Military Review

Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 10. The death of V.K. Vitgefta

47



The battle resumed approximately in 16.30, after the end of the Russian battleship "Poltava" from the 32 cable course (or so) gave a sighting shot at the flagship of H.Togo. The position of the squadrons by this time was as follows: the Russian battleships were on a wake column, to the left of them - the cruisers and destroyers even to the left of the cruisers. At the time of the shot of “Poltava”, the Japanese commander was catching up with the Russians from the right-to-back and was going by a converging course, and “Mikasa” was located on the traverse of “Poltava”.

Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 10. The death of V.K. Vitgefta


I must say that such actions characterize the naval talents of H. Togo not in the best way. Of course, his tactics made it possible to draw closer to the backward Poltava and again try to strike at the backward Russian battleship from a relatively short distance. But even if this strike were successful, in the future Kh. Togo could only go slowly along the convoy of Russian ships, substituting his flagship battleship under the concentrated fire of V.K. Witgeft. This method of rapprochement put the Japanese at an extremely disadvantageous position. But it was not difficult to avoid it, undertake H. That different maneuver: the commander of the United fleet could catch up with the Russian squadron in parallel courses, so that the Mikas would be on the Cesarevich traverse when the flagship battleships H. Togo and V.K. Witgeft was separated by six miles, overtaking him a little and only then lying down on converging courses.



In this case, the Russian squadron would not receive any benefits. Interestingly, H. Togo did something like this, moving closer to the Russian squadron a few hours earlier, in the middle of the 1 phase, when, after the fight at the counter-tacks, his 1 unit was behind the Russian squadron on the 100 cable and had to catch up 1 Pacific Squadron. And suddenly - as if some kind of obsession suddenly shook the mind of the Japanese admiral: H. Togo rushes in pursuit, extremely rashly exposing his flagship battleship to a hurricane of Russian fire.

How so? In order to suggest the reasons for such a strange act, let's calculate a little. The Russian column kept the 2 cable between the battleships, and the indicated number does not include the length of the battleships themselves, i.e. from the bow of one battleship to the stern of the ship ahead of him, there had to be an 2 cable. At the same time, “Poltava” lagged behind the last but one “Sevastopol” (approximately by 6-8 cable, according to the author), and collectively this meant that from “Poltava” to the leading “Tsesarevich” there was approximately 18-19 cable. Closer on short distances, X. Togo to the 16.30 was able to bring its flagship only something on the beam of “Poltava”. Having an advantage in speed in the 2 node and going along a parallel course, he would have overtaken the convoy of Russian ships for almost an hour. In other words, if the Japanese commander had moved according to the above scheme, without putting Mikasa under fire, he would have left the Tsesarevich aboard approximately 17.30, then in order to at least advance slightly, he would need more 15 minutes 20, and only in 17.45-17.50 he would lay down a course of rapprochement with the Russian battleships. Then he would start a short-range battle at seven o'clock - and this would be the case if the Russians had not tried to change the course, evading the Japanese, and they could have done so. In 20.00 it was already quite dark and the artillery battle would have to be stopped, and, most likely, twilight interrupted the battle even earlier.

Taken together, this meant that Kh. Togo could have used a rational way of approaching the enemy, but then, in order to beat the Russians before dark, the commander of the United Fleet would have had an hour, on the strength of one and a half. During this time, even acting at short distances, one could hardly hope to crush the battleships VK. Witgefta.

According to the author of this article, it was precisely the lack of time that compelled Kh. Togo to enter the battle from a position that was obviously unfavorable and extremely dangerous for him. This is how the tricks of the clever, but overly cautious, Japanese admiral ended - by taking the time to attempt to undermine the battleships VK. Witgefta with floating mines, the Combat Fleet Commander himself drove himself into a terrible time trouble to join the Yakumo to join the Yakumo. At the very beginning of the battle, when the main squadron forces saw each other, X. Togo had an excellent position and advantage over Russian ships in speed. Now he had to enter his ships into a decisive battle from an extremely unfavorable position - all in order to have the hope of smashing the Russians before dark!

But nevertheless, it should be noted that some of the advantages remained beyond X. Togo: the day was falling towards evening, the sun had changed its position on the horizon and now it was shining straight into the eyes of the Russian commanders. In addition, a strong wind was blowing in the direction from the Japanese to the Russian squadron. It is difficult to say how difficult it was to shoot the rays of the evening sun, but now the wind caused great inconvenience - the powder gases after the shot flew straight to the towers, and in order to avoid poisoning, we had to change the tower commanders after each (!) Shot. Artillerymen of small-caliber guns were used as a substitute, there was no shortage of them, but it is clear that this practice could not contribute to either the rate of fire or the accuracy of firing heavy Russian battleships.

Back in the sources and recollections of eyewitnesses, the fact that the Russian squadron was forced to fight with the starboard was repeatedly mentioned, which in the 1 phase of the battle was mainly affected by the Japanese shells, while the Japanese after the 16.30 fought with the relatively little injured left side. This is only half true, because during the 1 phase, the Japanese ships, sadly, almost did not suffer, and H. Togo didn’t care what board to fight. At the same time, before the resumption of the battle, the Russian squadron was damaged mainly by the right side, and there was no single reason why the Japanese commander should have attacked the Russians from the left side. In this case, the sun would have blinded the commanders of the 1 of the first detachment and the wind would blow the gases into the Japanese barbet installations: it is clear that X. Togo would have been completely useless.


The squadron battleship "Poltava", raising its flags, prepares for the opening of fire.

With the beginning of the battle V.K. Witgeft turned to 2 rumba (22,5 hail) to the left in order to increase the time during which X. Togo would overtake his column and thereby give his commanders maximum opportunities for defeating Mikasy. Some sources also indicate that V.K. Witgeft ordered an increase to 15 nodes, but this seems doubtful. Most likely, there was some confusion, and it was about trying to increase speed before X. Togo caught up with the Russian squadron again, but after the resumption of the fight, no evidence from the "Cesarevich" about the attempt to increase speed by the author of this article was found.

