Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 9. Respite and resumption of combat

Approximately at 14.50, the distance between the Japanese 1 squad and the 1 Pacific squadron became too long even for large-caliber guns, and soon after the Yakumo, passing under the stern of the Russian squadron, got hit, the shooting stopped. The Russian squadron moved along the course of SO80, following Vladivostok, and no one blocked her path, but it was clear that Heyhatiro Togo would not let the Russians go without a new battle. 5 hours still remained before dark, so the Japanese had time to catch up with the Russian squadron and fight it: Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft had to draw up a plan for the coming battle.

Immediately after the skirmish with the main forces of H.Togo, V.K. Vitgeft requested damage to the squadron ships: it soon became clear that no battleship or cruiser was seriously injured. This inspired certain hopes, and Wilhelm Karlovich discussed with his headquarters the tactics of further squadron operations. The officers spoke on two issues: is it possible to deprive the Japanese of their advantageous position relative to the sun, and which squadron position would be most advantageous for the renewal of the battle.

As for the sun, here, in the unanimous opinion, it was impossible to do anything, because in order to put a squadron between the sun and the Japanese, it was necessary to be south-west of the battleships X. Togo, but such a situation could not be allowed: taking into account the superiority Japanese speed, such a maneuvering would only lead to the fact that the Japanese squadron again blocked the way of the Russians to Vladivostok. But on the part of the position of opinion divided.

Senior Flag Officer, Lieutenant MA Kedrov offered to take the fight to the withdrawal, deploying battleships front of the system. At the same time, he proceeded from the fact that in this case the Japanese would also have to catch up with the Russians, turning to the front and then the Russian squadron would have a definite advantage in the number of guns capable of fighting. There is even a calculation according to which the Japanese had 27-caliber 8-12 inches and 47 6-dm caliber in a side salvo in battle in the wake columns, and the Russians 23 and 33, respectively. But in battle, the Russians would have 12 cannons 10-12 dm and 33 six-inch against 8-m 12-dm, 6-and 8-dm and only 14-and 6-dm cannon (here, by the way, it was, by the way, it was, by the way, it was, by the way, it was by the way, Russian, and only 2-and XNUMX-dm cannon (here, by the way, was, by the way, it was, by the way, it was the same since the Kasuga's nose turret did not have an eight-inch XNUMX, but one ten-inch gun).

Chief of Staff Rear Admiral N.A. Matusevich proposed to rebuild the squadron in the bearing system (the ships turn successively to 8 points to the right, and then “all at once” to 8 points to the left), and then, as the Japanese approach, try to get closer to them. According to N.A. Matusevich the Japanese are afraid of short distances and they are worse at shooting, which is why the Russian squadron could have an advantage.

VC. Witgeft rejected both of these proposals. Until now, H. Togo did not show a desire to enter into a close combat and there was some hope that this will continue. V.K. Witgeft did not want to come closer together, based on the following considerations:

1. A short-distance battle would entail severe damage, which many ships of the squadron could not take at all to Vladivostok, and of those who could, some would not be able to do this in a large way (by the standards of the Russian squadron). , that Vladivostok will break through far fewer ships than it could.

2. In the course of a battle at short distances, there will be great damage among the unprotected artillery armor (here we mean guns of 75-mm and below, usually standing openly and not in the casemates). This will certainly weaken the ability of ships to withstand attacks by enemy destroyers, and those of the Japanese, according to V.K. Witgefta, pulled at least 50.

In general, the plan of V.K. Witgefta looked like this: he hoped to avoid the decisive 28 battle of July in order to escape at night with intact ships and a fairly high squadron speed. At night, he expected to break away from the Japanese squadron, and in the evening to go east east of. Tsushima Thus, according to the Russian commander, the squadron will overcome the most dangerous section of the path at night.

Squadron battleship Retvizan

In other words, V.K. Witgeft tried to execute exactly the order of the governor "to go to Vladivostok, avoiding the battle if possible," but this, in fact, was the only way to break through if not all, then at least most of the squadron. So far, H. Togo has acted quite cautiously and has not climbed into close combat; it is possible that this will continue to be the case. Who knows, maybe the commander of the United fleet decided not to get involved in a decisive battle, but wants to first weaken the Russians with night attacks of destroyers, and only the next day to give battle? But this option is also beneficial for the Russian commander: at night he will try to evade mine attacks, and if it doesn’t work, then the squadron will meet enemy units with intact artillery. In addition, on the night of July 28-29, numerous numbered Japanese destroyers will burn coal and can no longer pursue the Russian squadron, therefore, even if a decisive battle cannot be avoided on July 29, the next night will be much less dangerous for Russian ships.

Thus, the decision of V.K. Witgefta, if possible, to avoid fighting at a short distance should be considered quite reasonable. But it should be borne in mind that everything will have to happen the way the Japanese commander decides - X. Togo had a speed advantage and it was he who determined when and at what distance the battle would be resumed. Let's try to evaluate the proposals of the officers V.K. Witgefta in view of this moment.

Unfortunately, it must be admitted that the idea of ​​a movement by the systems of the front is no good. Of course, if H. Togo suddenly accepted the “rules of the game” offered to him by the Russian commanders, then this would lead to some advantage of the Russians, but why should the Japanese be so substituted? Nothing prevented the 1 combat unit from catching up with the Russians without deploying the front, as Lieutenant MA had expected. Cedar, and following the wake column, and in this case, the 1-I Pacific immediately fell under the "stick over T" and defeat.

The proposal of Rear Admiral N.A. Matusevich much more interesting. Led by a ledge, the Russian squadron was given the opportunity to make a turn "all at once" and would rush to the attack on the non-expecting Japanese. Such an attack could lead to the fact that X. Togo hesitated, and the right battle would turn into a landfill in which the Russian squadron, which had the destroyers and cruisers at hand, could have an advantage.

Of course, the Japanese commander had the opportunity to avoid this, take advantage of his superior speed and avoid too close contact with Russian ships. But nevertheless it could turn out in every way, and in any case for some time the distance between the Japanese and Russian squadrons would be greatly reduced.

To evaluate the plan N.A. Matusevich we will return at the end of the description of the 2 phase of the battle and counting the effectiveness of the Russian and Japanese fire - without these figures, the analysis will not be complete. Now we note that the proposal of the Chief of Staff V.K. Witgefta was a decisive battle plan, in which, of course, and regardless of the winner, would be very much for both sides. But the problem was that such a combat style directly contradicted the breakthrough task to Vladivostok: after the dump at the “pistol” distances, the surviving, but obviously badly damaged, Russian ships would only have to return to Arthur or go to the neutral ports. It was possible to go to such things if it was impossible to break through to Vladivostok (die, so with music!), But the situation was just the opposite! After the main forces of the Japanese fleet broke the distance in 14.50 from the Russians, it seemed there was a chance. So why not try to use it?

