Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 4. Armadillos in the ranks, or altercations about the fate of the squadron
By the beginning of June 1904, all the armadillos of Port Arthur had gained technical readiness to sail. May 15 was repaired by Sevastopol, May 23 - Retvizan, two days later - Tsesarevich, and, finally, May 27 Victory returns to the system. There is no longer any reason to continue to defend Arthur’s inner raid, and on May 9, Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft sent a telegram to the governor of 21:
“Battleships, except for“ Victory ”, cruisers are ready to leave. An adversary in 15 versts from Arthur. Whether to go to sea, to engage in battle, or to remain ”(telegram No. 28 from 21 in May 1904 g, received by the vicar of 1 in June 1904).
And then ... The conventional wisdom:
1. Alekseev demanded that V.K. Vitgefta go to Vladivostok, and he in every possible way refused and did not want to do this.
2. Temporarily, etc. commander of the squadron preferred to use the fleet to protect Port Arthur on the model and likeness of the defense of Sevastopol 1854-55. during the Crimean War.
3. The squadron flagships supported Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft.
Now often there are reproaches of insufficient decisiveness (or even cowardice) of the squadron commanders: they didn’t want to go into battle, they hoped to sit behind the fortress walls ... But, reading the documents of that era, you come to the conclusion that the matter is much more complicated: the governor Alekseev, Rear Admiral V.K. Witgeft and the flagships and commanders of the 1 rank ships in completely different ways imagined the tasks of the port-arthur squadron.
Governor Alekseev believed that the Japanese fleet was significantly weakened. Even before V.K. For the first time, Vitgeft brought a squadron into the sea (10 June 1904) Alekseev reported temporarily id The commander of the Pacific squadron that the Japanese have at Port Arthur only the 2 battleship and the 5 armored cruisers. Alekseev showed even more optimism in his telegram No. 5 from June 11 (received in Port Arthur only June 21):
"I report the state of Japanese fleet: drowned "Hatsuse", "Shikishima", "Ioshino", "Miyako"; at the docks - “Fuji”, “Asama”, “Iwate”, “Yakumo”, “Azuma”, “Kassuga”; only Asahi, Mikasa, Tokiva, Izumi are serviceable (probably a typo, meant the armored cruiser "Izumo". - Approx. auth.), "Nissin".
Here Evgeny Ivanovich (Alekseev) reduced the Japanese fleet to 2 battleships and 3 armored cruisers. I wonder how I read this telegram to Wilhelm Karlovich, who, the day before this telegram was sent, met at sea 4 battleship (not counting "Chin Ien") and 4 armored cruisers of the Japanese?
So, the governor believed that the force opposing the Arturians at sea had significantly weakened. At the same time, he feared a Japanese ground attack on Port Arthur and rightly believed that the preservation of the squadron was more important than the preservation of the fortress. In accordance with these considerations, and despite the general unpreparedness of the squadron, he gave the order to divert ships to Vladivostok:
“... I take all measures for the quickest unlock of Arthur. But in view of every chance, the fleet, defending the fortress, needs to prepare for the last extreme, go to sea for a decisive battle with the enemy, break it, and make its way to Vladivostok ... ”(telegram No. 1813 from 19 in May 1904, received on 3 squadron in June 1904 ).
However, after five days, the governor clarified his position:
“If the squadron manages to destroy the enemy fleet and Arthur still holds, the squadron’s duty instead of leaving Vladivostok is to help lift the siege of the fortress and support the actions of our troops sent to the rescue of Arthur ...” (telegram No. 1861 from 23 in May 1904, received by squadron 31 May 1904).
Thus, the position of the governor was reduced to the fact that it was necessary to leave the fortress and go to Vladivostok, taking advantage of the relative weakness of the enemy. If you suddenly manage to break it along the road, then it makes no sense to go to Vladivostok and you can stay in Port Arthur, helping the fortress.
