Cruiser type "Chapaev." Part of 1. Design history
Cruiser "Kuibyshev", 1950
History The creation of the 68 cruisers is inextricably linked both with the evolution of Russian naval thought and with the growth of the industrial capabilities of the young USSR. To understand how their appearance and tactical-technical characteristics were formed, it is necessary to make at least a brief excursion into the history of Russian military shipbuilding.
The first Soviet shipbuilding programs, adopted in 1926, 1929 and 1933, were formed under the influence of the theory of the small sea war, which fully corresponded to the economic and shipbuilding capabilities of the Land of Soviets. The ships built before the revolution were being built, the battleships that were part of the RKKF were being modernized. However, the new construction was supposed to be limited to leaders, destroyers, submarines and other types of light ships, which in cooperation with aviation land-based were supposed to smash the enemy fleets that invaded the coastal waters of the USSR. It was assumed that light forces, capable of quickly concentrating at the right place and at the right time due to their high speed, would be able to deliver a combined strike in cooperation with aviation and ground artillery, i.e. at the same time attack the squadron of heavy enemy ships with diverse forces and thereby achieve success.
So that your own light forces do not "get stuck" in the destroyers and light cruisers of the enemy, the fleet it required a number of light cruisers capable of paving the way for their torpedo-bearing ships through the cover of an enemy squadron. Such cruisers had to be very fast for interaction with 37-40-node leaders such as Leningrad (project 1) and Angry (project 7) and possess sufficient firepower to quickly incapacitate enemy light cruisers. It was precisely such ships that the project 26 and 26 bis light cruisers considered by the author in the previous series of articles became.
However, back in 1931, I.V. Stalin at a meeting of the Defense Commission of the USSR SNK said:
And, apparently, from those (or even earlier), he did not part with the dream of the ocean fleet. That is why in the spring of 1936 in the USSR the first program of “large marine shipbuilding” was developed, which included plans to create a powerful linear fleet. It must be said that this program was created in an atmosphere of strict (and not completely clear) secrecy: theorists of naval construction (such as M. A. Petrov) and the fleet command were not involved in its creation. In essence, all their participation in the development was reduced to a short meeting held by I.V. Stalin with the leadership of the UVMS and the commanders, in which Stalin asked questions:
The answers of the commanders, of course, turned out to be completely different, otherwise it would have been difficult to expect: if the commander of the Pacific Fleet suggested concentrating on large ships (which were needed in his theater), the commander of the Black Sea Fleet wanted to build many torpedo boats along with cruisers and destroyers. Stalin's reaction was quite predictable: "You yourself do not know what you need."
But it should be noted that if the sailors did not know which ships they needed, they were eager to find out: by the beginning of 1936, the projects (of course, at the earliest stages - pre-sketch / sketch design) of three large artillery ships were worked out. Then it was assumed that RKKF would need two types of battleships: for closed and open sea theaters, therefore projects of battleships in 55 000 t (23 project “for TOF”) and 35 000 t (21 project “for KBF”) of standard displacement, and also heavy cruiser (project 22). Interestingly, the latter should have ultimatum, but still "cruising" characteristics - 18-19 thousand tons, 254-mm artillery of the main caliber and 130-mm universal guns, but the construction of small battleships in France ("Dunkirk") and in Germany (the Scharnhorst), our sailors were led astray. A heavy cruiser with 254-mm artillery would represent the top of the cruising “food pyramid” without turning into a battleship, but that is why he could not withstand the “Dunkirk” or “Scharnhorst”, which was extremely frustrating for the UVMS. As a result, the development task was almost immediately corrected: the cruiser displacement was allowed to be increased to 22 000 t and the installation of 250-mm, 280-mm and 305-mm artillery of the main caliber on it was worked out. Forced to orient the projected ships to a confrontation with small but battleships, both design teams, TsKBS-1 and KB-4, which carried out the preliminary elaboration of the heavy cruiser, went to 29 000 and 26 000 and standard displacement, respectively. Within these limits, the collectives obtained fairly high-speed (33 knots), moderately protected (up to 250 mm armor belts and up to 127 mm armored decks) ships with nine 305-mm guns in three towers. But they, of course, had already ceased to be heavy cruisers, representing small battleships or, perhaps, battle cruisers.
