Military Review

The combat debut of the Soviet dive bomber

The opinion that the AA-Arkhangelsky bomber Ar-2 is not much different from its counterpart SB, has long been rooted among fans stories domestic aviation - it is generally accepted that its combat use at the initial stage of World War II was equally unsuccessful. The words “Soviet dive bomber” evoke stable associations with the Petlyakov Pe-2, and often only with it. However, the documents show that where the Ar-2 was quite well mastered, it was used successfully, and used successfully as a dive player ...

Aircraft development: too little time

The 132 th speed bomber aviation regiment began to form 4 March 1940 in Kirovograd as part of the first large deployment of the Red Army air force. Most of the manning of the unit ended by May 15, and despite the fact that most of the personnel had just arrived from flight schools, the regiment as part of the 48 crew on the SB bombers was ready for combat during the day in simple weather conditions from medium altitudes. As is known, the war with Romania during the “liberation campaign” in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in the summer of 1940 did not happen, so the regiment continued to put together units and train personnel in calm conditions.

Total for October 28 1940 raid regiment was 2104 hours 30 mines (4030 landings), or, on average, 33 hours per crew. 298 bombings were carried out, of which 206 was performed (on average 4 per crew), and 325 aerial firing, of which 176 was performed (on average 3 on each navigator and radio operator).

By the beginning of 1941, the Moscow Aviation Plant No. 22 had accumulated around 200 diving bombers Ap 2, which, after the elimination of factory defects, had to go to the Air Force combat units. Soon, the production of this aircraft was stopped in favor of the Pe-2 bomber, and it was decided to deploy the Arkhangelsky aircraft as an "intermediate" machine for testing dive bombing before deploying the production of "pawns". For this purpose, in the border districts, the Moscow Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet air force, several units were selected, which the first Soviet dive bombers received. In the Odessa Military District, the choice fell on the 132-th SBAP, and the regiment received 24 Ap-2 (one in February, 12 in March and 11 in May) in return for part of their SB.

From 14 May 1941, the regiment was deployed in summer camps at the Yekaterinovka airfield. By 22 June 1941, the 132 SBAP had 59 combat crews and 60 combat aircraft of three types: 23 Ap-2 (19 good), 32 SB (30 good) and 5 Pe-2 (all good). Art-2 exploited the 3-I and 4-I squadrons, 2-I and 5-I squadrons flew on the SS, and the personnel of the 1-th squadron began retraining on Pe-2.

The training and combat training of the regiment in the 1941 year was conducted rather mediocre even compared to the previous year: until 1 June, the regiment crews flew just 1102 hours 27 minutes (2393 landing). Against this background, retraining at Ap-2 was conducted quite intensively: in March the raid was 47 hours, in April 31 hours, in May 115 hours (total 363 landings). An 121 route flight (of which 12 was at night), 84 bombing (64 completed), 153 aerial cone shooting (113 completed) were performed.

However, the crews did not really start dive-bombing - only one such bombing was noted, however successful. Apparently, in this regard, the order for combat training of the district headquarters for June 1941 highlighted the order for the 3 and 4 squadrons of the regiment to work out dive bombing for June 10. Unfortunately, data on the air raid and combat training of the OdVO air force for June 1941 have not yet been found, but judging by subsequent events, this assignment was carried out, and at least part of the crews of the 3 and 4 squadrons for the 22 June 1941 years of dive bombing worked.

War: do what you must and come what may

The first day of the war for the OdVO 45-th SADO, which was part of the second echelon of the Air Force, which included the 132-th SBAP, was rather calm. There were no Luftwaffe raids on airfields in the KiNohrad region of 22 June, but the regiments of the division, which were in the process of forming and retraining for a new materiel, did not receive combat orders. However, the OdVO command that was in a difficult situation because of the small number of combat-ready parts of strike aviation, which became the 9 Army command, decided to redeploy the 132 SBAP to Odessa to strengthen its strike force.

The order was received around 17: 00 on the first day of the war, and by the evening of June 23 the regiment was operational with crews (29 SB and 16 АR-2) relocated to the Razdelnaya airfield 60 km north-west of Odessa, and by evening was fully prepared for fighting. On the remaining seven Ap-2 technical personnel in Yekaterinovka, they eliminated numerous design and manufacturing flaws, and these machines, as they were ready, poured into the combat strength of the regiment.

In the morning of June 24, the regiment began to perform combat missions primarily for the destruction of enemy crossings and troops in the area of ​​Skulyany-Iasi. Actually, in the Skulyany region, the center of the German 11 Army was built, which, with its central 54 Army Corps 23 in June, forced the Prut border river and seized a bridgehead on the eastern coast, starting to advance into Soviet territory.
Aircraft 132-th SBAP were to strengthen the parts of 20-th SAD, which began to act on the enemy troops in the morning of the second day of the war, performing 77 sorties. 24 June, the work of Soviet aviation reached its apogee - the total strike aircraft carried out more than 200 combat missions that day, of which 39 fell on the 132 SBAP (15 SB and 24 Ap-2).

The initiative was made by the Nine Ar-2 of the 4th Squadron (Major Commander N. A. Zobov), who at 11 am bombed with dive links in a cluster of enemy equipment in the Skulyany area. Crews searched tank columns on the Skulyany – Falesti road, but targets identified as four groups of tanks of 6–8 each were found only on the outskirts of Skulyan, 100–200 meters from the road to Falesti.
According to the reports of the pilots, the entry into the dive was carried out at an altitude of 3000 meters, the output - at 1500. Total 32 bomb FAB-100 was dropped (one crew did not drop the bomb). According to crew reports, the enemy’s 14 tanks and 100 manned infantry were destroyed. In the target area, the group was attacked by an unidentified enemy fighter link, but casualties and damage were avoided.

