Once again about preparing Japan for war against the USSR in 1941

Currently, when there is an active revision stories, there were publications and statements that distort the nature of Soviet-Japanese relations during the Second World War, in which there is a noticeable desire to present Japan’s foreign policy as peace-loving, and aggressive plans to prepare for war against the Soviet Union - “defensive”. Such statements are not new, at the end of the twentieth century, a number of Japanese and American historians, considering the events of 1941 of the year, emphasized the “defensive” nature of the neutrality pact concluded by Japan and the USSR 13 on April 1941. For example, the former Japanese foreign minister, M. Shigemitsu, in her published memoirs, asserted that Japan “had absolutely no intention of violating the treaty of neutrality”. And American historian K. Basho said that Japan had signed a neutrality pact, wanting to protect itself from the threat of a Soviet attack from the north. It is precisely such statements that the Russian “historians” have adopted now.

At the same time, a lot of documents remained that testify that the Japanese leadership, while concluding this pact, planned to use it by no means for peaceful purposes. Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, before signing a neutrality pact, 26 March 1941, during a conversation with the head of the German Foreign Ministry Ribbentrop and Count Schulenburg, the ambassador of fascist Germany to the USSR, said about the forthcoming conclusion of the pact that no Japanese prime minister could to force Japan to maintain neutrality if a conflict arises between Germany and the USSR. In this case, Japan will certainly begin military operations against the USSR. And this will not prevent the existing pact.

Literally a few days after this statement, Matsuoka, on behalf of the Japanese government, put his ministerial signature on the text of the neutrality pact between Japan and the USSR, the second article of which said that if one of the parties to the pact was involved in the hostilities, the other party undertakes to maintain neutrality throughout the conflict.

After the signing of the pact, the intentions of the Japanese government regarding its use to cover the preparations for the aggression have not changed, as evidenced by Matsuoka’s statement to the German Ambassador to Tokyo, General Ott. In a telegram sent by 20 in May 1941 of the year and addressed to Matsuoka, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Oshima, informed his boss that, according to Weizsäcker, the German government attaches great importance to the statement of the head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Matsuoka, made by him to General Ott, that the beginning of the Soviet-German war, Japan will also attack the USSR.

Germany’s attack on our country prompted the Japanese leadership to step up preparations for war against the USSR. In an effort to disguise the preparation of their troops for an attack, the Japanese government deliberately misled the Soviet embassy about their plans. Here it is appropriate to bring information from the diary of the USSR Ambassador to Tokyo, KA. Smetanin, adopted by the tribunal as an official document. 25 June 1941, the ambassador of the USSR, who had met with Matsuoka on the eve, wrote down the following in a diary: “I asked Matsuoka about Japan’s position in terms of the outbreak of war and whether Japan would maintain neutrality in accordance with the pact. Matsuoka chose to shy away from a direct answer, stating that his position on this issue was set out in due time (April 22) in a statement on his return from Europe. ” Matsuoka was referring to a statement from 22 on April 1941 of the year, where he assured that the Japanese government would faithfully comply with the neutrality pact with our country (this statement was published in the Asahi newspaper 23 of April 1941 of the year). However, as the documents show, all this was intended for the deliberate deception of the Soviet government.

The German ambassador to Tokyo in a telegram from Ribbentrop on 3 on July 1941 reported that Matsuoka explained that the Japanese statement was made to the Russian ambassador in this form in order to deceive the Russians or keep them in ignorance, as the empire had not finished preparing for war. Matsuoka also noted that Smetanin does not suspect that military preparations, according to the government’s decision on 2 July 1941, “to prepare for the invasion of the territory of the USSR” are being conducted with ever-increasing activity. Soon the Japanese cabinet explained to the Allies its attitude to the neutrality pact with our country. 15 August, in the course of confidential conversations with the ambassadors of Italy and Germany, the head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, speaking of the pact, stressed that under current conditions this agreement with the USSR is the best way to take the first steps to implement existing plans for the USSR, and that is nothing more than temporary an arrangement that exists until Japan finishes preparing for war.