Originally V.K. Vitgeft seemed to share the opinion of his boss. In response to the telegram from the governor of 6 June:
"... as soon as all the ships are ready and the first favorable moment is presented for the squadron’s release against the enemy that is now weakened at sea, decide this important and serious step without hesitation."
The rear admiral replied:
“... The enemy is not terrible. Delayed exit without extremes, doubting the safety of mines; in the 10 area, the mines explode in all directions ... I go out according to high water, about the tenth. In the event of death, I ask you to pathe my wife's pension, I have no money. ”
It is extremely strange to read. "The enemy is not terrible"? Since March, the squadron did not withdraw from the internal raid, the newest Retvizan and Tsesarevich didn’t have any preparation at all since the fall of 1903 - only twelve January days, from the moment of the termination of the armed reserve to the blast at the very beginning of the war .
Battleships Tsesarevich and Retvizan on the inner roads of Port Arthur
V.K. Wiegeft, after leaving 10 in the sea, wrote to the governor in a report:
"... the squadron in a combat sense was no longer there, but there was only a meeting of ships not practicing in a squadron sailing, and the late Admiral Makarov, who died so unexpectedly, who was feverishly working on her organization in a more favorable time, left, only in that sense, raw material ... "
And yet “the enemy is not terrible,” but right there: “In case of death, please beg the pension of my wife” ...
Is it possible that V.K. Witgeft believed in the data of the governor of the extreme weakening of the Japanese fleet? It is doubtful: the Rear Admiral himself assumed that he would meet more powerful forces, telling Alekseev:
“... Once the importance and the need to leave the squadron is recognized, albeit with a risk, I will go out ready, trusting in God. I personally did not prepare for such a responsible duty. Meeting according to my information: 3 battleship, 6 armored cruisers, 5 cruisers II rank, 32 destroyer ... "(telegram number 39 from June 2, received by the governor the next day).
What did VK want to achieve with this exit? Witgeft? He reports to the deputy in the report 66 from 17 June 1904 g (report on the release of the 10 squadron in June):
“My plan for the proposed actions after the release was to have time to leave for the night at sea, away from the destroyers, hoping that the enemy’s fleet is much weaker than ours, according to the Headquarters, and is located in different places of the Yellow Sea and Pechili. In the afternoon, it was supposed to go to Elliot and, having found the enemy, attack him all or in parts. ”
VC. Vitgeft went to sea in the hope that the viceroy’s data were correct, and then he was going to give battle. However, Wilhelm Karlovich had a premonition that he himself estimated the number of the opponent who opposed him where Alekseev was more accurate, and the battle could turn out badly both for the squadron and for himself. It is possible that V.K. Witgeft had a premonition of his own death, it happens. But, be that as it may, the rear admiral led a squadron and met the United Fleet not far from Port Arthur, and in the forces that surpassed Alexeyev’s expectations, and his own. Missing only 4 armored cruisers Kamimura involved the capture of Vladivostok cruisers - they could not be quickly brought back to Arthur, but all 1-first combat unit composed 4 armadillos, "Nisshin" and "Kasuga" with the support of two armored cruisers 2-Detachment I was in front of V.K. Witgeft. For the general battle, Togo gathered all the forces available to him into a single fist: the ships of the 1 and 2 military units were accompanied by “rarities” - Matsushima and Chin-Yen of the third squadron of Vice Admiral S. Kataoka. It is not surprising that V.K. Vitgeft retreated - he did not consider himself able to fight such an opponent. Already in the evening, the battleship Sevastopol hit a mine, which caused him to have a rather lengthy repair, so that the rear admiral led the squadron to the internal raid.
Fuji squadron battleship
And he was probably quite surprised that any of his actions did not satisfy the governor at all. Despite the fact that in his first message, sent before the report of V.K. Witgeft pointed out:
"I met the enemy - 5 battleships, considering Chin-Yen, 5 or 6 armored cruisers (in fact, there were only 4. - Approx. Aut.), Counting Nissin and Kasuga, 8 cruisers of class II, 20 destroyers, why he returned to Arthur. "
Alekseev, nothing at all, answered VK. Witgeftu:
“The report of Your Excellency for the number 66 I received 17 th.
