Strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States. Today and tomorrow
Part I. Land Component
The aggravation of the political confrontation between Russia and the United States, which coincided in time with the active phase of renewal of the national nuclear triad, heightened public interest in the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of the leading powers. In the near future, it will only be heated, as the American triad enters the update phase.
Nuclear weapons (NW) there are nine countries: the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France and China legally, and India, Israel, Pakistan and the DPRK - illegally: the first three did not sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and North Korea withdrew from it. The arsenals of Russia and the United States, despite significant reductions, are overwhelmingly superior to the rest. When discussing the current and future nuclear arsenals of these countries, one cannot fail to consider briefly the terms of the START-3 agreement, since it largely determines their appearance.
The START-3 agreement was signed in April 2010 of the year and entered into force in February 2011. The term of the current contract is limited to February 2021 of the year, but it is envisaged to extend it, by mutual agreement, for another five years. A cautious discussion of the prospects of treaties in the field of reducing offensive weapons is underway, but it will be hampered by reasons both subjective (deterioration of relations) and objective nature - for example, further reductions increase the role of tactical nuclear weapons, under which there are no clear agreements. connect to the negotiation process; the role of missile defense and promising non-nuclear high-precision weapons. A positive thing is that the discussion of the extension of the existing START-3 agreement has begun.
The goal of START-3 is to reach the levels of February 2018 of the year:
- 700 deployed carriers, i.e., total deployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers;
- 800 carriers, including unopened, that is stored or intended for testing;
- 1550 warheads, counting warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs and bombers. The latter are counted not only as one carrier, but also as one charge.
At the moment, according to data published as of 1 March 2016, the parties are close to the required indicators, and in some places have already reached them. Thus, the number of deployed carriers in Russia is 521, and the number of warheads in the US is 1481. Paradoxically, since September 2013, the number of warheads in the Russian arsenal has almost continuously increased - this fact is explained by the fact that new missile systems, which are equipped with a shared warhead with individual targeting units (MIRV), come into service, outrunning the old monoblock ones. To reach the limitations laid down in START-3, the domestic military will have to complete the arsenal update (this process is almost continuous in our tradition) in one and a half years, then carry out active work on the decommissioning of obsolete complexes, while providing them with a worthy replacement .
Traditionally, the strategic nuclear missile forces (SMF), the land component of the nuclear triad, are the basis of domestic strategic nuclear forces. The importance of the Strategic Missile Forces is emphasized by the fact that this is a separate branch of the military, which reports directly to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In addition, they are the first and most successfully undergoing modernization.
Sword bringing peace
Exact data on the composition of the Strategic Missile Forces in Russia are not published, but the region is relatively widely covered in the media, and general conclusions can be drawn from open national and foreign publications.
The armament of the Strategic Missile Forces consists of land-based ICBMs installed in coal-fired launchers (silos) and on mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK), the second one is slightly larger. Both options are different answers to the question of maximum survival in the attack and, as a consequence, the provision of retaliation, the inevitable threat of which is the basis of the whole concept of nuclear deterrence. Modern silos have the highest security, and, given their placement far from each other, the enemy will have to spend on each one on the warhead, and to guarantee (a technical failure of an attacking ICBM or a significant miss) - perhaps several. The operation of the rocket mine is relatively simple and cheap. The disadvantage is that the coordinates of all silos to the enemy are probably known and they are potentially vulnerable to high-precision non-nuclear weapons. However, this problem is still relevant for a relatively distant future, since modern strategic cruise missiles have a subsonic speed and it is almost impossible to hit them all at once with them.
PGRK, on the contrary, are supposed to survive not for stability, but for mobility, being dispersed in a threatening period, they become weakly vulnerable to pinpoint strikes, and they can be effectively dealt with by massive strikes at home-based areas, preferably with high-power charges. The stability of the mobile platform to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion is much lower than that of a mine, but even in this case, the enemy will have to spend a large number of its warheads to defeat them reliably.
Above, we considered the worst option. The optimum is not a counterstrike, but a counterstrike, in which the missiles of the attacked side will have time to take off before the enemy warheads fall on their home areas. Ensuring this is a question of missile warning systems, the management system of the SNF and the speed with which they are deployed, which is a separate big topic.