In addition to all the above, you need to consider something else. Plan N.A. Matusevich meant to put everything on a single chance, and if this chance does not work, then the Russian squadron will most likely be defeated. The fact is that the long absence of the practice of joint maneuvering had a negative impact on handling and difficult maneuvering (formation of the ledge, turns “all of a sudden” toward rapprochement with the enemy) would most likely lead to the collapse of the 1 Pacific Pacific Squadron. In this case, the Japanese, in whose abilities there was no reason to doubt, could attack defeated ships and quickly achieve success. And V.K. Vitgeft accepted the most conservative option - to go further by a wake column, and if the Japanese take the risk of drawing closer - to act according to circumstances.

And so it happened that the Russian squadron continued to go to Vladivostok in the same order. The cruisers stayed in the wake column to the left of the battleships approximately 1,5-2 miles away, while the Askold was walking on the left side of the Tsarevich, and the destroyers were going to the left of the cruisers. Rear Admiral V.K. Witgeft gave his last orders. He gave a signal to N.K. Reizzenshteynu:

"In the event of a battle, the chief of the cruisers detachment will act at his discretion."

It is difficult to say why this signal was given. Wilhelm Karlovich, even before the breakthrough, notified his flagships that he was going to rely in battle to rely on the instructions developed by S.O. Makarov, in which the cruisers were explicitly allowed to act at their own discretion in order to put the enemy in two fires, or to repel a mine attack - for this they should not have expected the commander's signal. Maybe V.K. Vitgeft was dissatisfied with the passive behavior of N.K. Reizzenshteyna in the first phase of the battle? But what could make a detachment of armored cruisers in the battle of battleships who fought at long distances? Most likely, it was only a reminder-permission to take the initiative.

More V.K. Witgeft summoned the chief of the 1 th detachment of the destroyers, and when Vyazlivy approached the Tsesarevich at a distance of voice communication, he turned to the captain of the 2 rank E.P. Eliseev asked if he could attack the Japanese at night. E.P. Yeliseyev answered in the affirmative, but only if he knew the location of the enemy battleships. Having received such an answer, Wilhelm Karlovich, nevertheless, did not give any orders, and this caused bewilderment of many researchers of the July 28 battle of 1904.

However, the author of this article does not see anything strange in this. The Russian admiral did not know what the battle would turn into: whether X would catch him up in an hour, or in three, whether the Japanese commander would prefer to keep a long distance, or risk a short break, or a squadron would face a long fierce battle, where will H. Togo lead his squad when dusk comes, etc. Under these conditions, any order would probably be premature, so that VK. Witgeft, making sure that nothing prevented the night mine attack, postponed the final decision to a later date. Probably that is why he also ordered that the “destroyers stay at the battleships at night” in order to have the last ones at hand in the twilight.

Another Russian commander gave several orders concerning the actions of the squadron in the dark: "Do not shine searchlights at night, try to keep the darkness" and "Watch the admiral with the sunset." These were perfectly sound indications: as the whole showed story Russian-Japanese war, battleships and cruisers, reaching at night in blackout, were much more likely to avoid mine attacks than those who unmasked themselves with the light of searchlights and desperate shooting.

In general, V.K. Witgeft gave the correct orders, but they still made 2 errors. First, he did not inform the commanders of the ships of the gathering place on the morning of July 29. The squadron was preparing to leave at night, and it was very likely that the battle with the Japanese would resume and continue until dark. At night, V.K. Vitgeft intended to perform several sharp cuffs in order to confuse the enemy, and besides, mine attacks were expected: under these conditions, one would expect that some ships would lose their place in the ranks, to be repulsed from the squadron. Therefore, it was necessary to appoint a collection point, so that in the morning of July 29 it would be possible to attach to the main forces at least some of the stragglers, as well as the destroyers, if they were to be sent to the night attack.

The second mistake had far more serious consequences. VC. Witgeft made a very logical and theoretically correct decision - in the upcoming battle to focus fire on the flagship battleship H. Togo "Mikas", and therefore ordered to report the semaphore along the line:

"When you start shooting, shoot at the head."

The Japanese had to catch up with the Russian squadron, and Heyhatiro Togo could hardly have avoided the need to substitute the Mikas under the fire of the entire Russian line (as we shall see later, the way it happened). But the problem was that while concentrating the fire of several ships, their goal was completely hidden behind the pillars of water from near falls, and the gunners did not see their own hits, and they could not distinguish the fall of their own shells from the shells from other ships. All this sharply reduced the accuracy of shooting, so the Japanese fleet had a rule according to which, if the ship could not effectively hit the target indicated by the flagship, he had the right to transfer the fire to another enemy ship. VC. Witgeft did not make this reservation, which is far from the best effect on the accuracy of the shooting of the Russian battleships.

In the meantime, the main forces of the Japanese were approaching - slowly but steadily, they were catching up with the 1 Pacific squadron. The second phase of the battle in the Yellow Sea began.

Unfortunately, the beginning of the second battle is a great mystery, because eyewitness accounts and official documents directly contradict each other and comparing them absolutely does not clarify anything. The time of the resumption of the fight is unclear, the speed of the Russian ships is unclear, the position of the Japanese and Russian squadrons at the time of opening the fire is unclear

Official documents say the following - after 14.50, when the 1 th phase of the battle, V.K. Witgeft led his ships at a speed of either 14 or “near 14 nodes”. For the old battleships, this turned out to be too much, therefore, as reported by the “Report of the investigating commission on the July 28 fight”:

"The line of our battleships at this time was significantly stretched, since the end battleships - Sevastopol and especially Poltava are far behind."

“Poltava” lagged “very strongly” for an understandable reason - in the 1 phase, Russian ships did not receive critical damage, but a fragment of a projectile on the “Poltava” hit the machine bearing, which caused it to warm up and had to be reduced, which was confirmed by many sources . In addition, in this matter the official point of view is confirmed by the memories of the senior officer of Poltava, S.I. Lutonin:

“... the squadron is moving farther and farther away, now 20 cable is already up to Sevastopol ... the enemy is approaching, we are alone, our squadron is far, and just about all the forces of the enemy will fall upon Poltava.”

Further, S.I. Lutonin follows the description of the battle of “Poltava” with all the forces of the Japanese 1 battle squad, and it began like this:

“I was in the battery and saw the enemy coming closer and closer. The location of the Japanese ships was usual, “Mikasa” head. This terrible enemy placed on our traverse, is about to open fire and Zapet “Poltava” shells. But what am I hearing? Two sharp shots from our 6-dm tower number 1, I see, for “Mikasa” two white haze appeared in his casemates, both of our projectile, the distance was 32 cable, 4 hour of 15 minutes of the day. The commander of the tower, midshipman Pchelnikov caught the moment, he realized that he needed to stun the enemy, he needed to start the battle, and he started it, two shells saved Poltava from defeat.
In response to our call from all the left side of seven battleships, a volley of “Poltava” rang out, but he did not do any harm, because he was frustrated prematurely. There was a mass of fountains between us and the enemy, Togo was probably prepared with a volley on the 30 cable, and therefore the shells, without reaching the cable for two, sprinkled us with a bunch of fragments. ”

The case seems to be clear. In the 1 phase, the 152-mm tower of the midshipman Pchelnikov was jammed in a position almost on the traverse (that is, perpendicular to the ship's course) but slightly in the stern. S.I. himself Lutonin writes that this tower could only rotate within 2,5 degrees. Therefore, the midshipman Pchelnikov is not that caught the moment - he just, seeing that the Japanese flagship is about to go beyond the reach of his guns, launched a volley at him, being guided by the natural desire of the naval sailor to cause damage to the enemy.

