Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 3: V.K. Witgeft takes command

Minelayer "Amur"

From previous articles we saw that the experience of V.K. Witgeft as a naval commander is completely lost in the background of his opponent Heihatiro Togo, and the squadron over which the Russian Rear Admiral took command was quantitatively, qualitatively and in training of crews significantly inferior to the Japanese the fleet. It seemed that things had deteriorated completely, but this was not so, because with the departure of the governor, the paradigm “Take care and not risk it!”, Hitherto fettered the fleet, suddenly unclasped its claws.

And it happened, surprisingly, thanks to the governor Alekseev. And it turned out this way: the admiral himself was the commander-in-chief of the theater, and therefore the direct leadership of the squadron did not threaten him - it seems like not by rank. Therefore, the governor could calmly wait until the deceased S.O. Makarov will not receive a new fleet commander, appointing someone else, for example, the same V.K. Witgefta. Instead, Alekseev is acting quite politically: shortly after the death of Stepan Osipovich (for several days he was replaced by the prince and the junior flagship of Ukhtomsky) he arrives at Arthur and quite heroically takes command. This, of course, looks spectacular and ... does not require absolutely no initiative from the governor: since the squadron suffered heavy losses, there is no talk of confrontation with the Japanese fleet. So, you can, without fear of anything, raise your flagship over the battleship "Sevastopol" and ... do nothing in anticipation of the new commander.

After all, what happened at S.O. Makarov? The fleet, although much weaker than the Japanese, still tried to conduct constant and systematic combat work, and this (despite the loss) gave our sailors invaluable experience and constrained the actions of the Japanese, and there was nothing to say about raising the morale of the Arthur squadron. Nothing prevented these practices from continuing after the death of Petropavlovsk - apart from the fear of loss, of course. It is impossible to lose without a war, and Stepan Osipovich understood this very well, risking himself and demanding the same from his subordinates: as mentioned earlier, the question was whether S.O. Makarov is a great admiral or not, remains controversial, but the fact that nature rewarded him with well-known enterprise, personal courage and leadership qualities cannot be two opinions. C.O. Makarov was not afraid of losses, but the vicegerent Alekseev was a completely different matter. The latter, of course, sought to command the fleet during the wartime, only all his actions suggest that, being ready to try on the laurels of the combat admiral, the governor Alexeyev did not want and was not ready to accept the responsibility of the fleet commander.

The fact is that no matter how weak the Arthur squadron was, but as soon as it became clear that the Japanese were preparing a landing only sixty miles from Port Arthur, the fleet simply had to intervene. It was not at all necessary to attempt to attack the Japanese with the last three battleships remaining in service (of which, moreover, Sevastopol could not develop more 10 nodes until May 15 when it was repaired). But there were high-speed cruisers and destroyers, there was a possibility of night attacks - the problem was only that such actions would be associated with a greater risk.

Squadron battleship "Poltava" in the West Basin of Port Arthur 1904

And this put Admiral Alekseev before an extremely unpleasant dilemma: at your own peril and risk, organize a counterpart to the Japanese landing, fraught with losses, or enter history the commander of the squadron, in which, under the very nose, the Japanese carried out a major landing operation, and he didn’t even strike a finger to stop them. Neither option promises political profit and therefore the governor Alekseev ... hastily decreases from Port Arthur. Of course, not just like that - having previously sent a telegram addressed to the Sovereign Emperor with a rationale why Alekseev, well, it is extremely urgent to be in Mukden and having received the appropriate command from the Sovereign. So, Alexeev’s urgent departure is motivated by train - since the Emperor himself deigned to order ...

And right there, even before the governor’s train arrived for its intended purpose, Admiral Alekseev suddenly became a champion of active operations at sea: he gave instructions to V.K. Witgeftu attack the landing site by 10-12 destroyers under the cover of cruisers and the battleship Peresvet!

After all, how interesting it is: it means “to take care and not to risk” and suddenly - a sudden passion for risky and even adventurous operations in the best traditions of Admiral Ushakov ... What (just by chance!) Completely contradicts the instructions given by the governor VC. Witgeftu upon departure:

"1) in view of the significant weakening of forces, not to take active actions, limited only to the production of reconnaissance by cruisers and destroyer detachments to attack enemy ships. At the same time, they should arrange the sending of one or another with such conditions ... without sending special destroyers together cruisers can be produced ... without obvious danger of being cut off ... "

Alekseev, experienced in intrigues, excellently furnished the case: if the squadron chief action officer did not attack the Japanese - well, he, the vicar had nothing to do with it, because he gave a direct instruction to attack, and the rear admiral did not execute the order. If V.K. Witgeft will risk attacking the Japanese and will suffer defeat with sensitive losses, which means that he violated the orders of the vicegerent without the need not to risk them when they left. And in that extremely unlikely event, if the rear admiral left on the squadron succeeds - well, it’s wonderful at all, most of the laurel wreath in this case will go to Alekseev: it happened “according to his instructions” and V.K. Vitgeft is only the chief of staff of the governor ...

In essence, V.K. Witgeft plunged into a trap. Whatever he did (except, of course, the heroic Victoria over the Japanese fleet) - the fault would lie solely on him. But on the other hand, the direct order to protect the forces entrusted to him no longer dominated him: Admiral Alekseev could not give V.K. Witgeft direct instructions "to sit down and do not stick out", because in this case, the deputy would be accused of inaction of the fleet. Thus, V.K. Witgeft was able to carry out military operations according to his understanding without special violation of the instructions given to him - and this was the only (but extremely important) plus in his unenviable position.

That's just why, in fact, unenviable? After all, the position of S.O. Makarov was no better: he led the squadron at his own peril and risk, but after all he had to answer if he had happened. But only Stepan Osipovich was not afraid of responsibility, but Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft ...

It is not so difficult to assess the actions of the rear admiral for the three months of the squadron command, which also became the last months of his life. Certainly, temporarily, I.D. The squadron commander Rear Admiral Vitgeft did not become a worthy successor of the Makarov traditions. He did not organize the proper training of the crews - of course, the training program was and was executed, but will you learn a lot while anchored? And in the sea for the entire period of his command V.K. Witgeft led the squadron only twice. The first time was June 10, which seemed to be a breakthrough to Vladivostok, but retreated, seeing the Japanese fleet. Again, the rear admiral came out on July 28, when, fulfilling the will of the Emperor, he nevertheless led the squadron entrusted to him for a breakthrough and died in battle, until the last time trying to carry out the order given to him.

Regular fighting? Not at all, the 1 officers had to forget about the dashing, minable night raids in search of the enemy. Periodically, the ships of the Arthur squadron went out to support their own troops with artillery fire, but that was all. Still in the merit of V.K. His efforts to clear the free passage to the sea from mines are usually made to Vitgeft, and this was indeed a worthy deed of an experienced admiral in a minefield. The only problem was that VK Witgeft fought with the investigation (mines), and not with the cause (the ships that set them up). Recall, for example, “Opinions expressed at the meeting of Flagships, land generals and commanders of the ships of the first rank. 14 June 1904 g ":

"The chief of the fortress artillery, Major General Bely, stated the following: that in order to protect the raid from enemy mining and for the free access of the fleet to the sea, as well as walkways along the banks to support the flanks of the fortress, one should not spare projectiles and keep the enemy ships on 40-50 cable . to the fortress what is currently forbidden to him. "

But coastal artillery, in any case, was not a panacea for enemy mines. The word Vl. Semenov, at that time - to the senior officer of the cruiser "Diana":

“So, on the night of May 7, three small ships came and went about their business. The fortress spotlights illuminated them; batteries and boats standing in the aisle fired at them for about half an hour; they boasted that one had exploded, and as a result, in the morning, the boats that had come out for trawling picked up about 40 wooden racks floating on the surface. Obviously, by the number of mines dropped. But these last caught only five. Disappointing! .. "

What is it? Any ships, in view of the squadron ... and no one could do anything? And all because even the Makarov's “trifle”, as a cruiser on the outer roadstead, was abolished by the governor, for “as if something had not happened,” and V.K. Witgeft, though, in the end, decided to restore duty, but not immediately. There was no question of keeping several destroyers ready for a night attack and destroying impudent Japanese during the next mining attempt.

As a result, a vicious circle arose - V.K. Witgeft had every reason to fear the Japanese mines, and only because of this he could not strive to bring his ships to an external raid. Despite all his efforts to organize the trawling (and in this matter, the rear admiral’s management should in no case be underestimated), the waters before Port Arthur turned into a real minefield, which is why during the attack of the port-arthur squadron at sea, 10 June, the squadron battleship Sevastopol was blown up. Sam V.K. Witgeft at the same meeting of the Flagships of June 14 noted:

"... despite the daily trawling for too much a month, on the day of the release, all the vessels were in clear danger of newly delivered mines, from which they are not physically possible to protect themselves, and if only one" Sevastopol ", but did not explode when leaving and setting the anchor "Tsesarevich", "Peresvet", "Askold" and other ships, then it is only God's mercy. "

It is known that 10 June, during the exit of the Arthur squadron, its ships stood at the anchorage in the outer roadstead, and no less than 10 Japanese mines were caught between the ships, so the rear admiral was largely right. But it should be understood that such a density of mine settings was only possible due to the fact that Japanese light ships felt at home around Port Arthur - and who allowed them to do this? Who actually locked up the light forces of the squadron and cruiser in the inner harbor of Port Arthur? First - the governor, and then - Rear Admiral V.K. Witgeft. And despite the fact that the detachment from Bayan, Askold and Novik with the destroyers could have done some pretty dirty tricks on the Japanese even during the period of the squadron's maximum weakness. The Japanese regularly patrolled near Port Arthur with their armored cruisers, and yet all these Matsushima, Sumy and other Akitsushima could neither leave nor fight the Russian squad, and the doggie would not be very good, decide they are in battle. Of course, the Japanese could try to cut off the Russian cruisers from Arthur, but in this case no one prevented them from bringing a pair of battleships to the outer raid for the duration of the operation. In one way or another, it was possible to provide cover for light forces, there would be a desire: but here it is for Rear Admiral V.K. Witgefta and was not.

