe the theory in practice - to check the theoretical armor penetration with practical shootings. The result was discouraged:
          In field tests in 1940, Rukavishnikov’s PTR from 400 m did indeed pierce an armor plate 22 mm thick along the normal. But at a distance of 200 m and 100 m during testing, a sheet 30 mm thick was not broken at all (although it had to be punched). The problem was a 14,5 mm cartridge with a B 32 bullet with a steel core. The cartridge with the BS 41 bullet with a cermet core was only adopted in August 1941 (and its production began only in October) ...

          That is, the pre-war PTR did not penetrate regular BB cartridges onboard armor of the main German tanks. In addition, problems with the extraction of cartridges that were traditional for PTR were discovered. As a result, the PTR was withdrawn from service.
          And only after the appearance of the BS-41 bullets after the outbreak of war, the 14,5 mm caliber received at least some chance of breaking through the armor of German tanks.
          Quote: DimerVladimer
          Moreover, the Finns very effectively used the PTR Lahti L-39 - the Finnish anti-tank rifle used by the Finnish army during the Soviet-Finnish war and later during the Second World War.

          And why do we need to do a PTR in the caliber of 20 mm before the war, if comrade Taubin, who has not yet become a citizen of Taubin, swears and swears to give the army a 23 mm anti-tank anti-aircraft gun?
          By the way, the 20-mm PTR in the USSR was developed - just remember the Blum PTR. Work went into the war too - but as a result, instead of the PTR, a 20-mm anti-tank gun was regularly obtained (in weight and dimensions). smile
        2. +1
          13 November 2016 09: 35
          And could, based on the results of the Winter War, draw conclusions and pre-design and produce PTR.


          Could - that’s how the Germans had 3 Pzb 39 (40) in each rifle company!
          And whoever heard about the amazing successes of the German PTR in the fight against at least the T-26 or BT-7.
          Few released? Yes, no - more than 40 thousand units.
          Mentioned Maroshek, too, against Pz 1 b Pz 2 did not flash at all - even when they knew how to work with him.
          The unique 28 mm sPzB 41 with a conical bore (no. 1400 m / s) did not leave any noticeable traces - although it was rather a light gun.
          English "Boyes" also did not become "the highlight of the program".
          So the conclusion is unequivocal - a mobilization option with a lack of normal artillery.
          We drew the same conclusion before the war. But the catastrophic losses of 41 were forced to do just "mobilization" options.
    2. +2
      11 November 2016 12: 21
      Quote: jjj
      Uderian invented not massive use, but the use of tank wedges in a narrow area and a breakthrough to the rear without the support of infantry and convoys.


      Not entirely without infantry - motorized troops (namely, they were introduced into the breakthrough) still have infantry units.
      You most likely tried to convey that tank wedges did not wait for infantry divisions, which used horse drawn traction and traveled a maximum of 25-30 km per day for their two, while motorized divisions and tank groups traveled from 70-100 km per day .
  7. +3
    11 November 2016 11: 14
    The most terrible enemy of tank armor was an armor-piercing projectile (they were equipped with the first anti-tank guns, of which part of the ammunition was formed in the arsenal of field guns used for anti-tank defense). Such a projectile, possessing the appropriate body hardness, hitting the tank’s armor, will not crack, but, retaining the striking force, will pierce the armor and explode inside the tank. If an armor-piercing projectile explodes when it hits an armor, its effect will be negligible. Accordingly, the fuse mechanism not only must be durable, but also act with delay.

    As far as I remember, from a 34-year service in tank troops, an armor-piercing projectile strikes an armored object due to its kinetic energy, and not due to an explosion outside or inside it.
    1. +3
      11 November 2016 11: 57
      In the 30s, armor-piercing shells carried a small explosive charge (in a 76-mm shell 60 g of explosives), because the armor of the tanks at that time was bulletproof, and when the armor was pierced, a sufficient number of secondary fragments from the armor of the tank were not formed, and the shell simply flashed carefully thin armor of the tank through and did not hit the crew and engine. This later, as the armor of the tanks became thicker, explosives in the armor-piercing projectile no longer became necessary, since a sufficient number of secondary fragments had already formed when the thick bulletproof armor was pierced.
  8. +4
    11 November 2016 12: 25
    During the Civil War, tanks were used relatively massively by the troops of General Wrangel at the Kakhovsky bridgehead. At first, of course, there was some confusion, sometimes even panic. But then the gunners just set the shrapnel shell fuse on the strike and that’s it. English rhombs MKashki like Whippets came kayuk. After all, the former had 10-12 mm of armor, the latter up to 14 mm. What for an armor-piercing shell here? Regarding monoblock carriage and small angle of horizontal guidance. In rhombuses, depending on the model, the maximum speed was from 6 to 8 km per hour. The Whippetts already have 14 km / h! And this is on the highway or flat terrain. And how many will be on the battlefield pitted with craters and trenches? So, that the small angle of horizontal aiming at the guns of the First World War was not critical when firing at a sufficient distance. Look at the numbers of losses of British tanks in battles.
    1. +1
      11 November 2016 14: 22
      Quote: The cat is half-educated
      What for an armor-piercing shell here?