It is difficult to say whether the midshipman got into Mikasu or not. On the one hand, the Japanese side does not record hits in X. TOG’s 16.15 flagship or some close to this time, but on the other hand, the time of hits of several six-inch (and unidentified caliber, which could well be six-inch) projectiles is fixed. So we can say that Japanese sources do not confirm and do not refute the hit of midshipman Pchelnikov. These hits, or simply the fact that “Poltava” opened fire, made the Japanese nervous and strike prematurely. It is quite possible that the Japanese really tried to knock out the Poltava with one accurate volley of all the ships of the line (similar methods of shooting were also provided by the old Russian instructions on naval shooting), but they fired ahead of time and missed it.

So far, everything is logical and consistent, but more ...

The fact is that the “Conclusion of the investigative commission on the July 28 fight” does not at all confirm the words of S.I. Lutonin on opening fire in 16.15. It reads

“At the end of the fifth hour, when the lead ship of the enemy armored detachment went abreast of the fourth ship of our line, the Peresvet battleship was at a distance of about 40 cable, the second battle began.”

Even if we assume that the “fifth hour outcome” is 16.45, then even a half-hour difference with the data of S.I. Lutonin, but the most important thing is that midshipman Pchelnikov could not shoot at Mikas when the latter was on the beam of Peresvet, because by that time the flagship battleship X. Togo had long been beyond the reach of his tower!

Let us assume that the battle nevertheless began precisely at 14.15, at the moment when Mikasa was on the beam of Poltava. But “Poltava” defended from “Sevastopol” on the 2 miles, and even if we assume that the regular interval 2 of cable cable was kept between “Sevastopol” and “Peresvet” and then “Poltava” separated from Peresvet (taking into account the length of Sevastopol, approximately 22,6 KBT. Not to get to Peresvet’s trawls not by the end of the fifth hour, but at least to 17.00 Mikasa had to overtake Poltava "On 22,6 KBT, i.e., to go at a speed on the 3 node faster than VK Vitgeft went, and if the Russian squadron did indeed go with about the speed of 14 nodes or at least “around 14 nodes”, it turns out that the battleships of X. Togo flew forward on 17 nodes? !! ​​And if the Russian squadron did not fight before 16.45, then what did it do then? Poltava "And how excellently well-trained Japanese commanders for half an hour of one-gate battle could not knock out the battleship who fought alone against seven? And why not in some memoirs (including S.I. Lutonin) we do not read anything like that?

But the quite official “Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905” (Book III) adds intrigue, describing the beginning of the battle like this:

“When the distance was reduced to 40-45 cable, the battleship“ Poltava ”, without waiting for the signal, opened fire. Immediately the battle began all along the line, and it began immediately with full intensity. ”

The Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905 does not indicate the exact time of the resumption of the battle, but it is clear from the context that this happened after 16.30. Let's say it's true. But why, then, did the Japanese not start the battles, attacking the heavily lagged Russian battleship, and opened fire only after they took to the Perezvet traverse, ie, when even the terminal "Yakumo" has long passed the traverse of "Poltava"? Why V.K. Vitgeft, who had previously proved himself a good commander in battle, left Poltava to be eaten by the Japanese, leaving her two miles aft of Sevastopol? And what - it turns out that the memoirs of S.I. Lutonin is completely unreliable, because in this case all his records about the resumption of the battle are false from beginning to end?

Squadron battleship "Poltava"

Without insisting on his point of view, the author of this article suggests the following version of those distant events.

The Russian squadron after 14.50 had a turn of 13 nodes (Vl. Semenov, by the way, writes about 12-13 nodes). "Sevastopol" was in the ranks, but the damaged "Poltava" gradually lagged behind. Then, according to the “Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905” (by the way, contradicting itself):

"The commander of the" Cesarevich "appealed to the Admiral and reminded him that the battleship has only 70 revolutions, i.e. 13 nodes move, the admiral ordered to raise the signal "More to move" and add a turn gradually. They added 10 turnovers, but at that time “Sevastopol” and “Poltava” began to lag behind, why they again reduced it to 70 turns ”.

It is possible that it was because of this “More Move” signal that the very “14 nodes” or “about 14 nodes” emerged about which we read in the official battle descriptions, although the speed was increased for a while and soon again reduced to 13 nodes. But during this increase in speed, the line was stretched and the lag was not only of “Poltava”, but also of “Sevastopol” (a description of which we see in the “Report of the investigating commission”). However, later the speed was again reduced to 13 nodes and closer to the beginning of the battle, the backward battleships managed to catch up. It can be assumed that by the beginning of the battle "Sevastopol" took its place in the ranks (2 KB from the stern of "Peresvet"), and "Poltava" lagged behind the "Sevastopol" cable on 6-7. The Japanese caught up with V.K. Witgefta with a speed not lower than 15 nodes. The battle resumed exactly as S.I. Lutonin - at the moment when Mikasa was crossing the traverse of Poltava, but this happened not in 16.15, but closer to 16.30. Japanese ships hit Poltava, but unsuccessfully and for some time fired at him, but their heads, overtaking Poltava, quickly transferred the fire to Peresvet, because the latter was flying the flag of the junior flagship, and therefore was a more attractive target. . At the same time, the Russian battleships hesitated with the discovery of fire, and started the battle either in 16.30 or a little later, but still not when “Mikasa” went abreast of “Peresvet” but a little earlier.

The above version explains most of the logical inconsistencies in the sources, but this does not mean that it deserves more confidence than other possible hypotheses. Perhaps it is more logical, but logic is the enemy of the historian. Too often, historical events do not obey its laws. How many times already happened: according to the logic it should be so, but in fact it happened for some reason quite differently.

Only one thing can be reliably asserted: the Japanese 1 combat detachment that had attached the Yakumo slowly walked along the line of the Russian battleships, and near 16.30 the shot of Poltava began the second phase of the battle in the Yellow Sea.

To be continued ...