Thus, with the idea of ​​concluding a neutrality pact with our country, the Japanese pursued the perfidious goal of using it as a screen to disguise and prepare for an attack. It is worth noting that the conclusion of this neutrality pact was a success of Soviet diplomacy and a far-sighted step by the Soviet government, as it had a certain deterrent effect on the Japanese ruling circles, who were forced to reckon with the public opinion of their country and other states. It is known, for example, that the Japanese leadership, on the days of the most intensive preparation for military aggression in 1941, was discussing the question of the resignation of Foreign Minister Matsuoka to justify his actions, which are fundamentally contrary to the neutrality pact. This is evidenced, for example, by the statement made by 1 in July by the Japanese ambassador to Rome that, according to his government, the implementation of the Japanese military plans against the USSR "requires Mr. Matsuoka’s resignation due to the fact that he recently signed non-aggression pact with Russia ”, and“ it should disappear from the political arena for a while ”.

After Matsuoka’s resignation as Foreign Minister in July 1941, Japan’s foreign policy, which provided for a solution to the “northern problem” by armed force, did not change. On July 20, the new Japanese foreign minister, Admiral Toyoda, unequivocally assured the German ambassador that changing the cabinet would not affect government policy.

Under the cover of the neutrality pact, the Japanese were preparing for a military attack on our country, taking special measures to preserve secrecy. The chief of staff of the Kwantung Army during the meeting of the commanders of the formations, which took place on 26 on April 1941 (already after ratification of the neutrality pact), stressed that strengthening and expanding preparations for war with the USSR should be carried out “top secret”, taking “special precautions”. He pointed out that it was necessary, on the one hand, to continue strengthening and expanding preparatory actions for war, and on the other, to maintain friendly relations with our country in every possible way; trying to preserve the armed world and at the same time prepare for military operations against the USSR, which in the end will bring the Japanese a sure victory.

Before the fascist attack on the USSR, the preparation of the Japanese for the invasion of our Far East was carried out in accordance with the plan developed in 1940 by the Japanese army general headquarters. This plan, according to the testimony of Yamada, the commander of the Kwantung Army, and his chief of staff, Hut, provided for the main attack on the Soviet Primorye Territory and its occupation.

Immediately after the outbreak of World War II, the General Staff of the Japanese army began to develop a new plan of war against the USSR, called "Kan-Toku-En" ("Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army"). The plan and the main content of the plan speak of their aggressive nature. The former commander of the 4th Army of the Kwantung Army, Kusaba Tatsumi, stated that according to the new plan, at the beginning of the war against our country, the main blow was delivered to Primorye by the forces of the 1st Front. The 2nd front at that time provided cover for the flank of the 1st front and conducted preparations for operations in the direction of Zavitaya-Kuybyshevka. With the beginning of the war, the N-Army was to be transferred to the 2nd front in this direction (soon the N-Army was named the 8th Army) and aviation, striking the territory of Soviet Primorye.

According to the operational design of the command, the 2 th front, using the forces of the 4 army from the Shengvutun-Aygun area and the 8 army from the Chihe area, forces the Amur River and leads the attack in the direction of Curled-Kuybyshevka, cuts the Amur railway, destroys parts of the Red Army, takes Blagoveshchensk , Kuybyshevka, Curled and Shimanovskaya. After this, the attack on Khabarovsk and Rukhlovo is carried out.

Acting according to the Kan-Toku-En plan, the Japanese command took emergency measures to increase the number of its units in Manchuria. A German military attache in Tokyo, Krechmer, in a telegram sent to Berlin on July 25, reported that the call of reservists, which had started in Japan and Manzhou-Guo, had suddenly received July 10 and the following days (especially in 1, 4, 7, 12 and 16 divisions) large scale, not amenable to further disguise. And on July 10, military units began to be dispatched, namely, the transport, technical, and artillery units of the 16 and 1 divisions and the sending of reservists from Japan with Seisin and Racin destinations for troops and reservists, and Tien-Chin and Shanghai - only for reservists.

The Kwantung Army has increased by 300 thousand people. In order to conceal, if possible, the sharp increase in the Kwantung Army, the Japanese command did not form new units, but took the path of increasing the number of soldiers in the already existing units and units. The units of the Kwantung Army on the lands of Manchuria were staffed with personnel reinforced infantry divisions of type A-1 and A, which until the end of the autumn 1941 had been brought to full-time 24-29-thousandth personnel each. In terms of personnel and weapons, the reinforced division of the Kwantung Army was almost twice as large as the usual Japanese infantry division.

