Military Review

Unobtrusive tactical CD "Pirania": new "surprises" from the Polish defense industry in addition to JASSM

22



Huge attention of Washington and leading American armory corporations were awarded to the armed forces of Poland in just a few years after the beginning of the aggravation of the military-political situation in the small, but very complex and unpredictable European theater of operations. The proximity to the key positions of anti-aircraft missile brigades and regiments of the Air Defense Forces of Belarus and the Russian Aerospace Forces determines the constant "pumping" of the Polish Army and Air Force with the most modern modifications of Western strike missile weapons. For example, by the end of this year, the Polish Air Force will receive a direct supply from Lockheed Martin of 40 long-range tactical air-launched cruise missiles, which are intended to be mounted on the suspension points of F-16C / D multirole fighters.

In previous reviews concerning the level of threat to the Russian and Belarusian air defense systems from this contract, we determined that with a massive missile strike by all 40 JASSM at the same time, anti-missile defense in areas of one or a couple of deployed C-300PS battalions could be broken, and part of the unwrapped winged the rockets will follow to the coordinates of the indicated targets (the most dubious in this respect direction is the Belarusian HV); The situation with the air defense of the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions is much more stable, where video conferencing is switching to more advanced X-NUMX-channel C-10 “Triumph” much faster than Belarus. But here the danger is not excluded, because the Americans have "trump" drones - false targets ADM-400C MALD-J, which create radar and computing means "Triumph", as well as calculating a complex puzzle in the form of a "dense cloud" from dozens of target simulators and real targets flying in a chaotic mixed order at an altitude of 160 - 20 m. Selection of real targets may take precious minutes, for which no-no, but a few missiles can break through. But JASSM is not the only modern threat from which our advanced anti-aircraft missile systems will have to, because it is much easier to notify the approach of these missiles because of airborne F-50C pylons, the combat work of the latter from a distance of several hundred kilometers will be fixed by DRLOI aircraft operators -16U. Not less of a threat to air defense weapons are tactical long-range ground-based cruise missiles.

For our part, this is the Iskander-M operational tactical missile system 9K720 with the low-profile P-500 long-range cruise missiles capable of penetrating the enemy’s dense missile defense system more than 500 km away from the front line. The most expedient deployment of Iskander-M near the borders of Eastern European countries participating in NATO, as well as in the South and North Caucasus and the Baltic States, where the proximity of strategic military facilities in Turkey, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland allows less than an hour completely suppress most of the command and staff facilities, destroy the main radio intelligence and air defense units in order to disorganize the front lines of NATO’s NATO forces as early as the initial phase of a possible escalation of the conflict, as they say, cheniya and interdiction of access and maneuver A2 / AD in action.

The importance of ground-based tactical missile systems has become so widespread in our time that programs for their development are being conducted not only in global and regional superpowers, but also in states such as Poland, especially since the latter has earned serious support from American aerospace giants such like Lockheed Martin and Rayton. Apparently, the result of such support was the promising small-sized ground-based cruise missile "Pirania" ("Piranha"), designed by the Warsaw Institute of Technology Air Force (ITWL). An image of this rocket was published, September 30, 2016, on news janes.com web page along with preliminary TTX of the designed product.

We have before us a small-sized subsonic long-range tactical cruise missile with a compact turbojet engine, whose engine nacelle is located inside the tail section, which significantly reduces the radar signature of the missile defense in the frontal plane (a similar scheme is used in the Iskander-M missile system, as well as family “Caliber”), but in contrast to the “Caliber” on the “Piranha” there is an oval air intake made of composite materials that is significantly extended from the body, which repeats the design of the TFR of the families BGM-500A-F «Tomahawk». This indicates that Raytheon was actively involved in the Polish program Pirania.

The Piranha cruise missile is a fairly small-sized means of air attack: its case diameter is 200 mm, the wingspan of the retractable wings is 800 mm, and the length of 2200 mm. The mass of the rocket is within 100 kg (the Pirania rocket is 12 times lighter than the BGM-109G and exactly 2,5 times smaller than its size, which means making an exact reduced copy of Tomahawk). Low weight and size make it easy to run it even from small, but prepared car platforms located on a standard off-road chassis. This gives incredible advantages both in the promptness of the transfer of the complex to a particular section of the theater of operations, and in its excellent disguise among ordinary civilian and military vehicles. For example, it will be much easier for operators of the radio-technical complex MRK-411 installed on ORTR Tu-214Р aircraft to classify a large launcher of the RSNO M142 HIMARS or OXK M270 ATACMS rather than with the keyboard installation of the Kyrgyz Republic "Piranha".