Upon careful consideration, I do not find sufficient grounds on which, instead of following my instructions, to go to sea and, after attacking the enemy, defeat him, you decided to return to the raid ... ”7 telegram No. 18.06.1904, received 20.06.1904.
Upon careful consideration, I do not find sufficient grounds on which, instead of following my instructions, to go to sea and, after attacking the enemy, defeat him, you decided to return to the raid ... ”7 telegram No. 18.06.1904, received 20.06.1904.
Responding to a letter temporarily. the head of the Pacific Ocean squadron, directed by him to Alekseev along with a report, the governor wrote:
“Remember the battle of“ Varyag ”, and if you entered the battle with more faith in your squadron, you might have won, perhaps, a brilliant victory. I was expecting this, and all my instructions were reduced to a single goal, so that the squadron of the Pacific Ocean, having transferred a series of tests, could valiantly serve the Tsar and the homeland. ”
It is quite likely that these answers by Alekseev were completely shocked by V.K. Witgefta. After all, he was not a stupid man, and perfectly understood his inconsistency with his position, but he agreed to it because there was an order and because he was only assigned to temporarily perform duties during the general weakness of the fleet and the absence of large active operations. But then he was assigned to go out to sea and battle, even against the weakened forces of the enemy, and now he was assigned, no less than to become a real commander, to lead the fleet into battle and smash the considerably superior enemy forces!
Alekseev perfectly understood the weakness of his chief of staff and at first was not at all going to throw him into a decisive battle. But for some time he simply had no other way out: to replace the deceased S.O. Makarov, Vladivostok Vice-Admirals arrived N.I. Skrydlov and P.A. Bezobrazov, the latter was supposed to take the post of chief of the Port Arthur squadron. However, the proposals of the governor somehow convey P.A. Bezobrazova in Port Arthur N.I. Skrydlov responded with a categorical refusal due to too high a risk of such a “crossing”. But to prevent the siege of Port Arthur by the forces of the land army also did not work. And besides, Alekseev has already informed the sovereign about the need to break through the squadron to Vladivostok. Accordingly, 18 of June Nicholas II sent a telegram to his viceroy, in which he wondered why the squadron, having received no damage, nevertheless returned to Port Arthur and ends the telegram with the words:
"Therefore, I consider it necessary for our squadron to leave Port Arthur."
And so it happened that the “convenient” governor V.K. Nobody will replace Witgefta, but he cannot be defended in Arthur either. And instead of waiting for the newly arrived admiral and surrendering command, Wilhelm Karlovich now had to give the Japanese fleet a general battle on his own!
Gently, but very persistently, the governor made it clear to VK. Witgeft, that the situation had completely changed, and now the rear admiral is charged with the task of destroying the Japanese fleet or otherwise conducting the Port Arthur squadron to Vladivostok. And, obviously, he drove the latter into the blackest melancholy. That is why Wilhelm Karlovich gives an extremely pessimistic answer to the above letters of the governor:
“Without considering myself capable naval commander, I command only by virtue of chance and necessity, according to reason and conscience, until the arrival of the fleet commander. The combat troops with experienced generals retreat, not defeating, why from me, completely unprepared, with a weakened squadron, a thirteen-node course, without the destroyers, is expected to break the strongest, perfectly trained, combat seventeen-player fleet of the enemy ... Reproaches did not deserve: acted, informed honestly, truthfully about the state of affairs. I will try honestly and die, the conscience of the death of the squadron will be clear. God will forgive, then it will become clear ”(telegram No. 52 from 22 June 1904, received by the vicar of 26 June 1904).