In total, the Japanese army had 5 reinforced infantry divisions of type A-1 and 19 reinforced infantry divisions of type A. Of these, the Kwantung army had: all reinforced infantry divisions of type A-1 and 12 reinforced divisions of type A-2. By 1942, the number of soldiers of the Kwantung Army brought to one million people. The amount doubled tanks in comparison with 1937, and military aircraft - three times. In 1942, the Japanese in Manchuria concentrated 17 reinforced Japanese infantry divisions, equal in number and firepower to 30 ordinary divisions, a significant number of separate units, the number of soldiers in fortified areas increased sharply.

Undoubtedly, the Kan-Toku-En plan was drawn up from the north not to defend against the “Soviet threat”, and the large forces of Japanese troops hastily concentrated near the Soviet state border after the outbreak of World War II. In 1941, the leading Japanese military and state bodies and figures were convinced that the USSR did not threaten Japan. For example, the Japanese commander fleet Admiral Yamamoto, in a secret military order on November 1, 1941, stated that if the empire did not attack the USSR, then, in the opinion of the Japanese naval headquarters, the Soviet Union itself would not begin military operations against the Land of the Rising Sun. A similar point of view was expressed by Japanese Prime Minister General Tojo at a meeting of the Privy Council Committee in December 1941. He announced that Soviet Russia was busy with the war with Germany, so he would not try to take advantage of the imperial advance to the south.

A number of Japanese statesmen in the Tokyo process and in post-war memoir literature tried to argue that Japan in 1941 was not ready for war with the USSR because the German leadership had allegedly not informed the Japanese government about the impending attack on the Soviet Union. It allegedly learned about the fascist attack on the USSR only on 22 on June 1941 of the year in 16 hours, by Tokyo time. However, the Japanese government was actually aware of the impending attack on the USSR. 3 May 1941, Matsuoka, at a meeting of the Betting Committee with the government, said that, according to Berlin, Germany could strike Russia in two months. Also in May, Ribbentrop, at the request of the Japanese government regarding the possibility of the German-Soviet war, replied that at the moment the war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable. If the war starts, it can end in the month of 2-3. The concentration of troops for the war is complete. A few days later, 3 and 4 of June, the Japanese ambassador, General Oshima, during their conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop, received their confirmation of preparations for a war with the USSR, which he informed his government. The latter recognized the need to develop a new policy in this situation.

At the end of the second week of June, the Japanese government received a notice from Ambassador Oshima that the war against the Soviet Union would be launched "next week." Consequently, the Japanese government already knew in advance the dates of the German attack on the USSR. This is confirmed by the entry in the diary of the adviser to Emperor Hirohito, Marquis Kido, made by him almost a matter of hours before the start of the war. “21 June 1941 of the year,” wrote Marquis Kido, “Prince Canoe said that the modern war between Germany and Russia is not unexpected for Japanese diplomacy, since Ambassador Oshima was informed about this, and the government had enough time to take measures and prepare to the situation. "

Awareness of the government and command of Japan about the impending German attack on the USSR allowed the Japanese leadership to discuss in advance the most important issues of preparing Japan for war, determine their positions and carry out important measures to be fully prepared to launch an attack on the Soviet Union. In the spring and summer of 1941-year, in an atmosphere of heightened secrecy, extensive preparations were made for war: airfields, access roads to warehouses, ammunition and fuel depots, barracks for personnel were built in a hurry, artillery systems and infantry were modernized. weapons The Kwantung Army, the Japanese military intelligence, has stepped up activity in areas of Siberia and our Far East.

After 22 June 1941, the Japanese military preparations became even bigger. By the fall, Japanese troops stationed in Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Hokkaido, Korea, the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, as well as significant fleet forces were prepared for a sudden invasion of our Far Eastern frontiers and Siberia and were only waiting for a signal. But there was no signal.

22 June, when in Japan received news of the invasion of Germany into the USSR, the army and navy general staff at a joint conference came to a consensus on the two main areas of impending aggression - the "northern" and "southern". This opinion of the military circles, which matured long before the outbreak of the war, became the basis of a principled decision adopted by 2 July at the imperial conference on the forthcoming entry of Japan into the Second World War and the preparation of military operations against the USSR (“northern direction”) and against the USA and England (“southern direction ").