Now we come to the most interesting parameter of the Pirania rocket - its effective scattering surface. It is absolutely clear that it is not possible to accurately determine this indicator, without having data on the radio-absorbing materials of the hull, as well as on the prevailing radio-contrast metallic materials in the nose of the rocket. But being guided by well-known information on EPR of a similar size (20 cm case diameter) of aircraft, it can be said that it will be 0,015 — 0,02 X2 at best (taking radio-absorbing coatings into account), and therefore even the most sophisticated on-board Irbis-E radar ( Su-35С) or Shmel-M RLK (DRLOIU A-50U aircraft) will be able to detect it from a distance of no more than 95 — 115 km. "Piranha" - the goal is much more "complex" than the "Tomahawk" and even anti-radar missile HARM.

If during the launch of AGM-158A JASSM from the side of a tactical fighter, it will be easier to determine whether the attack was launched by detecting the attacking fighter in advance, and by JASSM with a larger EPR than the Piranha, then the ground launch from a small minibus or an off-road vehicle “Stealth” -drona, like “Piranha”, with radar tools will be very problematic. The only way to detect its launch is to use highly sensitive optical-electronic air-based surveillance systems with high-resolution cooled infrared matrices, since it is reported that Pirania will be equipped with a solid-fuel accelerator. The effectiveness of this method of detection may depend on such factors as the terrain from which the rocket is launched, as well as on the meteorological situation between the launching Piranha and the air-based heat finder.

It is known from official sources that the S-300PT / PS anti-aircraft missile systems can operate on elements of high-precision weapons with an effective dispersion surface of at least 0,05 m2, which may suggest the impossibility of intercepting Piranha cruise missiles using these modifications of the Three Hundreds . The elemental base of these versions of the air defense systems is indeed becoming obsolete: the analogue radio-electronic equipment of the 5Н63С combat control center (PBU) and 30Н6 multi-functional radar (MRS), in addition to the lower energy capabilities of the 30Н6, do make this picture believable. Under such conditions, one can only hope that Belarusian C-300PS, similarly to Russian ones, will receive a service pack to the level of C-300ПМ1. These complexes are capable of working on targets with ESR 0,02 xNUMX, where the promising Polish Piranha fit into.

A very serious disadvantage of the Pirania cruise missile is its low flight speed, which is about 500 — 550 km / h, but this is offset by the minimum flight height of 20 m, a small radar and infrared signature, and also a range of 300 km, which for a missile with a length of just over 2 meters is an excellent figure, almost reaching the American AGM-158A (350 km). The minimum flight altitude in 20 m creates serious difficulties for intercepting all modifications of the Osa-AKM troop landing system, including even the most up-to-date Belarusian Osa-1T and Т38 Stilet, since they are identical in TTX target detection station (SOC) and station target tracking (SCC) have a lower limit of lizirovaniya and shelling targets in 25 meters, and for confident destruction should be no more than 15-20 meters. So the ZRSKs of the Tor-M1 line with the 10-meter lower target interception threshold have a great advantage over Osas in combating goals such as Piranha.

The low altitude and high accuracy of the Piranha’s output to the battlefield are achieved by advanced onboard radio-electronic equipment, which includes: a radio altimeter, an inertial navigation system based on modern digital computers synchronized with a digital GPS module, and a tactical information exchange device with a command center for various radio communication channels, including satellite. In addition, the Piranha, flying at speeds around 0,4 — 0,45М, is capable of performing fairly high-quality local reconnaissance over a theater of military operations on its own trajectory, turning into a stealth UAV. The integrated compact on-board radar with a synthetic aperture mode (in the western SAR slang), which maps in detail the terrain of the earth’s surface directly below the Piranha flight trajectory, is responsible for this. The lower bound is for overcoming missile defense, the upper one is for reconnaissance. Together with the terrain, this weight, weighing only 20, will be able to provide NATO headquarters with photographically accurate radar images of our ground-based military facilities in the East European theater of operations if the latter are not covered by proper military air defense. Information on this radar, exactly as on the other most important network-centric Piranha nodes, is not disclosed, but it is known that in order to achieve a smaller circular probable deviation (CWO), it can be equipped with a combined dual-band infrared-ultraviolet homing head, the analogue of which is called POST-RMP , is installed on the Stinger-RMP complex FIM-2000C SAM.

