Coalition without allies
Since the beginning of the “Arab Spring”, Saudi Arabia, one of the main troublemakers in Qatar and Turkey in the Middle East, has been reworking the region for itself with considerable overstraining of forces and considerable risk for its own future. The problem of succession to the succession of generations and the coming to power of not sons, but for the first time in stories The KSA of the grandchildren of the founder of the dynasty creates various options for destabilizing the situation in the kingdom, up to its collapse in the not very distant future.
Press attention is primarily attracted to the actions of the KSA in the Syrian civil war, where the Saudis support the radical Islamist opposition, lobbying the overthrow of President Assad in the West. Meanwhile, the policy of Riyadh is increasingly stalling, not only in Syria, but also in Yemen, facing increasing irritation of its neighbors and allies, including Oman and Egypt. And for the kingdom itself, the consequences can be unpredictable, which fully applies to Iraq. Consider the situation with the current situation and regional projects of Saudi Arabia, based on the work of experts IBV P. P. Ryabova and Yu. B. Shcheglovina.
Militants go, but remain
According to domestic experts, the American and Saudi special services agreed to provide the militants of the "Islamic State" banned in the Russian Federation with a safe exit from Mosul before the assault began. Media reports that the terrorists (more than nine thousand) will be transferred to Syria to capture Deir ez-Zor and Palmyra. What is true to all this? The negotiations between the tribal Sunni elite of Iraq (and not IS) and the Americans were known as early as spring. The parties tried to bargain for themselves as much as possible advantages, which explains the constant postponement of the start of the operation.
In reality, no assault in the classical sense of the word was originally planned. In Mosul, they worked out an algorithm for the peaceful surrender of the city, following the example of Ramadi and Fallujah. At the same time, the main drawback of the plan is to preserve the potential of the IG units, which will be located near the “liberated” city, while no one will attack them. The main trump card of Baghdad and Washington in the negotiations is the lack of wide autonomy in the ranks of the upcoming Shiites, the provision of broad autonomy to the Sunni tribes and the purely nominal representation of the central government in the city administration. Plus, there was a question about the casualties among the residents during the assault. All this led to the search for a compromise.
The idea of getting out of the city of militants with their families is correct, but most of them will not go anywhere. They are natives of Mosul or dissolve in the streets of the city. Having in the reserve capable of quickly mobilizing militants of the IG, the Sunni elite of Iraq and plans to begin incorporation into its power structures. IG - the result of Sunni discontent with the removal of economic levers of control, which occurred as a result of the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein and the usurpation of power in Iraq by Shiites and Kurds. Although this process and gave the appropriate religious and ideological form.
The “movement” of nine thousand militants in Syria is more than doubtful - this is the entire composition of the IG in Iraq. Taking them Deir ez-Zor or Palmyra has no military or economic effect. Oil and fuel, which is produced in Deir ez-Zor at a dilapidated refinery, and so are exported to Iraq and the interior of Syria. In Iraq itself, the IG lost control of the oil fields. To make an extremely risky march to "discredit the Russian videoconferencing", exposing the rear in Iraq, Iraqi Sunnis will not. The role of the United States in this process is work through the Sunnis in the Iraqi army and Saudi emissaries to “free Mosul”, which is needed by both the outgoing and the new administration as evidence that “the United States defeated the IS”. The actions of Iraqi supporters of the IG against Russia in Syria are out of the question: the Americans have neither leverage, nor extra money for this.
With a purely military version of the assault, which the Americans just in case worked out, they did not work out. A jump airfield at the former Iraqi Air Force base near Mosul has not yet been repaired, the Kurds do not want to go to Mosul, and the Iraqi army simply will not fight. The Pentagon did not have time to take Mosul by the end of the year, although Obama allowed to deploy another five thousand special forces in Iraq. That is why it was necessary to use tribal diplomacy, which, obviously, generously paid. Moreover, the mention of Saudi intelligence is logical given the attempts of the KSA in recent years to actively influence the Sunni community of Iraq.
Mediation here is possible only through one channel - through the new KSA ambassador to Iraq. He is from the Shamarra tribe living in KSA and Iraq. The ambassador immediately engaged in establishing contacts with fellow tribesmen. The motivation of the Saudis, whom the Qatar experiment with the IG was dangerous, is understandable. They solve a strategic issue - the preservation of the Sunni core of opposition to Shiite Baghdad and the influence of Tehran in Iraq.