In pursuance of the order of the Russian commander, the battleships struck the flagship of the United Fleet and the Mikasa hid behind bursts from falling projectiles. But it was almost impossible to distinguish the fall of their shells, so other methods were used. For example, the senior gunners of Retvizan and Peresvet switched to volley fire: they fired 6-dm guns and, knowing the distance and time of the shells, determined the drop of their salvo by stopwatch. A different way was chosen by the commander of “Sevastopol”, the captain of 1 rank von Essen:

“According to the admiral’s order, we focused our fire on the enemy’s head ship, Mikasa, but since it was impossible to distinguish the fall of our volleys from aliens and it was difficult to correct the shooting, I ordered 6-dm tower No.3 to shoot and shoot at to the third ship in the column (it was “Fuji” - auth. note) and, taking aim, give the rest of the guns the distance to the lead one. ”


At the same time, the Japanese distributed their own fire - first “Poltava” came under their blow, but then gradually overtaking the Russian convoy concentrated the fire on the squadron battleship “Peresvet” (received a series of hits already in 16.40-16.45). This goal was much more interesting for the Japanese - after all, Peresvet was flying the flag of the junior flagship, but apparently the concentration of fire from the head battleships of the Japanese on Peresvet interfered with the fire and part of the Japanese ships moved the fire to Sevastopol.

And, apparently, the same thing happened further. When “Mikasa” was close enough to the leading Russian “Tsesarevich”, he transferred the fire to the Russian flagship and after him the battleships following “Mikasa” did the same, but part of the Japanese ships fired at the Retvizan. In other words, the Japanese concentrated the main force of their fire on the flagship Tsesarevich and Peresvet, but they acted without the slightest fanaticism - if a ship could not distinguish the fall of its shells by the flagships, he transferred the fire to other Russian armadillos. As a result, the Russians almost did not have any unshoted ships, with the exception of Victory, which received surprisingly few hits, but the Japanese, except for Mikasy, almost no one suffered damage from the Russian fire.

In Fuji, not a single projectile hit the entire battle, Asahi and Yakumo suffered no damage after the resumption of the battle in 16.30. The armored cruiser Kasuga received an 3 of an unknown caliber: most likely these were six-inch shells, but it is not even known whether it happened in the 1 or in the 2 phase, although it was probably still in the 2. One or two small projectiles hit the stern of the Sikishima, and a 12-inch projectile struck Nissin on 18.25.

Thus, for the entire second phase of the battle in the Yellow Sea, out of seven armored Japanese ships in line, three suffered no damage at all, and three more received from one to three hits each. It can be stated that the Russian battleships still sometimes carried fire from the Mikasa to other targets, but it is obvious: either the fire on the Sikisim, Nissin and Kasug was extremely short, or the shooting of the Russian ships was very inaccurate.

Half an hour after the start of the battle, the distance between the Russian and Japanese columns was reduced to 23 cable, and at about the same time, the flagship V.K. Witgefta: already in 17.00 Tsesarevich received the first hit after the resumption of the battle. “Mikasa” went to Tsesarevich's abyss approximately at 17.30 - by this time the Russian squadron had completely lost its positional advantage, which had been hers before 16.30, and now the 1-th combat unit overtook the head of the Russian column, and the “Tsarevich” was under heavy fire. And yet the Russian case was not lost at all: on the ships of V.K. Vitgefta believed that the Japanese were also very tolerant of Russian fire, and especially Mikas got it. For example, the senior gunner of Peresvet, Lieutenant V.N. Cherkasov wrote later:

"There were several fires on Mikas, both towers ceased firing and did not turn, and only one of the middle casemates fired from 6-dm battery cannons"


It must be said that the fire of the Japanese was indeed weakened to a certain extent, although not due to the “fault” of the Russian artillerymen. In 17.00, on the battleship "Sikishima" the barrel of one of the 12-dm guns was torn apart, and the second one had a compressor failure, and it lost the ability to fight for about half an hour. Literally in 15 minutes (in 17.15), a similar incident occurred at Mikas - the right barrel of the stern barbet was torn apart, while the left 12-dm gun also failed and did not shoot until the end of the battle. Less than 10 minutes (17.25) - and now “Asahi” is already suffering - in both of its stern 12-dm installations, the charges spontaneously ignited, causing both of the instruments to fail. Thus, in less than half an hour, the 1 combat unit lost 5 twelve-inch guns from the 16, and thus its firepower was seriously weakened.

The Japanese claim that all the 5s that failed their twelve-inch guns were damaged as a result of various emergency situations, but it cannot be ruled out that part of the guns were damaged by Russian fire - the fact is that an enemy projectile hit the barrel and the projectile was broken in the trunk can give very similar damage that is not so easy to identify. But here nothing can be said for sure, and the Japanese, as already mentioned, categorically deny the military damage of their guns.

The Russian main artillery losses were much more modest: at the beginning of the battle, the squadron ships had 15 twelve-inch guns (at Sevastopol, one 12-dm gun failed before the 28 July 1904 g), with which the squadron went into action, This was one of the guns of the Retvizan's nose turret could not fight further than 30 KBT, therefore during most of the 1 phase, the Japanese could only shoot 14 twelve-inch guns. But soon after 16.30, the damaged Retvizan cannon re-entered the battle, as the distance became quite suitable for it.

However, in 17.20, the Retvizan's nose tower was hit by a Japanese high-explosive projectile - the armor was not pierced, but the tower was jammed, and one of the guns was damaged - as a result, it was possible to fire only in the opposite direction Barrel - until the end of the battle, this tower could only make 3 shots. As for the main artillery of the battleships Pobeda and Peresvet, on the first of them in the stern tower on the 21-th shot one 254-mm gun failed, unfortunately, the exact time of this event is unknown. As for Peresvet, he had a nasal tower still stuck in 16.40, but, however, not completely - the possibility of manual rotation was maintained, but extremely slowly, and this required the efforts of 10 people. However, the guns of this tower continued to shoot at the enemy.

Thus, the Russian squadron fired 17.40 13-mm guns and 305 or 5 6-mm, and also 254 2-mm guns were "partially suitable" for the 254. The Japanese were able to respond from 11 305-mm, 1 254-mm and 6 203-mm guns, so that overall superiority in heavy guns remained for the battleships V.K. Witgefta. At the same time, none of the Russian ships had critical damage - all the squadron battleships were able to continue the battle.