Equipping this homing head provides for the possibility of using the Piranha cruise missile against mobile ground targets (armored combat vehicles, mobile elements of the air defense missile system and MBT) using infrared traps. The introduction of the ultraviolet channel allows the selection of real heat-contrast targets (from the infrared radiation of the engine) from the infrared traps. Also, a dual-band IR-UV homing head is capable of very efficiently capturing combat vehicles using optical-electronic countermeasure systems and coatings that reduce the infrared signature.

If we evaluate the Pirania cruise missile as a promising means of breaking through air defense and missile defense as a whole, the situation is such that calculations of a large number of modifications of modern military anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems run into problems with its timely detection and destruction due to the very small radar and infrared visibility. So, for example, modifications of the OSR “Osa”, including the version of “Osa-AKM”, will be able to fight this insidious “stealth” -racket solely due to the optical-electronic complex associated with the radar tracking system, at the same time when only the low-effective for detecting the IR channel in the forward hemisphere, the “Piranha” cannot be effectively detected by the SOC and SCC of old versions of “Wasps”. The same situation is likely to be observed with the old modifications of the Tungusska-M anti-aircraft missile-gun systems (prior to the version of the Tunguss-М1), where at the hardware level the possibilities of obtaining target designation from higher-level unified battery command Rangier type items, as well as radar devices. The more modern military complexes such as Tor-M1В / 2, Tunguska-MXNUM systems, Pantsir-С1, as well as long-range air defense systems of the C-1PM300 / 1 and C-2 type, which use more high-potential radar components, as well as in a set of uniforms. opportunities to combat this rocket will be a couple of orders of magnitude higher.

Nonetheless, about a dozen years after the adoption of the Piranha armed forces of Poland will be a major help in the formation of the NATO strike force at the western air borders of the CSTO, where we still have “gaps” and “impenetrable” areas with a radar field.

Information sources:
http://www.janes.com/article/64233/itwl-unveils-new-pirania-cruise-missile
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/bgm109c_d/bgm109c_d.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/catalog/type/zenitnye/
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22 comments
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  1. Bongo
    Bongo 12 October 2016 05: 22
    +3
    I don’t believe my eyes that Damantsev wrote this:
    Nevertheless, about a dozen years after the adoption of the Polish Armed Forces, the Piranhas will be of great help in the formation of the NATO strike echelon at the western air borders of the CSTO, where we still have “Gaps” and “impenetrable” sections of the radar field.

    Eugene, how is it, are you all right, are you healthy? Did you write that we still have "holes" in the air defense system? What about your usual "patriotism"?
    Under such conditions, one can only hope that Belarusian C-300PS, similarly to Russian ones, will receive a service pack to the level of C-300ПМ1.

    In this case, this is impossible and is the next amateurish reasoning of the author. It’s easier and more rational to build a new air defense system from scratch (by the way, the production of C-300P in the Russian Federation has ended) than to upgrade the C-300PS to the level of C-300ПМ1.
    1. Forest
      Forest 12 October 2016 08: 07
      0
      To block everything on the western border - you need to put the staggered divisions every 200-250 km.
  2. Same lech
    Same lech 12 October 2016 05: 32
    +4
    A very interesting article about this missile of the Poles.

    Our opponents along the perimeter of the western borders are building up their armament both qualitatively and quantitatively and the article is just about that


    we determined that with a massive missile strike by all 40 JASSMs at the same time, missile defense in the areas of one or a pair of deployed S-300PS divisions can be broken through, and part of the uncovered cruise missiles will follow to the coordinates of these targets (the most dubious direction in this regard is the Belarusian BN) ;


    I believe that the first echelon will be missiles from states such as POLAND in the event of a military conflict with RUSSIA.
    The United States, as always, will try to do our utmost damage to other people with our own hands, and then, after already weakened RUSSIA, to inflict a final blow, finishing off the remaining air defense and missile defense.
    Therefore, it is necessary in response to inflict maximum damage on all military and political structure of US satellites whose territory is used to attack our country ... and this must be done in the very first seconds of the attack on our cities.