The program of “large marine shipbuilding” introduced its corrections into these views: although it was developed by Namorsi V.M. Orlov and his deputy, I.M. Ludry, but of course, the last word belonged to Joseph Vissarionovich. It is likely that precisely the cense of its development led to a number of frankly strange decisions in terms of the number and types of ships planned to be built and distributed to theaters. A total of 24 battleships were supposed to be built, including Type A 8 and Type B 16, Light Cruisers 20, 17 Leaders, 128 Destroyers, 90 Large, 164 Medium and 90 Small Submarines. At the same time, at the time of the formation of the “large marine shipbuilding” program I. Stalin considered it highly desirable for the USSR to enter into the system of international treaties, so it was decided to abandon further development of the battleship in 55 000 t, limiting it to ships in 35 000 t suitable for the "Washington" standard and becoming "type A battleships" of the new program.
Accordingly, heavy cruisers were “reclassified” into “type B battleships”. On the one hand, it seems that such an approach fully corresponded to the wishes of the UVMS, who worked on the simultaneous construction of two types of battleships. But it should be noted that the “small” battleship UVMS with its 35 000 t displacement and 406-mm artillery of the main caliber was to be no less weak than any battleship of the world, and the “big” ship for the Pacific Ocean was created at all as the strongest battleship in the world . Now, instead, it was planned to create total 8 full-fledged battleships and as many 16 type B ships, which, possessing an 26-thousandth displacement and 305-mm main caliber, “hung” somewhere in the middle between a full-fledged battleship and a heavy cruiser. What tasks could they solve? Namorsi V.M. Orlov in the same 1936 wrote the following about them:
A little later, he put forward for them the requirement to fight battleships of the Scharnhorst type and Congo-class battlecruisers at favorable course angles and distances. However, in this form, the “battleship” part of the program raises many questions. In total in the world (if not to take into account exotic Spanish or Latin American dreadnoughts) there were only 12 relatively small battleships that could fight, and without much hope of success, the battleship type "B": 2 "Dunkirk", 4 "Julio Cesare, 2 Scharnhorst and Congo 4. Why was it necessary to "in response" build 16 own "twelve-inch" ships? Complete A-type battleships were supposed to have only 4 on the Black and Baltic seas - this would hardly be enough to withstand the fleet of any first-class maritime power. For example, by the time the Black Sea Four A-type battleships were commissioned, the Italian navy, which, as it was then thought, could easily enter the Black Sea with unfriendly targets, could have a much larger number of ships of this class. If initially UVMS for the Pacific Ocean intended the most powerful type of ships (battleship in 55 000 t), now there should not have been full-fledged battleships at all - only 6 ships of type “B”.
Thus, the implementation of the “large marine shipbuilding” program, although it was supposed to provide the Soviet Union with a mighty military fleet of 533 battleships in 1 million 307 thousand tons of total standard displacement, but did not ensure its domination in any of the four marine theaters. And this, in turn, meant that if the theory of the “small war” comes to an end, it is still too early to abandon the tactics of the combined strike. Even after the implementation of the 1936 shipbuilding program, the possibility of the appearance of enemy squadrons, which obviously surpass our fleet in the number of heavy ships, could not be excluded. In this case, the classic battle automatically led to defeat, and it remained to rely on the very same "strike with light forces in coastal areas."
The result was a bit strange: on the one hand, even after the adoption of the “large maritime shipbuilding” program, the cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis projects did not outlive themselves, because the tactical niche for their use remained. But, on the other hand, since it was now planned to create full-fledged squadrons in all four theaters (even for the Northern Fleet it was planned to build an 2 type B battleship), it became necessary to create a new type of light cruiser for the squadron service. And all these considerations found themselves in the 1936 shipbuilding program: from the 20 light cruisers destined for construction, the 15 should have been built according to the 26 project, and the remaining 5 - under the new escort squadron project that received the 28 number.