But in 17.37-17.40, Tsesarevich received two hits of twelve-inch shells, the first of which hit the foremast between the 1 and 2 tiers of the nasal bridge, and the second, passing two meters from the first, landed in the telegraph house. Their breaks beheaded the Russian squadron - Rear Admiral Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft died, along with him fell the flagship navigator and junior flag officer, and the chief of staff N.A. Matusevich and a senior flag officer were injured. Commander of the "Cesarevich" Captain 1-rank N.M. Ivanov 2-oh was only knocked down, but survived.


That same hit ...

Let us not distract from the battle, in order to evaluate the actions of the Russian admiral from the resumption of the battle and until his death. In the 2 phase of the battle of V.K. Witgeft barely maneuvered. He did not rush on the Japanese front of the line, although he had such an opportunity, because the chosen wake of the wake did not prevent it at all.



In essence, his only action after the resumption of the battle was to turn left on the 2 rumba. Why?

We will never know the answer to this question. But we can assume the following: as we said earlier, turning “all at once” and throwing the Japanese would have led to the dump and the structure of the Russian ships would have collapsed, and a fierce battle at a short distance would lead to severe injuries, which the battleships V.K. Witgefta could not go to Vladivostok. At the same time, maneuvering Kh. Togo, as a result of which he substituted his flagship under concentrated Russian fire, gave the Russians excellent hope, if not drown, then at least knock out Mikasa, and who knows what could happen after that? VC. Witgeft did not need much, he just had to make it dark until he did not receive serious damage. And if “Mikasa” could not continue the fight, being knocked out of the line, say, at the beginning of the sixth hour, the Japanese would have to waste time on rebuilding: they would have to either lead Vice Admiral S. Mies, who held his flag on the battleship Sikishima (fourth in line), or S. Kataoka on Nissin (sixth in line). While the essence of the matter, time would have passed, and there the Japanese would again have to catch up with the Russians, acting from an unfavorable position.

The battle resumed on 16.30, and only about 17.30 "Mikasa" went to the back of the Tsarevich, and for an hour the commanders of the 1-nd Pacific squadron were there to smash the main Japanese battleship! Alas, they could not use their chance - it was the lack of intensive training shots from the very autumn of 1903. After all, what would happen if an amazing miracle happened and found the battleships of Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky in place of 1 of the Pacific squadron?

In the Tsushima battle, his leading ships of the Borodino type were forced to shoot from where, as worse advantageous positions, than the ships of V.K. Witgefta. The wind also blew in the face of the Russian commanders, but there was still a lot of excitement that hampered the tip-off of the guns - the battleships of the 2 th Pacific Squadron in the Tsushima Strait swayed more strongly than the ships of V.K. Witgefta 28 July. At the same time, the course angle on the Mikasu was less convenient, probably even that part of the armadillo stern guns could not fire on it. The Japanese ships, completing the turn, immediately opened fire on the head of the Russian squadron, while in the battle in the Yellow Sea, the Japanese were forced to shoot primarily at the end ones. And yet, in Tsushima, for some quarter of an hour, Mikasa got 5 twelve-inch and 14 six-inch shells! Nineteen shells for 15 minutes, and for the entire battle in the Yellow Sea, the flagship X. Togo received only 24 hits ... But what would have happened to Mikas had the gunners 1 of the Pacific artillerymen Z.P. Rozhdestvensky - because then closer to 17.30 one could have expected the order of 60 (!) To hit the Japanese flagship, or even more? Even Russian shells with their meager content of explosives in such numbers could well have done decisive damage to the Japanese battleship.

In order to understand the decision of the Russian admiral, it is necessary to take into account the fact that in battle it always seems that the enemy suffers losses far greater than it actually is: the overwhelming majority of eyewitnesses believed that the Japanese had received significant damage even during the 1 phase of the battle , although in fact the Japanese squadron hardly suffered. Therefore, we can assume that VK. Witgeft was sincerely convinced that his gunners fired better than they actually were. Thus, in 16.30, when the fight resumed, V.K. Vitgeft was faced with a choice - to give up on the order of the governor and the Sovereign Emperor, to abandon the breakthrough to Vladivostok and try to get close to the Japanese and inflict heavy damage on them. Or, to continue the execution of the order and try to knock out the "Mikas", taking advantage of the fact that Kh. Togo strongly substituted himself, catching up with the Russian ships. Wilhelm Karlovich chose the second option - and turned the rumba on the 2 to the left in order to ensure the maximum duration of the fire on the Japanese flagship.

Further, in an article devoted to the analysis of various alternative scenarios that V.K. Vitgeft, we will try to understand whether the Russian rear admiral was right in choosing the tactics of the battle after 16.30. For now, we only note that Wilhelm Karlovich had the most serious reasons to act exactly as he did, and the reason for his apparent passivity may well lie not in indifference or submission to fate, but in sober calculation. He chose a tactic that fully responded to the task of breaking through to Vladivostok, and at the same time having a certain chance of success.

Contrary to popular belief, the death of V.K. Witgefta has not yet led to disaster. In a number of sources, one often hears reproaches to the commanders of Russian ships of passivity and inability to make independent decisions, but this is what the Tsesarevich commander did: he led the squadron forward, as if the commander was alive and nothing happened to him. Subsequently N.M. Ivanov 2-th reported:

“I decided that since the chief of staff was not killed, in order to avoid disorder in the squadron, if I report the death of Admiral Vitgeft, I will lead the battle further myself. I had a lot of data to assume this disorder, knowing that the authorities were passing to Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky, and remembering the same situation after the explosion of “Petropavlovsk” when hell was in the squadron. ”


On the one hand, N.M. Ivanov 2 had no right to do that, but if you approached the question creatively, the situation was this: if the admiral was killed, then the right to lead the squadron passed to his chief of staff, and only after his death - to the junior flagship. Chief of Staff N.A. Matusevich was wounded and could not command a squadron, and therefore the commander of the “Tsarevich” should have transferred the command to Prince Ukhtomsky, but N.A. Matusevich was alive! And because N.M. Ivanov 2-oh had a formal reason not to transfer command - that's exactly what he did. Unfortunately, he was not allowed to lead the squadron for very long ...