In the IG, there is practically no Saudi influence. Qataris and Turks, without announcing it publicly, have so far distanced themselves from the IG, which is true both tactically and strategically. Preserving the Sunni military potential in Iraq for KSA will be a pyrrhic victory - Iraqi Sunnis, under whatever banner they may fight, remember well the role that Riyadh played in defeating Saddam's Iraq ...
Yemeni shootout
The situation is developing in Yemen, where KSA plays a leading role in the "Arabian Coalition", which is at war with the Northerners of the Housewives and supporters of the ex-President A. Saleh. On the Yemeni coast of 10 and October 12 fired a destroyer of the US Navy. Housiths (supporters of the Ansar Allah movement) deny involvement in the shelling. About this agency SABA said a military source in their ranks. The destroyer Mason responded with a defensive salvo. Three radars were destroyed in Yemen.
The shelling was conducted by Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship missiles (ASM) modernized in Iran. It seems that the Iranians are testing an experimental RK batch in combat conditions at sites with powerful protection. Most likely to determine the protection algorithm runs and held. And both times the same ship was fired. Obviously, the launch initiators tried to study the work of the protection system of a particular type of ships in the escort of an aircraft carrier. Despite all the denials, the Americans are talking about involvement in the shelling of the Housits, probably based on radio intercept materials.
One of the main conditions of the American plan to pacify Yemen is the refusal to engage in hostilities in Sana'a and Sa'da provinces, where the Zeus-Hosts are. Washington believes that it is necessary to agree on the voluntary withdrawal of their forces from the capital under the terms of incorporation into power. This does not suit Riyadh, which does not wish to acquire at its side a Shiite enclave with a strong Iranian influence. The elimination of the mayor of Sana, which, according to Americans, was the result of an air strike on the mourning ceremony last week, beats the US plan, as he was called by them as an intermediary who was to ensure the surrender of the weapons khoshitami.
October 12 limited contingent of Saudi troops through the province of Hauf entered the province of Sa'ada. Saudi military personnel did not dare to go deep into Saada, and analysts conclude that this was a demonstrative response of KSA to numerous raids of hawits in Najran and rockets fired at Saudi territory. This is a blow at the initiative of the United States: Saad’s immunity has been violated. Simultaneously, reconnaissance is under way for use by the Saudis of a bridgehead in Hauf to launch an offensive against Saad and Sana.
Episodes with the shelling of the destroyer "Mason" in the White House were regarded as an attempt to involve the US in hostilities in Yemen against the Housits. Formally, Washington supports the actions of the coalition led by KSA. But there often visit the envoys of the Housits and the ex-president A. Saleh. Since 2015, the United States froze the advisory and military-technical support of the Saudi military operation in Yemen. Given the casualties among the civilian population as a result of the latest air strikes of the KSA air force and the sharply anti-Saud position of the US Congress, we cannot talk about its resumption in the medium term.
The main object of the interests of Americans in Yemen remains the "Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP), against which their ground forces and UAV squadrons based in Hadramawt work. According to CIA Director J. Brennan, the KSA intelligence is actively using the AQAP groups for their own purposes. This dictates the cautious stance of Americans in their actions against the Housewits, who do not feel sympathy for Islamist Salafists. The United States is unlikely to begin active operations against the Howitsit now. They may destroy a couple of radar stations or a battery of rockets, but no more. The use of ground forces is fraught with losses. It is more profitable to be neutral, not associating yourself with one or another opposing force.
Omani Channels
At the October 3 meeting, representatives of the GCC countries in Ochar (Oman) focused on the complicated Saudi-Omani relations. This meeting, which was chaired by the representative of Kuwait, was used by Riyadh to emphasize Muscat’s “wrong policy”. Kuwaitis planned to reduce tensions and improve Saudi-Omani relations, but this attempt failed due to the aggressive behavior of the envoy of the KSA king who attacked Oman with criticism.
The Saudis have made major allegations against Muscat’s “inadequate” efforts to combat arms smuggling at the border with Yemen. Note that in Dhofar, which we are talking about, the ability of the Omani security officials to control the border is nominal. This is due to Muscat’s policy of decentralizing this once rebellious region and granting it actual autonomy.
