Armadillos of the Peresvet type. Wonderful mistake. Part of 3
Comparing the capabilities of artillery and armor of the Russian, German and English battleships, we conclude that at the time of their laying, the fighting qualities of the battleship cruisers of the Peresvet type were in line with the concept of fighting the German battleships in the Baltic and English 2 class - in Asia. But, in addition to fighting, pure cruising qualities were also required from ships of the Peresvet type, and here everything turned out to be much more complicated.
Strictly speaking, information about the speed and range of the "battleships-cruisers" is very contradictory. The most common source, perhaps, should be considered the monographs of V. Krest'yaninov and S. Molodtsov, “Battleships of the Peresvet type, as well as the works of R.M. Melnikov, but, oddly enough, they do not give unambiguous answers about the speeds and cruising range of the “battleships-cruisers”. So, V. Krestyaninov and S. Molodtsov write:
It seems to be short and clear, and also confirmed by the results achieved by ships of this type on the measured mile. The fact is that all further descriptions of the battleship tests report that they have reached 13 775 - 15 578 hp, and this power usually developed during six-hour continuous runs, while the planned speed of 18 knots was exceeded in almost all cases. It would seem that everything is correct and understandable - a similar result corresponds to the planned indicators of the power of the machines and the speed at the boost.
But the problem is that the Russian ships, as a rule, were tested without forcing mechanisms, with natural thrust. At the same time, the description of tests of battleships of the Peresvet type does not indicate anywhere whether natural or forced traction was used. It is only known that on tests “battleships-cruisers” showed an average speed:
“Relight” - 18,64 knots (during the first run, showed 4 knots for 19,08 hours, but then it was necessary to withdraw one boiler) with an average power of 13 775 hp
Oslyabya - 18,33 knots (15 051 hp)
"Victory" - 18,5 knots (15 578 hp)
But was this average speed the limit for the ships, or could they (when crossing) give more? The author of this article believes that the "armadillos-cruisers" were tested all the same during a forced blast. Interestingly, from September 30 to October 2, 1902 Mr. Peresvet participated in battleships in full swing, while, as R.M. Melnikov, the race was held:
which clearly implies the refusal to force boilers. The Nagasaki-Port Arthur route (566 miles) was traveled by Peresvet in 36 hours, with an average speed of 15,7 nodes - which is close enough to the planned 16,5 nodes, which the ship had to show on a natural load.
It should also be noted that “Peresvet” came to the test underloaded, having a displacement of only 12 224 t, while its normal displacement actually tends to 13 868 t. Accordingly, the speed in a normal displacement should have been lower what is shown on tests, nevertheless, recalculation by the method of admiralty coefficients adjusted for an increase in displacement shows that even at 13 868 t the ship would exceed the 18-node threshold (the speed should have been 18,18 knots). Consequently, it can be stated that the Peresveta developed speed and even exceeded a little.
Squadron battleship "Peresvet"
Rinaun turned out to be somewhat faster than the Russian “battleships-cruisers” - it developed 17.9 knots on natural thrust (8 hourly mileage, power 10 708 hp) and 19,75 knots with forced air (6 hour mileage, power 12 901 l .c.), but here it is necessary to make a small reservation - it is not known at what displacement these results were shown (the ship could be greatly lightened) and moreover, it is not known whether the speeds indicated above were average mileage or maximum. Of course, comparing the Peresvet 18,64 ties to the British battleship's 19,75 ties becomes a bit sad, but if the maximum speed is indicated for Rinaun, the differences in speed are not as great as it seems - remember that the average speed on the four-hour mileage Peresvet reached 19,08 bonds, which means that the maximum was even higher - and it would not differ much from the one shown by Rinaun.
The German Kaiser Frederick III developed the maximum power on the 13 053 hp shafts, giving the speed of the 17,3 node, which was less than the contractual node on the 0,2 - again it is unclear whether it was the rated power of the machines or forced. Yet, and most likely, in its speed qualities, Peresvet occupied an intermediate position between Rinaun and Kaiser Frederick III.
In terms of range, everything is much more complicated. Usually for Peresvet and Oslyib indicate 5610 miles at a speed of 10 nodes, we will meet these figures in V. Krestyaninov and S. Molodtsova, but in the same book, respected authors point out:
Firstly, in itself it is strange that it is not a question of 10, but of the 12 hub economic process. And secondly, the above quote already contains a certain contradiction, because even if we take the consumption not "100-114 tons per day", but all 114 tons, then even the planned full coal supply (2058 tons) guaranteed the ship more than 18 days full speed, for which the ship (at a speed of 12 nodes passing 288 miles per day) could pass 5199 miles, but not 5000 miles. If we take the average daily consumption of 100 tons, then the course range will obviously increase (20,5 days and 5927 miles).