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 1: Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft and Kheyhatiro Togo
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 2. Squadron received by V.K. Vitgeft
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 3: V.K. Witgeft takes command
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 4. Armadillos in the ranks, or altercations about the fate of the squadron
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 5. Last preparations
The battle in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part 6: The beginning of the battle The battle in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. The part 6: The beginning of the battle
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 7: The amazing maneuvers of the Japanese admiral
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 8. Finishing the 1 phase
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 9. Respite and resumption of combat
47 comments
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  1. kalibr
    kalibr 1 November 2016 07: 45
    13
    Good Andrew writes, well done!
    1. avt
      avt 1 November 2016 08: 57
      +3
      Quote: kalibr
      Good Andrew writes, well done!

      Okay . And it would be better if there were less “alternative history”. bully
      Later, in an article devoted to the analysis of various alternative scenarios that V.K. could choose Witgeft, we will try to understand whether the Russian rear admiral was right in choosing the tactics of the battle after 16.30. Now we only note that Wilhelm Karlovich had the most serious reasons to act exactly as he did, and the reason for his seeming passivity may well lie not in indifference or humility to fate, but in sober calculation.
      laughing Well, so that forehead, that spell. Well let it be
      Wilhelm Karlovich had the most serious reasons to act exactly as he did, and the reason for his apparent passivity may well lie not in indifference or humility to fate, but in sober calculation.
      Because I understood that the squadron with the entire previous service was not ready for other, really active actions. Well, by the same token, the future alternative, which the author actually writes in great detail in his monograph. So what doesn’t like “resignation to fate”? Not heroically? in the light of the fact that he himself perfectly understood that he was in the wrong place in a difficult moment - "I am not a naval commander" request
      1. Maegrom
        Maegrom 1 November 2016 11: 51
        +4
        And you call not alternative history, but modeling, and everything will be fine)).
        What is "heroic"? Did Nakhimov act heroically by sinking the ships of the Black Sea Fleet? You always have to weigh and come to decisions that are correct only with a certain probability. Even Clausewitz, albeit in a different terminology, wrote about this.
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        1 November 2016 12: 21
        +3
        Quote: avt
        good. It would be better if there were less "alternative history"

        Well, how is it :))))) I’m still a regular althistory :))))
        Quote: avt
        Because I understood - just the squadron of the entire previous service is not ready for other, really active actions

        Then we will surely analyze these most active actions :)))) In general, the main mistake of the VKV is that it did not organize the preparation of the composition entrusted to it, hence everything else.
        It’s just that you cannot approach the VKV with black-and-white logic (I don’t blame you for that) - on the one hand, he overwhelmed everything that is possible in Arthur, but at the same time he commanded with a wise and clear understanding of his capabilities. And chesslovo, if he had 2TOE commandos, he would have bought up the Japanese laughing
        1. Nehist
          Nehist 1 November 2016 13: 09
          +1
          Good day Andrey! Well, I don’t see the error of the VKV in that he did not organize the training ... Since there were no forces and no means to organize this very training and that he could be I.O. ruin the commanders there? In Arthur and before him, everything was ruined
        2. unknown
          unknown 1 November 2016 14: 05
          0
          And where are the 2TOE commandants so learned to shoot?
          The most prepared were Nebogatov's ships: floated crews, prize-winning artillerymen of the Training squad. Yes, and the shells are unspoiled. But Nebogatov was the original traitor: he ripped off the night passage of the strait, opened the squadron's place with a radio game, managed to lag behind by 38 cables. For nothing that "Asamu" disabled.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            1 November 2016 22: 17
            +2
            Quote: ignoto
            And where are the 2TOE commandants so learned to shoot?

            Do not believe it - Rozhdestvensky taught them. And they shot perfectly.
            Quote: ignoto
            The most prepared ships were Nebogatov: floating crews, prize artillerymen of the training squad

            This is not true. How many shooting along the way did Nebogatov organize? What kind of floating crews can we talk about if the ships were actually training, i.e. on them sailors were trained with midshipmen? Which came and went? Where did the prize gunners come from?
            Quote: ignoto
            Yes, and the shells are unspoiled.

            What do you mean? I beg you, just do not write about the soaked pyroxylin - this battalion bike hit 100 years old at lunch.
        3. avt
          avt 1 November 2016 15: 39
          0
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          It’s just that you cannot approach the VKV with black-and-white logic (I don’t blame you for that) - on the one hand, he overwhelmed everything that was possible in Arthur, but at the same time he commanded in battle with a wise and clear understanding of his capabilities.

          request So what am I talking about? Everything according to Vysotsky -
          Will of the will, if you have a lot of strength, and I got carried away: I pulled ten thousand as five hundred - and sintered! She let me down - I warned you! - breathing room: I ran only two laps - and fell, - but it's a pity!
          It would be fun if it weren’t so sad request and tragic for centuries for us in Russia.
      3. unknown
        unknown 1 November 2016 14: 14
        0
        The monograph is its own written, previously found, analyzed, exclusive.
        The author is too academic.
        I especially like about the fact that the Japanese did not recognize damage and loss. And when did they recognize?
        This is the same as in the case of Chemulpo: "Asama", well, not at all, well, not a bit, but disappeared for two months.
        So "Mikasa" after the Yellow Sea was not damaged at all. And no. It’s nothing that the traitors from St. Petersburg with all their might hampered the movement of 2TOE.
        The spruces managed to be repaired. Even two training firing. It must be thought that the crew was not even transferred ashore, or other ships.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          1 November 2016 18: 57
          +2
          Quote: ignoto
          This is the same as in the case of Chemulpo: "Asama", well, not at all, well, not a bit, but disappeared for two months.

          Where? :))) She didn’t disappear, for example, on February 22, Vladivostok visited.
          Quote: ignoto
          So "Mikasa" after the Yellow Sea was not damaged at all.