      It may just be features of national classification... Uv. D. Shein wrote that when he was digging the documents of mechanized corps and tank brigades up to 1941, he found that in the tables of the presence of ammunition in the column "armor-piercing shells"often recorded USH (shrapnel). That is, according to the table, it is armor-piercing, but in fact - shrapnel.
  9. +8
    11 November 2016 12: 27
    And where did the most popular ersatz-armor-piercing projectile - shrapnel with installing the tube to hit?
    Even in the following world massively used USh in the role of BBS:
    Shrapnel is still one of the main armor-piercing shells, since it can penetrate up to 300 mm of armor at a range of up to 35 meters, which allows it to be used successfully against light tanks, and at close range (up to 200 m) and against the side armor of medium tanks. ..
    © From the report “Defeat of the armor of German tanks”. July 1942 NII-48
  10. 0
    11 November 2016 12: 51
    Thanks to the author. Very interesting, inaccessible data.
  11. 0
    11 November 2016 13: 00
    Thanks, interesting.
  12. +2
    11 November 2016 14: 12
    Quote: DimerVladimer
    Quote: jjj
    Uderian invented not massive use, but the use of tank wedges in a narrow area and a breakthrough to the rear without the support of infantry and convoys.


    Not entirely without infantry - motorized troops (namely, they were introduced into the breakthrough) still have infantry units.
    You most likely tried to convey that tank wedges did not wait for infantry divisions, which used horse drawn traction and traveled a maximum of 25-30 km per day for their two, while motorized divisions and tank groups traveled from 70-100 km per day .

    And not so, any Wehrmacht tank division had 1 mp and 2 mp, i.e. 4 tank battalions accounted for 6 motorized infantry. and with the rear everything was normal, that is, the armored and motorized divisions were with the principle, I carry everything on myself.
  13. +1
    11 November 2016 14: 51
    Quote: Comrade_Stalin
    WWII gunners were not taught to shoot at a moving target, in my opinion, there was not even a theory. In addition, then the guns were all on a single-beam carriage, and the angle of horizontal guidance was usually + -3 °. And the moving tank constantly went beyond the angles of fire from the gun. So it’s even surprising that German gunners destroyed up to half of the attacking tanks.

    at the speed with which tanks moved in the WWI I don’t think it was a very big problem
  14. +1
    11 November 2016 16: 17
    Some authors met the assertion that armor-piercing shells were only in the fleet, and were not provided for in field warfare weapons
  15. +2
    11 November 2016 17: 22
    Quote: Monarchist
    Some authors met the assertion that armor-piercing shells were only in the fleet, and were not provided for in field warfare weapons

    But armor-piercing guns for field guns in the WWI were not needed, the shrapnel projectile put on strike solved all issues and for him the armor of 12-14 mm was not an obstacle. So why unnecessary?
    1. 0
      11 November 2016 18: 05
      Quote: Predator
      And armor-piercing to field guns in the WWI were not needed, the shrapnel projectile put on strike solved all issues and for him armor 12-14 mm was not an obstacle.

      EMNIP, uv. M.N. Svirin wrote about the "shrapnel on strike" that the 76-mm shrapnel shell took 30 mm from 300 m. So the PMV tanks with standard 75-77 mm field cannon shells had to be hit "with a bang."
      1. 0
        April 18 2017 20: 03
        It’s for sure, according to Shirokoryad or all the same to Svirin, I read that during the Civil War the White Guards tanks acted morally only on infantry unprepared for their appearance, but it was worth some kind of “paint” not to get confused and put the buckshot of the regiment three-inch on the “hit” "as after the battle the Red Army men were already taking pictures against the background of captured, incapacitated White Guard tanks .... Well, the British themselves wrote that the tanks suffered the greatest losses from high-explosive shells of regimental and division artillery. Small-caliber shells of the first small-caliber anti-tank guns did not cause significant damage to the tanks because of their large armored volume, hitting such shells while piercing the armor caused some damage and killed some crew members, but the tanks continued to carry out the combat mission, but getting a high-explosive shell breaking through the armor to close ones distances and exploding inside, it was destructive both for the tank itself and for its entire crew.
  16. 0
    11 November 2016 17: 23
    And the battlefield rests on tanks smile
  17. 0
    11 November 2016 17: 58
    [quote = cap] [quote = jjj] Yes, hundreds of tanks in the First World War ... Who would have thought.