Squadron battleship "Sevastopol"

It can be assumed that V.K. Witgeft felt temporary. We absolutely know that he did not consider himself capable of leading the powers entrusted to him to victory. It is likely that he saw his main task only to save the ship crew and people by the time of arrival of the current commander of the squadron, and in the viceroy, who soon after leaving, began to “mobilize” the rear admiral for active actions, he saw an obstacle for that he considered it his duty. Judging by the documents available to the author of this article, the viceroy’s expectations were as follows: active operations by cruisers and destroyers (but without undue risk!), Early repair of damaged battleships, but for the time being they are under repair, and the rest cannot be used - remove their guns in favor of the land fortress. Well, there, you see, the new commander arrives in time. If not, wait until all the battleships are ready, return the guns to them and then act according to the situation.

VC. Witgeft was wholeheartedly for disarming the fleet, he was not only armadillos, but also ready to disarm the cruiser (here the governor had to restrain the impulses of his chief of staff) - just to not lead the ships into battle. One can hardly talk about cowardice - apparently, Wilhelm Karlovich was sincerely convinced that he could not achieve anything with active actions and would only fill up the whole thing. Therefore, V.K. Witgeft quite sincerely urged the flagships to accept the famous “Great Charter of the Fleet's Abdication”, as it was later called in Port Arthur, according to which artillery of the battleships should be brought ashore to enhance the defense of the fortress, and the destroyers should now be kept as the eye of the future for future operations. It is possible that V.K. Witgeft really was sure that he was acting for good. But if so, then we can only state: Wilhelm Karlovich did not understand people at all, did not know how and didn’t know how to lead them and, alas, didn’t understand at all what his duty to the Fatherland was.

After all, what was happening on the squadron? C.O. Makarov died, causing general depression, and the etching of the "Makarov" spirit and any initiative during the command of the governor only worsened the situation. But on April 22, the governor left Arthur, and everyone seemed to even sigh with relief, knowing that there certainly would be nothing with the viceroy, but with the new commander ... who knows?

VC. Witgeft should not have been overly concerned about preserving the ships. Well, let's say he would transfer technically sound battleships to the newly appointed squadron commander - then what? What is the use of serviceable battleships if their teams have had less than 40 practice days since the S.O. command since November last year? Makarov? How to defeat a skilled, experienced, numerically and qualitatively superior enemy with such crews? These were the questions that Wilhelm Karlovich had to attend to, and the answers to them were to continue what Stepan Osipovich Makarov began. The only sensible act in place of the new commander would be the resumption of systematic hostilities and the most intensive training of squadron battleships remaining on the move. Moreover, the formal permission for the active actions of V.K. Witgeft received.

Instead, after some three days from taking office, the rear admiral urges the flagships to sign the "Great Charter of the Renunciation of the Fleet." As Vladimir Semenov wrote (“Payment”):

"The protocol began with a statement that in this situation the squadron is not able to have any success in active operations, and therefore until better times all its means should be given to strengthen the defense of the fortress ... The mood on the ships was the most depressed, not many better than on the day of Makarov's death ... the last hopes were falling ... "

26 April, the text of the "Great Charter" became known in the squadron, which dealt a severe blow to its morale, and in less than a week, on May 2, V.К. Witgeft finished it off completely. It's amazing how the new commander managed to turn the only indisputable Russian victory weapons in moral defeat, but he succeeded.

Now there are different views on the role of V.K. Vitgefta in undermining the Japanese battleships "Yashima" and "Hatsuse". For a long time, the opinion prevailed that this success was not due to, but contrary to the actions of the rear admiral, and the matter was made solely thanks to the valor of the Amur mine commander captain 2 rank F.N. Ivanova. But then an assumption arose that the role of V.K. Witgefta is much more important than it was considered. Let's try to figure out what happened after all.

So, after some 4 hours after the departure of the governor of 22 on April, V.K. Witgeft gathered the flagships and captains of the 1 and 2 ranks for the meeting. Apparently, he suggested that they should mine the approaches to the internal raid in order not to miss the Japanese firefighters, but this proposal was rejected. But the second paragraph of the minutes of the meeting read:

"At the first opportunity to put a minefield with transport" Cupid "

However, neither the place nor the time of mine setting was not specified. For some time, everything calmed down, but then the rear admiral was disturbed by the commander of "Amur" captain 2-rank F.N. Ivanov. The fact is that the officers noticed: the Japanese, carrying out the near blockade of Port Arthur, follow the same route over and over again. It was necessary to clarify its coordinates in order not to be mistaken, exposing a mine can. For this kavtorang asked V.K. Witgefta on special orders to observation posts. VC. Witgeft gave such an order:

“Amur” will have to reach the sea and at a distance of 10 miles from the entrance beacon in the near future, put an 50 mine obstacle in the target entrance area, and therefore it is suggested that the duty officers of the signal station (Golden Mountain) watch the enemy’s movement carefully, collecting information from the surrounding posts, and when the duty officer, in accordance with the location of the enemy and his movement, finds that the Amur transport can carry out the aforementioned mission, report to the boat "Brave" to report to Admiral Loshchinsky and transport and "Cupid" "

Several of the observation posts located in various places took the bearings of the Japanese detachment during the last passage of the latter, and this made it possible to accurately determine its route. Now it was necessary to lay mines, and this was a rather difficult task. In the afternoon, Port Arthur had Japanese ships that could sink the Amur or simply notice the laying of mines, which immediately condemned the operation to failure. At night there was a great risk of encountering Japanese destroyers, and besides, it would be difficult to determine the exact location of the minelayer, which caused a great risk of putting mines at all where they should be. The task looked uneasy, and V.K. Witgeft ... withdrew from her decision. The right to determine the exit time of the minzag was delegated to Rear-Admiral Loshchinsky, chief of the mobile and mine defense.

On the morning of May 1, Lieutenant Gadd, who was on duty at the signal station of Golden Mountain, discovered a blocking detachment of Rear Admiral Deva. Gadd interrogated other posts and came to the conclusion that the laying of mines was possible, and he informed the mine defense headquarters and Amur. However, the exit minzaga remained quite risky, why Rear Admiral Loshchinsky did not want to take responsibility for himself - instead of sending Amur to lay mines, he asked for instructions from the squadron headquarters. However, V.K. Apparently, Vitgeft did not crave this responsibility either, since he ordered to tell Loschinsky on the phone:

"The squadron commander ordered the deportation of" Amur "guided by the location of the enemy ships"

But Loschinsky even now didn’t want to send his Amur to his combat mission with his own will. Instead, he, taking with him the mine-commander, went to the meeting - to report to V.K. Witgeftu and ask for his permission. But V.K. Instead of direct instructions, Witgeft answers Loschinsky:

"Mine defense is your business, and if you find it useful and convenient, then send it"

In the end, V.K. Still, Witgeft gave a direct instruction by raising a signal at Sevastopol:

"" Cupid "to go to destination. Walk carefully

It took almost an hour for these altercations, which, however, played a mine statement only on hand - the Japanese ships were moving away from the place of the play. The case was risky - “Amur” was separated from the Japanese by a very small distance and a strip of fog: it could be noticed, in this case the minelayer would be doomed.

But if V.K. Witgeft did not seek to determine the time of the launch of the mines, he determined the exact location of the staging - in 8-9 miles and it is completely incomprehensible what he was guided by. The Japanese couldn’t damage this barrier; they walked more seaward. Admiral did not want to put a barrier outside the territorial waters? But in those years, the zone of territorial waters was considered to be three miles from the coast. In general, the decision is completely inexplicable, but the commander of “Amur” received just such an order and violated it by putting a minefield at 10,5-11 miles away.

The fact of violation of the order was reflected as in the report of F.N. Ivanova V.K. Vitgeftu, and in the report V.K. Witgefta - deputy, and therefore can not cause doubts. Accordingly, it can be argued that the official point of view on this question is correct, and the role of V.K. Witgefta in this operation is small. Of course, he supported (and maybe even put forward) the idea of ​​an active mine setting, and F.N. Ivanov (at his request) to determine the route of the passage of the Japanese troops, but this and all that can be recorded in the asset of the rear admiral.

It is very sad that, having started at least some active actions, V.K. Witgeft could not use them to raise the morale of the squadron. Having laid mines, he simply had to admit that on these mines somebody would blow up and there would be a need to finish off the enemy squad. Moreover, even if no one was blown up, but the ships were “ready for the march and battle” (the battleships could be brought to an external raid), still such readiness to attack the enemy caused great enthusiasm on the squadron. Instead, as Vl. Semenov:

“- On the raid! On the raid! Roll the rest! - shouted and raged around ...
As I believed then, I believe so now: they would be “rolled out”! .. But how was it possible to go to the raid without having any fumes? .. Brilliant, the only one in the whole campaign, the moment was lost ...
... This blunder affected the squadron worse than all the losses.
We will never be able to do anything! Where to us! - hot heads used to say biliously ... Not destiny! - they said more balanced ... And somehow they immediately decided that there was nothing more to wait for, that it remains only to acknowledge the justice written in the "great charter of renunciation" ... I have never seen such a decline in spirit. True, later the mood got stronger again, but it was already on the basis of the determination to fight, in any case and in any situation, as it were necessary, as if "spite" someone ... "

Even when the success of the mine setting became apparent, V.K. Witgeft was still hesitating - the cruisers did not receive an order to raise pairs at all, and the destroyers only with a great delay. The first explosion under the stern of "Hatsuse" sounded in 09.55, the Russian destroyers were able to enter the external raid only after 13.00. The result did not hesitate: the Japanese took the damaged Yasima in tow and left, driving the destroyers off with cruisers. If temporarily I.D. Rear-Admiral Vitgeft had a squadron commander under the destroyers and cruisers at the time of the blast, their joint attack could have finished not only with Yasima, but perhaps also of Sikisima, because at the first moment after the blasting the Japanese panicked, opening fire by water (assuming they were attacked by submarines). Yes, and the later actions of Japanese sailors betrays their strongest psychological shock. “Hatsuse” died in view of Port Arthur, “Yasima” was led to the island of Encounter Rock, but according to the official Japanese history of the war at sea, it soon became clear that the possibilities of fighting for the survivability of the battleship were exhausted. The ship was anchored in a solemn atmosphere, to the cries of "Banzai!", The portrait of the Emperor was carried out, and then the whole crew of the battleship organizedly went aboard the cruiser "Suma".