The 3 squadron of the regiment, led by the commander captain M. A. Makarin, found targets on the Romanian coast near the village of Kyrpitsy in 12: 05. Crews have determined that this is a large group of tanks disguised along the road to Skulyany, then in 12: 10 nine Ap-2 dive links dropped 36 FAB-100. Despite the anti-aircraft artillery fire and the attack of a single fighter, the aircraft received no damage, and the crews noted the destruction of 10 tanks and 150 enemy soldiers.

Major Nikolai Zobov, commander of the 4 Squadron of the 132 SBAP, (left, in the photo with the rank of captain) and 3 Squadron Commander of the 132 SBAP, captain Mikhail Aleksandrovich Makarin (right)

The same 3 Squadron distinguished itself in the second half of the day, becoming the only regimental unit that carried out the 24 on June 2 second sortie. In 18: 45, the six Ar-2 six attacked a motorized convoy (again identified as tanks) with a dive just 5 kilometers from Falesti, on the Skulyany-Falesti road. The victims of 24 FAB-100 allegedly became 8 tanks and 50 enemy soldiers. In the target area, the crews noted heavy anti-aircraft fire.

By the morning of June 25, the position of the Soviet troops had not improved. It was not possible to dump the Germans into the river, so the 4-I squadron of the 132-th SBAP was ordered to destroy the crossings in the Skulyan area. In 06: 15, the six Ar-2, guided by Major N. A. Zobov, dropped FNB-23 100 from a dive. According to the report of the komeska, the crews made direct hits and destroyed the crossing. Anti-aircraft artillery opened fire after the Soviet aircraft left the peak and did not cause any damage, and a couple of fighters identified as “SET-15” suffered a failure - apparently, they meant the Romanian R.11f. All Art-2 returned to their airfield without loss.

However, military success is changeable, and for the beginning of the Soviet pilots the weather let down. After 09: 00, the target area tightened the clouds, and the 10 six Ap 05 2 squadron, which reached the target area in 3, was forced to reset 24 FAB-100 from horizontal flight from 3000 meters altitude, without seeing the target. Naturally, the crews did not observe the results of the bombing, but the anti-aircraft guns and fighters did not annoy them either.

The re-launch of the eight 4 squadron in 11: 50 was a failure. Actually, everything went wrong already at the start, when Lieutenant Alyabyev was taking off from the holder of an airplane taking off from the holder of the bomb, and the squib was triggered. As a result, the plane received heavy damage and made a forced landing. Further more: the weather in the target area became even worse, because of the continuous downpour, the squadron slipped far to the west of the target and restored orientation only over Iasi. When attempting to turn on the target, the group was attacked by the six Bf 109. Crews urgently dropped bombs and tried to escape, but German pilots showed perseverance and enviable skill: despite the clouds and heavy rain, they pursued Soviet bombers about 120 kilometers, from Yassy to Dniester, constantly attacking, although Soviet aircraft periodically entered the clouds and flew at maximum speed. As a result, only the planes of Major N. A. Zobov and Lieutenant V. P. Antonenko returned to their airfield, while the remaining five Ap 2s were shot down. Fortunately, from the 15 members of the downed crews, 10 people soon returned to the regiment.

Feldwebel Rudolf Schmidt shows marks of victories on the steering wheel of his fighter. 12-th, 13-th and 14-th in a row of victory declared over the AR-2 4-th squadron of 132-SBAP in the battle 25 June 1941 year

The successful battle was conducted by the six Bf 109E pilots from 5./JG 77, who took off to 11: 00 in Berlin time. According to Jochen Prine, in 11: 42 – 12: 13 they declared 10 victories over the Martin Bombers, with three victories each counted against Chief Lieutenant Rott (Fl. Rudolf) Schmidt), and Corporal Marshausen (Gefr. Günther Marschhausen) and Unter Officer Kindlein (Uffz. Kindlein) - two each.

The Soviet crews had an active opposition: according to the report of the shooters of the returned aircraft, one of the attackers was shot down by the flagship radio-gunner jr. sergeant Peter Aleksandrovich Gorbachev. According to German data, on this day the aircraft of the “hero of the day” Feldwebel Schmidt was lost from anti-aircraft artillery fire (Bf 109E-4 W.Nr. 5365). With high probability we can say that he was shot down by the crew of the Martin-Bomber, which he stated in 12: 07. In fact, the plane of Major N. A. Zobov received three holes.

Bf 109E fighters from 5./JG 77, summer 1941 of the year (artist Igor Zlobin)

Actually, this battle was not something out of the ordinary: on the eve of the III./JG 77 fighters, the SB group of the 45 SBAP was “thinned out” with approximately the same result. It was not the crews who fought back and managed to inflict damage to the enemy, but the command of the division and the 9 Army's air force, it was worth asking the cause of the losses. They could not organize a cover for the bombers, although it was not difficult to guess that the intensive use of Soviet strike aircraft over the Skulyany area — Falesti would force the enemy to cover him with fighters. Looking a little further, we note that the losses of the 4 squadron of the 132 SBAP influenced the actions of the command, and the next day the 132 SBAP groups began to cover the 20-fighters of the SAD. Alas, due to the fact that the interaction was not established, it was not possible to properly accomplish this task, which predetermined the heavy losses of the parts of 45 June 26.

The commanders of the 3 and 4 squadrons of the 132 SBAP made correct conclusions from the losses of June 25. In the subsequent departures, both units suffered minimal combat losses: a total of nine Ap-2 on 317 combat sorties were lost in the air before being withdrawn to the rear, and four more vehicles were written off due to various damage. At the same time, from June 26 to 18, the regiment lost only three Ap 2, and one more machine did not return from the reconnaissance flight. She acted in isolation from the main regimental forces in the interests of the 9 Army Air Force headquarters, which was given a pair of Ap 2 (the number of sorties made by these crews was not indicated in the regiment’s documents). One 4 squadron of July 12 was mistakenly shot down by its MiG-3 fighter. Thus, on 317 combat sorties there are eight downed by the enemy Ar-2, which gives one loss for approximately 40 sorties - an excellent indicator for the summer of 1941 of the year!