In the same letter V.K. Witgeft outlines the possibilities that he sees for the forces entrusted to his command:
“I report to the prospect that according to the present state of affairs in Arthur, the status of the squadron, there are only two solutions - or the squadron, together with the troops, should defend Arthur before the proceeds, or perish, because the moment of departure to Vladivostok can occur only when death is in front and from behind. "
Thus, Wilhelm Karlovich outlined his position, which he followed, judging from his other letters to the governor, until the very departure to the sea and the 28 battle on July 1904 in V.K. Vitgeft did not consider it possible either to successfully fight the Japanese in the mind of Port Arthur, or to rush into Vladivostok: if he was left to himself, he probably would have written off crews and guns to the coast to defend the fortress in the image and likeness of the defense of Sevastopol. And this, of course, does not suit the governor at all. Therefore, in the response telegram, he writes V.K. Witgeftu:
“June 22 telegram number 52 received. Your opinion about the existence of only two solutions for the squadron - to defend Arthur, or to die together with the fortress - is so inconsistent with the HIGHEST instructions and purpose of the forces entrusted to you that I must offer the discussion of the council of flagships and captains to the issue of leaving and breaking through the squadron to Vladivostok , with the participation of the port commander ”(telegram No. 11 from 26 June 1904, received on 2 July 1904 squadron).
The meeting of commanders and flagships took place the day after the telegram of the governor, 4 July 1904, was received. A protocol was sent to the governor, according to which:
"There is no favorable and safe moment for the fleet to leave the sea ... ... A squadron cannot go to Vladivostok without a battle ... a squadron leaving Vladivostok can be justified only when all measures of Arthur’s defense from the fleet are exhausted and the fall of the fortress is inevitable ... contribute to the early fall of the fortress. "
When reading this report, it seems that it seems that neither the flagships, nor the commanders of the ships at sea wanted to go and preferred to disarm the ships for the defense of Arthur, but in reality this is not the case. The fact is that the signed “Opinions” of the flagships and captains of the 1 rank, who participated in the meeting, were attached to the “Protocol”, and there their opinions were concretized quite clearly:
Opinion of the chief of the battleship detachment (signed by Rear Admiral, Prince Ukhtomsky):
“I believe that our squadron should not leave Port Arthur for Vladivostok unless it is decided to surrender Port Arthur to the enemy in the general course of military events, not upholding it to the last possible opportunity. Near Port Arthur all the main naval forces of the Japanese, their army and their military transports are gathered, and therefore the place to our fleet is here, and not in the waters of the Sea of Japan. ”
Opinion of the coastal defense chief (signed by Rear Admiral Loschinsky):
“The fleet, remaining in Port Arthur, greatly enhances the passive and active defense of the fortress; probably, in the future it will also be of great service to the passage of our main ground forces through Kinh-Zhou and past the city of Dalny, where our squadron can approach, gradually catching mines in front of it and, perhaps, in this place will give a general battle to the enemy. ”
Opinion of the Chief of the squadron of cruisers (signed by Rear Admiral Reizenstein):
“For the good of the cause, for the victory the fleet should not be left by Arthur. The real task of the fleet is to clear your way to the Far, which is done. Move along the coastal strip to the Far, take possession of it and stay there. Then not only Arthur was saved, but the Japanese from Kvantunga were ousted, and there was no move to Arthur either dry or sea, and our northern army could unite with Arthur unhindered. The fleet will leave, and the northern army will not come to Arthur, since there will be a barrier to the enemy fleet in Talenenwan. ”
Opinion of the commander of the squadron battleship "Tsarevich" (signed by the captain of the 1 rank Ivanov):
“If Port Arthur is not predetermined to surrender, then with the fleet in it he can successfully withstand the siege for another month, another; the question is in the number of reserves and combat supplies, and the fleet, acting perhaps more actively, may even significantly weaken the enemy squadron. ”
The opinion of the commander of the squadron battleship Retvizan (signed by the captain of the 1 rank Shensnovich):
“I anticipate another case of a squadron exit if our second squadron arrives in the waters of the Pacific. In this case, the squadron that left Arthur will give battle, and when the enemy squadron disappears into its ports for the inevitable repairs that are necessary after the battle at sea, the second squadron of the Pacific Ocean will remain and dominate the sea. ”
Opinion commander of the squadron battleship "Sevastopol" (signed by the captain of the 1-th rank von Essen):
“There is reason to think, however, that after the energetic actions of our cruising detachment in the Sea of Japan, part of the enemy’s naval forces were recalled to the shores of Japan; There is a need to make sure of this by reconnoitring the output of our squadron into the sea with its full complement, for a while from one to the other high water. If at the same time it turns out that the enemy has significantly reduced the ships operating against Arthur, then our fleet can take some active actions, keeping the Japanese in a constant state of tension, and then leaving for Vladivostok is not necessary. ”
Opinion of the commander of the cruiser I rank "Pallada" (signed by the captain of 1-th rank Sarnavsky):
“My opinion is for the fleet to remain in Port Arthur until the last moment, and if the Lord God wants Port Arthur to be taken by the enemy, then our fleet will have to go out and break through, and how many ships of our fleet would come to Vladivostok, this will be our plus and our pride. Now, if the fleet leaves the besieged city, I even dread to think what a depressing impression it will have on the whole of Russia and on our ground forces.