Squadron battleship "Yashima"

But this is according to official history, but the report of the British observer, naval attache, Captain W. Päckinham, contains a “slightly different” vision of those events. According to S.A. Balakin in “Mikasa” and others ... Japanese battleships 1897 — 1905 ”:

"According to some information, Yasima remained afloat until the morning of the next day, and several ships were sent to rescue an abandoned battleship already on May 3 ... In general, the story of Yasima reminds us of the death of the Boyarin cruiser three months earlier. ”

Only by a timely attack, the Russians had good chances to increase the number of dead Japanese battleships from two to three. But even if this did not happen, there is no doubt that 3 in May, the 1 th squadron of the Pacific Ocean could, if not crush the Japanese supremacy at sea, then it was essential to shake it and strike a powerful blow, seriously confusing all the Japanese cards. If on that day the Russian fleet was led by a resolute admiral capable of taking risks, then ...

Imagine for a second that on the eve of May 2 in K.V. Witgefta would be infused with the spirit of Admiral F.F. Ushakov - what could happen in this case? At dawn, all the Russian ships took to the outer raid - if they could get close to the Japanese squadron after an explosion at the mines of their battleships or not, the question was fortunate, and let's say that they failed, and the Sikishima with the cruisers left. But it is obvious that after the “confusion”, the Japanese will come into confusion, since the Commander of the United Fleet simply will not be ready for the death of two of its battleships without the slightest damage to the Russian fleet - which means it's time to strike at the site of the Japanese landing at Bitszyo!

Surprisingly, but the fact is that such a move had excellent chances for success. Indeed, literally several hours before the blast on the Russian mines Yasima and Khatsuse, the armored cruiser Kasuga rammed the armored decking Yosino. The latter immediately went to the bottom, but the Kasuga also got it - the ship was heavily damaged, and another armored cruiser, the Yakumo, was forced to haul the Kasuga in Sasebo for repairs. Kamimura, with his armored cruisers, was looking for the Vladivostok detachment at that time, since Kheyhatiro Togo quite reasonably believed that to block the weakened Arthur squadron his 6 squadron battleships and three armored cruisers would be more than enough. And indeed - 2 May V.K. Witgeft could lead into battle only three battleships, an armored and four armored cruisers, and 16 destroyers, and such forces, of course, had nothing to dream of crushing the backbone of the United Fleet.

But on May 2 everything changed, and the absence of Kamimura with his 2 squad could play a bad joke with Togo: on this day, the United Fleet forces were scattered, and he could immediately throw into battle 3 battleship, 1-2 armored cruisers (and rather, all the same), several armored decks, yes 20 destroyer units - i.e. roughly equivalent to the Russian forces. Yes, of course, Mikasa, Asahi and Fuji were stronger than Peresvet, Poltava and Sevastopol, but the 28 battle of July 1904 r testified irrefutably - at that time the Russian battleships were able to withstand hours of battle with the Japanese, without losing combat capability. Moreover, according to Vl. Semenov’s attack on Bitszyvo by the ships remaining in the ranks of the ships were discussed in a lively manner by the officers of the squadron:

“In the mess-rooms, such a plan was hotly debated. Using the spring weather (light mists often came up), get out of Arthur as imperceptibly as possible, crush the transport fleet and come back, of course, with a fight, as the Japanese will undoubtedly try not to let us back. It would not even be a fight, but a breakthrough into its own, albeit blocked, port. Of course, we would have suffered greatly, but damage in artillery combat is always easier than mine holes: when repairing them, you can usually do without a dock or a caisson, which means by the time the Crown Prince, Retvizan and Victory "- we will again be in full force. Finally, even if the battle came out decisive and unhappy for us, if our main forces were almost destroyed, it would have fallen to the Japanese! They would have to leave for a long time and thoroughly repaired, and then in what position would an army be landed, which we (by the number of transports) determined approximately 30 thousand? .. Without reserves, without a wagon train, it would be forced to retreat to Yalu to connect with the existing there are troops ... "

And if such actions were discussed when Togo had six battleships, now, when he had only three at his disposal ... and even four, if Sikisime could join the main forces before the Russian ships approached Bitszyo? In any case, as long as the main forces of both squadrons would have tied each other in combat, the armored "Bayan", with the support of armored "six thousand meters", could easily have broken through and attacked the landing site. It is extremely doubtful that her immediate cover, the old men of “Matsushima” and “Chin-Yen” under the command of Vice-Admiral S. Kataoka could stop them.

Perhaps such an attack would not have been successful, but it would have the most significant impact on the Japanese command. What can I say - only a timid exit of the Russian squadron 10 June, when VK Vitgeft did not dare to fight with the Japanese and retreated because of the enemy to the external raid under the cover of coastal artillery caused a certain change in the plans of the Japanese command - the very next day after the squadron sailed into the sea, the army commanders were notified:

“The fact that the Russian fleet can leave Port Arthur has been realized: the transportation of food by sea, which is necessary for the Manchurian armies, is endangered, and it would be imprudent for the 2 Army to move north of Haizhou at the present time. The Liaoyang battle, which was supposed to occur before the onset of the rains, was postponed for a period of time after their end.

And what effect could the decisive battle of the main forces have at that time, almost because of the landing site?

However, all these are only unrealized opportunities and we cannot know what they could lead to: all of the above is nothing more than a despised by many genre of alternative history. Nevertheless, the author of this article considers it appropriate to show how really wide the choice of solutions was for VK. Witgefta, and how modestly he took advantage of the opportunities presented to him.

Returning to the real story, it should be noted that during the period of command of V.K. Witgefta did a good job at the port facilities, and even the repairmen: the work on damaged battleships was carried out very quickly and efficiently. But can it be credited to a rear admiral? The fact is that 28 in March 1904 was a naval officer, who previously commanded the battleship Tsesarevich, received production in the rear admirals and was appointed commander of the port of Port Arthur. This officer was distinguished by his extraordinary management, reorganized the work of the port facilities, which made the fleet not aware of any problems with coal, or with materials, or with repair work. His name was Ivan Konstantinovich Grigorovich, as it is known, he later became Minister of the Navy: and I must say that if he was not the best, then he was one of the best ministers in the entire history of the Russian State. Also in no case should not forget that S.O. Makarov brought along with him one of the best domestic ship engineers - N.N. Kuteynikov, who immediately took an active part in the repair of damaged ships. Such subordinates should not have ordered what to do - it was enough for them not to interfere, so that the work was done in the best possible way.

Thus, we can already with the usual sadness state that V.K. Vitgeft did not cope with the duties of the squadron chief - he did not want and could not organize either crew training or systematic combat, and did not prevent the landing of the Japanese army that threatened the Russian fleet base Port Arthur. In addition, he completely failed to prove himself as a leader, and his actions to disarm the fleet in favor of the fortress and the inability to use the gift of Fate (which this time appeared in the person of Amur mine-laying commander FN Ivanov) had a very negative effect on the combat the spirit of the squadron.

But by the beginning of June, the damaged battleships were back in service - now the Russians had 6 squadron battleships against four Japanese, and it was time to do something ...

Продолжение следует ...

Comments

[Schultz]

Let us remember the brothers of the heroes of the Shantung battle with the Tsesarevich, who died in private and in council:
- Rear Admiral Vitgeft Wilhelm Karlovich - Commander of the 1st Pacific Squadron,
- Lieutenant Azariev 1st Nikolai Nikolaevich,
- Lieutenant Dragichevich-Nikshich Sergey Vasilievich,
- midshipman Ellis 3rd Oleg Nikolaevich,
- Captain for Admiralty Potresov Alexei Fedorovich - died (24.10.) in Port Arthur,
- Lieutenant Korobkov Modest Sergeevich - junior mechanical engineer - died (02.11.) in Port Arthur,
12 n.h. died, including:
Akinfiev Kondraty Andreevich - signalman,
Ivanishin Grigory Danilovich - miner,
Zheltov Nikita Filippovich - sailor 2 tbsp.,
Pasenyuk Nikander Ilarionovich - galvaner, Petrov Ivan - signalman, Piryanov Yakov Ivanovich - sailor 2 tbsp., Plyasovsky Vasily Fedorovich - sailor 1 tbsp. (Died 25.07),
Rukhva Wilhelm Sanderovich - Mars, Rybakov Fedor - the commandant - died (15.10),
Savenko Vasily Ivanovich - sailor 1 tbsp.,
Urinaev Fedor - sailor 1 tbsp., Died (29.10.),
Ermish Andrey - botsm.sign.

[avt]

However, the exit of the minzag remained risky enough, so Rear Admiral Loshchinsky did not want to take responsibility - instead of sending Amur to lay mines, he requested instructions from the squadron headquarters. However, V.K. Witgeft, apparently, also did not want this responsibility, because he ordered to inform Loshchinsky by phone:

Bravo Andrey! Cool painted what you and I for some reason argued BEFORE writing the monograph! This throwing off of responsibility, God forbid, failure hangs on it, but luck is not necessary, with VRIO and further down, there is the most important fact that there simply could not be success! Well, that very one - man-made by the will of the naval commander and his subordinates who believe in him. Everything was thrown at the "will of God", the classic Russian ABOS, SKY, well, the result - take a bite A good, thoughtful cycle. The conclusions of the monograph can only be disputed with the texture in hand. But why are they stuck in the heading "weapons"! ?? This is a clear story!

[Nehist]

I repeat again !!! Alekseev gave Amur Commander exclusive powers !!! In the first part I even cited an excerpt from the order with a number and a link to archival documents !!! And in general, gentlemen! How many of you are Far Easterners? For 30 years I’ve been working on the topic of RPE, I have such a hobby because I live here, I can go Novik’s tools to kick. I will repeat once again !!! Did not obey Loshchinsky !!!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Nehist

I will repeat once again !!! Did not obey Loshchinsky !!!