The intensity of the hostilities of the dive bombers of the 132 SBAP can be estimated by the following indicators. Operating from Razdelnaya airfield from 24 to June 28, the 3-I and 4-I squadron of the regiment carried out 67 combat sorties, of which the crews were bombed from a dive flight in 51. Losses brought down amounted to six Ap-2. From the Pechera airfield (10 km south-west of Nemirov), the regiment operated from 2 to 9 in July against the forces of the German 11 Army attacking Mogilev-Podolsky, and 10 – 11 in July, deployed on 180 °, bombed the 3-ro-ro unit of ro-ro XMX-1 July, rotated into 3 °, bombed the 4-ro-ro unit of the Army, attacked 142-Podolsky. 75-th tank group, advancing from Zhytomyr to Kiev. During this time, the 2 and XNUMX squadrons made XNUMX combat sorties, of which XNUMX crews were bombed from a dive. Losses brought down amounted to only two Ap-XNUMX.

The air battle of 10 July, which occurred during the flight for bombing of German tanks and motorized infantry, advancing along the Zhytomyr-Kiev highway, was illustrative. In the area of ​​Rozhev 12, the Ar-2 was dropped on the enemy from a diving 72 FAB-100, the crews reported on the destruction of 10 tanks, two armored vehicles and 11 vehicles. The enemy had a serious opposition: first, the Soviet dive bombers were fired upon with intense fire by anti-aircraft guns, and then they were attacked by the four Bf 109. Despite the fact that a single Ar-2 crashed a motor with a direct hit by an anti-aircraft projectile, the Soviet crews did not become confused and almost all attacks were repelled by concentrated fire from radio-gunners.

The most experienced staff leader of the I./JG 3 link, led by group commander Hauptmann Hans von Hahn (Hptm. Hans von Hahn) and Ober-Lieutenant Buchholz (Oblt. Max Buchholz), not only failed to crush the group, but even to upset it, and only their prey was brought down Ar-2 Art. Lieutenant V.V. Melnikov from the 4 Squadron. Even a padded anti-aircraft gun, the plane returned to the airfield, where it made an emergency landing on the stomach (due to the damage to the hydraulic system, the landing gear did not come out). Interestingly, both the German ace said on another victory (23-I and 19-I, respectively), but the Soviet shooters were not particularly shy: the results of the battle is already known to us ml. Sergeant P. A. Gorbachev and Art. sergeant V.S. Graidzler was credited with one downed Bf 109, although in reality no German fighter received any damage. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in two weeks of fighting the skill of the crews of the Ap 2 crews reached a high level, and intercepting them was undoubtedly a difficult task even for the best Luftwaffe aces.

Commander I./JG 3 Hauptmann Hans von Hahn accepts congratulations on the 24 air victory. 12 July 1941 of the year, Polonnoe airfield. The 23-I mark of victory is drawn on the steering wheel after the battle with the 2-132 Art-X SBUM July July

Redeployed on the night of 11 July to the Zyatkovtsy airfield near the town of Gaisin (50 km west of Umani), the 132 th regiment began working on 12 of the 48 th motorized corps of the 1 th tank group advancing on Berdichev. A total of 18 sorties were flown before 77 July, mainly on targets in the Lyubar, Polonnoe, Berdichev and Kazatin areas. Unfortunately, for this period, generalized data on the number of dive bombings in the regiment’s combat magazine are not available.

Actually, already on July 16 the main part of the regiment departed from the combat area for re-formation into rear, and the remaining group led by the commander of the 5 squadron captain Kasyanov (nine AP-2 and three SB) entered the 6 Army's command . This group was defeated for only two days, and on July 19 was already deployed to Kirovograd, where, transferring aircraft to other parts of the Air Force of the Southern Front, departed after the regiment to the rear. Actually, this event allowed us to get an idea of ​​how Art 2 132 SBAP looked like: at least three cars were subsequently left at the Kirovograd airfield because of faults and hit the photographic lenses of German soldiers.

The successful combat operations and the small losses of the squadrons of the Ar-2 are especially well visible against the background of their colleagues: the regiment command, 1, 2 and 5-squadron flying on the SS, completed only 195 combat missions before leaving the regiment, having lost at this is in aerial combat and from a bomber 22 anti-aircraft artillery fire, three more were written off as a result of combat damage, and three were destroyed in accidents and disasters due to the fault of the personnel. It is not surprising that after the regiment was reorganized into a two-squadron, it was the commanders of the units armed with Ar-2 who became the commanders of the newly formed squadrons. In addition, Captain Makarin and Major Zobov were awarded the Order of the Red Star for their personal heroism.

Aircraft Art-2, owned 132-SBAP left at the airport Kirovograd due to faults

In the documents of the regiment and division, the 3 squadron of the 132 SBAP and its commander, captain M. A. Makarin, are particularly noted. The squadron maintained combat capability throughout the war and suffered minimal combat losses — two Ap-2, one of which was hit by 27 June anti-aircraft guns, and the second on July 4 by Messerschmitts from 7./JG 77. The commander himself performed 24 sorties in less than a month, which is undoubtedly an outstanding result.

Further fate was favorable to him: performing 1941 – 1942 on the Kalinin front in winter. More 32 combat departure, Makarin was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, received the rank of major and was soon appointed commander of the regiment in the Far East. Mikhail Alexandrovich participated in the hostilities against Japan as the commander of the 36-BAP, then served in various positions, went to the reserve in the rank of colonel.

The commander of the 4 Squadron, Major N. A. Zobov, achieved even greater results - during the same period, a brave commander and pilot carried out 29 combat sorties. In addition, it should be noted that it was he who formally belonged to the primacy in dive bombing in combat conditions. Major Zobov was an experienced commander. He participated in hostilities in Republican Spain, for which in 1937 he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Unfortunately, his fate was tragic: Nikolai Alexandrovich did not return from the February 21 departure, 1942, on the Kalinin Front. Before his death, he managed to perform more 36 sorties, for which he was awarded the second Order of the Red Star.