The traditional smuggling of weapons along this route is a source of income for the local tribal elite, with whom the Omani government’s plans are not quarreled. During the civil war in Dhofar, the camps of local partisans were located in the Democratic Republic of Yemen, from which came the flow of aid from armaments and volunteers, so that the smuggling channels worked out well. The end of the civil war in Dhofar was once possible after the unofficial consent of Muscat to the wide autonomy of the region and the embedding of the local tribal elite in the executive power in the sultanate at all levels.
A few days before the mini-summit, the loyal to Riyadh units of the Yemeni people's militia intercepted six trucks carrying weapons that arrived in the country from the Oman province of Salal. Among the cargo were detected tactical missiles of medium-range ground-to-ground production of Iran. It was such a rocket that recently struck the positions of the Arabian Coalition forces in the north of Yemen, destroying dozens of Saudi military men. True, at that time the Housits announced that this was a new Yemen-made rocket. With the same missiles, the Khousits regularly strike at ground forces of the KSA, firing into the coalition headquarters in Khamis Misat.
At a mini-summit in Oman, a KSA representative unveiled information about the transportation of weapons from Oman to Yemen. According to him, the Omani territory is used not only for the delivery of Iranian weapons through the airport in Salalah and islands in the Indian Ocean, but also for storage and its further transportation to Yemen. The heir to the Crown Prince and KSA Minister of Defense M. Bin Salman asked the Amir of Kuwait to have an impact on Sultan Qaboos, the outcome of which was the meeting of the GCC member countries in Oman.
The appeal of M. Bin Salman to Sultan Qaboos is based on an analysis of the situation conducted by the Saudi special services. The UOR KSA believes that the Sultan Qaboos does not know about the supply of Iranian weapons through Dofar, and the operations are conducted by the head of the Oman Intelligence and Security Service, M. al-Noman. The UOR KSA believes that the Omani special service is “littered” by Shiite and pro-Iranian elements and cannot be trusted. The exchange of information through special services between states has not existed for a long time, which negatively affects the work of the center for coordinating the activities of law enforcement agencies of the countries - members of the GCC.
With the same success, Saudi special services could also cease contacts with the British MIKNUMX, since its operatives are sitting at the headquarters of Omani intelligence and, of course, in the course of operations on the transfer of Iranian weapons. According to the experts of IBB, Sultan Qabus, despite his health, is aware of the situation in the region. The head of the Omani special services is one of the closest circles of Qaboos and does nothing without his approval. Moreover, such operations as the transfer of weapons, for which Tehran appears to be paying well.
Cooperation with Iran remains for Muscat the role of an unofficial mediator between the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Iran, which Muscat will not refuse, and also allows you to maintain trust with both Housits and reputable people in South Yemen who are traditionally engaged in this business. It is noteworthy that Muscat defies pressure from Riyadh, which indicates that the grip of Saudi Arabia in the region is weakening against the background of economic turmoil and power struggle in the ruling elite of KSA.
Egyptian weekdays
Cairo’s vote in the UN Security Council for different resolutions on Aleppo, proposed by France and Russia, clearly irritated Riyadh. The Ministry of Finance KSA threatened colleagues from Egypt to freeze support for the Egyptian pound and stop oil exports at preferential prices through the Saudi company Aramco. Thanks to the help of KSA, the Egyptians are keeping the pound rate and avoiding a serious devaluation. For import-oriented Egypt, this is a key topic. Attempts to obtain an IMF or World Bank credit line will stumble upon demands for fiscal tightening, including a reduction in food procurement subsidies.
The issue of food security is extremely acute for Egypt. The scandal in relations with Moscow related to the refusal to buy Russian grain due to the violation of sanitary norms meant, in reality, the lack of necessary money in the treasury. The Egyptians for the same reasons refused to buy wheat in Ukraine, which sells at dumping prices. So the Saudi threat is more than real, especially if we recall Riyadh’s recent refusal to allocate Beirut three billion dollars to modernize the Lebanese army because of its vague position regarding the burning of the KSA embassy in Tehran.
As far as can be judged, the reduction in the volume of Egyptian budget financing by Saudi Arabia occurred at the beginning of the summer. The grain crisis indicates this. At the same time, Cairo was able to complete the deal on the purchase of French helicopter carriers Mistral. So it is a question of sequestering aid to Egypt, and not a complete freeze. Most likely, KSA plans to invest in the construction of infrastructure facilities in Sinai, which should provide employment for the local population and reduce social tensions, will remain in the project.