One of the points of the resolution adopted by the emperor at the conference said that, although the Japanese attitude to the outbreak of war was clearly defined by the allied spirit of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, the Japanese should not interfere with it for a while, however secretly should continue armed training against the USSR, however, we will proceed from our own interests. We should also continue negotiations with the USSR with even greater caution. And as soon as the course of the German-Soviet war becomes favorable for Japan, it is necessary to resolutely apply the full power of Japanese weapons to solve their northern problems.

In the first weeks of the German-Soviet war, while the German offensive was developing successfully, the Japanese top leadership, believing in Germany's quick victory, was inclined to deliver the first strike against our country. Representatives of the Japanese monopolies, the most adventurous elements in the ruling circles, insisted on immediate entry into the war. Matsuoka, the protege of the powerful Manchu concern Mange, already on 22 of June, at an audience with the emperor, insistently advised him to consent to the immediate entry of the empire into the war with the USSR.

However, the most influential figures of Japan, although they were in favor of aggression against the USSR, but recommended starting it a little later, when the Soviet Union would be significantly weakened. War Minister General Tojo, for example, stated at a cabinet meeting in the presence of the emperor that Japan would be able to gain great prestige if it attacked the USSR when it was ready to fall, “like a ripe plum”. The Japanese generals believed that this moment would come in about a month and a half. The Chief of the Army General Staff, General Sugiyama, at a meeting of the Bid Communications Committee and the Government of 27, said that it would take 40-50 days to prepare the Kwantung Army to invade Soviet territories. On July 1 in Rome, the Japanese ambassador announced that Japan wants to actively oppose Russia, but needs another few weeks. 4 July, the German ambassador Ott reported to Berlin: The Japanese army is diligently preparing ... for the unexpected, but not rash, opening of military operations against Russia, the first goal of which is to capture areas on the coast. Therefore, General Yamashita also remained in the Kwantung Army. ”

But by August 1941, the Japanese command’s confidence in the quick victory of Germany was shaken. The strong resistance of the Soviet troops disrupted the schedule of the onset of the fascist Wehrmacht. In early August, the intelligence department of the army general staff reported to the imperial headquarters about disrupting the plan of the German command to crush Russia in the month of 2-3. The Japanese noted that Smolensk defense delays the German army for more than a month, the war takes a protracted nature. Based on this 9 withdrawal of August, the Japanese bid and the government make a preliminary decision on preparations for delivering a primary strike against the United States.

However, even in the period when Japan conducted intensive preparations for a war against the United States, the work on the invasion of our territory was not stopped. The Japanese command tracked the war on the Soviet-German front and the state of the grouping of our troops in the Far East and Siberia with maximum attention, trying to choose the most favorable moment for an attack. The chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, during the meeting of the commanders of the formations in December 1941, gave instructions to each army and first line compound to monitor the current changes in the martial law of the USSR and the MPR to ensure that at any time they have information about the true situation in order to “establish signs of a turning point in the situation. "

And the turning point has come. However, not in favor of the German troops. 5 December 1941, the Soviet troops launched a counter-offensive near Moscow. The defeat of the selective armies of the Wehrmacht near the walls of our capital meant a complete failure of the German Blitzkrieg plan against our country. That is why the Japanese ruling circles decided to abstain from the planned attack on the USSR in 1941. The Japanese leadership considered it possible to start a war with us only if one of two factors was present: the defeat of the Soviet Union or the sharp weakening of the forces of the Soviet Far Eastern Army. By the end of 1941, both of these factors were missing.

We must pay tribute to the foresight of the Soviet Supreme Command, which, during the period of heavy fighting near Moscow, was being held by military forces in the Far East, which did not allow the Japanese military leadership to hope for a victorious outcome of the impending attack. General Kasahara Yukio, who was then chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, admitted at the Tokyo process that, although by December 1941, part of the Soviet troops had been sent to the West, and the Far Eastern army had decreased, the power ratio did not allow the Japanese generals to hope for success aggression.

