The large-scale production of APKWS tactical missiles is forcing Russia to respond with a “Threat”
The head with a semi-active laser homing head light tactical guided missile WGU-59 / B APKWS
The week before last, October 20, 2016, in the translated materials of the information and analytical resource “Military Parity” a small news article on the development of the program of light tactical controlled aviation air-to-ground missiles APKWS, with the title of the article ending "There are no analogues in the Russian Federation." With all due respect to the promptness of posting fresh news material on the military-political situation in the world on the pages of militaryparitet.com, it is simply impossible to agree with the title of this publication even with a stretch.
As it became known, 14 of October of this year at the White Sands (New Mexico) test site successfully passed the last stage of the tests of a light two-seat subsonic attack aircraft / tactical strike aircraft Scorpion, developed by Textron AirLand (composed of Cessna and "Bell") with technical support from the United States Air Force. The last stage consisted in testing the use of air-to-surface missile weapons, where AGM-114F Interim Hellfire missiles with a tandem cumulative warhead, as well as advanced short-range tactical missiles WGU-59 / B APKWS-II, showed their best side, previously tested from the onboard combat training version of the Bell 407GT helicopter.
APKWS (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon) missiles are the most famous modification of the 70-mm “Hydra” unguided missile (NUR), which BAE Systems specialists equipped with a semi-active laser homing head, and therefore upgrading tens of thousands of “Hydra” sets with semi-active laser seeker will cost dozens of times cheaper than the resource-intensive production of a smaller or similar number of Hefire missiles. At the moment, 7000 laser kits have already been supplied to the Navy, ILC and the USAF, and the rate of further supplies will increase to 5000 units. in year. Missiles will be one of the most important "tactical assets" of assault and helicopter attack aircraft of the United States.
In fleeting percussion operations, APKWS-II missiles may become the most serious threat to our military air defense missile and air defense missile-cannon complexes "Tor-M2E" and "Pantsir-S1": WGU-59 / B has an initial speed of about 1500 m / s (5400 km / h) and a low deceleration rate, which is why the target (when firing at the maximum range of 12-15 km) it remains at the level of 850-900 m / s. This is faster than the official speed limit of the Tor-M1 / 2 family of machines (700 m / s), and almost corresponds to the speed limit for interception of the Pantsir-C1 SCRA. In addition, the EPR of APKWS-II missiles barely exceeds the radar signature of the compact reconnaissance hex game, i.e. roughly 0,003 - 0,005 m2. To bring down such an air object, moving almost at hypersonic speed, is tantamount to intercepting a needle bullet flying at the speed of sound. And not every air defense system will be able to effectively counter such a means of air attack. Of course, knocking the WGU-59 / B carrier APKWS-II will be easier than working on a rocket, but here are your circumstances: the attacking Scorpion, Thunderbolt or any other tactical aircraft can approach the Tor at an ultra-low height, and if there are no C-35PS, C-300 Triumph or friendly aircraft within 400 radius, the Torah operators will have big problems. Even taking into account that APKWS, like any other semi-active laser-guided missiles, means that the enemy’s laser target designator is located near the target (may be in service with the United States Special Forces Special Operations Forces or at regular ground forces). its operators will be very difficult for two reasons.
First, they will turn on the target for illumination only a couple of seconds before the flight of WGU-59 / B, and there is simply no time to respond. Why so short a time? Yes, because the coordinates of the target will be transmitted in advance to the rocket carrier either from its own radar or airborne optical and radio reconnaissance systems of the E-8C "J-STARS" or "Global Hawk" type, and to open the positions of the laser target designation source in advance (before arrival rocket) will not make sense. Secondly, modern ground-based target designators are compact and provide radio command control over wires or a radio channel at a distance of up to several kilometers from the control device. Destroy one target designator, and then use the second, third, and so on.