Our fleet should now proceed to more active operations on enemy coastal positions, their shops, and so on. "
Our fleet should now proceed to more active operations on enemy coastal positions, their shops, and so on. "
Opinion of the temporary head of the 1 squadron destroyers (signed by Lieutenant Maximov):
“I consider the withdrawal of a squadron from Arthur to leave for Vladivostok to be wrong and not caused by anything. I think that the withdrawal of a squadron for combat with the enemy is not subject to doubt. ”
Opinion of the temporary head of the II squadron destroyers (signed by Lieutenant Kuzmin-Karavaev):
“The squadron should try to break up the Japanese fleet located on the Kvantunsky Peninsula, but in my opinion, it should not go to Vladivostok.”
Armored cruiser "Diana" and two destroyers of the type "Falcon" at its side during duty, Port Arthur 1904 g.
Thus, slightly exaggerating, we see three points of view on further actions of the squadron:
1) The steward believed that with combat, without it, but the fleet must break through to Vladivostok.
2) V.K. Witgeft believed that it would be best for the fleet to abandon active actions and focus on protecting Port Arthur.
3) Flagships and squadron commanders assumed that it would be best to remain in Port Arthur to the last extreme, and in this their point of view coincided with the position of V.K. Witgefta. But, unlike the latter, many of them saw the fleet’s task not to bring cannons to shore and help the garrison to repel the attacks of the Japanese army, but to prevent its army from weakening the Japanese fleet by active actions of the squadron, or even to give him a general battle.
According to the author of this article, the only true was the opinion of the flagships and commanders of the squadron.
Unfortunately, a breakthrough to Vladivostok was absolutely impossible for the Russian squadron. And the point here is not at all that the United Fleet of Kheyhatiro Togo surpassed the Russian forces in Port Arthur in all respects. On the way to Vladivostok, battleships V.K. Witgefta was expected by a completely implacable enemy, his name is coal.
Lieutenant Cherkasov in his "Notes" wrote:
“... if at Sevastopol and Poltava there is enough coal in peacetime only to reach the shortest possible economic route from Arthur to Vladivostok, then they will not have enough reserve in a combat situation halfway through. Novik and the destroyers will have to load coal into the sea from the ships of the squadron ... ”
But who could give them this coal? According to the results of the 28 battle of July, we see a completely bleak result: the “Tsarevich” was not too damaged in the battle, his guns and machines were intact, the hull had no critical damage and flooding. From this point of view, nothing prevented the breakthrough of the battleship to Vladivostok. But in battle, the ship’s chimneys suffered: and if in its normal state, following a twelve-node course, the battleship spent 76 tons of coal per day, as a result of the battle, this figure increased to 600 (six hundred) tons.