Riyadh has not yet ruptured, but began to experience serious financial discomfort. Salary delays by the Bin Laden foreign working group, which after the unrest had to be extinguished from the KSA budget, are an unprecedented and extremely alarming signal. Even more revealing is the transformation of the KSA's position on the issue of freezing the level of oil production in the OPEC framework without regard to the position of Iran. It seems that the Saudi economy is beginning to experience difficulties against the backdrop of expensive military campaigns in Syria and Yemen, which is hidden in Riyadh.
With regard to Egypt, Saudi tactics began to change in a number of foreign policy moments. It was clear from the very beginning that the alliance of the two countries is temporary and the support of the Egyptian military by Riyadh is connected with the regional struggle for influence in the Muslim world with Doha, which uses the Muslim Brotherhood. Their KSA considers it a major threat after Iran, which does not prevent the Saudis from supporting Wahhabi jihadist groups in Syria. The Egyptian regime is secular and does not welcome any Islamists, so it is on the side of Damascus. Cairo doesn’t care who will oppose Assad, as well as al-Sisi, the Wahhabis or the Brothers. This is a deep contradiction between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which sooner or later the alliance shakes.
We are not talking here about ambitions for regional leadership, which both Riyadh and Cairo have. The kingdom has accumulated a lot of claims against Egypt, starting with Libya, where the Egyptians are pursuing a clearly different policy from the Saudis, and ending with the passive participation of the Egyptian military in the campaign in Yemen. In this regard, Cairo is increasingly drifting into the orbit of Abu Dhabi, with which it has many coincidences, above all a common rejection of the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region with the United Arab Emirates.
KSA makes a compromise with Turkey and Qatar on the issue of the admission of the “Brothers” into the political life of Syria in the future. Moreover, Riyadh is trying to negotiate with the Yemeni branch of the Brothers in the face of the Islah party about the start of active hostilities against the Housits that for Egypt, which is involved in operations in Yemen on the side of KSA, is a bad incentive to continue the military campaign there. These contradictions between Egypt and Saudi Arabia are beginning to become apparent. They are stimulated by the lack of free financial resources at KSA. Most likely, a real crisis in relations with Egypt can be expected in the medium term.
Press attention is primarily attracted to the actions of the KSA in the Syrian civil war, where the Saudis support the radical Islamist opposition, lobbying the overthrow of President Assad in the West. Meanwhile, the policy of Riyadh is increasingly stalling, not only in Syria, but also in Yemen, facing increasing irritation of its neighbors and allies, including Oman and Egypt. And for the kingdom itself, the consequences can be unpredictable, which fully applies to Iraq. Consider the situation with the current situation and regional projects of Saudi Arabia, based on the work of experts IBV P. P. Ryabova and Yu. B. Shcheglovina.
Militants go, but remain
According to domestic experts, the American and Saudi special services agreed to provide the militants of the "Islamic State" banned in the Russian Federation with a safe exit from Mosul before the assault began. Media reports that the terrorists (more than nine thousand) will be transferred to Syria to capture Deir ez-Zor and Palmyra. What is true to all this? The negotiations between the tribal Sunni elite of Iraq (and not IS) and the Americans were known as early as spring. The parties tried to bargain for themselves as much as possible advantages, which explains the constant postponement of the start of the operation.
In reality, no assault in the classical sense of the word was originally planned. In Mosul, they worked out an algorithm for the peaceful surrender of the city, following the example of Ramadi and Fallujah. At the same time, the main drawback of the plan is to preserve the potential of the IG units, which will be located near the “liberated” city, while no one will attack them. The main trump card of Baghdad and Washington in the negotiations is the lack of wide autonomy in the ranks of the upcoming Shiites, the provision of broad autonomy to the Sunni tribes and the purely nominal representation of the central government in the city administration. Plus, there was a question about the casualties among the residents during the assault. All this led to the search for a compromise.