It can be assumed that the range of Peresvet was (calculated) 5610 miles on 10 nodes and 5000 miles on 12 nodes. At the speed of 10 nodes, the Russian battleship would pass 240 miles per day and 5610 miles would pass in 23 days and 9 hours, while the average daily coal consumption would be slightly more than 88 tons (if you take the planned full supply of 2058 coal).
At a speed of 12 nodes, the ship would have passed 288 miles per day, and 5000 miles would have passed in 17 days and almost 9 hours, the average daily consumption of coal would be 118,5 tons. But what about the 100-T specified by the authors? It can be assumed that these figures do not include coal consumption for any on-ship needs. In addition, the calculation formula that we used implies the mandatory and complete consumption of all 114 tons of coal, while calculating the range of Peresvet type ships could take into account some losses during storage and transportation of coal or others that similarly affect on the calculation of the cause.
Suppose that the above version is correct. Then we have that the reduction in economic speed from 12 to 10 knots caused an increase in the range of 610 miles or 12,2%. So, if the project provided for a range of 6860 miles on 12 nodes, then on 10 nodes this distance should have been on the order of 7 70 miles. All would be nothing, but we read from V. Krestyaninov and S. Molodtsov:
For example, even the planned fuel consumption in 47 tons does not include the very "5 tons for ship needs." Let the Russian “battleship cruiser” have them not even 5, but 10 tons. But even then, the average daily consumption of 57 tons will provide more 36 days of travel at 10 knots, or a range of 8665 miles!
And then - even more interesting: in another chapter of his book, V. Krestyaninov and S. Molodtsov write about the first exits of the battleship Peresvet:
In other words, if earlier it was said that when 100-114 T was consumed, the speed of 12 nodes was reached, now it is only 10-10,5 knots at 100 t / day! Given that 100 tons per day at an average speed of 10 knots and coal reserves 2058 tons give about 5000 miles of range, but not 5610 miles!
Thus, the only thing that can be argued for sure is that the armadillos of the “Peresvet” type, having achieved and even slightly exceeded the planned maximum speed indicators, very “failed to get” the course range. Presumably, their estimated range was no more than 5610 miles per 10 knots (Pobeda had 6080 miles), while the actual did not exceed 5000 miles at the same speed, and maybe even less.
In principle, a similar range against the background of the British and German ships was not so bad: for example, the German Kaiser Frederick III had 2940-3585 miles on 9 nodes, although other sources give 5000 miles. As for the Rinaun, O. Parks assigns utterly utter 8500 miles on 15 (!) Nodes, and here we can assume a banal typo, especially since for ships of the previous series (Centurion) 6000 miles are shown on 10 nodes . Probably it would not be a mistake to assume that the Peresvetov’s range also proved to be intermediate between the German and English battleships, but the problem was that such a range did not at all meet the objectives of the battleship cruiser. Yet 5000 for miles or less was completely insufficient range for raider operations in the ocean. Thus, we are forced to state with regret that one of the most important characteristics that determine the purpose of the ship was not achieved. Why did it happen?
The fact is that on the “battleships-cruisers” a new, very ingenious power plant was used, consisting of three steam engines working on three shafts and rotating three screws. It was assumed that the economic move will be ensured only by the middle machine, and the other two, located on the sides, will work only in a combat situation.
"Relight" in the Alexander Dock, September 1900 g
The calculation was perfectly sound, but ... the material part of the Experimental basin failed. Already much later, in 1898 g, the captain A. N. Krylov, the future academician, characterized his work as follows:
The problem was that when one of the three machines was working, one of the three screws also rotated. And the remaining two screws created such disturbances that movement under one machine turned out to be almost impossible: all this would have been easily revealed on testing models of battleships like Peresvet ... if the models were tested with screws. Well, the result was the following - if one or two machines worked, they were forced to overcome the resistance of non-rotating screws: if all three machines worked, then too much coal was spent on their work, because each of them required relatively low power, at which the efficiency was low.
If this problem was revealed at the ship design stage, it is possible that it could be solved by some transfer, when the work of one central machine would rotate all three screws at once - in that case, perhaps, the planned range would be achieved or, at the very least, failure would not have been so grandiose.
Sometimes “on the Internet” one has to read that the three-screw “Peresvetov” scheme is dictated by the fact that in Russia there was no place to take machines capable of providing the required power on two shafts. It is at least strange to read this: two years before Peresvet and Oslyab, the armored cruiser Russia was laid down, which had 2 machines for 7250 hp. each (and the third, of lesser capacity, for the economic course). Those. if the problem of “braking screws” would be revealed in a timely manner, then the “Peresvet” could easily have become twin-screw without losing the power at all. But generally speaking, in itself, the three-screw chassis was not at all any flawed compared with the two-screw or four-screw one adopted much later. Interestingly, the Germans, having equipped their Kaisers (including, of course, Kaiser Friedrich III) with three steam engines, were so pleased with this scheme that all their subsequent series of battleships and battleships sought to do exactly three-rotors.