Comments

[Rurikovich]

Hello Andrey
It is always difficult to paint a true picture if the sources differ. But you do it. We see that Vitgeft, following logically from the results of the clashes at the beginning of the battle, concludes that if Togo continues to be cautious, then, in theory, the plan to break through to Vladivostok "avoiding battle as much as possible" is quite real. Therefore, he preferred further straight-line movement. On the one hand, it is clear - why destroy the most visible advantageous position? The Japanese are behind, already in the afternoon, so the actions of the Russian admiral are understandable.
But the admiral had to understand that one of the most important tactics - speed - was on the side of the Japanese. In any case, the continuation of the battle was inevitable, and it was necessary to somehow level this aspect. And personally, I think that this had to be taken into account. Most likely, you will still consider this moment at the end. Although no one forbids considering their options (especially when analyzing an already past event), I still say that Witgeft's mistake was to underestimate Togo's intentions to fight (the result of the latter's throwing at the beginning) and led to passivity. And this led to the fact that the Japanese simply caught up with the Russians and themselves dictated the distance of the battle. Many then understood that it was necessary to act more actively, but the last word was for the admiral. And over him was pressing "avoiding the fight" ... But this is just my opinion. The enemy's speed advantage at that time had to be taken into account! And the Russian commander had to look ahead not in terms of the overall picture, but to solve the problem here and now, which was catching up with his ships. He didn't. And the benefit now can quickly disappear if nothing is done to preserve it, at least until dark. Simply put, Vitgeft lived in one word - Vladivostok, Togo in another - battle. That makes all the difference
Article agro plus !!!
PS A small remark - at this moment (7.08 in Minsk) in the photo under the caption "The squadron battleship" Poltava "is actually" Petropavlovsk ". You yourself know the differences of this trinity in appearance
With all respect, Andrew

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Greetings, dear Andrew!

Quote: Rurikovich

But the admiral had to understand that one of the most important tactics - speed - was on the side of the Japanese. In any case, the continuation of the battle cannot be avoided, and at least somehow this aspect had to be leveled

I agree. In the next article I will definitely touch on this issue in more detail (I was going to!)

Quote: Rurikovich

Substation A small remark - at this moment (7.08 in Minsk) the photograph under the caption "Squadron battleship Poltava" is actually "Petropavlovsk".

Here hezh ... You are absolutely right. Burst.
Thank you!

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In the next article I will definitely touch on this issue in more detail (I was going to!)

I apologize, I rush things again ...

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Burst.

Come on... We are all humans. Everyone can be mistaken.
We look forward to continuing, Andrei Nikolaevich!
Sincerely, also Andrey Nikolaevich

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Rurikovich

Sincerely, also Andrey Nikolaevich

Oh, just don’t say that you are also from Chelyabinsk

[Rurikovich]

Noooo That would be too much Thousands of kilometers west, but also Slavs

[Schultz]

Andrei Nikolayevich - our respect with great respect from researcher to researcher. The only drawback (the disease of all historians of the fleet) is the lack of analysis of sea weather (direction of currents, wave density, wind), and the rest are only pluses.

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Schultz

The only drawback (the disease of all fleet historians) is the lack of analysis of sea weather (directions of currents, wave balm, wind)

In my opinion, the weather was mentioned. Clearly, there is no light breeze, there are practically no currents in that part of the Yellow Sea that can influence the course of the battle. Therefore, there is no sense in writing about it (weather)

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Hello, Alexander Viktorovich!

Quote: Schultz

Andrei Nikolayevich - our respect with great respect from researcher to researcher.

Thank! It is very nice to hear high marks from a professional!

Quote: Schultz

The only drawback (the disease of all fleet historians) is the lack of analysis of sea weather (directions of currents, wave balm, wind)

I agree. When I redo the cycle into a book, I will try to fix this shortcoming :)

[Nehist]

Bravo!!! Andrei, you are now in this article touched on many aspects that are generally not taken into account by Central Asia.! Now, a few remarks, so to speak ... On the gathering place on the 29th day ... For this very reason, the destroyers received orders to be near the EDB, since the flag signals could not be distinguished at dusk and Witgeft forbade the use of signal spotlights. That is, he perfectly understood everything and tried to hold out until darkness. Matusevich’s proposal was considered seriously, unfortunately the gallant Poltava and Sevastopal nullified this as you rightly noticed the only chance! In the end, Witgeft had a minimum program to break into Vladivostok, and as a maximum during a breakthrough, inflict significant damage on the Japanese !!! At the same turn, to minimize damage to his ships, that is, he even allowed the 1st TOE to break through to Vladivostok, but with the greatest possible damage to it. This is precisely what caused all of his maneuvers that were not understandable at first glance. Well, about the second one, how do you write a mistake ... In addition to the order, there is also a sensible initiative, and here Witgeft is no longer to blame, namely the EDB commanders

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Greetings and thanks, dear Nehist!

Quote: Nehist

About the gathering place on the 29th day ... For this very reason, the destroyers received orders to be in the vicinity of the EDB, since the flag signals could not be distinguished at dusk and Witgeft forbade the use of signal lights

You are right that Witgeft did the right thing by ordering the destroyers to stay nearby, but still he should have appointed a meeting place in advance - in the evening and at dusk there would be little opportunity.

Quote: Nehist

Well, about the second one, how do you write a mistake ... In addition to the order, there is also a sensible initiative, and it is not Witgeft who is to blame, namely the EDB commanders

I believe that you are right.

[ser56]

VKV could not appoint a meeting place before the second phase - it was far before dark and a lot of things could happen! This he could and should have done at dusk ...
As for his order to shoot at Mikasa, the concentration of fire on the flagship is a common place of the then tactics, by the way, Togo did this under Tsushima and no one disputes this ...
Another thing is that the VKV did not have experience in post-war exercises, when it was established that it was not reasonable to concentrate fire on more than 3 ships ...

[Nehist]

By the way, the cycle about Relight promises to be interesting !!! In general, the most beautiful ships at that time were)

[DimerVladimer]

Thank you dear Andrew.

Massaging the fire on the flagship (Mikasa) is really Witgeft's serious mistake, for the above reasons (reducing the accuracy of the fire).
It was more logical to exit the terminal ships of the 1st squadron, Matelot Mikasa (Asahi) - to transfer and massage the fire on it - do not forget when the ship is under fire - this is a great psychological effect, in addition, the accuracy of shocks from shells decreases fire control devices, the gun-maid may be out of order - i.e. many random factors contributing to a decrease in accuracy and rate of fire. That is, 3 squadron battleships could massage the fire on Mikasa, and 3 on the next in the column - Asahi.
But the temptation to knock out the flagship with massive fire was too great. Witgeft put on this card and she almost played ...

[unknown]

The same tactic is in Tsushima. And fire from more than three ships at one target is ineffective. As a result, some of the Japanese ships did not come under fire. This made it possible to refer them later, on paper, to the best projects of their time. In Tsushima BBO Nebogatov was quickly knocked out "Asama", after which Kamimura was doing something unknown.
And to finish off the heavily damaged ship ... and the Nyurberg 4 sank the Monmouth with shells.