Thus, the UVMS leadership demanded, and the designers began to design the new cruiser, not because the 26 project turned out to be something wrong: actually, the creation of a new type of ship, which later became a light cruiser of the 68-K "Chapaev" project, began long before as a cruiser of the types "Kirov" or "Maxim Gorky" could demonstrate at least some flaws. But cruisers of the type "Kirov" were created in the framework of the paradigm of the "small sea war" and were not very suitable for escorting a squadron. Of course, speed never happens a lot, but for actions with their heavy ships, the 36 nodes of the 26 project looked redundant. But the additional speed nodes always come at the expense of some other elements, in the case of the 26 project - the refusal of the second command-distance point and so on. The task of the rapid elimination of light cruisers was no longer posed. Of course, it is nice to be able to quickly dismantle the enemy light cruiser on the frames and other parts of the hull set, but the main enemy of the “accompanying” cruiser was leaders and destroyers, and against them more rapid-fire artillery was needed than the 180-mm gun. In addition, the defense should be strengthened: while the “cruiser-raider” of the 26 project, with a concentrated or combined strike, had every opportunity to determine the distance of the battle and its course angle to the enemy, the light cruiser-defender should still be located between the attackers and their target, leaving the choice of battle / course angle to the enemy. Moreover, it should be assumed that if the light cruisers lead the attack of the enemy light forces, they will try to bind us with our battle, in this case it is important not to be distracted, but to destroy enemy destroyers without too much fear of 152-mm projectiles. And, besides, it is possible to break through the enemy leaders and destroyers on the “pistol” distances, from which their artillery, which has already grown to 138 mm (from the French), acquires significant armor penetration.
Counter Terminer "Le Terribl" and its 138-mm / 50 guns
In addition to protection and artillery, fuel reserves also required changes. The 26 project cruisers were built for operations in the restricted areas of the Black and Baltic Seas and should not have gone far from the coast in the Pacific Ocean, and therefore had a limited range: according to the project, sea miles with full (not maximum) fuel ( that in fact it will be somewhat higher, in 3, of course, they could not have known). At the same time, for the newest “A” type battleships, they planned to ensure the range in 000-1936 for miles and, of course, they could not accompany such ships of the 6000 cruiser.
Consequently, the domestic fleet needed a light cruiser of a different concept and another project. Thus began the history of the creation of the Chapaev-type cruisers, but before proceeding to its description, it is necessary to fully understand the question, how did it happen that the cruisers almost completely squeezed out the Kirov and Maxim Gorky-type ships from shipbuilding programs.
So, 26 June 1936, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on the construction of the “Great Sea and Ocean Fleet”. But next year, 1937, this program has undergone significant adjustments. In the summer of 1937, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs N.I. Yezhov announced:
As a result, the “purge” of the Navy’s ranks began, with the creators of the “large marine shipbuilding” program, Namorsi V.M. Orlov and his deputy I.M. Ludry, were repressed. We will not, of course, try to bring a verdict to the 1937-38 purges, this is a topic for a separate large study, we confine ourselves to stating that the shipbuilding program 1936, created by "pests", simply had to undergo a review. And so it happened: in August 1937, the USSR government issued a decree on the recycling of the shipbuilding program.
Without evaluating the repressions, we must admit that the shipbuilding program only won from the revision initiated by them. The number of battleships was reduced from 24 to 20, but now they were full-fledged battleships: designing an A-type battleship showed that the combination of 406-mm artillery and protection against an 406-mm projectile at a speed around 30 nodes could not fit into 35 or in 45 thousand tons. At the beginning of 1937, it became known that Germany and Japan will continue to lay ships in the 50-52 thousand tons of displacement in the future. In response, the government allowed the standard displacement of the Type A battleship to 55 — 57 thousand tons. At the same time, the type B battleship had already exceeded 32 tons in the design process, but still did not meet the requirements of customers. nor the views of the designers, so this project was declared wrecking. As a result, the UVMS leadership decided to build ships of type "A" with 406-mm artillery and displacement in 57 thousand tons for the Pacific Ocean and type-B battleships with the same protection, but with 356-mm guns and significantly smaller sizes for other theaters . Theoretically (without taking into account the economic possibilities of the country), this approach was much preferable to the battleships in 35 and 26 thousand tons of the previous program. Moreover, it very quickly became clear that the battleship “B” in its size tends to approach the type A battleship, not possessing its effectiveness, which at the beginning of 1938 from type B battalions was finally abandoned in favor of the strongest ship type "A", which was to be built for all maritime theaters.