The second chimney of the squadron battleship Tsesarevich after the battle of 28 July 1904 g
The “Tsarevich” project had a normal supply of coal - 800 t, full - 1350 t, on the sea 28 July came out, having 1100 t, since nobody wanted to overload the ship before the battle. After the 28 battle in July, the battleship had only 500 tons: this would not have been enough for Vladivostok, before entering the Korean Strait.
Approximately the same situation developed for the battleship Peresvet: it went into battle, having 1200-1500 and coal (the exact amount, unfortunately, is unknown), and this should be enough for 3000-3700 miles - the actual consumption of coal on ships This type reached 114 tons per day at a speed of 12 nodes. The distance from Port Arthur to Vladivostok through the Korean Strait was less than 1100 miles, so it would seem that the reserve is enough for the battleship. But in battle, two of his three smokestacks were badly damaged. And although the exact consumption of coal of the battleship in the 28 battle of July is unknown, there is evidence that Peresvet returned to Port Arthur with almost empty coal holes. And this means that it was impossible to even dream of any breakthrough to Vladivostok after the battle - the maximum that could be done was to bring the battleship to Qingdao and be interned there.
As V.K. Witgeft and the flagships, it was almost impossible to go to sea secretly from the observers of Heihatiro Togo - the squadron needed too much time to enter the outer raid and into the sea. And then the more high-speed Japanese fleet managed, in any case, to intercept the ships of the port-arthur squadron. Accordingly, the Russian battleships could not evade battle, but in battle it was impossible to avoid damage. In this case, the two oldest battleships obviously could not get to Vladivostok. Even without having received combat damage (which is obviously fantastic), they would still have to maneuver intensively and move at higher than economic speeds, respectively, they would quickly squander coal. In fact, the only possible way to use them was that Sevastopol and Poltava, going out with the fleet, helped him in a battle with the Japanese, and then returned to Port Arthur or interned in the same Qingdao. So it was possible to try to ensure the breakthrough of four battleships out of six, but if at least one of these four were damaged by pipes, then, just like Sevastopol and Poltava, it would not be able to follow to Vladivostok. And in the end, only half of the squadron, or even less, will break through.
And will it break through? Evaluating the consequences of the 28 battle of July 1904, many authors point out that the Russians had almost broken through, and that they had only a little more time to hold out before dark, and then look for the wind in the field! But this is not the case at all. Having survived the battle with the Russian squadron, the Japanese could easily head for the Korean Strait, even if only part of their squadron — if the Russians succeed in knocking out some Japanese battleships and armored cruisers. And already there, having connected with four armored cruisers of Kamimura, Heyhatiro Togo could give a second battle to the remnants of the Russian squadron. Chances to slip unnoticed by the Korean Strait, past all observation posts and numerous auxiliary ships of V.K. Witgefta practically was not. And even if such a miracle happened, nothing prevented the Japanese from advancing to Vladivostok and intercepting the Russian squadron already on the outskirts of the city.
The problem of the Port Arthur squadron was that after the battle with the Japanese fleet and regardless of its outcome, some of the ships should either return to Arthur or be interned, and only a part of the breakthrough ships could get to Vladivostok, and most likely - part insignificant. But Japanese ships damaged by Russian fire in the course of a breakthrough will be repaired and put back into service. But the Russians are not: those that return to Arthur will die, those that are interned will be saved, but they will not be able to continue the war. Accordingly, it made sense to break through only if the question of the life and death of the Arthur squadron arose, but the situation in June and the beginning of July of 1904 did not look like that at all.
But to act actively from Port Arthur ... it was a very tempting option, because in this case a lot started to play against the Japanese. Squadron Kheykhatiro Togo was tied to the landing sites, she covered the transports that supplied the army. But there were no Japanese bases there, all the Japanese had with them were the floating workshops, and in the event of receiving any serious damage, they had to go to Japan for repairs. At the same time, although Port Arthur, as the base of the fleet, was not able to compete with the Japanese naval bases, it could very quickly repair the damage of moderate gravity from artillery fire. The problem was the lack of a dock for battleships, but underwater damage in an artillery battle was not so frequent, and far less devastating than the same blasting on a mine.