[Nehist]

Here! You write correctly, BOB Nebogatova ignoring Rozhdestvensky’s order (all the more so, they didn’t reach Mikasa) They shot at the DBK of the Japanese, as a result of which they shied away from them as if from fire, they had a great advantage in speed. And so yes, in a linear battle, all DBK would fall under the BWO

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Nehist

Here! You write correctly, BOB Nebogatova ignoring Rozhdestvensky’s order (all the more so, they didn’t reach Mikasa) They shot at the DBK of the Japanese, as a result of which they shied away from them as if from fire, they had a great advantage in speed. And so yes, in a linear battle, all DBK would fall under the BWO

Do you really think so?

[Cat]

Do not offend the ensign!
A thinking "ensign" is already a "+".
Expressing his thoughts without "such a mother" "++".
If you still read the sources "+++".
Well, he has the drawback of "first kick the cat - speak up", and then think "why".

[Trapperxnumx]

Yes, I do not offend. All the more so, my very respected comrade Nehist.
I really wonder his opinion and why he thinks so. Of course, the artillery of the GK of our BBO is nominally better, but the same battle of Ushakov showed the opposite result.

[Cat]

1. Our BWOs were very heavily overloaded, however, like all ships of the squadron. Because of this, Apraskin had only 3 guns of the main caliber, instead of 4 - 305 mm.
2. Lost in equipment range finders. Two for the ship with us and up to 6 for the Japanese. If you believe Novikov-Surf on our BWO medium artillery was equipped with mechanical sights.
3. Shells, the quality of our armor-piercing with high humidity of peroxide was inferior to the Japanese with "shimosa".
4. The crews of our reservists against the Japanese, who fought for a year.
5. In a squadron battle, our BWO showed themselves well, but Ushakov alone could not cope with the distribution of fire weapons for several purposes and lost.
6. The superiority of the Japanese in the amount of medium artillery.
7. And the last speed.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Kotischa

Our BWOs were very heavily overloaded, however, like all ships of the squadron

Were not:)))

Quote: Kotischa

In a squadron battle, our BWO showed themselves well

Unfortunately, they did not show themselves in any way.

Quote: Kotischa

But Ushakov alone could not cope with the distribution of fire resources for several purposes and lost.

Everything is much simpler. BBO are ships of a training artillery detachment, on which gunners were trained to shoot. By Tsushima, they had very well-executed main guns, and of all the 254-mm naval artillery, they were the "lucky owners" of the worst samples. In general, it was possible to shoot from their 254-mm, but to hit ...
"Ushakov" had combat damage, roll and corny did not reach the Japanese

[Comrade]

Quote: Nehist

BBO Nebogatova ignoring Rozhdestvensky’s order (all the more with all his desire, they didn’t reach Mikasa) They shot at the DBK of the Japanese

Sorry, but Rozhestvensky did not give the order to Nebogatov's ships to shoot at the Mikasa, his order applied only to the battleships of the First Armored Detachment.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ignoto

The same tactics in Tsushima.

Yes.

Quote: ignoto

In Tsushima BBO Nebogatov quickly knocked out "Asama"

"Asama" received serious damage from 305-mm shells and, not surprisingly, from 152-mm shells, which fell into the pipe, which forced the boiler to shut down for a while. Those. it was clearly not BBO

[ser56]

in fact, a shell with an EDB IN1 hit Asamu ....

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Hello DimerVladimer!

Quote: DimerVladimer

But the temptation to knock out the flagship with massive fire was too great.

I agree. Witgeft probably understood that his commandants were not very accurate and hoped that a massive fire would help somehow - statistically, Mikas should have received a certain number of hits.

[avt]

. The fact is that a prolonged lack of joint maneuvering practice did not affect the controllability in the best way, and complicated maneuvering (step ledge, “all of a sudden” turns to approach the enemy) would most likely lead to the fact that the structure of the 1st Pacific squadron disintegrated. In this case, the Japanese, whose abilities there was no reason to doubt, could attack the ships that had lost their order and quickly achieve success. And V.K. Witgeft accepted the most conservative option - to go further with the wake column, and if the Japanese dare to get closer, act according to circumstances.

That is, do not bother with any options and the initiative, and indeed all the options for the development of the battle were given completely to the Japanese at their discretion. Which they could, and indeed the spit, as they wanted. Made mistakes or not - it does not matter if the First Squadron is completely passive in view of the objective and subjective reasons completely described by Andrei in the monograph. And if there was an advantage in progress, coordination in maneuvering, and frankly - an advantage in artillery, the First Squadron had no chance of any success.

[unknown]

Yes, the Japanese did not have any advantage in artillery: Togo had four battleships with 12 "and two or three cruisers with 8" (with a firing capacity of 6000 tons of cruisers); at Vitgeft - four battleships with 12 "and two battleships with 10".
The rate of fire of the main caliber is about the same, and in 6 "the Russians have an advantage: with a shell mass of 45-41,5 kg, the difference in the mass of loaders of about 20 kg is very significant. The Japanese shells did not make a strong impression in this battle: the ships did not burn.
The advantage of the move is 2 knots per hour, i.e. 20 cable.
We dispersed into 100 cable ones, turned around and began to catch up. How much to catch up?

[Nehist]

No need to catch up !!! How many times have already been written about this, the Japanese would not have caught up with the squadron of Vladivostok cruisers if it had not been for Stormbreaker with their machines, in the end, as always, the heroism of some has to pay for the stupidity of others ... The advantage in speed if it was less than 5 knots at that time was not essential. in 6 "guns, we lost quantitatively not by much, but we lost, but in the main battle team we exceeded almost one and a half times, and it was in the rate of fire, which was more than light shells and electric drives for feeding and turning the towers, the Japanese had hydraulics

[Rurikovich]

Quote: ignoto

Togo has four battleships with 12 "and two or three cruisers with 8" (with a firing capacity of 6000 tons of cruisers)

Um These same cruisers with 8 "artillery are in no way analogous to our 6000t cruisers in terms of fire performance. They had the same 6-7 6 "guns on board (in comparison:" Diana "- 5-6", "Askold" - 7-6 "," Varyag "- 6-6", "Bogatyr" - 8-6 "aboard) plus 4 8" guns. And these same "six thousand" were created for the Pacific Ocean in response to the Japanese "Kasagi", which had 2 8 "and 10 -4,7" (five on board). And 6 "were chosen with the expectation that the shell is heavier than 4,7, 8 ", but the guns themselves are faster than XNUMX" guns. Therefore, in terms of firepower, these cruisers were stronger than the Japanese "dogs", but comparing them with the Japanese BKR is somehow not very The displacement of the latter is almost 4000 tons larger, the skin is thicker and that the speed is lower, so they were not created for racing with six thousand meters. So a relatively long collision in BKR is very fraught for our cruisers without side armor

Quote: ignoto

at Vitgeft - four battleships with 12 "and two battleships with 10".