From 1987 to 2005, the year in Russia in limited operation was a small number of combat railway missile systems (BZHRK) "Molodets" (12 trains were released, three PUs in each) - the only BZHRK brought to serial production and combat duty. From a tactical point of view, BZHRK can be considered a special case of the PGRK: the main difference is the use of an extensive rail network for dispersal during a threatening period. On the one hand, this provides high mobility, on the other hand, the use of civilian infrastructure complicates security issues and, to a certain extent, “substitutes” for the first blow large transport hubs, i.e. cities. The issue of visibility for reconnaissance assets is also painful, since, once discovered, the train is no longer easy to hide again - for obvious reasons.
At the design stage is a new BZHRK "Barguzin". The use of smaller missiles will reduce the weight, which will increase the secrecy - in contrast to the "Good fellow", he will not need three diesel locomotives at once. However, the prospects of Barguzin are still unclear, since criticism, including from the customer, is subject to operational difficulties and large costs in terms of budget cuts, with disputed advantages over the widely used wheeled PGRK.
Now they are the basis of the Strategic Missile Forces, namely the large Topol ICBM family: PC-12М Topol, PC-12М2 Topol-M and PC-24 "Yars". The original Topoli began to take up combat duty since 1985, and are now being removed from service. It is planned to end this process at the beginning of the next decade. Missile launches are carried out regularly, both to confirm the fleet's health and to test new technical solutions (given that they are still planned to be destroyed, the flying laboratory in this situation goes "for nothing"). According to various estimates, such PGRKs remain in service from 54 to 72: given the continuous process of transition of the Topol to non-deployed and subsequent recycling, it is difficult to accurately determine their number at a specific point in time.
The PC-12М2 Topol-M complexes (the start of deployment is 2006 year) and the PC-24 Yars (the start of deployment is 2010 year) are the development of Topol with an advanced rocket. In view of the slightly increased mass, the number of axles increased from seven to eight. Between themselves "Topol-M" and "Yars" are close - the most important is the difference in combat equipment. If the Topol-M, like the original Topol, is equipped with one 550 kT warhead, then the Yars is equipped with a three-unit or four-block 150 – 300 kT (according to different estimates). The use of a single warhead on the Topol-M was due to the fact that it was created taking into account the requirements of START-2, which prohibited the complexes with MIRVT IN. After the failure of the START-2, it was rapidly upgraded due to the pledged technical reserve.
Before the transition to Yarsy, only 18 units of the Topol-M PGRK were deployed. However, his missile was widely (supplied by 60 units) used since the 1998 of the year to replace the IBR UR-100Н УТТХ (PC-18А), with an exhausted service life, in the silo. "Yars" deployed in the mobile version of at least 63. In addition, they are used for the ongoing replacement of UR-100Н in silo - those no less than 10.
PGRK RS-26 “Frontier” with a small rocket and six-axle chassis is created. Smaller dimensions will drastically increase the maneuverability of the complex, since Yarsy is still too big for ordinary roads. According to the statements, "Frontier" is already ready for deployment, but it may be limited to political issues, because, according to the United States, it can be used for targets at a distance significantly less than 5500 km, and this violates the Treaty on the Elimination of Medium and Short Range Missiles.
In addition to "Topol-M" and "Yars" in service there are also ICBMs exclusively mine-based. UR-100Н УТТХ, which were put on duty in 1979, are almost decommissioned - no more than 20 – 30 units are left, and this process will be completed in the next two or three years. The P-36М2 “Voevoda” (PC-20В, better known by the sonorous American name SS-18 “Satan”) - the largest ICBM in the world, together with the powerful 8,3 MT combat unit, or ten light 800 CT unit warheads. The P-36M2 took up combat duty in 1988 year. Currently, 46 missiles of this type are in service. At the beginning of the next decade, they should be replaced by the promising heavy Sarmat RS-28, also capable of carrying at least eight warheads, including the promising maneuvering ones.
In Russia, strategic missile forces are an essential part of strategic nuclear forces. Priority in equipment is becoming more and more PGRK, with high stability, but retained and silos - as an economical option and as a means of deploying missiles of particularly high power. In the Strategic Rocket Forces not only there are more carriers than on navy, but they also carry a larger number of warheads. At the same time, the Strategic Missile Forces are successfully saturated with new technology and, as far as one can judge, they are safely mastering it in numerous exercises.