    Further in this light, the question naturally arises: is it time for us to withdraw from the treaty on the non-proliferation of short- and medium-range land-based missiles.
    It turns out that our aggressive neighbors already have impressive arsenals of such weapons, and we, as always, rely on the decency of our potential aggressors ... not good.
  3. Bongo
    Bongo 12 October 2016 05: 43
    +2
    Quote: The same LYOKHA
    Our opponents along the perimeter of the western borders are building up their armament both qualitatively and quantitatively and the article is just about that

    As far as I understand from the text of the article, it is also about the means by which we can counter this threat. Or not? The author describes the means of counteraction in places that showed incompetence and, in the manner characteristic of him, gives out what is being done for reality. At least with regard to the modernization of the Belarusian C-300PS built 30 years ago.
    1. Same lech
      Same lech 12 October 2016 05: 50
      +2
      it is also about the means by which we can counter this threat. Or not?


      Counteract this threat ??? ...
      Tell us how this will happen with a massive attack on our cities?
      The experience of the first hours of June 22, 1941 is indicative at least for me ... we will only have to defend ourselves and, if possible, try to mitigate the damage as a result of shelling (unless of course this happens suddenly).
      1. Bongo
        Bongo 12 October 2016 09: 16
        +2
        Quote: The same LYOKHA
        Counteract this threat ??? ...
        Tell us how this will happen with a massive attack on our cities?

        But I didn’t take such a job, this article is not mine No. Or didn’t you read it and see who the author is?
  4. Alex_59
    Alex_59 12 October 2016 06: 45
    +3
    VKS switch to more advanced 10-channel С-400 Triumph
    Stranger and weirder. Does C-400 already have 10 channels? At first it was 6, then there appeared infa that 8. Now 10? Do they really finish it gradually, or is this a mistake?

    Generally by article. On the one hand, the goal is really complex and dangerous. On the other hand, the Kyrgyz Republic is still not the means by which a decisive advantage can be achieved in one's favor in a serious war. Even a massive application. For all purposes - the Kyrgyz Republic will not be typed. Then you don’t feel like gunners and pilots need to sweat, and this is a loss.

    And ours urgently needs to finish C-350, and in general 9М96. The weak point of the C-300P / C-400 family is the illumination-guidance radar, without which everything else is iron. The KR arrived in the RPN - that's all, there is no division. We need to move away from such an architecture, and to do this, bring the C-350 faster and incorporate the military C-300В and Buki into the country's unified air defense system - let them be on duty in the RPM along with air defense personnel, because their survivability is many times higher.
    1. Bongo
      Bongo 12 October 2016 09: 45
      +3
      Quote: Alex_59
      The weak point of the C-300P / C-400 family is the illumination-guidance radar, without which everything else is iron.

      And also a great recharge time.
      Quote: Alex_59
      We need to move away from such an architecture, and to do this, bring the C-350 faster and incorporate the military C-300В and Buki into the country's unified air defense system - let them be on duty in the RPM along with air defense personnel, because their survivability is many times higher.

      This began to be carried out several years ago, but not from a good life, of course, but because of the need to "plug holes". Several S-300V and Buk missiles from the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces were transferred to the Air Force-Air Defense, where they were reorganized into a ZRP.
      Alexei, with all due respect to the greater survivability of C-300, I cannot agree with you. No. In addition, the fire performance of the S-300V is significantly worse than that of the S-300P air defense system, and the reload time is longer. The survivability of the Buk air defense missile system is somewhat higher, but this complex also has disadvantages. For example, less noise immunity and unsuitability for carrying a long-term OBD.
      1. Alex_59
        Alex_59 12 October 2016 10: 44
        +3
        Quote: Bongo
        Several S-300V and Buk missiles from the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces transferred