And here, formally, "Pobeda" and "Peresvet", although they are EBRs and are put in a line, they were created for other purposes (by the way, Andrei began a cycle about these ships) and got into this rank not from an easy life, but because of very different expectations from them. So they could actually withstand the Japanese BKR in that battle. In fact, they were large armored cruisers. And they could well withstand even three Japanese. In fact, the forces in the artillery were almost equal in the number of barrels: 4 + 2 ships for ours versus 4 + 3 for the Japanese. The matter remained small - to use tactical techniques correctly and wisely to compensate for the lower speed

Quote: ignoto

The Japanese shells did not make a strong impression in this battle: the ships did not burn.

The same can be said of ours. Formally. Armor-piercing shells are used in order to penetrate armor and inflict damage on the inside of the ship. In particular, damage or destroy the KMO and the ammunition cellar. Therefore, one should not expect catastrophic fires from them in view of the relatively small number of explosives. But the ships are burning not from shells, but from the presence of combustible materials on them, from the place where the shell hits. And do not forget about fire fighting teams. From them, too, there may not be fires ...

Quote: ignoto

The advantage of the move is 2 knots per hour, i.e. 20 cable.
We dispersed into 100 cable ones, turned around and began to catch up. How much to catch up?

So after all, caught up So there was an advantage, and one that allowed in those conditions to overtake the enemy to darkness and impose battle

[unknown]

I'll start with the last one. About caught up, the battle distance and the like. Winners write history, as they feel comfortable, they write. I, who received a specialized historical education in the glorious Soviet times, recently (10-15 years) begin to become disillusioned with traditional, generally accepted descriptions. It is not a matter of emotions, but of the real contradictions of the traditional version of history. The entire description of the RYA looks like a badly written play, on order.
About shells. Lutonin, after the battle, was able to examine an unexploded shell. Well, not armor-piercing.
By the way, ours also answered not only with armor-piercing ones.
So, "Peresvet" used up 109 10 "shells, of which armor-piercing - nine." Pobeda "- 60 armor-piercing and 55 high-explosive. Of course, we have pyroxylin, and the Japanese have shimosa. But, the Germans also have pyroxylin, which is superior to shimozu in high explosive 1,45 times.
And after analyzing the results of the Tsushima battle, the British switched from equipping shells with a caliber of more than 6 "black powder, the explosiveness of which is forty times lower than that of pyroxylin. In Jutland, there was enough.
About armored decks of the first rank. Yes, they are inferior in displacement, significantly. As well as the Japanese "miracle-yudo" "Peresvetam". Yes, no belt. But the bevel of the carapace along the entire waterline. CMU is protected. And you can dive under the belt ("Retvizan").
On fire performance superior. Much. Not from a good life, the Japanese switched to a caliber of 140mm. The projectile is lighter: 37 against 45.5 kg. But what else to do if your loaders are inferior in weight to an average of 20 kg. Yes, this is still relevant now: with equal skills, which loader can cope faster: with a mass of 45-50 kg or 65-70 kg.
If we also add the manual loading of 8 "shells, an unsuccessful feed to 6", the unsuccessful composition of the cordite charges, which led to a rapid burnout (the British had already switched to a different composition): these factors reduced the rate of fire of the Japanese.
In Chemulpo, the Korean produced 22-8 "(two outdated guns) and 27-6" (one gun), and Asama -27-8 "(four modern ones) and 103-6" (out of seven barrels).

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ignoto

In Chemulpo, the Korean produced 22-8 "(two outdated guns) and 27-6" (one gun), and Asama -27-8 "(four modern ones) and 103-6" (out of seven barrels).

This plays absolutely no role, since the number of shots directly depends on the zeroing method. If "Asama" tried to practice salvo shooting while waiting for the falls of the previous ones, then he shot more accurately but much less often than he could. And, of course, it is worth getting behind the bearings - how many Asama guns could fight at each moment of the battle.
And yes. You constantly write that the "asamoids" could only use lightweight shells, because the feed was not designed for heavy ones - this is not an obstacle, because a significant part of the ammunition was stored right in the towers.

Quote: ignoto

But, among the Germans, pyroxylin, which surpasses chimose in explosiveness by 1,45 times.

But inferior in brisance, and most importantly - the content of explosives in Russian shells is too small, which is why they hardly caused damage

Quote: ignoto

Not from a good life, the Japanese switched to a caliber of 140mm.

Not good. But they found a way to solve this problem - they stored 152-mm shells directly at the guns, so they did not have to drag them from the delivery devices from afar, like the Russians. And they paid for it in the Korea Strait, but it happened only 1 time during the whole war.

[Rurikovich]

Quote: ignoto

Winners write history, as they feel comfortable, they write. I, who received a specialized historical education in the glorious Soviet times, recently (10-15 years) begin to become disillusioned with traditional, generally accepted descriptions. It is not a matter of emotions, but of the real contradictions of the traditional version of history. The entire description of the RYA looks like a badly written play, on order.

And they did not think about the opposite - that in connection with the opening of (relatively) archives, hard-hitting facts began to emerge, which the "traditionalists" either do not notice, or anathematize instead of actually reconsidering the controversial issues

Quote: ignoto

About shells. Lutonin, after the battle, was able to examine an unexploded shell. Well, not armor-piercing.
By the way, ours also answered not only with armor-piercing ones.

This means that both sides in that battle "sinned" with low-quality shells. there are questions to the rear and the ministries

Quote: ignoto

About armored decks of the first rank. Yes, they are inferior in displacement, significantly. As well as the Japanese "miracle-yudo" "Peresvetam". Yes, no belt. But the bevel of the carapace along the entire waterline. CMU is protected. And you can dive under the belt ("Retvizan").

Well, you know, I personally would rather have a ship with side + deck protection than just a "deck" instead. One deck can hardly be called adequate protection. It only gives the illusion of protection. The ship sinks not from the penetration of the deck, but from holes in the hull, from which the deck does not protect. She can only theoretically protect machines with boilers and cellars, and even then at long distances. So if the ship has an armored deck and nothing else, consider that the ship is "naked" The ramp deck with side without armor is equivalent to the absence of armor

Quote: ignoto

On fire performance superior. Much.

Well, well "Asama" rests on the bottom of the fire performance of "Varyag"

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

In general, no one can compare with a six-thousander cruiser in firing performance :)))) The Varangian, according to ignoto, released 425 six-inch ones in 14 minutes. "Retvizan", for the whole battle in the Yellow Sea - only 300 :)))))) Tsarevich (he had all 12 guns) - 509. In general, the Varyag is a super-cruiser and if we set them up instead of battleships, we would dare ffsekh

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In general, the Varangian is a super-super-cruiser and if we tuned them instead of armadillos we would dare ffsekh laughing

So vague doubts torment me!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Rurikovich

So vague doubts torment me!

And this is Reitenstein's fault. It is he, a bad person, who undertook to embarrass you. His "six-barreled machine gun" "Askold" was supposed to break the Japanese ballistic missiles like Tuzik a heating pad, but instead he fired some unfortunate 266 6-inch shells for the whole battle ... Shame !!!