Here's how the command of the 132 Air Division was evaluated by the 45 SBAP:

“The regiment basically conducted all its combat work on ground troops and mainly on enemy motor-parts in movement along roads and in places of their concentration, as well as on crossings to r. Prut in the district Skulyany - Stefaneshty and on the river. Dniester in the district of Kamenetz-Podolsky. According to the reports of the crews, for the most part, the gaps lay in the district of targets and on the target itself. Our ground units defending r. Prut in the district of Stefaneshty, witnessed great losses of the enemy’s motor-mechanic parts from the bombardments. The regiment from ground units was grateful for the successful assistance. "

Despite the obvious success of using the Red Army's first serial air bomber in the 132 SBAP, I would like to note its significant shortcomings that reduce the effectiveness of dive strikes: the crews used almost exclusively FAB-100 bombs, and, as a rule, when loading from a dive, the combat load made only four such bombs. Large-caliber ammunition was used in a few cases, so the declared successes, especially in terms of destroyed crossings, seem rather dubious.

The combat debut of the Soviet dive bomber

Bomber Ar-2, owned by 132-i SBAP, destroyed at the airport Kirovograd
In addition, for more effective use of dive-bombers on enemy troops, observer-aircraft planners were needed, who, being in advanced ground units, would have corrected Ap-2 strikes. They were simply not there at that time, so the bulk of the strikes fell on the enemy’s rear, at best, on the forward detachments of the enemy’s advance convoys, and the German troops leading the battle directly on the front lines were practically not hit. This, of course, did not help much the defending or counterattacking units of the Red Army, which remained without real support from aviation.

FAB-100 aerial bomb suspension in the Ap X-NUMX bomb bay - you can clearly see the PB-2 bomb-holder device (photo from the Ap-3 dive bomb testing report)

Another annoying omission was that the extensive experience of diving into 132's SBAP was not analyzed or used to train other units armed with dive bombers. It is no longer a secret that most of the regiments equipped with Pe-2 dive-bombers, even in 1942 – 1943, did not use these aircraft for their intended purpose and did not bomb with dives.
Art-2 - Unused Opportunity

As an afterword, several factors should be cited which, in the author's opinion, caused such a rapid mastery of a new aircraft by personnel, including the use of its capabilities as a dive bomber.

The first is the origin of the Ap-2 from the serial aircraft of the SB, with which it had similar flight characteristics. The Ap-2 was simple in piloting techniques, including taking off and landing, and therefore available for training even the poorly trained young flight personnel of the Red Army Air Force, which was in the best way different from the strict and subordinate to the Pe-2 pilot. Considering that the majority of cadets of bomber aviation in 1939 – 1941 were graduated from flight schools on SS or CSS, retraining on АР-2 turned into a simple formality.

In the design of the Ap-2, one more feature was provided: this plane initially received a special bomb-holder PB-3, which allowed dropping bombs from a dive not only from the external suspension, but also from the bomb bay. PB-3 design allows hanging on it following bombs combination: 2 × FAB-50, or 2 × FAB-100, or 2 × FAB-250, or 2 × Brabo-220, or 2 × BetAB-150, or 1 × FAB -500. Such a suspension did not degrade the aerodynamics and maintained the maximum horizontal speed, unlike the Pe-2, which did not have such a device, and the pawn could only drop bombs from a dive with an external suspension.

From 15 February to 18 in March 1941, an experienced squadron of dive bombers from the Air Force’s air force weapons test site tested the dive bombing from the dive Ar-2, and a detailed instruction on the training of personnel, which was released, and the most detailed instruction for personnel training was released. rearmed on a new pikirovschik. 3000, 2500 and 2000 meters at input speeds from 270 to 315 km / h were recognized as the main entry heights in a dive, the recommended dive angles are 60, 70 and 80 °. There is no reason to doubt that it was precisely as a result of well-thought-out training based on theoretical and practical data that the personnel of the combatant units could in the shortest possible time master the technique of diving bombing. This is confirmed by the documents of the 132 SBAP, according to which the dive was entered at heights of 3000 – 2500 – 2000 meters (minimum input height), which fully complies with these instructions.

It remains only to regret that the release of a very successful aircraft, the first Soviet dive bomber Ap 2, was limited to two hundred copies.

Unlike Art-2, the subsequent fate of the 132 SBAP was quite successful: in 1942, the regimental personnel was one of the first to master the newest Tu-2 bombers, went through the entire Great Patriotic War, and in 1945, for distinguishing battles for capturing the capital Nazi Germany received the honorary title "Berlin".

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  1. Same lech
    Same lech 10 September 2016 06: 00
    In the first months of the war, the Germans certainly had an overwhelming advantage in the air and I admire the heroism of our pilots who fought in obviously unfavorable conditions ...
    the reasons for this situation are now known to all and then there was only the question of the survival of the country.
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 10 September 2016 14: 16
      Are you 10 years old? Or decided to "check in" on the site?
  2. Amurets
    Amurets 10 September 2016 08: 03
    For this purpose, several units were selected in the border districts, MBO and air force of the KBF, which were received by the first Soviet dive-bombers. In the Odessa Military District, the 132nd SBAP was chosen, and the regiment received 24 Ar-2 instead of part of its SB (one in February, 12 in March and 11 in May).
    Thanks to the author for remembering this rather rare car of the initial period of the Second World War. It's a shame that he didn't mention other shelves. In his book "Dive bombers" P. Tsupko recalls the pilots of the 13th regiment of dive bombers, who also started the war on the Ar-2 aircraft. The truth is in Belarus.
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 10 September 2016 14: 18
      The car, to put it mildly, was a failure.
    2. Gamdlislyam
      Gamdlislyam 10 September 2016 14: 51
      Quote: Amurets
      It is a pity that he did not mention other regiments.