It is also worth remembering that the leadership of Japan was not limited only to the preparation of its troops for war against the USSR. In 1941, the General Staff of the Japanese army conducted active reconnaissance and sabotage work on the territory of the Soviet Union in close contact with the Hitlerite Abwehr. This indicates a gross violation by Japan of the existing neutrality pact. As soon as Germany attacked the USSR, the headquarters of the Japanese army took the initiative in establishing contacts with the Wehrmacht high command to coordinate anti-Soviet subversive activities. The memorandum of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces reported that 04.06.1941, Colonel Yamamoto, assistant to the Japanese military attache in Berlin, informed the head of the 2nd Wehrmacht counterintelligence unit, Colonel Von Lausen, that the General Headquarters of Japan was ready to conduct anti-Soviet subversive activities in our Far East, especially from the MPR and Manzhou-Guo, and, above all, in the zone of Lake Baikal. According to the agreement between the command of the army of Japan and the Wehrmacht, the Japanese General Staff systematically provided the fascist command of Germany with valuable intelligence about the USSR. Major General Matsumura, who held the post of 1941 to August 1943 in the autumn as head of the Russian division of the General Staff of the Japanese Army, showed that he, by order of the Chief of the General Staff, transmitted to the 16 division of the German General Staff information about the Soviet forces in the Far East, the military potential of the Soviet Union and moving our troops to the west.

During 1941, a large number of Japanese spies, saboteurs, and counter-revolutionary literature were shipped across the Soviet border. Only border troops were detained while crossing the 302 border of a Japanese spy. Japanese intelligence has thrown two armed gangs across the border of the Soviet Union to carry out sabotage and terrorist activities in our Far East. Soviet authorities have established 150 cases of transfer of counter-revolutionary literature across the USSR border. In 1941, Japanese forces 136 once violated the Soviet state border with subunits and single-handedly and 24 once fired at Soviet territory, border guards, and ships. In addition, Japanese aircraft 61 once violated our border, and the Japanese fleet 19 once went into the Soviet territorial waters.

Brazenly violating the articles of the neutrality pact, the Japanese navy illegally blocked the coast of our Far East, firing on, drowning and detaining Soviet ships. The International Military Tribunal, on the basis of irrefutable data, stated that Soviet ships, having clearly readable identification marks and flags anchored in Hong Kong at the end of 1941, were shelled and one of them was sunk; a few days later, Soviet transport ships were sunk by bombs dropped from Japanese aircraft; Many of our vessels were illegally detained by Japanese warships and forced to go to Japanese ports, which were often under arrest for a long time.

Thus, in the 1941 year, the Japanese leadership was actively preparing to invade our territories, while committing aggressive acts against the USSR, and grossly violated the neutrality pact. Having decided on top-priority aggression against the United States, the Japanese did not stop preparing for war against us, waiting for the right moment to begin. Japan kept the million-strong army ready on the Soviet borders, diverting to this a significant part of the USSR Armed Forces and thereby providing substantial assistance to Germany in its military operations on the Eastern Front. Japanese plans were thwarted by our victories near Moscow. It was they, and not the peacefulness of the Japanese high circles, who forced the Land of the Rising Sun to refrain from military intervention against the USSR in 1941. But the Japanese government did not cease to bear their aggressive plans, and only crushing blows of the Red Army against the Hitlerite Wehrmacht in the 1943-1944. forced Japan to finally abandon the attack on the USSR.

Sources:
Koshkin A. Kantokuen - Barbarossa in Japanese. Why Japan did not attack the USSR. M .: Veche, 2011. C. 12-19, 37-51.
Cherevko K. Sickle and hammer against the samurai sword. M .: Veche, 2003. C. 240-246, 330-340.
Cherevko K. Destroyed hopes // Sea collection. 1985. No.5. C. 62-64.
Savin A. Preparation of Japan for the war against the USSR. // visage 1976. No.1. C. 38-43
Kutanov L. The struggle of the USSR for the establishment and development of good-neighborly relations with Japan (1925 — 1939). M .: Science, 1975. C. 11-14.
Yu. Golitsyn. From the History of Russian-Japanese Relations // Expert. 3 November 1997.

Comments

[parusnik]

And the American historian C. Basho claimed that Japan had signed a pact of neutrality, wanting to protect itself from the threat of a Soviet attack from the north.

... Yeah, on Hassan, and Khalkhin-Gol ... well the USSR attacked ... When these historians write this ... somehow they don’t think about it ... but what was peace-loving Japan .. at that time doing in China? .. Rice probably helped the Chinese clean up ... purely humanitarian goals ...