          Why not? 24 hits. Only here is the result - scanty
      4. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 1 November 2016 18: 33
        +2
        Quote: avt
        It would be better if there were less "alternative history"

        He describes the battle, but these same author’s retreats, in my opinion, do not spoil the picture at all. On the contrary, give food for thought for analysis wink
        Quote: avt
        Because I understood that the squadron with the entire previous service was not ready for other, really active actions. Well, by the same token, the future alternative, which the author actually writes in great detail in his monograph. So what doesn’t like “resignation to fate”? Not heroically? in light of the fact that he himself perfectly understood that he was in the wrong place in a difficult moment - "I am not a naval commander" request

        Agree yes Apparently Vitgeft realized that during his reign-sitting in Arthur he did nothing to increase the chances of success in this battle .... He had only to go further and "endure" hi
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      1 November 2016 12: 21
      0
      Thank!:) drinks
  2. Urfin
    Urfin 1 November 2016 09: 32
    +2
    I read about the Russian-Japanese war with pain and interest ... Offensive defeats and missed opportunities ..
    It contains the sprouts of the crisis of the Russian Empire, which led to disaster.
    1. unknown
      unknown 1 November 2016 14: 00
      0
      In his last interview, Kerensky said that the February Revolution was planned, prepared and carried out by the tsarist secret police. The so-called Civil War destroyed the most active part of the population. The army of workers and peasants in this war was led by tsarist generals and colonels. The royal family of more than 50 people, together with gold, departed from the Crimea in 1919 on the battleship Marlboro. The most meticulous researchers in the photo from the battleship saw the tsar's daughters of the "innocent murdered", and even found some of them in post-war Great Britain, perfectly settled with their families.
      What can we say about Stalin, in which some already see Felix Nikolaevich Yusupov-Elston-Sumarokov.
      Yeah, wonderful things are your Lord ... and literary hoaxes, too.
    2. Ulan
      Ulan 1 November 2016 21: 11
      +5
      Here I am too .... with pain and interest. As a kid I read both "Port Arthur" by Stepanov and "Tsushima" by Novikov.
      After that, he himself made small models of ships and arranged battles, where, of course, Russian sailors won. I would very much like the film "Port Arthur" and "Tsushima" to be shot instead of the "admirals".
      Such an epic about the heroism of Russian sailors could have turned out, whatever "Pearl-Harboru".
      But the state has no money. On the shameful and mocking "Yeltsin Center" there are, but on our heroic history - no. Shame.
  3. Ural resident
    Ural resident 1 November 2016 09: 49
    +2
    Thank you for the article. Always looking forward to continue.
  4. Schultz
    Schultz 1 November 2016 10: 53
    +1
    As always, brave, Andrei Nikolaevich! And you must admit that a friendly correction for the weather brought a sufficient marine fleur to the battle. H. Togo, of course, was in a hurry for the setting sun and at the same time created positions for the deployment of the squadron, 2 rumba to the left - still that maneuver and looks like it was not brought to the result, only who interrupted it?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      1 November 2016 12: 24
      +2
      Thank you, dear Alexander Viktorovich!
      Quote: Schultz
      And you must admit that a friendly correction for the weather brought a sufficient marine fleur to the battle.

      Of course :))) And in general, I am very good at constructive criticism - both my knowledge and my materials benefit from it :))) hi
  5. BAI
    BAI 1 November 2016 11: 27
    +2
    Nevertheless, warships are handsome! The pinnacle of engineering. Even outdated ones look great. Photos need more.
  6. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 1 November 2016 12: 42
    +4
    Thank you dear Andrew.
    Comparison of the current artillery of the Civil Code - very indicative of the intensity of the battle.
    About explosions in the trunks of the main caliber - the same thing is repeated during the Tsushima battle - this is indicated by English observers at the Togo fleet - this event is much more likely than a gun getting into the barrel :). In addition, these gaps occur in the second half of the battle, when the trunks that do not have cooling are warmed up, do not have time to dissipate heat and the explosive charge begins to warm up.
    1. unknown
      unknown 1 November 2016 13: 50
      +1
      The same was in the English fleet, which indicates that the English technology for the manufacture of gun barrels has ceased to meet the requirements of the time and it is time to switch to German technology. Plus, the Japanese still continued to use in the charges a cordite brand of which the British had already refused.
      1. Vladislav 73
        Vladislav 73 1 November 2016 22: 07
        0
        Quote: ignoto
        English technology for the manufacture of gun barrels has already ceased to meet the requirements of the time and it is time to switch to German technology. Plus, the Japanese still continued to use in the charges a cordite brand of which the British had already refused.

        1-For understanding, please indicate what kind of English and German art-barrel production technologies are 2-What kind of cordite brand have the British already abandoned? Or abandoned cordite in general?
        1. unknown
          unknown 7 November 2016 15: 00
          0
          English - "wire technology": the inner pipe was wrapped in several layers of wire before cutting.
          German: fastening cylinders were pulled onto the inner tube.
          As a result, the British guns were heavier, they quickly approached the limitation of the barrel length (already 50 caliber were unsuccessful) and the mass of the projectile. 385 kg is the mass of the projectile not only "Mikasa", but also all 12 "dreadnoughts. Germany-405 kg, Austria-Hungary-450 kg, Russia-471 kg.
          According to the cord: The Japanese used the Mk1-30 brand cord, and the British had already switched to the MD-26, since the previous one was too powerful and contributed to the rapid burnout of the trunks.
      2. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 3 November 2016 09: 21
        +1
        Quote: ignoto
        The same was in the English fleet, which indicates that the English technology for the manufacture of gun barrels has ceased to meet the requirements of the time and it is time to switch to German technology. Plus, the Japanese still continued to use in the charges a cordite brand of which the British had already refused.


        I think here the matter is more in the shells than in the trunks, namely in the addition of aluminum to the explosives. Which slightly increased the temperature of the explosion. However, the addition of aluminum increases the sensitivity of explosives to temperature increase in the barrel, especially since the Japanese used thin-walled shells whose walls did not have time to dissipate heat. This is an assumption.
        1. unknown
          unknown 7 November 2016 14: 37
          0
          So thin-walled that domestic gunsmiths could fit a similar amount of explosives only in 12 "shells of 1911 weighing 471 kg.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      1 November 2016 18: 34
      +1
      You're welcome!
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      About the explosions in the trunks of the main caliber - the same thing is repeated during the Tsushima battle - this is indicated by English observers at the Togo fleet

      Yes. But for some reason, Corbett points out that a shell hit in the case of Mikasa
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      this event is much more likely than a hit in the gun barrel :).