You wrote

And as far as I remember, Alekseev in the order of 16.04.1904 gave Ivanov broad powers to ensure mine sweeping operations on the squadron, that is, Ivanov did not actually obey Loshchinsky

Firstly - "as far as I remember", and secondly, I myself have not found anything like that.

[Nehist]

Well, the order itself is not difficult to find

[Comrade]

Quote: Nehist

I can go Novik’s tools to kick.

Well, they would have taken a few pictures, to see the hunt.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: avt

Bravo Andrey

Thank you!

Quote: avt

Cool painted what you and I argued for some reason BEFORE writing a monograph

Then I had questions about this episode, but now, thanks to the help of one very knowledgeable and respected person, whose knowledge of RYAV is many times higher than mine, and who writes comments on this site under the pseudonym "Comrade" - the puzzle has developed :)))

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Then I had questions about this episode, but now, thanks to the help of one very knowledgeable and respected person, whose knowledge of RYAV is many times higher than mine, and who writes comments on this site under the pseudonym "Comrade" - the puzzle has developed :))

You do it great. He himself somehow had a little thought against the backdrop of Kaptsovskoy obstinacy to speak out on the subject of opposing armor and shell, but the only drawback that people willingly agree was defeated - laziness Evidently, Oleg was a little lacking in obstinacy so that desire prevailed over me

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Rurikovich

He himself somehow had a little thought against the backdrop of Kaptsovskoy obstinacy to speak out on the subject of opposing armor and shell, but the only drawback that people willingly agree was defeated - laziness

Too bad :))) I would read with pleasure :)

[Alex_59]

And then they write, saying that all sorts of people arranged for a revolution — everything was good in RI, quiet, grace. RI would have been without these revolutions — the thriving prosperous country, all the damned Bolsheviks had ruined. And you start to dig - sadness. There is no smoke without fire, it turns out not everything was so rosy then, as the monarchists think.

The cycle is good, there is nothing even to write in the comments, exhaustively and excitingly.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Alex_59

The cycle is good, there is nothing even to write in the comments, exhaustively and excitingly.

Thank! Well ... I think that already in the next article there will be something to write in the comments - I'm going to move one very heretical thought there :))))

[Mooh]

Heretical thought we look forward to. So far, everything is very interesting, but quite predictable.

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I'm going to move one very heretical thought there :))))

As a speaker, you have every right And we will read, discuss, condemn, and so on in the text, for we have the right to discuss what is submitted to the audience

[alekc73]

In the article, Admiral Witgeft looks like a complete ignoramus in military affairs. The question is how he rose to the rank of admiral.

[avt]

Quote: alekc73

In the article, Admiral Witgeft looks like a complete ignoramus in military affairs. The question is how he rose to the rank of admiral.

Elementary Watson, as soon as you become familiar with the system of obtaining ranks and the so-called maritime qualifications.

[Nehist]

Witgeft was a competent person, but alas, a staff officer. Sorry, but the battalion commander and division chief of staff are very different positions !!! if you begin to put the battalion’s headquarters on a battalion, it’s just crap !!! Because to plan and execute very different things !!!

[Monarchist]

No special mind is required to follow the guidelines. Even Peter1 wrote: "You must look dashing and a little silly, so as not to confuse the commander with the mind"

[Alex_59]

Quote: alekc73

In the article, Admiral Witgeft looks like a complete ignoramus in military affairs. The question is how he rose to the rank of admiral.

Yes, God bless him, with the title, they give the title for length of service, but the position! Com fleet! I’m now studying the beginning of the Second World War. There was such a front commander - Kuznetsov F.I. That's how he became a front commander, without commanding either a division, an army, a corps, or a brigade, and not being in the army for 8 years before being assigned to the most important border region from the point of view of the country's defense? So I also think - how? But! Miracle and only.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alex_59

There was such a front commander - Kuznetsov F.I. That's how he became a front commander, without commanding either a division, an army, a corps, or a brigade, and not being in the army for 8 years before being assigned to the most important border region from the point of view of the country's defense?

Heh heh heh ... how do you like the Minister of the Empire of the Empire who commanded a maximum of a detachment of ships of the naval corps?

At the end of the marine corps, it was made in 1878 in midshipmen.
In 1878-1881 he was circumnavigating the clipper "Dzhigit".
In 1884 he graduated from the course of the Nikolaev Maritime Academy in the shipbuilding department, promoted to the rank of lieutenant;
since 1886, sailed in the Baltic Sea and abroad.
In 1895, he was promoted to captain of the 2nd rank and appointed senior officer of the cruiser Svetlana.
In 1899 he was appointed commander of the Brave boat, which was being built at the St. Petersburg Admiralty Plant.
Appointed as the commander of the training ship Verny, Voevodsky sailed in 1902-1903 in a detachment of ships of the marine corps.
In 1904 he was appointed head of the training team quartermaster and commander of the 1st rank cruiser "Duke of Edinburgh" and promoted to captain of the 1st rank.
In 1906, he commanded a detachment of ships of the marine corps and in August of the same year he was appointed head of the naval academy and director of the marine corps; at this post, the Voivodship was promoted to rear admiral in 1907 and enlisted in His Majesty's retinue.
In 1908 he was appointed fellow minister of the sea,
in 1909 - Minister of the Sea and promoted to vice admiral.

KR, KL, training ship, training cruiser, detachment of ships of the marine corps, director of the marine corps, EIV suite - and here he is, the future naval minister.

[Nehist]

So I just rudely and simply described on the example of a battalion

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Alex_59

Miracle and only

Or maybe the miracle is that the natural mind can replace education, but no education can replace the natural mind Therefore, some "comrades" reach the ranks of the ranks, while being at the same time with an empty head (qualification and length of service ), and some thanks to their intelligence and other positive qualities make full use of the chance given to them to leave a mark on history and respect for posterity

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

So I wrote in the first part of the cycle :))))

[uskrabut]

This is if you do something, you can do something wrong. And if you don’t do anything, then you won’t do anything wrong.

[Nehist]

Andrew!!! You apparently poorly studied the material precisely on the landing of the Japanese !!! I don’t remember the number of the directive ... But it was directly said there to send the tricks under the cover of cruisers to attack transports! As a result, Askold, Novik and some other little thing came out .. But when faced with a squad of Uriu who was directly responsible for escorting and landing, they retreated.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Nehist

You apparently poorly studied the material precisely on the landing of the Japanese !!! I don’t remember the number of the directive ... But it was directly said there to send the tricks under the cover of cruisers to attack transports! As a result, Askold, Novik and some other little thing came out ..

I think you're talking about some other episode right now

[Nehist]

About landing in Badzivo

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Well, for example, MK Askold directly stated that in April he did not go to sea and his first exit was the cover of Amur on May 5.

[murriou]

Special thanks to the author not only for the article itself, but also for direct links to previous articles in the series.

And by the way, is there now an opportunity with a new, damn, engine to find a complete list (with links) of articles for each author?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: murriou

Special thanks to the author not only for the article itself, but also for direct links to previous articles in the series

Please! Now I try to do this all the time, but sometimes I forget

[Mooh]

Elementary Watson. Just like on the old one. In the comments, find the author, get into his profile and see all the publications.

[murriou]

Well, in general, yes, you can calculate the author among the participants in the discussion, or know in advance is also good.
There are probably other tricky ways.

But the article is signed with a full name, which may have nothing to do with a nickname on the forum. And in place of the creators of the forum, I would give the author’s signature as a link by which you can go to the full collected works.

[Nehist]

Andrew!!! Your last quote on 6 versus 4 just killed !!! 6 EDB we will analyze !! except Retvisan and Tsesarevech there were no implanted EDBs, it was limited to Poltava and Sevastopol! One has a problem with a machine, another with guns !!! Relight with Victory on the EDB is clearly not pulling ... But there is a big but !!! If they could walk as fast as they were designed ... the ships were wonderful !!! The same DBK did not put in line from a good life. They didn’t shoot either at the head but at the turn on the terminal ships, as can be seen from the popodiya table

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Nehist

Your last quote on 6 versus 4 just killed !!!

(taking a textbook of necromancy from a shelf) Wait, now ... we will help

Quote: Nehist

6 EDB we will analyze !! except Retvisan and Tsesarevech there were no implanted EDBs, it was limited to Poltava and Sevastopol! One has a problem with a machine, another with guns !!! Relight with Victory on the EDB is clearly not pulling ..

Yes, you don’t have to disassemble anything, I wrote about this in the second part :)) But nevertheless, they were all considered to be the EDB and they all went into operation, so it would be time to make the Japanese some kind of slam :)))

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Nehist

Your last quote on 6 versus 4 just killed !!! 6 EDB we will analyze !! except Retvisan and Tsesarevech there were no implanted EDBs, it was limited to Poltava and Sevastopol! One has a problem with a machine, another with guns !!! Relight with Victory on the EDB is clearly not pulling ... But there is a big but !!! If they could walk as fast as they were designed ... the ships were wonderful !!! The same DBK did not put in line from a good life. They didn’t shoot either at the head but at the turn on the terminal ships, as can be seen from the popodiya table

Alexander, the battleship is a conglomerate of characteristics depending on the displacement and the year of manufacture (because the year of manufacture affects the quality of the materials from which the armor, vehicles and, which is very important, weapons) are made. Let's analyze ours, and find out what is important here. And it is imperative that they all already had modern art for their time. And if combat training was more or less adjusted, then in the weight of the volley, the advantage would be on our side, because combat training implies not only accuracy, but also coordination in service, which affects the rate of fire. And even if the lower rate of fire of ours was straightened out at the expense of the 8-254-mm guns "Peresvet" and "Victory". If the "Navarin" were part of the Arthurians with their old cannons in unbalanced towers, then I would not count him as a combat unit either. And therefore we do not consider "Victory" as battleships? They had a 229mm belt. Are the extremities not protected? So they were not protected in many battleships. The speed, fortunately, allowed them to walk on an equal footing with the new "Tsarevich" and "Retvizan". And in battle, when the matelots shoot, depending on the situation, at the neighbors, they held the blow well. Even if the caliber is smaller, the difference between 12 and 10 inches is not as significant as between 12 and 8 inches. Speed? Yes, “Poltava” with “Sevastopol” were not such walkers as the four described above. But they at least confidently kept the same 13-14 knots of the squadron speed. In contrast to the Baltic "Tsushima" with their 9 nodes. So Andrey is right here that we had 6 EBRs against 4. At the time of the battle. And I will even say more - before the second part of the battle, when the Japanese were catching up with ours, had the same Vitgeft of desire and brains, it was not possible to go for a "breakthrough" stupidly, but to arrange the same head coverage and concentrate the fire of all battleships on the head Japanese. Just turn to the right and that's it - classic T. But this is so, a personal invention. After all, it was not we who were on the bridges ... And Andrei answers this question "Why did they not do that" with today's article about V.K. Witgefta

[Nehist]

About Grigorevich !!! If he is so wonderful then why the hell did he raise him with the rank of head of the port? Or maybe it would be better if the younger flagship instead of Ukhtomsky? Makarov signed orders !!! So it was not in vain that he wrote off such a military officer from the boat to the shore? Andrey, you sometimes contradict yourself

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Nehist

About Grigorevich !!! If he is so wonderful then why the hell did he raise him with the rank of head of the port? Or maybe it would be better if the younger flagship instead of Ukhtomsky? Makarov signed orders !!!