But the changes were not limited to battleships alone: it was proposed to include in the shipbuilding program new class ships that were not in the old one, namely, the 2 aircraft carrier and the 10 heavy cruisers. Accordingly, the updated program had two fundamental differences, which put the final cross on the further construction of the cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis project:
1. The developers of this program believed that its implementation would allow RKKF to have parity with potential opponents in each maritime theater. Thus, the situation in which the task of confronting the enemy formations of heavy ships would be assigned solely to the light forces of the fleet was no longer predicted. Accordingly, the tactical niche of the 26 and 26-bis cruisers of the project should have disappeared.
2. The program envisaged the construction of not only "classic" light, but also ultimatum-powerful heavy cruisers, which were to become the strongest in its class. Their displacement was planned at the level of 18-19 thousand tons (by initial estimate), the main caliber - 254-mm artillery, the reservation was supposed to protect from 203-mm projectiles, and all this was to develop speed in 34 node. The capabilities of heavy and light cruisers completely covered the whole range of tasks that could be assigned to a cruiser-class ship, and there was no need for an additional type of ships.
Thus, the RKKF was to receive the classic light and very powerful heavy cruisers in sufficient quantities, and the need for an “intermediate” ship, such as the cruisers of the 26 project, was no longer necessary. According to the new program, they were supposed to build just 6 units (in fact, the laid ships of the 26 and 26-bis projects), and on this their construction should have been stopped. However, the question of resuming the construction of Maxim Gorky-type cruisers was supposed to return once more, after testing the first ship of the series, but this did not happen.
Subsequently, the heavy cruisers evolved into the 69 “Kronstadt” project, suspiciously similar to the “pest” type B battleship, but this is a completely different story. As for the light cruisers "escort squadron", the history of their creation began in late August 1936, when Namorsi V.M. Orlov formulated the tasks for this type of ships:
1. Intelligence and patrol.
2. Fight light enemy forces while escorting a squadron.
3. Support attacks of their destroyers, submarines and torpedo boats.
4. Operations on the sea communications of the enemy and raid operations on its coast and ports.
5. Mine setting active minefields in the waters of the enemy.
The UVMS management demanded to “pack” the new ship (which passed according to the documents as “the 28 project”) into the standard displacement 7 500 t, i.e slightly more than the “allowed” displacement of the cruiser “Kirov”, which was planned for that at the level of 7170 t. At the same time, the sailors “ordered” a completely enchanting range - 9-10 thousand nautical miles. Sketch design of the ship should have been conducted (in parallel) by the designers of TsKBS-1 and the Leningrad Design Institute.
The new ship was designed on the basis of the cruisers of the 26 Ave. The length of the hull "Kirov" increased by 10 meters, width - per meter, while the theoretical drawing is almost the same as that of the cruiser project 26. Several increased the armor of the sides, traverses and barbets - from 50 to 75 mm, and the front of the tower - even to 100 mm, but they reduced the vertical armor of the conning tower from 150 to 100 mm and left the 50-mm armor deck as it was. Of course, the main innovations touched the main caliber: 180-mm guns gave way to six-inch guns, instead of three three-gun turrets MK-3-180 they planned to install four three-guns, thereby bringing the number of barrels to twelve. At the same time, the ranged anti-aircraft caliber was preserved in its “original” form - six one-gun 100-mm B-34 units, located as well as on the Kirov cruiser. But according to the project, the new ship was finally to receive rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns, albeit in very modest quantities: two “nests” (46-K) with quad 37-mm installations, and only 8 trunks. Their placement is of interest: on the fore and aft superstructure, so that both “nests” could shoot on either side, and one each at the bow or stern of the ship. The number of machine gun installations remained the same as on the Kirov - four, but they had to become paired, which is why the total number of 12,7-mm trunks doubled from four to eight as compared with the 26 project. As for the torpedo and aircraft armament, it remained unchanged: two 533-mm three-tube torpedo tubes and two KOR-2 aircraft.