      At the time of the German attack on the USSR, Ar-2s were still in the 2nd SBAP of the Leningrad District, the 46th and 54th SBAP in the Baltic States, the 13th SBAP in the Western Special Military District, the 33rd sap as part of the 14th bomber divisions in the Kiev Special Military District, as well as the 73rd BAP of the Baltic Fleet Air Force. In addition, one squadron of the 2th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Moscow District flew to Ar-27.

      Quote: Amurets
      It remains only to regret that the release of a very successful aircraft, the first Soviet dive bomber Ap 2, was limited to two hundred copies.

      And all in all, the Air Force of the Red Army and the Navy received 164 vehicles before the start of the war, and another 7 after the start of the war.
      1. Gamdlislyam
        Gamdlislyam 10 September 2016 15: 19
        The second quote is taken from the text of an article by Timin Mikhail, and has nothing to do with his esteemed colleague Nikolai (Amur).
        I apologize.
      2. Amurets
        Amurets 10 September 2016 15: 22
        Quote: Amurets
        It remains only to regret that the release of a very successful aircraft, the first Soviet dive bomber Ap 2, was limited to two hundred copies.

        And all in all, the Air Force of the Red Army and the Navy received 164 vehicles before the start of the war, and 7 more after the start of the war

        Be careful, this is not mine. And for clarifying which parts were armed with this aircraft, thank you.
  3. Fitter65
    Fitter65 10 September 2016 08: 33
    The successful battle was conducted by the six Bf 109E pilots from 5./JG 77, who took off to 11: 00 in Berlin time. According to Jochen Prine, in 11: 42 – 12: 13 they declared 10 victories over the Martin Bombers, with three victories each counted against Chief Lieutenant Rott (Fl. Rudolf) Schmidt), and Corporal Marshausen (Gefr. Günther Marschhausen) and Unter Officer Kindlein (Uffz. Kindlein) - two each.

    It is interesting that both German aces declared the next victory (23rd and 19th, respectively),

    They said that 10 shot down means shot down, and no one cares that only 5 planes were shot down. As the "historians" say, our archives cannot be trusted.
    I liked the article. I already read about Ar-2 before, and of course you can’t tell about 132 BAP in the article, but the fact that the author gave is enough to understand what kind of aircraft, in what conditions and how it was fought.
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 10 September 2016 13: 25
      .As "historians" say, our archives cannot be trusted.

      the name of these idiots can
  4. bober1982
    bober1982 10 September 2016 09: 24
    The 132nd regiment lasted until 1997, then it was combined with the 444th regiment, preserving all the regalia and name.
    Full name: 132nd Berlin Order of Kutuzov III degree and Alexander Nevsky heavy bomber regiment.
    Before the collapse of the USSR, they were based in Tartu, flew on the Tu-22m3, then relocated to the east, where they later became part of the 444th regiment.
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 10 September 2016 14: 14
      All right. Do you think people do not know how to use a search engine?
      1. bober1982
        bober1982 10 September 2016 14: 35
        Of course, people are able to use the search engine, but the article does not say anything about this, and that’s supplemented.
        If you use a search engine, then why articles?
  5. parusnik
    parusnik 10 September 2016 12: 17
    It remains only to regret that the release of a very successful aircraft, the first Soviet dive bomber Ar-2, was limited to two hundred copies.
    ..... Indeed, the Ar-2 was a very good aircraft, somewhat inferior to the Pe-2 in speed, the Arkhangelsky dive significantly exceeded its combat load, had excellent take-off and landing characteristics and was more accessible for inexperienced pilots to master.
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 10 September 2016 14: 11
      About was more accessible for development by inexperienced pilots. in more detail. We are adults, and we understand that flying is a raid.
      1. bober1982
        bober1982 10 September 2016 14: 39
        Andrey77 ...... We understand that in the flight business we need a raid.
        In more detail your idea can sound ?, curious.
    2. Amurets
      Amurets 10 September 2016 14: 25
      Indeed, the Ar-2 was a very good aircraft, somewhat inferior to the Pe-2 in speed, the Arkhangelsky dive significantly exceeded its combat load, had excellent take-off and landing characteristics and was more accessible for inexperienced pilots to master.

      All the same, do not forget what both cars came out of. The Ar-2 is a deep modernization of the SB-2, and the Pe-2 emerged from the VI-100 fighter. And the further combat path of the 13th Aviation Regiment is connected with OMAG and again with a fighter version of the Pe-2, the Pe-3 aircraft. Again reference to P. Tsupko, the book "Over the expanses of the northern seas"
    3. Gamdlislyam
      Gamdlislyam 10 September 2016 15: 08
      Quote: parusnik
      Indeed Ar-2 was a very good aircraft