The idea of getting out of the city of militants with their families is correct, but most of them will not go anywhere. They are natives of Mosul or dissolve in the streets of the city. Having in the reserve capable of quickly mobilizing militants of the IG, the Sunni elite of Iraq and plans to begin incorporation into its power structures. IG - the result of Sunni discontent with the removal of economic levers of control, which occurred as a result of the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein and the usurpation of power in Iraq by Shiites and Kurds. Although this process and gave the appropriate religious and ideological form.
The “movement” of nine thousand militants in Syria is more than doubtful - this is the entire composition of the IG in Iraq. Taking them Deir ez-Zor or Palmyra has no military or economic effect. Oil and fuel, which is produced in Deir ez-Zor at a dilapidated refinery, and so are exported to Iraq and the interior of Syria. In Iraq itself, the IG lost control of the oil fields. To make an extremely risky march to "discredit the Russian videoconferencing", exposing the rear in Iraq, Iraqi Sunnis will not. The role of the United States in this process is work through the Sunnis in the Iraqi army and Saudi emissaries to “free Mosul”, which is needed by both the outgoing and the new administration as evidence that “the United States defeated the IS”. The actions of Iraqi supporters of the IG against Russia in Syria are out of the question: the Americans have neither leverage, nor extra money for this.
With a purely military version of the assault, which the Americans just in case worked out, they did not work out. A jump airfield at the former Iraqi Air Force base near Mosul has not yet been repaired, the Kurds do not want to go to Mosul, and the Iraqi army simply will not fight. The Pentagon did not have time to take Mosul by the end of the year, although Obama allowed to deploy another five thousand special forces in Iraq. That is why it was necessary to use tribal diplomacy, which, obviously, generously paid. Moreover, the mention of Saudi intelligence is logical given the attempts of the KSA in recent years to actively influence the Sunni community of Iraq.
Mediation here is possible only through one channel - through the new KSA ambassador to Iraq. He is from the Shamarra tribe living in KSA and Iraq. The ambassador immediately engaged in establishing contacts with fellow tribesmen. The motivation of the Saudis, whom the Qatar experiment with the IG was dangerous, is understandable. They solve a strategic issue - the preservation of the Sunni core of opposition to Shiite Baghdad and the influence of Tehran in Iraq.
In the IG, there is practically no Saudi influence. Qataris and Turks, without announcing it publicly, have so far distanced themselves from the IG, which is true both tactically and strategically. Preserving the Sunni military potential in Iraq for KSA will be a pyrrhic victory - Iraqi Sunnis, under whatever banner they may fight, remember well the role that Riyadh played in defeating Saddam's Iraq ...
Yemeni shootout
The situation is developing in Yemen, where KSA plays a leading role in the "Arabian Coalition", which is at war with the Northerners of the Housewives and supporters of the ex-President A. Saleh. On the Yemeni coast of 10 and October 12 fired a destroyer of the US Navy. Housiths (supporters of the Ansar Allah movement) deny involvement in the shelling. About this agency SABA said a military source in their ranks. The destroyer Mason responded with a defensive salvo. Three radars were destroyed in Yemen.
The shelling was conducted by Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship missiles (ASM) modernized in Iran. It seems that the Iranians are testing an experimental RK batch in combat conditions at sites with powerful protection. Most likely to determine the protection algorithm runs and held. And both times the same ship was fired. Obviously, the launch initiators tried to study the work of the protection system of a particular type of ships in the escort of an aircraft carrier. Despite all the denials, the Americans are talking about involvement in the shelling of the Housits, probably based on radio intercept materials.One of the main conditions of the American plan to pacify Yemen is the refusal to engage in hostilities in Sana'a and Sa'da provinces, where the Zeus-Hosts are. Washington believes that it is necessary to agree on the voluntary withdrawal of their forces from the capital under the terms of incorporation into power. This does not suit Riyadh, which does not wish to acquire at its side a Shiite enclave with a strong Iranian influence. The elimination of the mayor of Sana, which, according to Americans, was the result of an air strike on the mourning ceremony last week, beats the US plan, as he was called by them as an intermediary who was to ensure the surrender of the weapons khoshitami.
October 12 limited contingent of Saudi troops through the province of Hauf entered the province of Sa'ada. Saudi military personnel did not dare to go deep into Saada, and analysts conclude that this was a demonstrative response of KSA to numerous raids of hawits in Najran and rockets fired at Saudi territory. This is a blow at the initiative of the United States: Saad’s immunity has been violated. Simultaneously, reconnaissance is under way for use by the Saudis of a bridgehead in Hauf to launch an offensive against Saad and Sana.