      Why? There were enough documented hits in the trunks - but for some reason exclusively with Russian ships.
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      In addition, these gaps occur in the second half of the battle, when the trunks that do not have cooling are warmed up, do not have time to dissipate heat and the explosive charge begins to warm up.

      But how can I say ... at 14.50:1 the 16.30st phase ends, at 17,25:XNUMX the fight resumes, the barrels by this time are quite "rested" but five barrels fly out by XNUMX? The fact of the matter is that it is very strange. Of course, stranger things happen in life, but ...
      1. unknown
        unknown 7 November 2016 15: 03
        +1
        In Tsushima, the Japanese lost 27 guns with a caliber of 6 "or more from internal barrel bursts.
      2. Mooh
        Mooh 14 November 2016 23: 15
        0
        The physics and chemistry of the process is quite well understood. Picric acid reacts with the metal of the projectile and forms detonating compounds from concussion when fired. Hence the gaps and they are associated not with the condition or temperature of the barrel, but with the age of the production features and storage conditions of the projectile. Perhaps also with power and burning rate of the charge.
  7. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 1 November 2016 12: 53
    +4
    I would also refrain from an alternative history, because for each "cunning" maneuver, there is a counter-maneuver.
    Sorry to draw on your circuit again.
    The one maneuver that you propose — an attack by the front — is a completely unrealistic maneuver, since there is one risky counter-maneuver against it (with a turn to the left, which will cut off Poltava and put the 1st squadron in two fires - with the head ships of the first squadron going in front), they will not be able to shoot - at counter-courses, the firing sector will be blocked by the right-wing matelot.
    And Togo’s safer maneuver in this case - to make a similar U-turn and break the distance again to become in line — an attack with the front against the line — this will halve the amount of HA in the salvo.
    Let's not have an alternative history - otherwise all of us "admirals on the couch" will start building the squadron's maneuvering without having the slightest reason for that - none of us even commanded a destroyer, let alone a squadron :)
    1. unknown
      unknown 1 November 2016 13: 46
      +2
      Unfortunately. the traditional description of RYAV is "alternative". Literary hoax written by order of the winners. If you are thinking. that history was rewritten after the collapse of the USSR, you are greatly mistaken.
      History began to be rewritten under Khrushchev, after the assassination of Stalin.
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 1 November 2016 14: 26
        +2
        Quote: ignoto
        Unfortunately. the traditional description of RYAV is "alternative". Literary hoax written by order of the winners. If you are thinking. that history was rewritten after the collapse of the USSR, you are greatly mistaken.


        You are cunning.
        Who prevents to read sources - contemporaries, the report of the commission to which dear Andrey so often refers.
        The analysis has not been canceled.
        In order to have a complete picture, you need to study as many sources as possible.
        In the memoirs, sometimes you learn some very interesting nuances.

        For the Japanese, this was the first major victory over a white man. Joining the club of world powers on an equal footing, and in relation to Russia - a winner. Of course, they had to downplay their losses on the land front and damage to ships - so as not to "lose face". Statements like that during the battle with the Varyag they were not injured, this is typical of the Japanese.
        1. unknown
          unknown 7 November 2016 14: 29
          0
          I am not cunning, but traditional history.
          Many researchers question not only ancient history, but also relatively modern.
          The real history of mankind cannot be traced beyond the mid-19th century, and even that is distorted. REV from the same series. Series of literary hoaxes. History was composed by people with a liberal education. When techies begin to analyze it, it crumbles.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      1 November 2016 18: 46
      +1
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      I would also refrain from an alternative history, because for each "cunning" maneuver, there is a counter-maneuver.

      I am sorry, but the maneuver you are proposing will lead precisely to the fact that the battle turns into a dog dump.
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      with a turn to the left, which will cut off Poltava and put the 1st squadron in two fires - and the lead ships of the first squadron marching in front formation will not be able to shoot - on counter-courses, the firing sector will be blocked by the right-hand matelot

      It will not be so there :))) If the Russians perform such a maneuver, then after the turn, all of a sudden, they must raise the signal "Get closer and ram the enemy", otherwise it all makes no sense. Under these conditions, to meddle between Poltava and the squadron is simply to run into a ram. The Russians have cruisers and destroyers behind the battleships, i.e. Togo's heads, if they are not rammed, will short-circuit the mine attack. There will be no overlapping of the firing sector until Mikasa crosses the front line, and by that time it will already be the bearing line - the ships have different speeds. And you can shoot at anyone, even at a ship passing the pivot point.
      Such a maneuver (an attack by the front line) can be parried, but just the opposite - your own "all of a sudden" from the enemy and retreat.
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      Let's not have an alternative history - otherwise we are all "admirals on the couch"

      I am very sorry, but we will. By the way, Matusevich offered something like that.
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 3 November 2016 12: 14
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        It will not be so there :))) If the Russians perform such a maneuver, then after the turn, all of a sudden, they must raise the signal "Get closer and ram the enemy", otherwise it all makes no sense. Under these conditions, to meddle between Poltava and the squadron is simply to run into a ram. The Russians have cruisers and destroyers behind the battleships, i.e. Togo's heads, if they are not rammed, will short-circuit the mine attack. There will be no overlapping of the firing sector until Mikasa crosses the front line, and by that time it will already be the bearing line - the ships have different speeds. And you can shoot at anyone, even at a ship passing the pivot point.


        I wrote that this is a very risky maneuver, however, Poltava will already be in a left turn (with loss of speed) and return to the course for a ram, it will take a new turn 90 to the right, it will again lose speed - and all this under concentrated fire. Since the Japanese column fires with the port side, after such a maneuver, Poltava will be under concentrated fire throughout the Japanese column. Another thing is that Togo already had the opportunity to break the Russian column and he would not risk it.