In the fleet, the development of new SLBMs and SSBNs seems to be accompanied by problems and delays. The submarine fleet continues to pursue the traditional illness of the Soviet Navy - a low floating rate (the percentage of time spent at sea). In combination with a reduction in the number of personnel, this leads to the fact that one or two SSBNs are simultaneously on patrol, which is incomparable with many dozens of PGRKs and silos in readiness.
Ugly ducklings
In the US, the land part of the triad is, in contrast to ours, the weakest component. This is also manifested in the fact that the mine-based land-based ICBMs are located in the structure of the Air Force - in the Global Impact Command there are the so-called 20 Air Forces, which, respectively, include “Missile Squadrons” (literally Missile Squadron), combined into "Rocket wings".
Armed with the US Armed Forces is the only type of ICBM - LGM-30G "Minuteman III". The first Minuteman III stood on duty back in the distant 1970 year and for their time became a revolutionary breakthrough - they were used for the first time by the SPH IN. Of course, since then a number of modernization programs have passed, primarily aimed at increasing the reliability and safety of operation. One of the most serious "improvements" has deprived Minuteman III MWR IN - instead of three 350 kT warheads, one was installed with 300 kT. Officially, this action of the United States demonstrated the defensive nature of its nuclear weapons - in the first place, the MIRPT IN are useful in delivering a first strike, when one of its carriers can destroy several enemy ones. However, the real reason was probably primarily to optimize the distribution of the “pool” available in START-3: without these measures, the “holy” - SSBNs and Trident II missiles would have to be trimmed.
"New" warheads were removed from the LGM-118 "Peacekeeper" - a much newer (beginning of the deployment - 1986 year) and advanced ICBMs. Each Peacemaker could deliver not three, but ten warheads with greater accuracy and to a somewhat longer range. He was deservedly considered the American counterpart of the Soviet "Satan". However, difficulties in creating and ending the Cold War led to the Peacekeeper being released in a rather small series - only 50 was put on duty. For the same reasons, the US programs to create the PGRK and BZHRK were not implemented. At the end of 1980-x, largely influenced by Soviet developments, the BRZHK with Peacekeeper missiles and the PGRK with the new small MGM-134 Midgetman rocket were in the active phase of development. Both programs were closed in 1991 – 1992, at the prototype testing stage. Peacekeeper itself was decommissioned in 2005 year as part of measures to fulfill the conditions of START-2.
By 2018, the United States plans to leave 400 Minuteman III in service. To fulfill this condition, 50 units will be transferred to "non-deployed" - the missiles are sent to the warehouse, and silos are filled. Thus, the ground-based ICBMs occupy a significant proportion (more than half) in the carrier pool, while no one plans to increase the number of SSBNs and bombers. However, in this case, the naval component accounts for more than two times more warheads.
The main task of the land component in the new conditions of the United States is to “create a threat” - for the reliable defeat of silos, the enemy will have to spend even more warheads than is stored in them. With this approach, the requirements for rockets are small - the main thing is for the enemy to believe that they are able to take off. However, even this sooner or later may become too difficult for Minuteman III. Their replacement program is called Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). The possibility of creating a PGRK or BRZHK was estimated, but in the end they settled on the cheapest and simplest placement in the silo. Active funding for the creation of GBSD began in 2016. The cost of building, manufacturing and upgrading ground infrastructure is estimated at 62,3 billion dollars, stretched over three decades. According to the plans, the first “squadron” of GBSD will be on duty in the 2029 year, and it will be possible to completely replace Minuteman III with the 2036, but most defense programs are characterized by delays.
However, it is unlikely that GBSD will be implemented in full - with the conclusion of further agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons, the American land component is the first in line for reductions. And now, with the relatively comfortable START-3 format, there are proposals to reduce the proportion of the land component or even completely abandon it in favor of more stable SSBNs and multi-tasking bombers.
Abbreviations used:
Strategic Nuclear Forces - Strategic Nuclear Forces
Nuclear weapons - nuclear weapons
NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
ICBM - intercontinental ballistic missile
SLBM - submarine ballistic missile
RGCH IN - shared head with blocks of individual guidance \
Strategic Missile Forces - Strategic Missile Forces
Silos - mine launchers
PGRK - mobile soil missile systems
BZHRK - combat railway missile system
- Alexander Ermakov, independent military expert
- http://dfnc.ru/raketnya/strategicheskie-yadernye-sily-rossii-i-ssha-segodnya-i-zavtra/
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