        This is already too much. NE has its own specifics. I meant that the air defense of the air defense and the air defense of the airborne forces should simply be combined into a single information exchange network. This may allow the first strike to be repelled more effectively. And then ... the SV has its own business, they have to go after the infantry, so transferring them to the VKS IMHO is a mistake.
        Quote: Bongo
        regarding the greater survivability of C-300, I cannot agree with you
        Well, all the same, the MSNR in the C-300B in each battery, and not in the division, and the illumination radar on each PU.
        Quote: Bongo
        unsuitability for carrying a long database

        Here, of course, it's hard for me to say, I'm not an expert. What is it expressed specifically? Low MTBF of failure in the radar, the inability to keep powered PUs from external energy sources?
        1. Bongo
          Bongo 12 October 2016 11: 15
          +1
          Quote: Alex_59
          Well, all the same, the MSNR in the C-300B in each battery, and not in the division, and the illumination radar on each PU.

          Given that the C-300 battery has two 9A82 launchers - with two 9X82 missiles and four 9A83 launchers - with four 9M83 missiles and anti-aircraft missiles, there are no advantages over the X-NUMXM9 missiles over the S-83300 No.
          Quote: Alex_59
          What is it expressed specifically? Low MTBF of failure in the radar, the inability to keep powered PUs from external energy sources?

          First of all, habitability conditions, the need to keep calculations in self-propelled firing installations. At the design stage, the military complexes were not tasked with carrying a long-term database. And this affected the serviceability and resource of the hardware while in the "hot" state.
          1. Alex_59
            Alex_59 12 October 2016 13: 13
            +1
            Quote: Bongo
            Given that the C-300 battery has two 9A82 launchers - with two 9X82 missiles and four 9A83 launchers - with four 9M83 missiles and anti-aircraft missiles, there are no advantages over the X-NUMXM9 missiles over the S-83300

            In the "number of trunks" - no. I meant that OShS S-300V is less centralized, more distributed. Batteries can operate autonomously. In "P" - will not work, only the division.
            Quote: Bongo
            First of all, habitability conditions, the need to keep calculations in self-propelled firing installations. At the design stage, the military complexes were not tasked with carrying a long-term database. And this affected the serviceability and resource of the hardware while in the "hot" state.

            Clear. In principle, this is decided by the creation of separate booths for combat duty, replenishment of spare parts, regular maintenance with an extension of the resource and other things. But ours certainly will not think of it.
            1. Bongo
              Bongo 12 October 2016 13: 40
              +2
              Quote: Alex_59
              In the "number of trunks" - no. I meant that OShS S-300V is less centralized, more distributed. Batteries can operate autonomously.

              Alexei, how does the C-300B battery actually differ from the C-300P division other than the name? It is also the smallest structural unit capable of conducting combat operations on its own. In addition, the S-300V transferred to the Air Force-Air Defense Forces began to be reduced to anti-aircraft battalions and regiments, rather than batteries and brigades as in the Air Defense Forces.
              The С-300В has no superiority in the fight against aerodynamic targets, the 9А82 and 9А83 controllers do not have their own detection tools, but only guidance tools. In the event of failure of the 9С15М radar, the anti-aircraft battery also becomes blind. Of course, the radar of the program review 9С19М2 remains, it is intended mainly for the detection of BR.
              Considering that the S-300B air defense system was built approximately 10 times smaller than the C-300P, and workable samples can be counted on the fingers, they do not play a special role in our air defense system.
  5. svp67
    svp67 12 October 2016 07: 04
    0
    Well, the evil Polish "lapdog" "barked" ... Well, in the event of a military conflict, our anti-aircraft gunners will have to spin well ...
  6. Zaurbek
    Zaurbek 12 October 2016 08: 06
    +1
    I think that the Iskanders M should not have to take off such F-16s and hit at once at the airfields. But a rocket interesting to us is extremely necessary. For armament Su-30/24/34/35
  7. fzr1000
    fzr1000 12 October 2016 11: 12
    +1
    The information is not good. The Poles are preparing for revenge, maybe they want to revive the Commonwealth 2? Their advisers and special forces are in the Donbass constantly and rotate from the beginning of the conflict. Or is it just that urine in my head does not give me peace? By the way, we also need to think about some Mini-Caliber, obviously it will not be superfluous.
  8. Vita vko
    Vita vko 12 October 2016 11: 35
    +2
    Such weapons are a serious defense challenge. It is impossible to create a continuous low-altitude lesion zone along all the borders of Russia. Therefore, one should concentrate on the use of the main unmasking features associated with the combat use of the Pirania-type CR. This is the work of a radio altimeter of mapping systems, engine sound and low flight altitudes, which in combination may allow the creation of mine-explosive obstacle systems in threatened directions or simply the installation of special networks.
  9. Semenov
    Semenov 12 October 2016 12: 02
    0
    Poland is scratching its back again. Preemptive strikes against storage bases and airfields would greatly simplify the tasks of our air defense. Missile defense in Romania, Poland, Turkey, "plutonium ultimatum", Syria, US threats with England - aggravation akin to the Cuban missile crisis? God grant that it seems.
  10. demiurg
    demiurg 12 October 2016 13: 43
    0
    As long as the Polish government is in its country, there will be no attack. The answers of TNWs will be afraid.
  11. Alex_59
    Alex_59 12 October 2016 14: 33
    +3
    Quote: Bongo
    Alexei, how does the C-300B battery actually differ from the C-300P division other than the name?