        There will be no overlapping of the shelling sector until Mikasa crosses the front line, and by this moment it will already be a bearing line - the ships have different speeds. And you can shoot at anyone, even at the ship passing the pivot point.


        Going counter courses? At 30 cable - this moment will come very quickly. It is good if the front towers of the GK have time to give at least 2-3 volleys on the head, and the rear not more than one. And it remains to shoot at the pivot point, which will also soon be under the fire of only one extreme right ship in the front formation, while it will be under concentrated medium-sized fire on the starboard side already 3-4 ships that completed the turn of the Japanese squadron.
        If the maneuver is very risky, it gives more than it brings risks ...

        Torpedo boats would have to spend a lot of time to turn around 180 for an attack, and then, in order to reach the distance of torpedo fire in the light of day, it would be an absolutely suicidal attack.
  8. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 1 November 2016 14: 10
    +1
    In essence, his only action after the resumption of the battle was to turn left on the 2 rumba. Why?


    Well it's not difficult.
    Seeing that Togo is converging on the right, Witgeft conducts a counter-maneuver - deviating from the course to the left - he takes the current to the intersection of the courses of squadrons to infinity, provoking Togo to a new left turn, again deviates the course - this ensures that the Togo squadron will either have to go a longer way, as it were, along the outer radius - these are time-stretched access to the beam of the squadron having a high speed and thereby forcing its flagship to stay longer under concentrated fire.
  9. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 1 November 2016 19: 13
    +3
    Greetings Andrew hi
    It seems to me that Witgeft saw the apogee of his inaction in Arthur in the form of Japanese catching him winked A soberly thinking admiral will not be in open space under enemy fire, unless he wants to reduce his scores to life. For this there is a conning tower request Although what to say so. The man "washed" his hands. winked They may object, such as a poor review, such as a large headquarters, such as Togo was also in open space. All this is an excuse - you have to live with your own brains. But still the question is - what .... was it outside the conning tower? After all, they do not shoot with cast cores, shells are already exploding ...
    About the maneuvers. Your point of view is understandable and logical, all the more so for reasons it’s understandable that the squadron’s desire to at least not violate the system. But again, the fool understands that Togo is using the modern language to clinch, which means that he will not be able to maneuver. There will be a fight, you won’t shy away from it. Okay, we have defended the position, but at least somehow it was necessary to interfere. Anyway, I will remain at my own place - I would not turn left a couple of points, but to the right. The Japanese would find themselves inside the radius, shooting at the head would be more convenient. And if Togo wanted to break out, then he would have to break the system. In terms of speed, he had to either tear the distance to the left again or try to pass under the stern with a turn. But all the same, this takes time and again I would have to solve the problem of the battle as catching up. But the Russians could only be won by not allowing Togo to get ahead. I repeat, this is my personal opinion. And so they caught up with us, quietly overtook and the initiative in the arrangement is again in the hands of the Japanese crying Hypothetically knowing that the shooting at the squadron was unimportant in view of the lack of combat training, it was tactical opposition that allowed at least something to be done yes Maybe passivity in the actions of the GKV seems reasonable, but alas, this is the result of his "rule" request Of course, Witgeft’s tactics responded to a breakthrough, if only he would have been in a winning position before dark. Although you will still analyze all this hi
    I think that Ivanov-2d was right - it made sense not to make confusion during the battle, it would be better hypothetically to postpone this moment to some kind of lull period, if this took place. Hypothetically, of course.
    Article plus-description with commentary on actions is quite satisfied drinks hi
    1. Nehist
      Nehist 2 November 2016 08: 34
      0
      The presence of the VKV on the bridge gave him a more complete picture of the battle and the position of his and other ships! As I wrote in one of the parts of the VKV, I was an excellent analyst and, seeing the whole picture, I successfully neutralized the Japanese speed advantage by maneuvers. About the turn to the right to rapprochement, as you wrote, it was contrary to the order received by the GVH. All the same, his task was to ensure a breakthrough of the squadron to Vladivostok with the least damage, and as the rapprochement approached, the damage would begin to grow, all the more so in Japanese medium-caliber guns.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 2 November 2016 18: 06
        0
        Hello, Alexander hi
        Quote: Nehist
        The presence of the VKV on the bridge gave him a more complete picture of the battle and the position of his and other ships!

        Personally, I think that such a finding still makes sense when there is active maneuvering before the battle or the very beginning of the battle itself, which blows visions of the whole picture. But when the enemy stupidly draws closer and goes to overtake in order to cover the head of your squadrons, such a picture is already clear, and even when you are already under fire, then you must already take care of your head. After all, leading to a simple, when the brains in the skull, then they are in better preservation than if they were under the armpit or on the knee wink
        Quote: Nehist
        As I wrote in one of the sections of the VKV, there was an excellent analyst and, seeing the whole picture, he successfully neutralized the Japanese speed advantage by maneuvers

        How he "neutralized" the speed advantage is perfectly described by the author of the article, by turning to the left, in order to increase the time of firing at Mikasa. And this was all that Togo request - Vitgeft himself opened the way to anticipation and fulfillment of his plans due to his passivity. After all, on the road, how do you prevent a faster "ace" from bypassing you? You give up the lane or just cut wink
        Quote: Nehist
        About the turn into the right to rapprochement, as you wrote, it was contrary to the order received by the VKV

        Fulfillment of this order makes sense when the conditions in which you are located correspond to the order ... You yourself are a military man and understand all this. I also served in the army under contract and I know that the initiative is not only punishable, but also encouraged if she has a result wink This order lost its meaning when the Japanese approached and tried to get around the Russians for a better position. The turn to the left already put an end to this order, because it simply gave the tactical advantage FULLY to the enemy, and not only gave, but even contributed to this hi
        Quote: Nehist
        All the same, his task was to ensure a breakthrough of the squadron to Vladivostok with the least damage, and as the rapprochement approached, the damage would begin to grow, all the more so in Japanese medium-caliber guns.