A more or less proven and effective way to combat APKWS-II will remain active defense systems with positional detection radar and anti-Afghan anti-missiles and more modern means. The speed of the targets hit for KAZ “Arena” is only 700 m / s, and therefore the interception of the controlled Hydra 4-5-flywheel will be difficult to perform. Also, a good effect of countering the American APKWS will be realized by optoelectronic active protection complexes of the “Blind-1” type. But there is also a drawback: set for a couple of seconds before being hit, the smoke screen will not allow WGU-59 / B to hit the target with a circular deviation of 1-2 m, but even getting into the ground or building near the target can lead to significant damage to lightly armored units, disabling radar self-propelled air defense missile systems and loss of personnel. APKWS has a great future.
The main reason for the rapid and trouble-free development of the APKWS program is that since the 2008 year the Americans have a lot of groundwork for the similar ambitious project “Talon LGR” (“Laser-Guided Rocket”). The project was launched in the US city of Tucson 8 years ago, and its goal was to equip the armed forces of the allied states in Asia Minor with lightweight and unified M-260 and M-261 70-mm guided missiles based on the NUR "Hydra-70". The development and refinement of tactical missile systems was conducted by the American and Emirates corporations Raytheon and Emirates Advanced Instruments. At the same time, only the UAE AF showed interest in the Talon LGR rocket and its mobile launcher based on an armored car with a wheel formula 6xXNNUMX Nimr.
The Talon LGR rocket is equipped with a weaker than APKWS, solid-fuel rocket engine with a mass of 6,2 kg, which accelerates it to a speed of 700 m / s, and the rocket becomes vulnerable to military air defense. The range of this missile at the expense of ground launch is no more than 8000 m, but, thanks to the advanced onboard computer and data communication bus with the carrier, it has several flight modes. The standard mode using complex terrain is a “hill”: a mobile launcher approaches a hill (hill), and then launches the Talon LGR rocket at a large angle relative to the earth’s surface, the rocket rises to an altitude of 1,5-2 km and the semi-ballistic trajectory approaches the calculated coordinates of the target, after which the semi-active laser guidance is activated on the spot of the land or air-based target designator. Talons, like WGU-59 / B APKWS-II, have a great future not only in the US, but also in the Middle East, Asian and European arms markets, and then in theaters of operations. And what can we oppose? What promising and inexpensive rocket complexes can the Russian engineering thought boast of a new century?
The main strike armament of modern Russian tactical aviation, as well as combat helicopters, should be represented by rather expensive high-performance missile systems with X-31P and X-58USHKE anti-radar missiles, Uran as well as multi-purpose tactical missiles of the X family. -31, X-35MK and the Hermes helicopter complex. But almost all of these rockets are quite expensive, which is why very often the new “Drying” and “MiGs” can be seen with the old PRLR X-38ML / MR / MPU, and the “Black Sharks” - with the “Whirlwind” complex. And some helicopter regiments and IAP because of the small budget do not have enough precision weapons. Nevertheless, the chance to quickly rectify the situation is still in our hands.
Since the conduct of the MAKS-1999 air show, 17 years have passed. Nevertheless, it is impossible to say for sure whether the most interesting example of that long-time air show, the Threat threat missile system developed by Ametekh STC (Automation and Mechanization of Technologies), came into service for at least one helicopter regiment of the Russian Air Force.
This complex was conceived by the developer as an inexpensive and highly accurate short-range strike vehicle for the destruction of strongholds, training camps, shelters, as well as enemy armored vehicles of all types in the most weakened upper projections of the hull and tower. The main emphasis was placed on the unification of promising missiles with most types of aircraft launchers of the type UB-16 / 15-57UM, B-8 and B-13, due to which virtually any attack and impact transport helicopter (from the Mi-8 to the Mi-24PN and Mi-35) can be turned into an inexpensive high-precision complex of direct support of troops with large ammunition of 3-type compact missiles.
Three types of missiles were developed based on the well-known NAR C-5, C-8 and C-13, and therefore have similar calibers: 57 mm (C-5corp), 80 mm (C-8core) and 120 mm (C-13cor); "Cor" - adjustable. The main difference between these missiles from uncontrollable options is a two-stage version, where the first stage is a starter accelerator with a solid fuel charge and petal stabilizers, and the second is a combat one, with built-in semi-active laser homing head, pulse gas dynamic control nozzles, and petal stabilizers similar to the first stage. In fact, the combat stage is a corrected ammunition, similar to artillery counterparts. The reloading of the guides in launchers is considerably simplified in comparison with the reloading of heavy tactical missiles of the X-29T / L type. So, C-5 corps (weighing about 7 kg) can be in the amount of a part of the set delivered to the launch canister by just one person from the wing wing personnel. C-8 corps (weight 15,2 kg) can also be placed in PU with the help of one employee of the service personnel.