That's it. And the sensible head of the port was Makarov much more useful than the younger flagship. In arthur - a super responsible position, and you will remember what mess there was going on before Grigorovich (Semenov described)

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

and you will remember what mess was going on there before Grigorovich (Semenov described)

The mess in MorVed was happening everywhere. Most of all, I liked the epic with the assembly of fighters of the "Falcon" type on the Far East:

On November 4, the steamer left for its intended purpose, and only in December in Vladivostok they received copies of contracts, from which it followed that collapsible "falcons" were being built for the Vladivostok port, and in Port Arthur - a telegraphic notification about the assembly of destroyers in this port!

On January 9, 1900, the commander of the Vladivostok port asks to clarify "the contradictions regarding the place of the destroyer assembly"

On January 11, the head of the GUKiS, Vice-Admiral V.P. Verkhovsky, informs Vladivostok: "9 collapsibles are being assembled by the Nevsky plant in Port Arthur";

On January 18, the head of the Izhora plant announced his intention to send engineer Vologdin to Vladivostok to assemble three Sokol-class destroyers;

On January 20, the GUKiS asks to report "the size and number of boathouses for the upcoming assembly of four destroyers 190 feet long, whether there are devices for boring the brackets, what size and how many covered lockable sheds you can give for work." (Note: all this should have been figured out at least a year ago.)

January 30 was followed by a brief, but full of hidden rage, response from Vladivostok signed by Vice Admiral G.P. Chukhnin: "There are no boathouses, workshops, sheds, and loans for their construction too."
The next day follows a telegram from the chief of the GUKiS to the commander of the Vladivostok port: "The destroyers will be assembled in Port Arthur, so send the previous telegram there by mail to provide the required information."

The time has come for the Chief and Commander of the Kwantung Region and the Pacific Marine Forces, Vice Admiral E.I. Alekseev, to join the controversy: on March 4, he reports to the head of the Marine Ministry his opinion on the upcoming arrival of the steamer Normania with four collapsible destroyers, GUKiS is to be taken in Port Arthur "probably for assembly". Emphasizing that earlier he did not have "any instructions on this subject", Alekseev writes that for the assembly of destroyers it will be necessary to build boathouses, workshops, sheds on the Tiger Tail Peninsula, and this is associated with great costs and time, and given the "imperfect improvement of Port Arthur Admiralty ", the work on their construction" will cause serious damage and delay in the correction of defects in the ships of the squadron, "on the basis of which he considers it" more correct to assemble these destroyers in Vladivostok. "

On March 6, the head of the GUKiS followed: "The head of the Marine Ministry ordered to inform that a year ago it was decided to assemble collapsible destroyers in Arthur, for which the Nevsky Plant will arrange slipways, workshops, and send people. The plan is being worked out. There are no funds in the Vladivostok port. , he asks to assemble the hulls of the four already sent, if possible, without prejudice to the defective squadron. "

And that was far from the end ...

[Nehist]

Rear-Admiral Greve whom Makarov wrote off to Vladivostok ... Created such a fortress !!! You should have seen all this ... At one time I even serviced some buildings from the time of the REV

[Nehist]

About training !!! In the instructions there are more than 200 all sorts of teachings. Witgeft I repeat I was once again an excellent staff officer but not to practitioners ... Makarov, by the way, too !!!
Now you can throw stones at me !!!

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Nehist

In the instructions there are more than 200 all sorts of teachings. Witgeft I repeat I was once again an excellent staff officer but not to practitioners ... Makarov, by the way, too !!!

So Vitgeft was given the opportunity to test his calculations in practice, as a staff officer. So much I know from real contractual service, the Chief of Staff is almost the second person in the state, because he is directly involved in planning and must know all the pros and cons of the operation, as well as when the commander is disabled, the Chief of Staff takes command by default, if it is not agreed upon separately. And since the personality of Vitgeft was much weaker than Makarov, then Makarov in the month allotted to him by fate did much more than Vitgeft in the three months allotted to him. At the same time, if Makarov, on the contrary, tried to do something, then Vitgeft not only did not try, but also destroyed "by the will of God" Makarov's undertakings. It's about the role of personality in history

[ser56]

Enlighten on the points, what did COM?

[27091965]

sending destroyers together with cruisers can be done ... without the obvious danger of being cut off ... "

Hello Andrey. On the question of landing assault, there are reports of commanders of destroyer squads. They didn’t expect anything good for our troops.

"Leader of the 1st Destroyer Detachment Captain 2nd Rank Elisѣev, in his note, gave the following reasons:
1. Taking into account that the distance to this place by direct courses is about 60 miles, adding to this time to exit, collect, bypass obstacles and search for an enemy about 2 hours, it follows that such an expedition will take 12 hours, that is, when conditions to return to development, it is necessary to leave Arthur at 4 pm.
2. In view of the close blockade, it’s inconceivable to leave the destroyers in the afternoon.
3. Destroyers will not have the opportunity to fully engage in the fulfillment of the main task of attacking transports at night, since: 1) due to the extremely difficult and long-lasting due to the flooded fire-ships of the exit, they must immediately enter into battle with the blocking destroyers, with what enter in turn and by mѣrѣ exit; 2) whoever succeeds in breaking through will have to enter the battle again with security ships at transports and only after that approach the main target and far from the number that was supposed to be. After this, we cannot return to Arthur or Dalny, as it will be day. "

In addition, for the cruisers to exit, it was necessary to put a boat with signalmen near each flooded transport. In this situation, I do not think that this operation could bring results. Moreover, out of 2 destroyer detachments, only 2 were suitable at that time for operation.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: 27091965i

Hello Andrey.

And all the best to you, Igor!

Quote: 27091965i

On the question of landing assault, there are reports of commanders of destroyer squads

There is, but what is in it?

Quote: 27091965i

that is, under the condition of returning to development, one must leave Arthur at 4 p.m.

Why go back before dawn? Who prevented the returning destroyers from meeting with "heavy forces" of three EBRs inclusive?

Quote: 27091965i

In view of the close blockade, it’s inconceivable to leave the destroyers in the afternoon.

And who was stopping the withdrawal of the fleet's forces and hammering on the blocking detachment, thereby covering the exit of the destroyers?
The fact is that the commanders gave an assessment of the purely destroyer operation, and this should have been a fleet operation, if only if only the destroyers went to Bizzyvo.
Eh, I was not there

[27091965]

and it was supposed to be a fleet operation

"A strategic result from the exit of even the entire squadron can not be expected, and therefore the question of the best use of the combat force of the fleet involuntarily arises. You can go out, enter into a glorious and mortal battle, but with Arthur this will not lift the siege. Our fleet may be ours, The enemy's hands are untied. The squadron going from Russia will not be able to join. If Arthur is taken, the fleet will also perish, and therefore, considering that now the existence of the fleet is inextricably linked with the preservation of Arthur in our hands, the defense of Arthur off the dry road, is of paramount importance not only in the sense of protecting the honor of Russia, but also in the sense of the favorable outcome of the entire war for us, both on land and at sea, and therefore the fleet should with all its forces contribute to the land defense, both by people and and armed, in no case stopping at half-mounds. "


A joint meeting of army and navy officials prevented a decision. Well, but seriously, the main reason, as it seems to me, is the division of the army and navy into two separate departments, each defended its interests, thinking about the ultimate goal in favorable conditions.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: 27091965i

Strategic results cannot be expected even from the entire squadron.

Recession, but what are the general battles? Well, I’m taking a simple example - May 1
On the morning of May 1, the blockade of Port Arthur was carried out by a detachment of Rear Admiral Deva consisting of the battleship Fuji, the armored cruisers Yakumo and Kasuga, the cruisers Chitose and Yosino. further away, so that the destroyers went into the raid?

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Well, really, the strength of our three armadillos was not enough to scare them away,

Quite enough, but all thoughts were occupied by the land front. Even donkeys were bought to communicate ships with the front. In general, they did not do their own thing. In addition, the decision was taken collectively, which means that there is no one to take responsibility.

[Rurikovich]

The author in this part explains what he represented, in his opinion (and based on the documents that the namesake possesses), V.K. Witgeft, as a commander. This will be very important when the battle itself is likely to be described. I fully support , because it is always necessary to approach the description and derivation of results carefully, taking into account many facts. Then the steps that a person, due to his character and circumstances, will take in his place in a certain situation will be understood.
The fact that the Arthur squadron had the opportunity to make, if not a radical change, then at least inflict heavy damage on the Japanese, is already a story and its lesson is that a lot depends on the personality of the commander. But again, history does not know the subjunctive mood, and at that moment many contradictions characteristic of the leadership in the Russian Empire ruled the commander’s brains, and they won. Therefore, he decided not to take risks and in any case rely on God The result, as we already know, is sad. Morality - trust in God, but do not condone yourself. It is now possible to argue, like, you are the most important, everyone has disappeared, so act. But at that moment we were not there and it was not for us to draw conclusions. We can only analyze, study and fantasize a little about "if only if only" ...
Authors chic plus
We look forward to continuing!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Rurikovich

for it is always necessary to approach the description and derivation of results carefully, taking into account many facts. Then the steps that a person, by virtue of character and circumstances, takes in its place in a certain situation will be understood.