Sometimes you hear complaints about the quality of machines and boilers "Peresvetov". Obviously, they were not the peak of perfection at the time the ships entered service, but it must be remembered that at the time of the laying the Russian ships received the most modern boilers in comparison with their peers. At Peresveta, Belleville water-tube boilers were installed, while the British Rinaun carried obsolete fire-tube boilers, while the German-based Kaiser Frederick III had both fire-tube boilers and water-tube boilers.
Also, sometimes you have to deal with unflattering statements about “these Krivorukov Russians”, who are unable to efficiently exploit the sophisticated equipment that Belleville boilers used at that time. But here you need to understand that with the transition to a new, more sophisticated technique, all nations faced problems - just not all of them like to trumpet about their problems and difficulties, which may give the impression that the same English people mastered the development of new boilers painlessly. Meanwhile, it is not so - the same O. Parks, even if it is extremely streamlined, but still writes:
Translated into Russian, it sounds like this: the British crews did not receive any training or competent instructions for handling water tube boilers, which is why they had to learn the latter by trial and error, with all the ensuing consequences. Alas, about the same thing happened in Russian navy - a very contemptuous attitude and underestimation of the role of Beelzebub led to insufficient training of machine teams, which, moreover, mastered their naval specialty on the fire tube boilers of old training ships.
Concluding the description of the main technical features of the first Peresvetov, I would like to note that the ships received a number of extremely useful innovations: for example, they received autonomous drainage systems, when 9 was provided with drainage turbines instead of a single main pipe. For the first time were used electric steering cars. The ships were distinguished by good seaworthiness, which was provided by a high forecastle.
Unfortunately, the battleships of the Peresvet type did not escape the “scourge” of domestic shipbuilding - the overload, which on ships of this type took on very large values. So, Peresvet turned out to be overloaded on 1136 t, Oslyabya on 1734 t, and on Victory, which was laid later, in the project which managed to take into account some of the flaws of these ships, it was possible to reduce the overload to 646 t.
Again, “on the Internet” we often read about ugly weight discipline and poor design quality, but this is not entirely true. Figuratively speaking, one of the main problems of domestic shipbuilding was that too often the ship that was designed was not built at all, but that ship that was laid was not the one that was being completed.
Here is the same “Peresvet” - according to the original project, it should have had a completely different composition of medium and small-caliber artillery than it actually received. Initially it was thought that the normal displacement of ships would be 12 674 t and in a number of documents, the MTK called new ships:
But it was supposed to install not 11 six-inch guns, but only 8, not 20 anti-mine 75-mm guns, but 5 with 120-mm caliber, not 20 small-caliber 47-mm, but 14, and only the number of 37-mm “X” button, and in the final draft, reduced from 10 to 6 units. At the same time, all the six-inches were originally supposed to be “stuffed” into a single casemate - in the final draft each gun had to get its own casemate.
All this required additional displacement - and in fact, numerous modifications of the ship during the construction process were not limited to artillery and armor. Thus, the very first and very significant reason for overloading is the insatiable desire of admirals and designers to improve the already designed ship in every way. In some way they could be understood - technical progress in those years was striding by leaps and bounds, and technical solutions just now modern ships quickly became obsolete, and the long construction time of domestic battleships and ships of other classes led to the fact that at the time of completion the fleet received not the most modern combat units. Thus, the desire to improve the ship in construction was understandable, but could not lead to a good result.
In addition, the desire to use modern "stuffing" led to the fact that at the time of designing the ship, the exact weight characteristics of the equipment were not yet known, and this also created an additional overload. And, besides, in other cases an ugly building did take place.
Peresvet and Oslyabya were laid on one project at the same time, but in different shipyards - the first at the Baltic Shipyard, the second - at the New Admiralty. But the total time of construction of Peresvet was about 50 months, and Oslyabi - almost twice as many, 90,5 months, while the Oslyab overload exceeded that of Peresvet by 598 tons. The Oslyaby construction overload exceeded all imaginable limits, which, of course, could not but affect the fighting qualities of this ship.
Thus, it can be stated that the attempt to get "battleships-cruisers" equally suitable for battle against squadron battleships of Germany and battleships of England's 2 class, as well as for actions on oceanic communications failed. The fighting qualities of Peresvetov allowed them to cope with the first task, but their range, quite acceptable for squadron battleships, was too small for ocean raiding - the miscalculations in the design of the power plant and the large construction overload of these ships caused this.
In comparison with the same British battleships of the 1 class, the Peresvet type ships received weakened weapons and reservations - this was a sensible compromise for the cruiser battleship capable of long operations in the ocean. But, since the cruisers from Peresvet did not work, we can say that the Russian Imperial fleet received two relatively weak squadron battleships.
Продолжение следует ...
- Andrei from Chelyabinsk
- Armadillos of the Peresvet type. Wonderful mistake. Part of 1
Armadillos of the Peresvet type. Wonderful mistake. Part of 2
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