      State tests of one of the first SB-RK, in which all the novelties of construction and equipment were finally formed, were carried out until December 1940, when the decision to rename it Ar-2 (Arkhangelsky-second) followed. The report’s final materials said that the SB-RK aircraft manufactured on the basis of the SB was significantly better than the serial SB, according to its flight tactical data, but lagged behind modern foreign and domestic twin-engine bombers in speed (the latter were understood to be SPB, BB-22 and First of all, the Pe-2, which showed a maximum flight speed of 540 km / h). The maximum speed of the aircraft with a flight weight of 6600 kg at an altitude of 4700 m was 475 km / h instead of the specified maximum speed of 490 km / h. The climb and the ceiling satisfy the tactical and technical requirements for medium bombers. The practical ceiling of an aircraft with a normal flight weight of 6600 kg (6 FAB-100) is 10000 m, with a flight weight of 7100 kg with four FAB-250 on the external suspension, the ceiling was 9000 m. Climbing time of 5000 m with a flight weight of 6600 kg was 7,1, 7100 min., With a flight weight of 9,3 kg - 7100 min. The take-off run with a flight weight of 340 kg is XNUMX meters.
      The Ar-2 series was launched in November 1940. Production vehicles developed a maximum speed of 443 km / h.
      Improvements to the Ar-2 dive bomber continued in 1941. In February 1941, the improved Ar-2 with serial number 1/511 entered the state tests. This car was considered the lead for the new 511th series, and was distinguished by some improvements. M-105 engines are pushed forward 150 mm to improve longitudinal stability. VISH-22E propellers were installed with a diameter of 3,1 m instead of the previous diameter of 3,0 m (respectively, M-105 were put with a reduction of 0,59 instead of 0,66). The aircraft was distinguished by improved finish and aerodynamics - thinner brake grilles and jet tailpipes were installed. These improvements made it possible to obtain a maximum speed of 2-1 km / h on Ar-511 No. 505/512 instead of the previous 475 km / h. Nevertheless, they decided to remove the aircraft from serial production, replacing it with a new diving Pe-2, which not only had higher flight characteristics, but also had significant reserves for further improvement.
      1. rubin6286
        rubin6286 11 September 2016 20: 53
        You all wrote correctly about the upgraded SB, which began to be called Ar-1940 in December 2, but you could not achieve a large increase in speed. The survivability of the machine was poor. As before, the protected tanks and the system of pressurizing the tanks with inert gas were still missing. The all-metal plane flashed with a bright flame, struck by the fire of enemy fighters.
        Many veterans in conversations with me talked about the courage and heroism of bomber pilots,
        flew in the first months of the war without fighter cover. It sounded something like this: "They were burning them. The tanks in the planes are not protected at all. There is a long queue and the SB is on fire." The Ar-2 aircraft, like the SB, had a poor view from the cockpit to the sides and down, the pivot installation of the gunner-radio operator had narrow firing sectors down and to the sides, and the ShKAS machine gun had a high rate of fire, but weak armor penetration. Dive bombing required a certain skill and by the beginning of the war, few had it. At the same time, the Ar-2 allowed only a gentle dive and its accuracy was relatively low. The plane was available to the average pilot only because the SB was the main bomber, it was being trained at the flight schools and the transition to the Ar-2 was a formality for the pilots. The Pe-2, which was put into service on the eve of the war, was structurally better, but also "not a gift." There was a war, people don't choose on it, but they fight with what is ...
        1. sivuch
          sivuch 12 September 2016 09: 23
          If sclerosis does not change the crew of Ar-2, 3 people remain. , and the upper and lower points of the db serve one shooter
    4. sivuch
      sivuch 10 September 2016 15: 16
      Yes, but in terms of survivability and defensive weapons, he did not leave the Security Council
  6. Andrey77
    Andrey77 10 September 2016 14: 08
    that where Ar-2 was quite well mastered, it was used successfully
    I’ll tell you about any weapon so I’ll sing a song.
  7. svp67
    svp67 10 September 2016 16: 59
    This dispute has been going on for a long time, and from the point of view of the modern worldview, it can be stated that almost all of Tupolev's design bureaus should not be put in a "sharashka", do not split it into several dive bomber, then it would not be necessary to urgently "mold" more than an average dive bomber from a not bad high-altitude high-speed twin-engine fighter, launch it, rebuilding the entire production into series. The path could be more logical, simpler, and most importantly less expensive and more efficient. SB - Ar2 (or whatever it was called there) - Tu-2
    1. Gamdlislyam
      Gamdlislyam 10 September 2016 19: 55
      Quote: svp67
      if almost all of Tupolev's design bureaus had not been put into the "sharashka", had not split it into several teams at the same time, had not made his main forces deal with a "stillborn" four-engine long-range high-speed dive bomber, then there would have been no urgent need for a fighters "sculpt" more than an average dive bomber, launch it, rebuilding all production in a series. The path could be more logical, simpler, and most importantly less expensive and more efficient. SB - Ar2 (or whatever it was called there) - Tu-2

      Dear colleague Sergey, from your comment it is clear that you are far from the story of the landing of A. Tupolev and his inner circle. A lot has been written about this in VO.
      You can also imagine quite poorly what kind of combat aircraft SB, Ar-2, Pe-2 and Tu-2 (the last two machines were created in sharashka in record time).
      And do not pull out from the landfill a rotten liberalistic myth about some kind of 4-motor diving bomber.
      Projects dive bombers, as well as high-altitude and long-range fighters, was developed a lot before the war. They built and tested several machines of design teams of Polikarpov N.N., Arkhangelsky A.A. (he was before Tupolev’s arrest as his deputy), V. Petlyakova, and a few more successful ones. The series reached Ar-2 and Pe-2.
      Ar-2 is a modification of the SB-2, which was developed in the early 30s, and made its first flight in 1934. It was an attempt to extend the flight life of a far-reaching bomber.
      The development of the prototype Pe-2 began in the second half of 1938, and the first flight was completed at the end of 1939. Due to the fact that the development of the Polikarpov machine was delayed, the leadership of the country decided to re-qualify the Petlyakov machine as a pike-picker (especially since by this time the need for long-range high-altitude fighters had become irrelevant).
      1. svp67
        svp67 10 September 2016 22: 39
        Dear colleague.
        And do not pull out from the landfill a rotten liberalistic myth about some kind of 4-motor diving bomber.
        This "myth" you named had its own name, and the code in the Tupolev Design Bureau, namely ANT-57 aka PB-4