To safely load 122-millimeter C-13 with a mass of 70 kg, you need a human 2. The total recharge time of the entire ammunition complex "Threat" is several times less than that of heavy missiles. The launch of C-5 / 8 / 13korn rockets is based on the principle of their unmanaged variants, then the acceleration stage separates and after a slight deceleration, petal stabilizers open (C-5Coron opens them with a spring mechanism, and in heavy C-8core C -13kor - due to more powerful gas pistons). The construction of the “Threat” missiles is much more complex and advanced than that of the American WGU-59 / B APKWS and Talon-LGR. Target illumination is also carried out 1 a second before the approach, which practically guarantees defeat of the target, especially when launching missiles. In the role of target designators can be any means of sea, land or air-based, like the American missiles. Now about the launchers of combat qualities of the “Threat” complex.
The C-5 rocket can be used from the widest list of unguided rockets blocks (from UB-8-57 with 8 guides to UB-32М and UB-40 with 32 and 40 guides, respectively). This makes it possible to turn into a high-precision aviation complex not only any attack helicopter, but also fighter aircraft of the 2 and 3 generations, some of which are being mothballed. The cumulative warhead of this missile has a mass of more than 3 kg and is capable of penetrating steel armor plates with a size of 200 mm. The flight speed of the C-5core is 1620 km / h, which theoretically refers it to the list of targets of modern air defense missile systems, but in practice it is practically impossible to intercept it, since 57-millimeter diameter and EPR in ten-thousandths of a square meter does not allow to capture the BM- 5 for accurate auto tracking even modern radar with AFAR. In addition, a small caliber of an adjustable combat stage can lead to the fact that the radar equipment of modern KAZ of the type “Trophi” or “Iron Fist” or AMAP-ADS can detect BM-5 too late. The maximum range of the C-5core is 7 km, which will protect the carrier from being intercepted by self-propelled Avenger SAMs or Stinger MANPADS.
The S-8kor missile can be launched from various variants of the NUR units of the B-8 family, the main of which are B-8M-1 (for front-line fighters) and B-8V-20 (helicopter version). The cumulative warhead mounted on the BM-8 combat stage is almost 2 times heavier than on the BM-5, which provides the S-8correa armor penetration of 400 mm. This missile is capable of easily penetrating side and aft armor plates of modern modifications of the western main combat tanks "Leopard-2A7" and M1A2 SEP. The speed of this rocket is 1728 km / h, and the range reaches 8 km due to the longer operation of the first-stage solid propellant engine (1,28 s versus 0,84 s for the S-5core). The speed of the carrier aircraft for launching all three types of “Threats” should not exceed 330 m / s, apparently due to the beginning of the formation of the shock-wave structure of the air flow around the carrier and the NUR unit at supersonic speeds.
Combat stage with semi-active laser hs BM-8 adjustable tactical missile C-8 corps complex "Threat"
The corrected C-13 rocket with a mass of 70 kg has a more massive warhead (about 15 kg), a more powerful solid propellant charge and, accordingly, a range of 9 km, the speed of this rocket reaches 1800 km / h. On its armor penetration in official sources is not reported, but, given the standard anti-tank missiles of similar caliber, it ranges from 800 to 1000 mm steel envelope. The radar signature of a larger BM-13 combat stage does not allow breaking through the defense of modern active defense systems, and therefore specialized tactics are needed to destroy a combat unit. A salvo firing of two C-13 corps is required: the leading combat stage can be equipped with tungsten shrapnel, which 2-3 seconds before approaching the slave with a cumulative or powerful high-explosive fragmentation combat stage, will disable the radar sensors of the active protection complex. This is the most advanced method of fighting the KAZ of modern Western tanks, since the American long-range KAZ from Raytheon has not yet entered mass production. It is capable of intercepting attacking shrapnel shells (of anti-radar type) at ranges up to 850 m, i.e. to scatter the "deadly" tungsten balls. The C-13corp missiles are used from blocks of the type B-13L (for tactical fighters) and B-13Л1 (for attack helicopters); The bow of the B-13L has the shape of a pointed oval for ideal aerodynamic qualities at transonic and supersonic speeds, the B-13Л1 is “blunt”, completely cylindrical.