Episodes with the shelling of the destroyer "Mason" in the White House were regarded as an attempt to involve the US in hostilities in Yemen against the Housits. Formally, Washington supports the actions of the coalition led by KSA. But there often visit the envoys of the Housits and the ex-president A. Saleh. Since 2015, the United States froze the advisory and military-technical support of the Saudi military operation in Yemen. Given the casualties among the civilian population as a result of the latest air strikes of the KSA air force and the sharply anti-Saud position of the US Congress, we cannot talk about its resumption in the medium term.
The main object of the interests of Americans in Yemen remains the "Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP), against which their ground forces and UAV squadrons based in Hadramawt work. According to CIA Director J. Brennan, the KSA intelligence is actively using the AQAP groups for their own purposes. This dictates the cautious stance of Americans in their actions against the Housewits, who do not feel sympathy for Islamist Salafists. The United States is unlikely to begin active operations against the Howitsit now. They may destroy a couple of radar stations or a battery of rockets, but no more. The use of ground forces is fraught with losses. It is more profitable to be neutral, not associating yourself with one or another opposing force.
Omani Channels
At the October 3 meeting, representatives of the GCC countries in Ochar (Oman) focused on the complicated Saudi-Omani relations. This meeting, which was chaired by the representative of Kuwait, was used by Riyadh to emphasize Muscat’s “wrong policy”. Kuwaitis planned to reduce tensions and improve Saudi-Omani relations, but this attempt failed due to the aggressive behavior of the envoy of the KSA king who attacked Oman with criticism.
The Saudis have made major allegations against Muscat’s “inadequate” efforts to combat arms smuggling at the border with Yemen. Note that in Dhofar, which we are talking about, the ability of the Omani security officials to control the border is nominal. This is due to Muscat’s policy of decentralizing this once rebellious region and granting it actual autonomy.
The traditional smuggling of weapons along this route is a source of income for the local tribal elite, with whom the Omani government’s plans are not quarreled. During the civil war in Dhofar, the camps of local partisans were located in the Democratic Republic of Yemen, from which came the flow of aid from armaments and volunteers, so that the smuggling channels worked out well. The end of the civil war in Dhofar was once possible after the unofficial consent of Muscat to the wide autonomy of the region and the embedding of the local tribal elite in the executive power in the sultanate at all levels.
A few days before the mini-summit, the loyal to Riyadh units of the Yemeni people's militia intercepted six trucks carrying weapons that arrived in the country from the Oman province of Salal. Among the cargo were detected tactical missiles of medium-range ground-to-ground production of Iran. It was such a rocket that recently struck the positions of the Arabian Coalition forces in the north of Yemen, destroying dozens of Saudi military men. True, at that time the Housits announced that this was a new Yemen-made rocket. With the same missiles, the Khousits regularly strike at ground forces of the KSA, firing into the coalition headquarters in Khamis Misat.
At a mini-summit in Oman, a KSA representative unveiled information about the transportation of weapons from Oman to Yemen. According to him, the Omani territory is used not only for the delivery of Iranian weapons through the airport in Salalah and islands in the Indian Ocean, but also for storage and its further transportation to Yemen. The heir to the Crown Prince and KSA Minister of Defense M. Bin Salman asked the Amir of Kuwait to have an impact on Sultan Qaboos, the outcome of which was the meeting of the GCC member countries in Oman.
The appeal of M. Bin Salman to Sultan Qaboos is based on an analysis of the situation conducted by the Saudi special services. The UOR KSA believes that the Sultan Qaboos does not know about the supply of Iranian weapons through Dofar, and the operations are conducted by the head of the Oman Intelligence and Security Service, M. al-Noman. The UOR KSA believes that the Omani special service is “littered” by Shiite and pro-Iranian elements and cannot be trusted. The exchange of information through special services between states has not existed for a long time, which negatively affects the work of the center for coordinating the activities of law enforcement agencies of the countries - members of the GCC.
With the same success, Saudi special services could also cease contacts with the British MIKNUMX, since its operatives are sitting at the headquarters of Omani intelligence and, of course, in the course of operations on the transfer of Iranian weapons. According to the experts of IBB, Sultan Qabus, despite his health, is aware of the situation in the region. The head of the Omani special services is one of the closest circles of Qaboos and does nothing without his approval. Moreover, such operations as the transfer of weapons, for which Tehran appears to be paying well.