And because the squadron did not need to leave Port Arthur, it was necessary to conduct active hostilities, hoping to impose battle on the part of the Japanese fleet. But even if it had not been possible, it was quite possible to take the risk and give the general battle of Heyhatiro Togo not far from Port Arthur, when it was possible for the wounded ships to retreat under the protection of the fortress. A badly beaten "Japanese" had to go to Japan, and even accompanied by other warships, be repaired there and waste time returning back - a similarly damaged Russian battleship had good chances to return to service faster.
And besides, on the squadron, not knowing the condition of the preparation of the 2 Pacific Pacific Squadron, seriously admitted that it could come up in a few months and there was already a different reason to go out to sea - to fight the Japanese, tie up their fleet with combat even if the losses of the port-arthur squadron turn out to be higher, but they will not be meaningless, but will pave the way for ships coming from the Baltic.
The moods of the flagships and kaprangs of the Arthur squadron were fully explained by the above reasons: they had been in the Port Arthur fortress for a long time, they understood that when they tried to break through, the squadron would, with an enormous degree of probability, cease to exist as an organized fighting force without causing significant damage to the Japanese fleet, her departure will bring the fall of Port Arthur closer. So why go? What could a squadron from Vladivostok do that it was not able to do, based in Port Arthur? Rear Admiral Ukhtomsky did not prove himself a great naval commander, but the words he spoke at the Assembly of flagships sounded as if Fyodor Fyodorovich Ushakov or Horatio Nelson suddenly spoke through his mouth:
"Near Port Arthur all the major naval forces of the Japanese, their army and their military transports are gathered, and therefore the place to our fleet is here."
In Russian historiography, it was somehow gradually forming the view that the constant demands of the viceroy Alekseev about the breakthrough of the squadron to Vladivostok were in essence the only true ones, and that only indecision (if not to say faint-heartedness) was temporarily. The commander of the Pacific Ocean squadron V.K. Witgefta prevented their early implementation. But if we put ourselves in the place of the flagships and impartially consider the capabilities of the 1 Pacific squadron: without post-knowledge, but as Arthur sailors saw in 1904 in June and early July, the desire of the governor to quickly take her ships to Vladivostok is premature and dictated by the eternal "to take care and not to risk", as well as the fact that the governor, in spite of his admiral's rank, very badly imagined the consequences of such a breakthrough.
Unfortunately, one should not see a strategic genius in the attempts of V.K. Witgefta delay a squadron in Port Arthur. This delay made sense only under the condition of active hostilities against the enemy at sea, and this VK. Witgeft did not want at all, preferring to stand at anchor and only sending detachments of ships to support the land flanks. The case is important and very useful, but not sufficient for the squadron.
The views of a number of flagships and ship commanders, alas, remained unheard: the squadron again froze in the internal pool of Port Arthur until the squadron battleship Sevastopol was repaired. And there everything turned out to be the same: on July 25 the battleship was commissioned, and on the same day, the ships in the internal raid found themselves under fire from siege 120-mm howitzers. The next day, Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft received a telegram from the governor:
"On July 4, the protocol of the meeting of flagships and captains HIS IMPERIAL majesty deigned with the following answer" I fully share your opinion about the importance of getting the squadron out of Arthur as soon as possible and breaking through to Vladivostok. "
On this basis, I confirm to you for the exact execution of the order set forth in my dispatch number seven. Report on receipt ”(telegram No. 25 from 21 June 1904, received on 26 July 1904 squadron).
.On this basis, I confirm to you for the exact execution of the order set forth in my dispatch number seven. Report on receipt ”(telegram No. 25 from 21 June 1904, received on 26 July 1904 squadron).
Two days later, 28 July 1904, the squadron, led by the squadron battleship "Tsarevich", which held its flag V.K. Witgeft, entered the breakthrough in Vladivostok.
To be continued ...
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