According to information from various sources, it is known that the Threat complex has a multichannel combat information and control system, and several (no exact numbers are given) of the work channels are present both on the rocket and on the target. For example, Su-35C with 4 blocks of B-13L carries 20 adjustable C-13kor missiles, and for a very short period of time it can be guaranteed to destroy an entire tank platoon.
At the beginning of the review, the Talon LGR ground mobile missile system was described with a modernized controlled version of the Hydra-70 tactical missile. This complex fits well in the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates. Our situation is even simpler: for the long years of combat use of unguided C-5 / 8 / 13 missiles both in friendly and now enemy camps. For example, in the military formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, we observe the artisanal conversion of the tracked launcher Strela-10М3 into the rocket launcher system. On the combat module of the machine 9K35МNNXX, instead of 3 TPK with anti-aircraft guided missiles 4М9, 333 of the NUR B-2М-8 1 guides were installed in each. The Kiev junta uses these "products" against the civilian population and the armed forces of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics. It is also known about the earlier, simplified, Ukrainian MLRS based on a small LuAZ-20М with an installed NUR UB-969-32 unit with 57 guides for C-57 missiles. To the horror, the “oak” guidance mechanism UB-5-32 was represented by a small “table” on an azimuth-rotating support with a gear-changing angle mechanism. Many similar machines fall into the lenses of amateurs and reporters who prepare material in hot spots in the Middle East and Central Asia. In the near confrontation of the MLRS on the basis of unguided aircraft rockets, they often have several times greater efficiency than systems such as the BM-57 Grad or BM-21 Uragan, since their minimum range is limited to several hundred meters.
In view of these circumstances, Russian missile developers have many possible configurations for designing a short-range tactical missile system with adjustable C-5 / 8 / 13 rocket missiles. Ground-based data missiles causes some tactical and technical flaws. So, their range will not exceed 5-7 km, and the flying speed of the combat steps will barely reach the sound level, which will facilitate their interception. But there are also many advantages of an operational and technical nature.
The first of these is a relatively small mass of missiles and NUR units for them, so that the combat modules can be installed on almost any vehicle: from a light SUV or BTR to MTLB or BMP. This allows the forces of military transport aviation to deliver dozens of such systems to the theater at once.
The second advantage is a higher transfer rate than that of such BM as MLRS and HIMARS to a particular area of the theater of military operations, which, with a large saturation of the BRM and enemy infantry units, can be a decisive factor for the advantage in a separate section of the front line.
The accuracy of the three types of missiles of the “Threat” complex is absolutely not inferior to the American WGU-59 / B APKWS and Talon-LGR missiles. Circular probable deviation (QUO) of our products is approximately 1,5 m. The speed characteristics of the American APKWS, on the contrary, give it a head start in the potential for breakthrough military air defense with interception speeds up to 1000 m / s, but the standard non-detachable headgear increases both optical and radar rocket signatures.
In the Syrian company, the flight crews of tactical aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces often use standard bomb weapons, relying on the accuracy of the specialized computing subsystem SVP-24 “Hephaestus”. However, no matter how accurate and productive the computerized sighting system is, free-fall bombs continue to remain unguided weapons, which can only be used to effectively attack enemy stationary military targets. More frequent use of unmanaged weapons speaks about its partial deficit in our videoconferencing. And the only most correct solution is to defrost the production branch of the magnificent threat complex “The Threat”.
Information sources:
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/ugroza/ugroza.shtml
http://nevskii-bastion.ru/apkws-ii-usa/
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