Cooperation with Iran remains for Muscat the role of an unofficial mediator between the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Iran, which Muscat will not refuse, and also allows you to maintain trust with both Housits and reputable people in South Yemen who are traditionally engaged in this business. It is noteworthy that Muscat defies pressure from Riyadh, which indicates that the grip of Saudi Arabia in the region is weakening against the background of economic turmoil and power struggle in the ruling elite of KSA.
Egyptian weekdays
Cairo’s vote in the UN Security Council for different resolutions on Aleppo, proposed by France and Russia, clearly irritated Riyadh. The Ministry of Finance KSA threatened colleagues from Egypt to freeze support for the Egyptian pound and stop oil exports at preferential prices through the Saudi company Aramco. Thanks to the help of KSA, the Egyptians are keeping the pound rate and avoiding a serious devaluation. For import-oriented Egypt, this is a key topic. Attempts to obtain an IMF or World Bank credit line will stumble upon demands for fiscal tightening, including a reduction in food procurement subsidies.
The issue of food security is extremely acute for Egypt. The scandal in relations with Moscow related to the refusal to buy Russian grain due to the violation of sanitary norms meant, in reality, the lack of necessary money in the treasury. The Egyptians for the same reasons refused to buy wheat in Ukraine, which sells at dumping prices. So the Saudi threat is more than real, especially if we recall Riyadh’s recent refusal to allocate Beirut three billion dollars to modernize the Lebanese army because of its vague position regarding the burning of the KSA embassy in Tehran.
As far as can be judged, the reduction in the volume of Egyptian budget financing by Saudi Arabia occurred at the beginning of the summer. The grain crisis indicates this. At the same time, Cairo was able to complete the deal on the purchase of French helicopter carriers Mistral. So it is a question of sequestering aid to Egypt, and not a complete freeze. Most likely, KSA plans to invest in the construction of infrastructure facilities in Sinai, which should provide employment for the local population and reduce social tensions, will remain in the project.
Riyadh has not yet ruptured, but began to experience serious financial discomfort. Salary delays by the Bin Laden foreign working group, which after the unrest had to be extinguished from the KSA budget, are an unprecedented and extremely alarming signal. Even more revealing is the transformation of the KSA's position on the issue of freezing the level of oil production in the OPEC framework without regard to the position of Iran. It seems that the Saudi economy is beginning to experience difficulties against the backdrop of expensive military campaigns in Syria and Yemen, which is hidden in Riyadh.
With regard to Egypt, Saudi tactics began to change in a number of foreign policy moments. It was clear from the very beginning that the alliance of the two countries is temporary and the support of the Egyptian military by Riyadh is connected with the regional struggle for influence in the Muslim world with Doha, which uses the Muslim Brotherhood. Their KSA considers it a major threat after Iran, which does not prevent the Saudis from supporting Wahhabi jihadist groups in Syria. The Egyptian regime is secular and does not welcome any Islamists, so it is on the side of Damascus. Cairo doesn’t care who will oppose Assad, as well as al-Sisi, the Wahhabis or the Brothers. This is a deep contradiction between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which sooner or later the alliance shakes.
We are not talking here about ambitions for regional leadership, which both Riyadh and Cairo have. The kingdom has accumulated a lot of claims against Egypt, starting with Libya, where the Egyptians are pursuing a clearly different policy from the Saudis, and ending with the passive participation of the Egyptian military in the campaign in Yemen. In this regard, Cairo is increasingly drifting into the orbit of Abu Dhabi, with which it has many coincidences, above all a common rejection of the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region with the United Arab Emirates.
KSA makes a compromise with Turkey and Qatar on the issue of the admission of the “Brothers” into the political life of Syria in the future. Moreover, Riyadh is trying to negotiate with the Yemeni branch of the Brothers in the face of the Islah party about the start of active hostilities against the Housits that for Egypt, which is involved in operations in Yemen on the side of KSA, is a bad incentive to continue the military campaign there. These contradictions between Egypt and Saudi Arabia are beginning to become apparent. They are stimulated by the lack of free financial resources at KSA. Most likely, a real crisis in relations with Egypt can be expected in the medium term.
Information