[Nehist]

The first squadron had all the chances !!! And the same Ricenshtein took the initiative several times raising a signal to follow me !!! Alas, everyone was looking at Ukhtomsky, whose ship had practically no damage ... Yes, and the very attitude of the EDB commanders was like that. Essen, who had been inflamed by everyone, was against reaching the breakthrough squadron; for some reason he judged that the breakthrough alone was better, apparently he had not yet left the cruiser ..

[avt]

Quote: Nehist

The first squadron had all the chances !!! And the same Ricenshtein took the initiative several times raising a signal to follow me !!!

To everyone who believes in me - my children are behind me!?

Quote: Nehist

Alas, everyone was looking at Ukhtomsky, whose ship had practically no damage at all ... And the very mood of the EDB commanders was like that.

"Mood" is strong. The campaign really does not see the difference between how to raise a company from the trench to attack and driving ships as part of a squadron. And if instead of a killed commander the same platoon commander can lead, then I would have looked how the same platoon would have done the same with the battalion, if there were senior officers of the battalion, not to mention the larger formations.

[Nehist]

Raised and more than once ... When the senior "officer" in his pants sorry to put it! We saw we know ... In general, everyone who returned to Arthur under the tribunal must be given away because they did not fulfill it !!! Witgeft's order was violated. You know, in the rank of warrant officer, I sent a battalion for two weeks, and this was with the presence of two captains, major and three senior

[avt]

Quote: Nehist

Raised and more than once ...

Again

Quote: avt

The campaign doesn’t really see the difference between how to raise a company from the trench behind the attack and driving ships in the squadron.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Nehist

Alas, everyone was looking at Ukhtomsky, whose ship had practically no damage ...

Uhhh ... a small amendment. With your permission, Ukhtomsky's "Peresvet" is the most damaged ship among the Russian EBR :)

[demiurg]

Thank you :)) Almost get a novel :))

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

And thank you :))) The novel is not a novel, but someday all of this will become a book on the theme of naval battles of the REV :)

[Rurikovich]

So maybe we’ll go over Chemulpo?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Rurikovich

So maybe we’ll go over Chemulpo?

And where are we going to go :)))) And on it, and on Tsushima ...

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

And thank you :))) The novel is not a novel, but someday all of this will become a book on the theme of naval battles of the REV :)

Hooray !!!!!!!! )))))))))))

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: avt

And if there was an advantage in progress, coordination in maneuvering, and frankly - an advantage in artillery, the First Squadron had no chance of any success.

I do not quite agree - there are always chances, I will explain my idea.
Life is a chain of events with a certain probability.
In artillery combat, it all depends on the performance of the equipment, the training and motivation of the team. Rate GK determining victory in battle - is limited by the speed of supply of the BC to the gun, the accuracy of the hit - by training artillery officers controlling fire and aiming.
Makarov began with training and the chances of the squadron increased significantly. And even under the command of Wittgeft, the chances remained very substantial, although he passively kept the squadron in the base.

Do you think Togo had no doubt in this fight?
Just imagine - the Vladivostok cruisers are making impudent raids on the merchant fleet off the coast of the metropolis, paralyzing trade and thousands of merchants suffer losses, set fire to his house in Tokyo, he has already lost two first-class squadron battleships on mines - solely through the fault of his template tactics - against one Russian armadillo - the emperor begins to doubt him ... Togo is not fully aware of the condition of the ships of the 1st squadron, of the real training of crews. He, too, is inclined to overestimate the real state of the squadron going on a breakthrough.
I believe that Togo perceived his position as very precarious. If, as a result of the battle, he loses another ship - the difference in armored forces will be even reduced, and the 1st squadron will break through - this will be a serious fiasco fiasco, which can not be experienced as an admiral.
- Therefore, Togo will be happy with the option of doing everything possible to stop an attempt to break through, but not to lose a single squadron battleship, since the armored cruisers Kassuga, Nissin, Yakumo, Asama are not in the line could equally oppose the first-class EBR.
Having received several suitcases to Mikasa from the massive fire of the 1st squadron, he could overestimate the damage to the flagship armadillo - HE CANNOT LOSE THIRD EBR from the beginning of the war!
His fate as the admiral of the combined fleet was hanging in the balance in that battle ... I think he was really ready to leave the battle under pressure of responsibility, at least to assess the damage to the flagship and decide on the continuation of the battle / pursuit. He still had mortar forces and the calculation of a night attack.
In addition, up to Vladivostok, at least one more daylight would be for pursuit and battle (taking into account fuel consumption by the combined fleet in the 13-14 knots operating mode), and Togo could assess the damage to the fleet and decide to continue the pursuit by the main forces.
But at that moment, unfortunately, once again luck smiled at the Japanese ...

[unknown]

What first-class battleships are we talking about?
"Yasima" is an outdated project, the extremities have no belt, the main battery installations are outdated, most of the middle artillery is protected only by shields, the real speed is 15 knots. Do you recognize the description? Change a little, exaggerate ... and you get a description of battleships of the "Petropavlovsk" type, which Russian historians have never considered modern.
"Hatsuse" is protected by armor made by the Garvey method. Domestic historians, when describing domestic ships protected by a harvey, always emphasized that this armor was no longer the last word, and was significantly inferior to Krupp's, which gave reason to classify such ships as inferior.
The devil is in the details, and the history of wars is written by the victors. As they want, because the winners are not judged.
But maybe more objectivity?

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: ignoto

What first-class battleships are we talking about?

Of course, armadillos of the 1st class were meant.
I agree - the best of both Japanese drowned on the mines of the Japanese EDB - not to name.

[Denimax]

"Unfortunately, it must be admitted that the idea of ​​moving in front lines is no good."

This could be a retaliatory measure, if the Japanese began to shoot at the end ships or cover front.

[Trapperxnumx]

And yet, what beautiful ships were built in the Empire ....

And I look at the battleships
And beauty captivates the mind
For glory, our crowns
They were not built at random.
Their formidable look captivates their eyes
And steel crushes the ocean
And on a hot day, il moonlit night
The captain does not sleep, the captain does not sleep.
And in the vents of fiery weapons
Our man-made gin sits
And bad, very bad
When he suddenly speaks ...

[Taoist]

Horror ... I will not argue about the beauty of armadillos, but it is worth getting rid of "banal rhymes" ...

[Taoist]

Well, one more illustration about the fact that "you need to train" and at least have battle plans in advance.
After all, with proper training in maneuvering and fighting in a ledge system and consistent shelling of the flagship of the Japanese column (which was catching up with the Russian one and, therefore, was in the focus of fire for a long time), it could really change the course of the battle and reduce the risk for our battleships ... But both required a different level of preparation and synchronization of actions ... As a result, the same liabilities ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Taoist

Well, one more illustration that "you need to train"

That's for sure...

[Cartalon]

The order to shoot at the head for me is the key mistake, if the Russians had a chance, it was to knock out BKR before the Japanese inflicted damage on our armadillos, shooting at Mikas made sense while the Japanese overtook our convoy, then we had to shoot at the nearest ones.