    Guderian's "luck" at the first stage of the Second World War was that he knew about the linear positioning of artillery along the front, according to the combat regulations of the Red Army. Hence, practically flashing our defense. Then changes in the military regulations followed, but .... history does not know the subjunctive presentation.
    [/ Quote]
    What kind of "successes" are you talking about ?! What kind of "linear" arrangement of artillery, especially ATM ?! First, look at the composition of tank groups, where the participation of infantry formations was the rule and, depending on the conditions, the defense broke through precisely at the expense of the infantry divisions with the subsequent introduction of TD and MD. All in the classic-3x-6-fold superiority of forces and equipment in the main direction with mandatory participation Air force assembled from all directions in the interests of the main attack. The defense was suppressed due to the concentration of artillery forces, followed by an infantry attack, the anti-tank defense was mainly knocked out by dive bombers, who reacted quickly at the expense of aircraft controllers coming from the first wave of the offensive (air supremacy is a terrible thing). Citadels "were the main means of TD and in spite of the powerful defense (especially anti-tank), the Red Army managed to gnaw through more than 60 km.
    1. 0
      11 November 2016 18: 16
      Plus an advantage in mobility and intelligence: at first, our formations simply did not have time to respond to emerging dangers. Clinical case - Dubno-Brody: while the front assembled the mechanized corps, pulling them out of the tenacious arms of the commanders, while figuring out the directions of the strikes, while the MK marched to the concentration areas - instead of the soft underbelly of the rear and trailing parts of the panzerdivies, infantry appeared who managed to build an anti-tank . Into which the mechanized corps stratified on the march — bare tanks without artillery and practically without infantry.
      When the mechanized corps rolled down to zero, everything became even sadder: the infantry simply did not have time to respond to new dangers. What should the front commander, who has subordinate infantry divisions with their 3-5 km / h march, if he needs to fight with an enemy capable of concentrating a full-blooded tank group on one of the seven bridgeheads in a day? sad
      1. 0
        13 November 2016 08: 47
        Clinical case - Dubno Brody: while the front was collecting mechanized corps

        The mechanized corps was assembled by Zhukov - Kirponos and Purkaev were eager to create a "solid defense" in a vast area on the way of German mobile formations. Zhukov, on the other hand, hammered them into their heads - grab the Germans by the tail, cut the Panzerstrasse - without the supply, the "wedges" will not go anywhere. Don't wait for the infantry divisions to approach.
        While he was at the front command post, more or less (as much as possible) effective counterattacks were obtained.
        Zhukov flew away - and Kirponos again set about building a "strong defense".
        What all this led to - in Uman and Green Pomfret.
  18. +1
    15 October 2017 15: 07
    not the people, that’s got a blank about the defense of Moscow by Rokosovsky !!!! When 6-inch guns hit the Germans !!! In the difficult days of the defense of Moscow on the section of Solnechnogorsk - Krasnaya Polyana, which was defended by the 16th army of Rokossovsky, there was a unique case of the use of artillery pieces of the Russian-Turkish war. In those days, Rokossovsky turned to Zhukov with a request to urgently help anti-tank artillery. Zhukov had nothing in reserve; he turned to Stalin himself for help. Stalin suggested that Rokossovsky take some training tools from the F.E. Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy. Indeed, as early as 1938, the artillery academy, founded in 1820, was transferred from Leningrad to Moscow. To combat the German medium tanks, we selected old siege weapons of 42 line and six inch caliber, which were used even during the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke. After the war, due to the severe deterioration of the gun barrels, these were delivered to the Mytishchi arsenal, where they were stored in a preserved form. Shooting from them was unsafe, but they could still do 5-7 shots. For 42 lines of shells was enough, but for six-inch shells of their own shells were not. But in the Sokolniki artillery warehouse there were a large number of captured British Vickers high-explosive fragmentation shells of 6-inch caliber and weighing 100 feet, that is, a little more than 45,4 kilograms. There were also capsules and powder charges, recaptured by the interventionists in the civil war. Since 1919, all this property has been stored so carefully that it could well be used for its intended purpose.
    Soon, several fire batteries of heavy anti-tank artillery were formed. The gunners were commanded by the very oldest artillerymen who had participated in the Russo-Japanese war, and the servants were pupils of the 8th-10th grades of Moscow special artillery schools. The guns had no sights, so it was decided to shoot only direct fire, aiming them at the target through the barrel. For the convenience of firing guns dug into the ground at the very hubs of wooden wheels. German tanks appeared suddenly. The gun crews made the first shots from a distance of 500-600 m.German tankers initially took the shell explosions for the action of anti-tank mines - the explosions were so strong that when a 45-kg shell near the tank was broken, the latter turned over on its side or stood on the butt. But it soon became clear that the guns were firing at point blank range. A shell hit the tower tore it off and cast it tens of meters to the side. And if a six-inch siege cannon shell hit the forehead of the hull, then it went right through the tank, destroying everything in its path. The German tankers were horrified - they did not expect this. Having lost a company of 15 tanks, the tank battalion retreated. The German command considered the incident an accident and sent another battalion in a different way, where it also ran into an anti-tank ambush: The Germans decided that the Russians were using some new anti-tank weapons of unprecedented power.
    1. +1
      15 October 2017 15: 30
      Quote: yeah
      The gunners were commanded by the very same artillerymen who had participated in the Russo-Japanese War, and the servants were students from the 8th-10th grades of Moscow special artillery schools. The guns had no sights, so it was decided to shoot only direct fire, aiming them at the target through the barrel. For the convenience of firing guns dug into the ground at the very hubs of wooden wheels. German tanks appeared suddenly. P