Estimated appearance of the 28 project cruiser
The power plant was supposed to completely duplicate the turbines and boilers designed for serial ships of the 26 project: the head Kirov received a power plant made in Italy, but other ships of this type had its upgraded version mastered by domestic production. With all the above “innovations”, the standard displacement of the cruiser was to reach 9 000 t, while the speed was hoped to remain at the level of 36 nodes, but the range, of course, turned out to be significantly lower than in the technical specification: instead of 9-10 thousand miles only 5,4 thousand miles
In general, it can be stated that the designers could not “put” the 28 cruiser into the original TK, and this was why its fate was in doubt. It is not known what decision the UVMC leadership would take, but then the 1937 just began the year ... The next stage in the creation of light Chapaev-type cruisers began after the sailors VM Orlov was removed from his post and arrested, and the program of the “large maritime shipbuilding industry” submitted to him was subjected to an audit in order to identify in it “wrecking” elements. Of course, the 28: 11 August 1937 cruiser at the meeting of the Defense Committee (CP) at the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK) of the USSR did not escape this fate, of course, was asked to work out the type of prospective light cruiser with different types of weapons, including nine 180 -mm, twelve, nine and six 152-mm guns, and also consider the feasibility of further building light cruisers of the 26-bis project instead of designing something new. Moreover, the revision of the TZ of the light cruiser was given only two days!
The “two days” did not meet, but on October 1, the 1937 of the Defense Committee adopted a decree on the design of the new ship, which had a number of significant differences from the 28 cruiser. The number of towers of the main caliber was reduced from four to three, so the cruiser had to get nine 152-mm guns. Six one-gun 100-mm guns were replaced by four tower "Sparky". The total number of 37-mm automaton stems increased from 8 to 12. The speed was allowed to decrease to 35 nodes, but the armor belt had to increase from 75 to 100 mm. The range was somewhat reduced: now the cruiser was required to pass the entire 4,5 thousand miles with the maximum fuel supply, but there was a slight nuance. Usually the range of the course was set for the full course and for the economic course - and with that, and with everything, everything is clear. If the full speed in this case represents the maximum speed of the ship, which he could maintain for a long time, then the economic stroke was the speed at which fuel consumption per mile of the way was minimal. However, the 4,5 range of thousands of miles was determined for a certain “cruising course” (it is often understood as such that it is economic speed, but apparently not in this case). The speed of economic progress for our cruisers was defined as 17-18 knots, but cruising for a new ship - for some reason 20 knots. The standard displacement was set in the same range as before: 8000 — 8300 t.
At the same time, the defense committee determined the following order of work for the cruiser: before October 5 of the current year, the leadership of the naval forces of the Red Army undertook to submit a tactical and technical assignment to the ship, on October 10 of the year the draft design was expected so that 1938 of August 31 could be laid new cruisers of this type. At the same time, a decision was made (presumably because of the danger of disrupting the work on the cruisers of the new project. Approx. Auth.) About laying the two cruisers of the 1938-bis project in the 26 year (the future Kalinin and Kaganovich).
Certainly, the Defense Committee took the characteristics of the new cruiser not from the ceiling, but at the proposals of the sailors. But still surprising is the fact that the defense committee approved (albeit partially) the performance characteristics of the ship for which there was no tactical and technical task!
However, already 29 October 1938, it was approved. The new head of the MS RKKA MV Viktorov set the following requirements for the new ship:
1. Actions in the squadron for the withdrawal of light forces in the attack.
2. Support ship patrol and intelligence.
3. Guarding the squadron from the attacks of the enemy light forces.
As you can see, the tasks of the new cruiser (soon his project was assigned the 68 number) were significantly reduced compared to the original TTT (tactical and technical requirements), on the basis of which the previous 28 project was developed. Interestingly, the ships of the 68 project were no longer intended to act on enemy communications: now the leadership of the Red Army MS saw them as a specialized cruiser for service during a squadron, and only.