        One of the closest deputies of Tupolev L.L. Kerber told about the re-drinking of his creation
        The general approved and informed
        that the next day Tupolev will be delivered to Beria's report, but for now, so that "
        bother ", all three were placed in solitary confinement
        prisons 30.
        Reception at Beria, in his huge office, which overlooked the square,
        was pompous. Drawings are spread on the tables. At the end towards the "nearest
        assistant and best friend "Tupolev sits, next to him is an officer, opposite
        Davydov. At a distance against the wall between the two officers - Jäger and Frenkel. After hearing
        Tupolev, the closest said: "I told your proposals to a friend
        To Stalin. He agreed with my opinion that we now need a different
        a plane, and a high-altitude long-range four-engine dive bomber,
        let's call it PB-4. We're not going to give pin shots, - he
        frowningly pointed at the drawing of the ANT-58, - no, we will smash
        beast in his den. "Addressing Davydov:" Take action, - a nod in
        the prisoners' side - so that they prepare proposals in a month. All!"
        Tupolev returned as evil as a thousand devils, Beria’s plan was clearly
        insolvent. "High-altitude" means a pressurized cabin, that is
        cramped review. Four-engine distant - therefore,
        oversized, slow-moving machine is an excellent target for anti-aircraft gunners and
        unsuitable for large-scale production. Hermetic cabins are not
        allowed the use of reliable defensive weapons, for
        remote-controlled at that time in the USSR was not. In a word, mass
        "against" and not one "for", except that the Germans and Americans already have
        single-motor diving, therefore, we should surpass them and
        to create another not "tsar-bell", but "tsar-dive bomber"!
        In the evening, Tupolev gathered his group and shared his doubts: "Business
        very responsible. Perhaps this amateur has already convinced Stalin, and he will be
        It is difficult to refuse PB-4. I know a little Stalin, he doesn’t change his mind
        loves. We must very conscientiously choose the general view of the machine, an approximate
        weight calculation - it’s a pity that Petlyakov is not with us, he knows me better
        all the data is ANT-42 (PE-8), but PB-4 should be about the same. Take
        as the basis for the 42nd, seal the cockpit, consider the exit of bombs from the hatch when
        dive, consider extra weight, calculated overload for the dive
        will have to be raised. Georges (Frenkel) and I will write an explanatory note. "
        The note highlighted four key points:
        1. High-altitude long-range four-engine heavy bomber has already been created,
        this is ANT-42. In order to "beat the beast in its den", you need to organize
        its mass production.
        2. The dive pilot, since the percentage of their losses will still be large, should
        to be a small mass machine.
        3. To aim at a dive, the machine must be maneuverable, which
        cannot be reached on a heavy four-engine machine.
        4. The exact data on aircraft 103 declared by him, Tupolev, he
        guarantees required by PB-4 - cannot.
        A month later, Tupolev was taken to Lubyanka alone. This time he was gone
        three days, and we were pretty worried without him, and when he returned, he said:
        "My report irritated Beria. When I finished, he looked
        frankly angry at me. Apparently, he told Stalin enough about PB-4.
        a lot, and maybe convinced him. It surprised me, from past tricks in
        Stalin, I made the impression that he was in aviation, if he did not understand how
        the designer still had common sense and point of view. Beria said that
        they will deal with Stalin. The day I was worried alone, then was called
        again. “So, Comrade Stalin and I once again familiarized ourselves with the materials.
        The solution is: Now and urgently do twin-engine. As soon as you finish
        proceed to PB-4, we really need it. ”Then such
        Beria: - What is your speed?
        Me: - Six hundred.
        He: - Not enough, you need seven hundred! What is the range?
        Me: - 2000.
        He: - Not good, you need 3000! What is the load?
        Me: - Three tons.
        He: - Not enough, you need four. All!
        Addressing Davydov: "Order the military to draw up requirements for
        twin-engine dive. Parameters declared by citizen Tupolev,
        please clarify in the spirit of my instructions. "
        This was the end of the audience, we went to the secretariat, Davydov nodded
        head to Kutepov and Balashov, those on tiptoe obsequiously hid behind
        sacred doors, and soon, already in the form of hotel battles, appeared
        back, loaded with drawings and calculations. "
        Later, already at large, he shared with us:
        "I have had few such intense and responsible conversations in
        government, the conversations on which the fate of us all depended. Do PB-4
        it was crazy. The military, of course, would have rejected it and were right, for
        to dive on it for point targets, of course, was impossible. Negative
        Beria would qualify the conclusion as wrecking, because he would have to
        make excuses. Remembering his evil gaze, I tend to believe that he is not
        thinking, would sacrifice us all, and what would await us? "
        When he returned and outlined the events that happened to him in these three
        of the day, everyone breathed a sigh of relief, this time the storm passed, and opened
        some, though vague, but prospects. Work on PB-4 did not cause
        doubt it would be tantamount to a stanza from the song of the revolutionaries: "You yourself
        digging their own grave, a deep hole is ready. ”The monstrous tension was replaced
        with a sense of relief, spiritual freedom, the world seemed pink again. People
        sighed, life appeared in his eyes, interests appeared.
        1. Gamdlislyam
          Gamdlislyam 11 September 2016 08: 51
          Quote: svp67
          This "myth" you named had its own name, and the code in the Tupolev Design Bureau, namely ANT-57 aka PB-4