      You decided to entertain the venerable public with copy-paste of all the tales of the peoples of the north .. or limit yourself to this one .... about the use of siege guns from the Crimean War and their slightly aged but still peppy crews who wore logs for redoubts with personally His Grace Nakhimov, nothing against the Tigers not?....
      1. 0
        16 October 2017 07: 21
        The venerable public is YOU? And what about copy-paste, unfortunately with a computer not on YOU, but what about this topic, I think the ORIGINAL use of artillery was not invented, moreover I will say these "aged" were used until 1943, but the most surprising for There were Germans when they called the aircraft and it smashed everything to pieces (service staff quickly evacuated, and the cannon could be destroyed only by a direct hit), and after the raid, they dug up and fired again! so I think this topic is a note!
        1. 0
          16 October 2017 07: 23
          Yes, and the caliber of this 6 inch is only 152 mm and they didn’t even hear about tigers then, but this is so
      2. 0
        16 October 2017 08: 21
        moreover, personally, for the respectable PUBLIC, find on the Wikipedia Kozlovsky David Evstafievich (as I understand it is authority for you!) the F.E.Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy In November 1941, on the advice of Kozlovsky, six-inch guns of the 1875 model stored in Mytishchi were mothballed Arsenal (the 59th arsenal, the former military depots of the "Rayo Manor"). Native shells for these guns were not preserved, but due to unification they managed to use English captured shells, which remained in significant numbers after the Anglo-American intervention in Murmansk in 1919. The creation of two batteries of such guns in tank hazardous areas on the Solnechnogorsk – Krasnaya Polyana section allowed the 16th Rokossovsky army to stop German tanks breaking through to Moscow [4] [5].

        In 1946, Kozlovsky became a corresponding member of the Academy of Artillery Sciences.

        He died on July 12, 1949, was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery in Moscow [2]. Well, for me, he is an iconic figure from those people who are TWICE awarded the title of GENERAL MAYOR !!!
      3. 0
        16 October 2017 08: 33
        https://youtu.be/yPvmoC3p57c
  19. 0
    16 October 2017 17: 49
    but in general it feels like some forum users generally forgot the history of the Second World War, there were problems with the PTR and PTRD, but you probably forgot that by the end of the 41st artillery we still had gulkin horseradish (although we had it at the beginning of the Second World War, 4, if my memory serves me right), hence the design for 000 months and the problems of guns (and most likely problems with ammunition, as MANY plants were evacuated beyond the Urals and worked from the wheels under the open sky) and the use of the Molotov Cocktails instead of grenades, and members of the forum like a bolt scored on problems .... I think if it would be in reality, then I would have found extra kaylo right away., Yes, I want to say that in the conflict in (in) Ukraine, the ATG of the WWII model is successful, the APC is breaking through "Hurray" (there is a strong recoil problem, the lack of an effective muzzle compensator, but it works)

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