Gold words! That is why I have been sneaking up on the battle for so long :)))

[Comrade]

The only problem was that V.K. Witgeft fought with the investigation (mines), and not with the cause (the ships that set them)

An interesting incident happened on June 26, 1904, with one of the Japanese steamers laying mines near Port Arthur. The vessel, under the cover of the battleship "Asahi", which was a hundred yards away, was in broad daylight laying drifting mines when one of the "products" exploded on it. The feed of the minelayer immediately went under the water, the foremast fell from the shock and the wheelhouse collapsed, collapsing. Three mines were thrown overboard by the force of the explosion, and a steady list was formed. The car stopped and the steering gear was destroyed. Three groups were organized from the crew members, one was engaged in extinguishing the fire, the second was busy with the anchor device, the third, as if nothing had happened, began to throw mines overboard, which were then shot by cannon and machine-gun fire.
Earlier, on June 13, a similar incident took place at the Taiho-Maru minelayer. According to a report from British observer Pakenham, a mine filled with 50 pounds (almost 23 kg) of shimosa exploded there.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Greetings, colleague!

Quote: Comrade

An interesting incident occurred on June 26, 1904 with one of the Japanese steamboats that set mines near Port Arthur.

But not surprising - nevertheless, the mine business was still not set up too well, and indeed specialized mines are needed here.

[Comrade]

Dear Andrey, it was similar in our case near Port Arthur, once a mine raft exploded, people died.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Dear Valentine, yes, I heard sorry for people, but what can you do here? It's no business to lay mines from mine rafts, but the technique was then. Whether the case is "Cupid" ... and it is a pity that the "Yenisei" was lost immediately. And in WWI, the "Crab" was already laying mines from the underwater position "to the delight" of the Turks on the Black Sea.

[Comrade]

Quote: Nehist

Alekseev gave Amur Commander exclusive powers! I will repeat once again !!! Did not obey Loshchinsky!

This is not entirely true. According to the order of the Governor No. 21 of April 16, 1904, "the management of trawling work, as the most important thing," was entrusted to the Chief of Defense of the Raid and Entrance to Port Arthur. Directly sweeping work and monitoring them were assigned to the captain of the II rank F.N. Ivanov 6th. Consequently, Rear Admiral M.F. Loshchinsky carried out a general trawling guidanceand Ivanov - direct trawling, guided by the instructions received from the Viceroy and the circular of his headquarters No. 59.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Thank! I'll know:)

[Comrade]

Thank you, you have described great the situation in which Vitgeft found himself through the efforts of Alekseev. Everything is laid out on shelves, it is a pleasure to read.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

We are trying! :) And once again, let me thank you for your help with the episode of the mine setting of "Cupid" - if not for you, this article would not be good.

[unknown]

1. About Grigorovich.
I propose to recall another head of the port: Rudnev.
Becoming the commander of "Varyag" destroyed everything that was possible.
In battle, "Varyag" proved its complete superiority in fire performance, but it is not enough to release a shell, it would be necessary to hit.
There is another problem with the speed of the course. After leaving the repair on October 16.10.1903, 20,5, the cruiser showed a speed of 15 knots. The vaunted Japanese "miracle cruisers" in real life went from 17 to 27.01.1904 knots for a long time. But most commentators argue that by the battle of 14/XNUMX/XNUMX the Varyag could not make more than XNUMX knots.
This is how it was necessary to try to ruin the service and kill the mechanical part in three and a few months.
2. Again in the article flashed that "Fuji" is stronger, presumably more powerful than "Sevastopoli". What a fright. The Japanese battleship was built according to an outdated design. Main battery mounts with low rate of fire. Most of the medium artillery is protected only by shields. The extremities are covered only with carapace. Speed, REAL, not paper - only 15 knots. Against this background, "Sevastopoli" look quite at the level. And if we add the problems common to all Japanese ships with cordite charges and a large mass of 6 inch shells for Japanese sailors, then ...
PS Actually, with such a mass of a medium-sized Japanese sailor, even a 140mm caliber with a projectile mass of 37 kg did not solve a particular problem.
In this case, the American 127mm caliber would be optimal, but the Japanese needed it like everyone else, that is, the leading maritime powers, primarily Great Britain.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ignoto

I propose to recall another head of the port: Rudnev.

Those. on the topic you have nothing more to say, and for some reason you start the old and dull trolling about Rudnev?

Quote: ignoto

Becoming the commander of "Varyag" destroyed everything that was possible.

Rather, I pulled everything I could after the previous commander

Quote: ignoto

In battle, "Varyag" proved its complete superiority in fire performance, but it is not enough to release a shell, it would be necessary to hit.

Taking into account the departure of more than half of the old-time commandants and the lawmaking of the Varyag in Chemulpo, where the latter simply did not have the opportunity to train, your application is worthless.

Throughout March, while remaining on an external raid, the Varangian was busy with intense combat training. Almost every day, following the combat alert signal, the artillery exercises of the commandants began, after which they engaged in the material part of artillery and the training of specialists, training in determining distances with a range finder, fire and water alarms. More than once, piercing the darkness of the night, the sharp rays of the Varyaga searchlights glided through the raid, looking for attacking mine boats among the waves. Often received night orders from the flagship, for example, immediately put the patch on an imaginary hole. The execution of the order was reported with a digital signal 0106 - the night callsign of the cruiser. Continued on the cruiser and stem firing (up to 250-300 rounds per day)

So it goes.

Quote: ignoto

After leaving the repair on October 16.10.1903, 20,5, the cruiser showed a speed of 15 knots. The vaunted Japanese "miracle cruisers" in real life went from 17 to 27.01.1904 knots for a long time. But most commentators argue that by the battle of 14/XNUMX/XNUMX the Varyag could not make more than XNUMX knots.
This is how it was necessary to try to ruin the service and kill the mechanical part in three and a few months

We read Melnikov, we’ll be enlightened :) In fact, the cruiser had problems with speed before Rudnev, and the repair of the ship in Port Arthur did not improve the situation

At the end of June, apparently desperate in the success of the Varyag repair, Admiral E.I. Alekseev sends a lengthy report to the head of the Ministry of the Sea with a statement of all Varyag’s misfortunes and a message about the failure of the first bulkhead of the mechanisms by the port’s workshops, due to bringing the cruiser's top speed to 17 knots.

TsGA Navy, f. 417, op. 1, d. 25039, l. 397. by the way.

Quote: ignoto

Again in the article flashed that "Fuji" is stronger, presumably more powerful than "Sevastopoli". What a fright. The Japanese battleship was built according to an outdated design. Main battery mounts with low rate of fire. Most of the medium artillery is protected only by shields. The extremities are covered only with carapace. Speed, REAL, not paper - only 15 knots. Against this background, "Sevastopoli" look quite at the level.

You have already been answered this exclamation - 4 guns of Sevastopol did not even stand behind shields, but quite openly (the port was cut in steel of the hull), 152 mm turret had an average rate of fire of 1 round / min, Sevastopol hardly held 13-14 knots, extremities also not covered by armor.

[murriou]

Quote: ignoto

In battle, "Varyag" proved complete superiority in fire performance.

Excellence, let me ask, by whom? And how did you prove it?

[VohaAhov]

For Admiral Togo, the week of May 12-17, 1904 (NST) was a nightmare. In addition to the Hatsuse, Yashima and Yoshino, the Miyako advice note, Akitsushima fighter and destroyer No. 48 were lost during this period. In just a week, the Japanese lost 1370 people on these ships alone.

[Trapperxnumx]

And you know what's interesting? None of those serving in the Far East said "why am I here" or "why this war?"
Everyone longed for victory over the enemy! It seems to me that the awareness of the importance of events on the spot was much higher than in the European part of Russia.

Andrei is HUGE thanks for the article !!!! I look forward to continuing!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Trapper7

It seems to me that the awareness of the importance of events on the spot was much higher than in the European part of Russia.

Taking into account that a certain "scubent", with the permission of the Lord, our compatriot at the beginning of the RYAV managed to send a congratulatory telegram to the Mikado on the destruction of "this nasty cruiser Varyag" - you are absolutely right.

Quote: Trapper7

Andrei is HUGE thanks for the article !!!! I look forward to continuing!

And thank you, it will not rust for me :))

[Retvizan]

Fear of responsibility is a long-standing problem in RI. Even the analogue Port Arthur-Sevastopol suffered from this. Although there were also a lot of decisive goals.
The author correctly establishes the reason, Alekseev. Do not get involved in the battle, but constantly alarm the Japanese with cruisers and destroyers (especially if there are fewer of them). Attack, but do not get involved in the battle, threaten but save the ships. And in general, do not take risks, but pretend (exaggerated)
Witgeft staff-that’s what everyone has said. Makarov was appointed by the emperor’s rescript. He was not afraid and he had carte blanche. The viceroy could not infect him with his own.
The phrase from Stepanova was very memorable; it’s enough to reduce the Japanese advantage to an equal one, then the war will end. That is, there may not have been a need to fully win - it was necessary to equalize strength. In general, Stepan Osipovich at least outlined goals and tried to at least somehow do it.
As for leapfrog with the head of the TOE, this is that song.
In general, the loss of an active admiral is the fatal loss of RI in that war. The loss of active Kondratenko-the fall of Arthur became inevitable. The impression that the decrepit system rested solely on people who were not afraid of decisions and trusted subordinates.
Witgeft had the authority of a commander --- only as a senior in rank. I'd like to hear more about one person in the "Vitgeft case"
Nikolay Aleksandrovich Matusevich
Appointed I. D. Chief of Staff of the squadron (V.K. Vitgeft) and head of all coastal commands of the maritime department in the port of Arthur as junior flagship on May 29, 1904

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Retvizan

That is, there may not have been a need to fully win - it was necessary to equalize strength.