          Dear colleague Sergei, The Society of Myths Lovers, in which we have lived since the late 80s, has generated a stream of publications permeated with cliches. In this regard, is it worth talking about a man whose name has become a symbol of repression in the USSR (and even more so in post-communist Russia) -Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria, who is already "by definition" an enemy of everything reasonable, progressive, etc. naturally, a supporter of the most extravagant and unrealizable ideas.
          The dive bomber as a type first appeared in the plan for the experimental construction of the GUAS KA (Main Directorate of Aviation Supply of the Red Army) in 1935. As you know, at that time it was customary to designate aircraft with the first letters of the words that determine their purpose, with the addition of the number and type of motors. This is how the name "PB 4M-34FRN" arose. In the correspondence between the head of the GUAS KA PA Alekseev, the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force Ya.V. Smushkevich and the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov in the late 30s. issues related to the creation of PB-4 were repeatedly discussed.
          It was Smushkevich’s group who insisted on a four-engine dive bomber. His opponent was Alekseev.
          In 1939, the preliminary studies of the ANT-57 and (simultaneously) ANT-58 (the future Tu-2) began. But, soon, the Government made a decision to stop the serial production of the four-engine bomber TB-7 due to the complexity and high cost of production. Despite lobbying for the Smushkevich group, Alekseyev, with the support of Voroshilov, managed to stop the work of four motor dives. And the Order on the cessation of work was signed by the "evil genius" comrade Yakovlev AS, already being in the position of deputy. People's Commissar of the aviation industry.
          And the passage you cited from the novel by G. Ozerov (real author Kerber L. L.) “Tupolev Sharaga”, published in Frankfurt, in the anti-Soviet journal “Sowing” in 1973 (after the death of A. Tupolev), is fiction, because in this conversation, the author was not present.
          In Russia, this work was published 6 years after the death of Kerber L.L. (all participants of the described dialogue were not already alive).
      2. svp67
        svp67 10 September 2016 22: 50
        Projects of dive bombers, as well as high-altitude and long-range fighters, were developed a lot before the war
        Thank you for reminding me of what I still knew from childhood, but for an attempt to "open my eyes" you show complete ignorance of the designs of these machines, and apparently I could not fully convey my idea, namely, that the phased development of machines of one design bureau it would be easier to master both production by industry and mastering by flight personnel than the complete destruction of production technology and conversion to an aircraft of a completely different design, this is me about the transition from SB to Pe-2
        Due to the fact that the development of the Polikarpov machine was delayed,
        Let's just say: NN Polikarpov was very "helped" to do this, Comrade Yakovlev tried especially hard, who even somehow abandoned that while he was in power more than one new Polikarpov plane would not go into series production.
        1. Gamdlislyam
          Gamdlislyam 11 September 2016 08: 55
          Quote: svp67
          Let's just say: NN Polikarpov was very "helped" to do this, Comrade Yakovlev tried especially hard, who even somehow abandoned that while he was in power more than one new Polikarpov plane would not go into series production.

          Another liberal myth, which has been refuted dozens of times at VO.
          1. unknown
            unknown 11 September 2016 10: 57
            Dozens of times refuted, but did not refute.
  8. unknown
    unknown 11 September 2016 11: 08
    With what fright Pe-2 turned out to be faster than Ar-2. Serial Pe-2s reached 480 km / h, and serial Ar-2-475 km / h. To bring the speed to 534 km / h, a very deep structural and technological modernization of Myasishchev was carried out in 1942. And even after that, the Pe-2 remained a bad bomber. They like to repeat that the Ar-2 lifted 1500 kg only over short distances. And could the Pe-2 lift 1500 kg? Normally, 600 kg, and only in overload, up to 1000 kg. It is clear that we praise what we have. Therefore, we praise the bad Pe-2 and the bad fighter Yakovlev.
    1. Gamdlislyam
      Gamdlislyam 11 September 2016 16: 56
      Quote: ignoto
      With what fright Pe-2 turned out to be faster than Ar-2. Serial Pe-2s reached 480 km / h, and serial Ar-2-475 km / h. To bring the speed to 534 km / h, a very deep structural and technological modernization of Myasishchev was carried out in 1942. And even after that, the Pe-2 remained a bad bomber.

      Dear colleague, ignoto, during state tests of one of the first SB-RK (besides not fully equipped and without weapons), it really showed a speed of 475 km / h. But the serial Ar-2 speed did not exceed 443 km / h. Above, I cited some data from the Ar-2 test report. Even the improved Ar-2 (it was not launched into the series), during tests in 1941, developed a maximum speed of 505-512 km / h. The Ar-2 did not have a dive withdrawal automatic device (it was not installed on Pe-2 until mid-1942 on all machines, due to the evacuation of the plant producing this unit)
      The Pe-2 of 1941 was significantly different from the Pe-2 - 1942, and from the Pe-2I (1944) it differed like heaven and earth. Link to the description of the Pe-2I -

      Quote: ignoto
      They like to repeat that the Ar-2 lifted 1500 kg only over short distances. And could the Pe-2 lift 1500 kg? Normally, 600 kg, and only in overload, up to 1000 kg.

      In the comments above, I gave some flight performance data from the Ar-2 test reports. With a normal take-off weight of 6600 kg, the Ar-2 could take up to 600 kg of bombs, and during overload, with a take-off weight of 7100 kg, it took up to 1000 kg. In theory, the Ar-2 could also raise 1500 kg of bombs, due to a decrease in the fuel supply, but this was not tested in state tests. During the hostilities, sorties with such a combat load were also not recorded. Yes, that’s understandable, and even with a combat load of 1000 kg there were problems with aircraft control.
      Some LTH Pe-2I
      full speed
      near the ground - 556 km / h
      at an altitude of 656 km / h
      Practical range - 2275 km
      Practical ceiling - 9350 m
      Crew 2 rights
      Armament: front 12.7 mm UBK machine gun and the same in the tail mount
      Bomb load - 1500 kg maximum
  9. Decabrev
    Decabrev 25 September 2016 22: 22
    Only not one Pe-2I had time for the war. And what a beautiful project it was! You could even compare the IL-28 or Su-24 with the pre-war airplane, that’s where the advantages would be undeniable!
  10. Arikkhab
    Arikkhab 5 January 2017 17: 48
    this is how the Germans had "aces" who "shot down" 300-400 enemy aircraft
  11. iouris
    iouris 14 January 2017 12: 58
    A common drawback of Soviet aircraft is the power plant, i.e. weak engine. Hence the insufficient structural strength, weak armament, including defensive weapons, and a narrow firing sector. Bombing from horizontal flight with bombs of 100 kg only by chance could lead to significant results. Given the dynamics of the processes and the complexity of the task, the aircraft and dive bomber pilots should have been trained at least from 1938. Unfortunately, it can be said that the bomber aviation of the USSR, in general, was very ineffective. This only underlines the exceptional heroism of the crews that went into battle to complete a combat mission. The only real bombers were, perhaps, only Lend-Lease "Bostons", which, it seems, were supplied in rather good quality, so it is appropriate to analyze the tactics and results of combat operations of the bomber regiments that were lucky to fly this technique.