[Taoist]

So here I am about the same ... The operational control of the battle was absent as a fact. Timely transfer of fire for optimal targets was not carried out. As a result, the effectiveness of their fire also sharply decreased and the effectiveness of the enemy increased - since the rest of the Japanese column fired under conditions of an unshielded target ...
The main mystery for me personally is why there was no "rehearsal" ship ... It seems that Vitgeft did not plan to manage the battle at all.

[Comrade]

Digging deeply, dear Andrei, I read it with great pleasure, thanks +!
Interestingly, according to the Japanese, the first phase ended not because Togo was engaged in the elimination of the injuries received or inspecting them (as can often be read in domestic sources), but because he feared the Russian squadron "flight" back to Port Arthur. In favor of the Japanese point of view, we can cite the fact that we are not aware of cases when, during the Russo-Japanese war, a Japanese warship, having received several hits during the battle, would lag behind the enemy in order to find out the severity of the damage received. And here not one ship, but the main forces of the fleet left the enemy alone, having engaged in clarifying / eliminating the consequences of several shells hitting the flagship ...
Admiral Togo, I think, and so everything was promptly brought to the bridge, wherever and what are the consequences.

[Cartalon]

Well, if Togo was afraid of the flight of mice to a mousetrap, this is his personal difficulties.

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Comrade

It is interesting that, according to the Japanese, the first phase ended not because Togo was engaged in the elimination of the injuries received or inspecting them (as can often be read in domestic sources), but because he was afraid of the "flight" of the Russian squadron back to Port Arthur.

This, by the way, can be very I’ll only say to the author’s protection that, in addition to describing the battle, he personally gives his point of view, which is based on his conclusions and logical conclusions. Moreover, he did not spend days and nights in the archives of the Navy of Japan in search of truth

[unknown]

As it is unknown, A "Asama", having come under fire "completely unsuitable for squadron combat" BBO, left the line and battle for 1,5 hours just to clarify and eliminate damage.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ignoto

And "Asama", having come under fire "completely unsuitable for squadron combat" BBO

Firing 6 and 12-inch shells ...

[unknown]

The armament of the BBO consisted of 10 "guns (225 kg projectile) and 120 mm (20,47 kg projectile).

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Greetings, dear Comrade! :)

Quote: Comrade

Digging deep

So there is a shovel, time - too :)))))

Quote: Comrade

It is interesting that, according to the Japanese, the first phase ended not because Togo was engaged in the elimination of the injuries received or inspecting them (as can often be read in domestic sources), but because he was afraid of the "flight" of the Russian squadron back to Port Arthur

I believe that they are lying, and they are lying without blushing.

Quote: Comrade

In favor of the Japanese point of view, we can cite the fact that we are not aware of cases when, during the Russo-Japanese War, a Japanese warship, having received several hits during the battle, would lag behind the enemy in order to determine the severity of the damage received.

Nuuu, in Tsushima, the main forces dispersed in different directions several times. And then, I think that Togo wanted to add "Yakumo" before "the last and decisive" :)

Quote: Comrade

Admiral Togo, I think, and so everything was promptly brought to the bridge, wherever and what are the consequences.

In his ship - yes, but you could only request for others with a semaphore - a signal book is not enough. And I doubt that this can be done in battle.

[Comrade]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In his ship - yes, but you could only request for others with a semaphore - a signal book is not enough. And I doubt that this can be done in battle.

You can use the walkie-talkie. The destroyers of the Japanese, for example, constantly exchanged telegrams during the fighting.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I believe that they are lying, and they are lying without blushing.

In the battle at Cape Shantung, Mikasa was hit by three 12 '' shells in an hour and a half. And in the Tsushima battle within fifteen minutes, Mikasa was hit by five 12 "and fourteen 6" shells, but Togo does not even think of leaving Rozhdestvensky alone to examine the injuries received.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Greetings, dear Valentine!

Quote: Comrade

You can use the walkie-talkie

And yet - it is doubtful that the Japanese had such an opportunity.

Quote: Comrade

The destroyers of the Japanese, for example, constantly exchanged telegrams during the fighting.

Taking into account the fact that even in PMV up to half of the radiograms could not be exchanged ... They exchanged something, but that's what they sent and with what result they accepted ... In addition, it is one thing to broadcast some conditional signal or there exchange short orders, but report damage ... I don’t know.

Quote: Comrade

In the battle at Cape Shantung, Mikasa was hit by three 12 '' shells in an hour and a half. And in the Tsushima battle within fifteen minutes, Mikasa was hit by five 12 "and fourteen 6" shells, but Togo does not even think of leaving Rozhdestvensky alone to examine the injuries received.

Because the situations are completely nonequivalent. In Tsushima Togo had the experience of battling with the Russian fleet, and on July 28 he was not there (the battle at Arthur is more of a hassle). On July 28 Togo did not have the right to losses, because he was waiting for the 2nd TOE, and in Tsushima he could put at least half of the fleet, because if the Russians were destroyed, they would not have a third fleet and the Japanese would still win the war.
The history is still written by the winners, but in this case they simply covered up at least the strange behavior of Togo. If he wanted to lure the Russians away from Arthur, he could simply appear to them later than he did in reality. After the battle on the counter-courses, he could not catch up with the BKV, but annex Yakumo and follow the Russian squadron for a while, being between her and Arthur. All of this was logical and would make sense. Instead, he without "Yakumo" rushes after the Russian squadron, fights with it for about an hour, and then falls behind - because, you see, according to the Japanese version, he wants to carry them away from Arthur. :)))
Dear colleague, well, this is illogical :)) Most likely Togo wanted to split up the VKV at a long distance (50-60 kbt), and when this did not work out, he fell behind to attach Yakumo to himself before a decisive battle at short distances, and to assess the damage , sure.

[Comrade]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

The winners still write the story, but in this case they simply covered at least Togo's strange behavior.

Dear Andrey, in no case do not insist on my words. It was just that Packenham in his report to the Admiralty noted that the Japanese were very glad that "deception" failed and "escape" The Russian squadron back to Port Arthur did not take place. These are not the words of a historian, but of a naval attache, which gives them weight, and he wrote not for the general public, but for their lordships. Although, of course, this is not the last truth in the court.
What actually happened in anyone’s head - no one will know :-)
Another curious fact. I have at hand an electronic version of the book written by Togo and published in 1907. It is called "The Russian-Japanese Naval Battles." So there are only three fights, Chemulpo, Ulsan and Tsushima. Near Port Arthur and at Shantung, they were not honored to be attributed to battles. It's not clear what Togo was guided by :-)

[Denimax]

I think Togo has lagged behind to coordinate further actions with the second detachment. And of course with the help of a semaphore, and out of combat.

[NIKNN]

Thanks to everyone !!! And the articles and discussions are professional and very interesting !!!