In order to catch up with the forces, it was necessary first to go to sea. The war at sea was practically lost with the death of Makarov. For an adversary defending at the base and trusting in God is tantamount to a loser. Even the expected battle in the Yellow Sea had one strategy - ABOS we will break through. The main forces were roughly equal in weight to the salvo, so the notorious deaths of Hatsuse and Yashima equalized the chances. Another thing is that the Japanese were constantly swimming, conducting combat training, psychologically feeling themselves victors, because the battlefield was behind them throughout the siege. Makarov could change, conducting constant trips to the sea, rafting crews, detachments, showing the Japanese teeth. They felt it and were afraid. Vitgeft lacked this by his character. So even with equal chances, we were losing in everything. This is the sad truth of life. ..Because the drop-down chances must also be able to use

[Retvizan]

Quote: Rurikovich

For the adversary, who upholds on the base and trusts in God, is tantamount to a loser.

On Nicholas the Pleasure.
The plan for the defeat of the Russian Empire at sea (C) seems to have described the plan of Alekseev - COM.

Quote: Rurikovich

Even the expected battle in the Yellow Sea had one strategy - AVOS break through

Order of the Emperor and necessity. Nobody was engaged in and did not intend to deblock the PA.

Quote: Rurikovich

the Japanese constantly swam, conducted combat training, psychologically felt like winners,

you know - actually, the war with the Russians was the first serious test for them. Since the Japanese are the best Asian warriors, and here they were opposed by the European enemy. White barbarians are like that. And not Chinese or Koreans. Remember that they treated the Russians with unprecedented respect. Unlike the Chinese ... who have always been only genocide from them (the first capture of the PA by the Japanese from the Chinese). The support of BI and the United States also instilled confidence. But psychologically Togo did not feel like a winner. He had confidence and determination. And he had carte blanche for any action at sea. Only Makarov was on the stack. Well, we no longer have "our own". And Stoessely Fokov Vitgefov Alekseyev Starkov and the like were more than.
By the way, mines were put up for the route, and it was due to the landing, and the landing was due to the state of the RI fleet, and the state was due to the death of the EBR + COM and damage to the BOD and the inaction of the squadron and fortress.
If COM did not die, then mines and the death of 2 EDB on them, most likely there would be no.

[libivs]

Hmm ... A.M. would have deleted from your lower list Stessel (he did everything he could in those difficult conditions) and O.V. Stark (the main sin of which is the inability to spit on the higher command, but honestly admit that there are always one).

[mmaxx]

Stessel should not be deleted. After the death of Kondratenko, Arthur's defense simply fell apart the next day. Almost with the surrender of Mr. Vysokoy, agony began. And she had to be kept at all costs. But nothing was done for this. On the contrary, Stessel ensured by his inaction the shooting of the fleet and the capture of Port Arthur.
And take Arthur without an order .... Well, it's generally beyond.
As a note. Mount High is a very high altitude. With steep slopes. It’s even very difficult to get into the forehead there. The Japanese were very proud of taking this height. The Japanese made their memorial after the war on the mountain. And they did not forget about Kondratenko. In fact, they did the impossible. But why could this impossible happen at all? Frank sabotage and failure to fulfill their duties by the Russian command.

[libivs]

In fact, the High fell on December 5, and the Japanese immediately began to adjust the artillery fire on the squadron. Attempts to return the altitude were unsuccessful and impossible. R.I. Kondratenko died on December 15. With the death of the remnants of the squadron, the defense was already becoming absolutely hopeless and probably the next general assault led to the capture of the fortress and massacre like in 1895. As endowed with the highest authority in Arthur A.M. Stoessel assumed full responsibility for the personnel and made the difficult decision of an honorable surrender. The military council, contrary to popular belief, did not express anything definite about the surrender. "Port Arthur" by A. Stepanov is certainly a great book, but still too tendentious. This is me about sabotage. Nevertheless, with such sabotage, under the leadership of Stessel, the fortress repulsed four assaults.

[mmaxx]

I thought so too. And then I managed to visit Arthur. Unfortunately, very few. I managed to see something in kind. Nevertheless, when you see the area, everything becomes much more visible than when you read just books. The forces for the defense of the High at the time of its fall were not exhausted. And the fact that it was surrendered entirely to the fault of command. And a big victory for the Japanese. This mountain was not only important for the Japanese. But to us too. In general, the terrain of Port Arthur is very defensive.
And so ... he passed the key altitude, then recaptured 4 assaults and said: well, everything .. wasn’t able ... But why, instead of four assaults, they didn’t beat one to Mount Vysokaya ??? Especially when it is clear to a fool that after this further defense loses its meaning.

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Retvizan

On Nicholas the Pleasure.

Well, hour by hour no easier

Quote: Retvizan

Order of the Emperor and necessity. Nobody was engaged in and did not intend to deblock the PA.

It turns out that the Emperor from St. Petersburg is much clearer to see what and how to do? But heaps of different advisers, Ministers, headquarters, especially close from the retinue will not be taken into account?

Quote: Retvizan

in general, the war with the Russians was the first serious test for them.

But only confidence arose the field of the Sino-Japanese war and the battle of Yalu. Any victory gives rise to self-confidence

Quote: Retvizan

and here they were opposed by a European opponent

Here are just the British, whose weapons (EDB and BrKR) were the backbone of the Japanese Navy, believed that in those conditions they could cope with the Pacific squadron. Or at least provide support for the ground forces and their transportation ...

Quote: Retvizan

If COM did not die, then mines and the death of 2 EDB on them, most likely there would be no.

Alas, history does not know the subjunctive mood. Makarov died and then there was a battle on July 28, and "self-heating"

[ser56]

it’s a pity that the author repeats stories about Kuteynikov, he and the workers arrived on the COM train, but they were not sent to the PA ...
in addition, the author confuses the different active actions and the consumption of MN in the fruitless trips of COM without any achievements, but with losses .... it was COM that banned the activity of woks in straits, preparing for the gene. the battle, as well as the repair of Sevastopol, which can’t be understood at all ... by the way, the type of activity of the COM in the raid did not help to avoid an active mine setting by the Japanese with a tragic result, but the author needs activity on a southern night without radars ....
I note that the VKV absolutely right did not substitute Loshchinsky for his decision, did not constrain his initiative to the last extreme, otherwise the principle of subordination is violated, by which SOM sinned, locking everything to itself ... this, by the way, allowed Grigorovich to work successfully, but the author did not realize this ....
The author, alas, has macarophilia syndrome as a result of a long-standing myth ....
it’s good that the author is trying to get away from the stamp in the image of the VKV, recognizes his merits in organizing trawling and repair, interaction with the fortress ....

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ser56

In addition, the author confuses miscellaneous active actions and the consumption of MN in the fruitless campaigns of COM without any achievements, but with losses

Your suggestions? Keep sitting like a mouse under a broom and wait ... what? And that in the course of active actions the less trained side suffers losses - the law of nature. But if no action is taken, the less trained side will never become more trained.
Since you accuse me of all kinds of macarophobia, you may not consider it work and do not scribble, at least thesis, what should Makarov have done in your opinion?

Quote: ser56

it was COM that banned the activity of EQA in straits, preparing for the gene. battle, as well as the repair of Sevastopol, which you can’t understand at all ...

What can not be understood? repair of Sevastopol? But why repair it, remaining with 3 armadillos? So at least the teams could be driven and the battle taken near the fortress. At the same time, no one would have bothered to repair it after the repair of Tsesarevich and Retvizan - they also needed at least a minimum of training after the repair.

Quote: ser56

By the way, the activity of COM in the raid did not help to avoid an active mine setting by the Japanese with a tragic result, but the author needs activity on a southern night without radars .... laughing

It seemed to you that you said something funny? :) I am forced to disappoint. It is enough to compare the number of Japanese mines in the external roadstead during Makarov’s actions and during Witgeft’s inaction. so that everything becomes clear. Under Makarov, such a mine production is sabotage, it is possible, but very carefully, from destroyers. And with Wittgeft - by steamboats, in front of an amazed audience.

Quote: ser56

I note that the VKV absolutely right did not substitute Loshchinsky for his decision, did not constrain his initiative to the last extreme, otherwise the principle of subordination is violated, which committed COM

Yeah. Those. Makarov, sending destroyers into independent raids, somehow terribly limited their initiative, closing everything on himself. But Wittgeft - he yes, rightly not sparing his stomach taught subordinates to the initiative :))

Quote: ser56

this, by the way, allowed Grigorovich to work successfully, but the author did not realize this ....

What exactly did the author not realize? That Grigorovich could work successfully only when he was not under the corrupting influence of Makarov? :)))

Quote: ser56

The author, alas, has macarophilia syndrome as a result of a long-standing myth ....

Hardly. But you have obvious macarrophobia, it’s not clear what is based on, by the way.

[murriou]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

it’s not clear what is based on, by the way.

As far as I managed to notice, this debater bases all his fantasies in the main way on his own conceit

[ser56]

go learn the date and place of construction of the LCR Congo!

[murriou]

Are you still not satisfied with the repeated poking of your nose into the discrepancy of your fantasies of reality?

Yes, I know without you that the lead ship of the Congo series was built by the British and in England, the Japanese only put their hand at the stage of project discussion and final acceptance - but they did, and the ship was put into operation in 1913, already it doesn't matter if you agree with it or not

And RI had 152 ships built at foreign shipyards in the WWII navy, and these "Russian" ships were the best in the Russian navy.

Yes, the rest of the "Congo" were built according to the British project.
And in the Republic of Ingushetia many dozens of ships were built according to foreign projects, and they are also among the best for their generation and class - and purely Russian ships in the 20th century differed only in backwardness.

But all the other ships of the "Congo" series were built in Japan and by the Japanese. And already in WWII they were ready for battle, and in WWII they were able to fight.

And the Republic of Ingushetia with its "Ishmaels" was fruitless for several years - and could not bring the readiness as a whole to even half, the corps was prepared in barely half. This is during the time until in more developed countries (including Japan) more than one generation of dreadnoughts managed to be put into operation.

But Japan, already from 1902, fully provided itself with torpedo boats and destroyers, and after the RYV, some of the "volunteers" were ordered abroad, and some were built according to foreign projects.