    In principle, of course, nothing.
    9A82 and 9A83 launchers do not have their own detection tools, but only guidance tools
    A "searchlights" PU can not play the role of search radar? My knowledge is not enough here either ... I know for sure that the Buk air defense missile system can do this - if the situation arises, the firing Buka can independently find targets without anyone's help, and then fire at them, albeit with limitations, but it can ... For some reason, I thought that the same principle was implemented in 300V ... right now I sit and think ...
    Quote: Bongo
    Considering that the S-300B air defense system was built approximately 10 times smaller than the C-300P, and workable samples can be counted on the fingers, they do not play a special role in our air defense system.

    I believe that we are not in a position to neglect any opportunity to strengthen ourselves. "V" is not enough, yes, but Bukov, Os and Torov are decent. And while there is no movement with the combat operations of ground armies - why not use this potential somehow? It may not be possible to reach the battles of tank armada at all, well, why do we need this heap of equipment sleeping peacefully in the boxes of the ground? If the CDs will beat us? Let them also be included in the duty to repel the first strike. Let them be on duty with restrictions, but somehow. And then - how it goes. There will be a war with tank armada - they are removed from the place and forward. And if not, let the VKS air defense be strengthened. Only this is of course a theory, in our reality it is unlikely to come to this.
    1. Bongo
      Bongo 12 October 2016 15: 28
      +1
      Quote: Alex_59
      A "searchlights" PU can not play the role of search radar?
      Only after the issuance of target designation from search radars.
      Quote: Alex_59
      I know for sure that the Buk air defense missile system can do this - if the situation arises, the "fire" Buka can independently search for targets, and then fire at them, without anyone's help.

      The capabilities of a self-propelled firing unit are very limited; without the Kupol radar, the battery efficiency is significantly reduced.
      Quote: Alex_59
      I believe that we are not in a position to neglect any opportunity to strengthen ourselves. "V" is not enough, yes, but Bukov, Os and Torov are decent.

      There are even fewer brigades armed with modern Buk modifications than the S-300V. If the military "three hundred" are sent for repair and modernization, then the old "Buks" only for storage, and there are no more air-conditioned missiles for them. As for the short-range complexes, with the exception of the Pantsir-S, they are even less suitable for carrying out constant combat duty than the Buk air defense system.
      1. Lapkonium
        Lapkonium 12 October 2016 18: 01
        +3
        Quote: Bongo
        As for the short-range complexes, with the exception of the Pantsir-S, they are even less suitable for carrying out constant combat duty than the Buk air defense system.


        That is the huge problem of our object defense. You can’t get enough of all UAVs and S300 / 400 missiles, and neither Vityazey nor Morpheev are in the ranks yet, and when they are not entirely clear.
  12. Lex.
    Lex. 17 August 2017 21: 51
    0
    A low-altitude radar Rosa RB, which was recently discovered by a Lithuanian aircraft, and 4 Polonaise divisions with a salvo of 72 missiles, can also hardly be intercepted 100%