As for the performance characteristics of the cruiser itself, they practically did not differ from those determined by the defense committee: all the same 3 * 3-152-mm guns and so on. The only innovation was only some refinement of anti-aircraft artillery. So, initially 100-mm guns were planned to be installed in installations BZ-14, similar to those intended for the battleships of the 23 project, but then it was decided that they were too heavy and would increase the displacement of the cruiser too much, which made the decision to design lightweight 100-mm installations. The composition of anti-aircraft guns was determined: twelve barrels were supposed to be placed in six paired installations. The standard displacement remained at the level of 8000 — 8300 t, the reservation of the sides and decks, respectively, 100 and 50 mm, but it provided a very powerful defense of artillery: the towers to 175 mm, and their barbets - 150 mm. It must be said that the sources available to the author do not indicate when exactly the decision was made to protect the artillery so strongly, so it cannot be ruled out that such defense figured it even in the decision of the defense committee until the appearance of the TTZ Viktorov.
The design of the new cruiser was entrusted to the chief designer of the 26 and 26-bis ships of the project AI Maslova (TsKB-17), obviously, it was the best choice of all. In March 1938, the draft was ready, but with two deviations from the original TTT. And if the reduction of the cruising range (4 500 miles not on cruising (20 nodes), but on the economic course (17 nodes) was acceptable, then the increase in the standard displacement to 9 450 t against the maximum allowed 8 300 t - no.
During the draft design of the light cruiser, the People's Commissariat of the Navy was created, which was to be responsible for the plans for building the USSR naval forces. It was there that the draft design of the new cruiser, but the deputy commander of the Navy, I.S., was sent for approval. Isakov considered that the project requires processing. The main complaint was that the cruiser project 68 was larger than their foreign "colleagues", but at the same time inferior to them in armament. Therefore, Isakov proposed two possible options for finalizing the project:
1. Installation of the fourth 152-mm tower, the weight was proposed to be compensated by reducing the thickness of the barbet booking and the conning tower (from 150 to 120 mm) and the frontal sheets of the main caliber towers (from 175 to 140 mm), reducing the economic range to 3 500 miles.
2. Leaving the main caliber 3 * 3-152-mm, but at the expense of other articles of the load to find the economy of weight in 1500 t. GEM leave the same - thus achieving a speed increase.
One and a half months later, TsKB-17 presented a revised draft of the cruiser. The 4 tower of the main caliber was added, the barbets thickness was reduced to 120 mm, the speed was reduced by half a node (to 34,5 knots), and the standard displacement increased to 10 000 tons. Isakov was completely satisfied, his only demand was to return the X-NUMX-mm thickness of the barbet. In this form, the project 150 was submitted to the Committee of Defense at SNK. The last at the 68 meeting in June 29 approved the 1938 project without changes, and at the same time it has already put an end to the plans for the construction of Maxim Gorky-type cruisers:
It is noteworthy that this decision was made before the end of the tests of the lead ship of the 26 project - the light cruiser Kirov. The fact once again testifies that the termination of the construction of the 26 and 26-bis project cruisers occurred due to the change of the fleet construction concept, and not because of the discovery of some flaws revealed during the testing and / or operation process.
At the beginning of December, 1938 of TsKB-17 presented a technical design of 68: the displacement increased again (to 10 624), while the speed of travel was to make up the 33,5 of the node. This was the result of a more accurate calculation of weights: at the stage of preliminary design, the weight characteristics of many units supplied by contractors were not known, and, moreover, in some cases, the designers specified their own calculations.
The Naval Shipbuilding Directorate, having reviewed the submitted draft, rendered the following verdict:
In addition, the project contains a number of qualities that are not measured by conventional indicators, such as the number and caliber of guns, booking thickness, speed, etc. (requirements for cellars, artillery shelling angles, chemical protection, communications, saturation with electrical equipment, etc.). This allows us to conclude that the KRL Ave 69 will certainly be stronger than all the KRL foreign fleets armed with 152-mm artillery, and will be able to successfully fight also with lightly armored heavy cruisers of the "Washington" type ".
How justified was he? Let's try to figure it out in the next article.
To be continued ...
- Andrei from Chelyabinsk
- A. Maureen, "Light cruisers like" Chapaev "
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