On the other hand, Japan, with the pre-dreadnought battleships built after the RYA, significantly surpassed the Russian "Borodino" (also, by the way, not quite Russian, but according to the French project), and raised the dreadnought class much earlier than Russia.

You may not recognize the "Kawachi" as dreadnoughts, this is your personal deeply intimate affair, but their unconditional and significant superiority over any armored ship existing at that time in the Republic of Ingushetia is undeniable.

But by the time the Imps were commissioned, Japan had independently manufactured the Fuso battleship, which undoubtedly and significantly surpassed the Russian battleships in all respects.

But by the end of WWI, Japan received a French order for a series of destroyers, and Russian warships of Russian construction in other countries by the beginning of the 20th century. they didn’t order - only the Japanese accepted them, like trophies.

So we see whose industry is as far behind.

[ser56]

"Your suggestions? Continue to sit like a mouse under a broom and wait ... for what?"
corny:
1) order the wok to strike at communications in the Straits, which will inevitably force Togo to strengthen Kamimura’s defense there - the Japanese simply have no other choice. At the same time, there is a chance to defeat a squad of 4 old Japanese KR, except for the sinking of TR.
2) arrange raids by the KR detachment from the PA (Bayan, Diana, Askold, Novik) on the Japanese communication in Chemulpo, at the same time accompany the KR raids with MN detachments at close distances and cover the entrance and exit of the KR with an EDB detachment ...
3) After cross-sectional firing, immediately mine approaches to possible firing points -COM had a terrific chance to predict enemy actions and prepare an answer not in the form of cross-section firing, but an active obstacle ... he was offered, he saved mines ...
etc.
"Why was it necessary to repair it, staying with 3 battleships?" Are you serious? and after the repair of damaged EBRs again to wait for the repair of Sevastopol? Hmm ... and you also accuse the BKV of indecision ...
"After the renovation, they also needed at least a minimum of training." what prevented the training of gunners on other ships? By the way - the crews were experienced. they couldn't forget everything in a couple of months ...
"Under Makarov, such a mine setting is a sabotage, it is possible, but very carefully and from destroyers. And under Vitgeft, by steamships, in front of the amazed public."
1) With COM, the Russian EDB died due to mines, and 2 Japanese were killed during the VKV - that's the whole difference ... and the public is the public ... mines installed in famous places lose their meaning ...
2) I note, you forgot to indicate that after the death of the COM, the VKV did not have 4EBR + lame, but 2EBR + lame + undermined ... while the MN were brought into a low-operational state by COM ... I think the composition of the funds does not affect the plans ?
"Yeah. That is, Makarov, sending torpedo boats into independent raids, somehow terribly limited their initiative, turning everything on himself. But Vitgeft, yes, he did not spare his belly and taught his subordinates initiative:" We are ready to refute my thesis? Or limit yourself to just verbal sarcasm without information? By the way, do you know another way of bringing up initiative and responsibility among subordinates? Do you think orders through their head do this?
"That Grigorovich could work successfully only when he was not under the pernicious influence of Makarov ?:" see above, he was given complete freedom without petty tutelage, to which the restless admiral was inclined ...
"Hardly. But you have obvious macarrophobia, it is not clear what is based on, by the way."
1) I don’t have phobias, I just analyzed his work in the PA ... the conclusion is that because of the lack of willingness to work independently, COM did not understand the essence of the fleet’s main tasks in the war and acted on the basis of its ideas, and not out of the interests of the case ... .
2) His main mistake is not understanding the role of naval communications in the deployment of the Japanese army and the importance of the task for the fleet to influence them ... he built the illusions of linear battle, spent MN in fruitless raids, alas ...
3) as for the training of the crews, COM was carried away by a completely strange desire to reduce the distance between the EDB on the cab - why? This makes sense at combat distances of 10-15 cabs, and at 25-30 it no longer makes sense ...
At the same time, I consider COM to be a great hydrographic scientist, creator of Ermak and a number of important inventions ... He himself was certainly a brave officer, but a poor commander ... his younger flagship would be ....

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

order the wok to strike at communications in the Straits, which will inevitably force Togo to strengthen Kamimura’s defense there

What for? We are not ready for a general battle yet. What is the point of urgently driving ships into a raid?

arrange raids by a detachment of the Kyrgyz Republic from the PA (Bayan, Diana, Askold, Novik) on the communication of the Japanese in Chemulpo

The risk of losing the ships that have recently left the reserve is great - but there could not be much use from these raids. Ships could receive combat experience near the fortress, but they still could not interrupt communications of the Japanese cruiser

After cross over shooting, immediately mine the approaches to possible firing points

Witgeft offered, considered impossible. Right by the first paragraph of the protocol of the first meeting of the flagships.

etc.

I do not see a single reasonable or feasible proposal.

Are you serious? and after repairing damaged EBRs again wait for the repair of Sevastopol? Hmm ... and you still accuse the VKV of indecision ...

No need to wait. You must immediately go into battle when the 2 newest and strongest EDBs have not had artillery training for almost a year.
I kind of wrote you in Russian in white and white - Retvizan and Tsesarevich after putting into operation required some time for combat training - during this time you can fix Sevastopol

What prevented the organization of training of the commandants on other ships?

The fundamental impossibility of such training.

By the way - the crews were experienced. for a couple of months they could not forget everything ...

I didn’t know that only a couple of months passed from autumn 1903 to June 1904

With COM, the Russian EDB died due to mines, and with the VKV 2 Japanese were killed - that’s the whole difference ...

It’s biting and out of business. At COM, the fleet went to sea 6 times and there was one explosion of an EDB in a mine. And with the VKV, the fleet went out twice to sea, and in the first case, the battleships simply got into a mine can (God saved), and then Sevastopol was blown up. And Sevastopol would die if it weren’t for the tragedy of COM, because it exploded in a place where the detonation of mines is practically guaranteed, but because of the death of Petropavlovsk the mines were guessed to be unloaded.

mines installed in famous places lose their meaning

Yeah, especially on a tidy fairway. Do you apparently think that the mines delivered are so easy to neutralize? VKV constantly complained that no

I note that you forgot to indicate that after the death of the COM, the VKV did not have 4EBR + lame, but 2EBR + lame + undermined ... while the MN were brought into a low-operational state by COM ... do you think the composition of the funds does not affect plans?

Nonsense, and you know that very well. Firstly, the COM did not bring the destroyers into a "low-combat" state, and secondly, later the VKV, having 5 fully combat-ready EBRs, sat very, very quietly and sent ships into the sea only along the coast to shoot

ready to refute my thesis?

He was refuted in the article - there was no place to be a delegation of authority, but a banal shuffling of responsibility. If it was a matter of delegating responsibility, then Witgeft, having set the task, would have provided subordinates with a choice of a method for solving it. But he didn’t do this - he expected the strict implementation of his instructions and arranged a breakdown for Ivanov because he placed mines farther than planned and ordered Wittgeft. What initiative is there?

By the way, do you know another way to educate subordinates in initiative and responsibility? Suppose orders through their head contribute to this?

When ships are sent to carry out a combat mission, this is delegation of authority. And no orders through anyone's head :))

His main mistake is not understanding the role of sea lanes in the deployment of the Japanese army and the importance of the task for the fleet to influence them ... he built the illusions of linear battle, spent MN in fruitless raids, alas.

Your analysis is based on the assumption (100500 times refuted by both theorists and life) that a cruising war without sea supremacy could be successful. A cruising war on communications without sea dominance is doomed to lose, which, by the way, Makarov perfectly understood. You, proceeding from a deliberately erroneous premise, have arrived, unfortunately, to deliberately erroneous conclusions.

[Comrade]

it was COM that banned the activity of EQA in straits, preparing for the gene. battle, as well as the repair of Sevastopol, which is impossible to understand at all

It can be assumed that Makarov's decision was based on the latter's desire not to scatter the limited forces and capabilities of the artisans from the Baltic plant, of which there were only 189 people in Port Arthur. As we remember, to replace the damaged blade it was necessary to design, build and test a special caisson-air bell. The head of the squadron commander in such a situation should be sick not about how to increase the speed of "Sevastopol" from ten to thirteen knots, but about how to commission the "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan" as soon as possible. Stepan Osipovich just set his priorities correctly, that's all.

[ser56]

the problem is that you can’t fight in 10uz .... they fixed it with the VKV, like

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ser56

the problem is that you can’t fight on 10uz

It is impossible. But you can train a squadron.

Quote: ser56

when they were fixed, it’s

Why not fix it? The VKV leaned on the preparation of the squadron, well, the artisans put the caisson and repaired it. If there is no combat training, then the repair didn’t interfere with anything

[ser56]

But the meaning of these trainings in many fields? Combat missions allow you to train the crew better and the risk of ships leaving is justified by goals ...
"VKV leaned on the training of the squadron" tasks must be solved sequentially ... VKV had its mistakes, COM - others ... why do you want to get an icon?

[Comrade]

[Quote]the problem is that you can’t fight on 10uz[/ Quote]

There is no problem here, in the Tsushima battle, on average, it was at this speed that we fought. On July 28, sometimes they walked at a lower speed, without stopping to "fight" at the same time.

[Quote]when they were fixed, it’s[Quote]

It was just the turn, with the same success we would have done this work with any commander.

[ser56]

This is a hypothesis. no more ... to conduct work in parallel was necessary in order to accelerate them ...

[libivs]

A great continuation of the cycle. The request to the author, at the end of the series, to publish not a nickname, but a surname, while adding a systematization of sources and literature so that you can use your research when writing educational and special works on relevant topics.

[murriou]

In this message I completely agree with you.

[Comrade]

Quote: ser56

This is a hypothesis. no more ... to conduct work in parallel was necessary in order to accelerate them ...

If there are two plates of soup in front of me, and I start eating from each of them at the same time, spooning alternately from one or the other, then I still will not be able to eat the whole soup in two plates at a speed equivalent to that required for having only one bowl of soup. Moreover, it will be even slower than if I first ate soup from one plate, and then from another, because the hand with the spoon will be in the air longer.

[Oleg Karlash]

Yes, Wittgeft was probably the only admiral in the Russo-Japanese, whose command is respected.