        Alexander, the rapprochement of the Japanese already put an end to the parts of the order for the least damage yes They were simply inevitable. There would be the advantage of being ahead to keep and not let yourself get around. But alas ... hi
        So, psychologically, tactically, and even strategically, and even in sound terms, you just had to not let yourself get around winked Maybe I'll run ahead in my explanations regarding the author, but the coverage of the head of the Japanese (or, more simply, the obstacle to overtaking) neutralized the advantage in the average artillery of the Japanese - the rear matelots simply would not be very good at shooting past the Mikasa at the Russians, because crossing the course the Russians would keep the Japanese in center of its arc, shooting with the whole side, and the rear matelots of the Japanese would simply be turned off. In terms of time, such a development of events would not be long, but would put an end to the attempt to bypass the squadron and would give a gain in time until dark. And it was necessary to simply trust in the right. But this is so, the lyrics and my personal opinion hi
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 2 November 2016 21: 20
          0
          Quote: Rurikovich
          Give way or just cut wink

          Here you should ask a question and the phrase will read like this:
          "Are you giving up the lane or just cutting it?"
        2. Nehist
          Nehist 3 November 2016 14: 25
          0
          Well, with all its desire, the VKV could not let go around its column alas, speed did not allow it! The only thing left for him was to delay the moment of coverage, that is, force Togo to overtake him in outer radius, while still maintaining the ability to fire the maximum number of his ships on the lead ship of the Japanese
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      2 November 2016 09: 57
      +2
      Greetings, dear Andrew!
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Although what to say so. The man "washed" his hands.

      To some extent, you are probably right. But something was not sitting for the admirals of those times in the wheelhouse
      Quote: Rurikovich
      All the same, I will remain at my place - I would not turn left a couple of points, but to the right

      By the way, a very good idea is if implemented on time. I would do something else in addition to this ... but this later :)))
      Quote: Rurikovich
      There may be passivity in the actions of the GKV and it seems reasonable, but alas, this is the result of his "reign"

      Again - I agree. That’s why I write that the black and white approach is not applicable to the VKV - it really showed itself in Arthur mainly negatively and even very negatively, but in the battle it commanded not so badly. He would have more faith in his strength ...
      Quote: Rurikovich
      I think that Ivanov-2 was right

      Again - I completely agree. An attempt to rebuild under the fire of an enemy located in 20 kb is the madness of pure water. And Rozhdestvensky was absolutely right in determining the lead squadron to lead.
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Article plus

      Thank!:)
    3. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 3 November 2016 11: 53
      +1
      Quote: Rurikovich
      I would not turn left a couple of points, but to the right. The Japanese would find themselves inside the radius, shooting at the head would be more convenient.


      This is a temporary advantage, do not forget that the inner radius - you need to go a shorter distance - respectively, having an advantage in speed, Togo even faster went to the head of the Russian squadron (albeit taking all the ships in turn through the focus of the battle) and set the head T.

      Witgeft very rightly deviated to the left, walking along the inner radius, as it were, and he had to walk a shorter distance - the more so that he would go to the head of the Russian column - thereby Witgeft moved the point of coverage of the head of his column. And to deviate by more than 2 rumba means to withdraw from the shelling sector of the bow GK.
      1. Nehist
        Nehist 3 November 2016 14: 21
        +1
        Everything is correct, the VKV with its maneuvers tried to hold out until the dark as it was the most real chance to break through!
  10. Comrade
    Comrade 2 November 2016 01: 26
    +2
    Dear Andrey, thank you for the good and thoughtful work, it was very interesting to read +!
    I apologize, but this moment seemed to me controversial.
    But what would happen to Mikas, if the commanders of the 1-th Pacific level of the gunners Z.P. Rozhdestvensky - because then, closer to 17.30, one would have expected the order of 60 (!) Hits in the Japanese flagship, or even more?

    Hardly demonstrated accuracy in the first quarter of an hour could remain at the same level for a long time. Recall what happened in Tsushima. As you know, the optical sights of Lieutenant Perepelkin arr. 1899 g. After the first volleys began to fog up from the soot of smokeless gunpowder and spray and smoke from enemy shells, and tremors from shots quickly and easily mismatched the scale of the sight, the aim line itself and the axis of the gun. Fire control devices soon stopped working.
    Smokeless powder, which was used in charges, after a long stay in the tropics, due to the evaporation of ether, changed its chemical properties. As a result, its ballistic properties also changed. Shooting tables were made for gunpowder with some characteristics, but charges were already loaded into the gun with others.
    In the shortest possible time, wires were damaged on many ships, along which instructions were transmitted from the conning tower to the Geisler dials. Each plutong officer had to determine the distance by eye, in the end we shot, not seeing the fall of our shells and not knowing the distance. The combination of all these factors, coupled with the increasing damage to the material and the failure of the optical rangefinders, gradually reduced the excellent combat training of the Russian artillery to nothing.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      2 November 2016 09: 49
      +4
      Greetings, dear Valentine!
      Quote: Comrade
      The accuracy demonstrated in the first quarter of an hour could hardly remain at the same level for a long time

      In Tsushima - I agree :)))) In the first twenty hours, 63 hits were reached in Japanese ships - these are only those whose time is fixed. But there are nuances here - you are fairly writing about the reasons why the accuracy of shooting could fall, but there were reasons why you could expect more full-time shooting in the July 28 battle.
      1) Excitement - in Tsushima was stronger.
      2) The distance - already at 17.00 something about 23 kb, this is much closer than Mikasa was in Tsushima
      3) More guns capable of firing at Mikas on July 28 - he was on a much more favorable heading angle for Russian commandos
      4) The head EBRs of Rozhestvensky immediately fell under the "pressure" of the Japanese, and the effectiveness of Japanese fire was higher than in the ZhM. Here, on the contrary, the head would have remained unfired for some time.
      And all sorts of italy there :))))
      Those. accuracy would decrease over time, yes, but it could initially be significantly higher than in Tsushima - due to more favorable shooting conditions
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 3 November 2016 00: 54
        0
        Yes, Andrey, your arguments are fair and logical, I completely agree with you.
        1. unknown
          unknown 7 November 2016 14: 34
          0
          And existing range finders could measure a distance of more than 40 cable correctly?
          And how far were the shooting tables?
          And why, after the REV, the maneuvers of the English fleet practiced firing at a distance of up to 45 cable? Or like the Chinese, they all invented, but did not use until they got it from the Europeans.