[V.ic]

What "they are soft and fluffy" japa showed on December 7, 1941. With such neighbors, you must always keep a sharp ax under the pillow ..., so to speak, "in order to avoid"!

[Amurets]

http://www.protown.ru/information/hide/4877.htmlТ
I’m hard to write a comment, especially if you live in these parts and know a little history.

Thus, in 1941, the Japanese leadership actively and comprehensively prepared for the invasion of our territories, while simultaneously committing aggressive acts against the USSR, and in a flagrant manner violated the neutrality pact.

All this has been since the Civil War and intensified after the complete occupation of Manchuria in 1931. There were constant provocations along the entire border line. We must remember Hassan-1938, Khalkhin-Gol-1939. The first provocation was carried out with the aim of trying to capture Primorye, the second - with the goal of not only capturing Mongolia, but also trying to cut off the Far East from the USSR, go to Lake Baikal and capture the Circum-Baikal Railway. On provocations at the border in 1941, the figures are also very underestimated. In general, there are enough mistakes. Plus for this article is one, but important, this article is the first that I came across, which tells in detail about Japan’s large-scale preparation of the war in 1941 in our Far East.

[Technical engineer]

Quote: Amurets

All this was since the days of the Civil War and intensified after the full occupation of Manchuria in 1931. The constant provocations were all along the border line. We must remember Hasan-1938 year, Khalkhin-Gol-1939 year.

I completely agree. Moreover, he wrote about Khalkhin Gol. But this article is dedicated to the plans of the year 1941. Planned in the continuation of the topic article on the Japanese plans 1942-1943 year. Also with indication of real documents and historical facts .. However, now I think ... is it worth it?

[alexej123]

Alexander, it's worth it. "In dispute, truth is born." I always read your articles with interest. With links to documents, colorful, exciting.

[Hapfri]

What actually could the Japanese capture in our Siberia? There are no roads. There are almost no cities. Minerals, including oil, have not yet been developed. I would have to fight for the taiga and tundra. And most importantly, the Japanese had almost no gas for this.
Whether the business is southbound. Everything is directly opposite. Any analyst not suffering from Down Syndrome would prefer a southward move. In addition, there is oil. And the Japanese captured it all in a month.
The Japanese could build any plans. But they had no reason to fight in Siberia. They didn’t need anything. In addition, they already got involved in an endless war in China. They will break 100 divisions, the Chinese will have 100 new divisions in a month. Do you know how many Soviet pilots fought in the Chinese sky? 2000. This is about the lack of experience of Soviet pilots at the initial stage of the war.
We also made all sorts of plans. Thunderstorm plan for example. But this does not mean that we wanted to capture Europe in the 40th.

[Leto]

Any analyst not suffering from Down Syndrome would prefer a southward move.

Well, the author for whom the syndromes you indicated has not been previously observed believes that the Japanese were preparing to attack the USSR.

[Amurets]

What actually could the Japanese capture in our Siberia?

The Japanese needed Primorye and Transsib. Everyone needed the Transsib, that's why everyone and everyone rushed to the Far East. In principle, the Transsib is an opportunity to penetrate the richest regions of Siberia and the Far East. What the Pacific ports gave, the Americans and the Germans sensed during the "Zheltugin Republic". I didn't name the Americans for nothing, the Japanese had nothing to trade then.
http://lihodeev.livejournal.com/51823.html
The same gold deposits were in the upper Zeya.

[Hapfri]

Perhaps the regions of Siberia are rich, but at that time there were no roads there, that is, it was necessary to create infrastructure. Yes, and oil
deposits have not yet been explored. Japan creature dump
in austerity mode. In conditions of embargo from
USA. The war could not quickly end. Before
all the Japanese needed oil, and it was easiest to take it in the south

[Witness 45]

Well, yes, the Japanese did not need anything in Siberia and the Far East, it’s just not clear what they needed then at Lake Hassan in 38 or at Khalkhin Gol in 39? They needed the Far East, just as they needed, if they had a huge army as a Chinese slave, they would have mastered all its resources, they began to develop it right after the end of the civil war on Sakhalin, they began to pump oil until they were driven out. So do not drive here fairy tales about harmless Japanese for Russia.

[Alexey RA]

You won’t put gold on bread and you won’t pour in the tank. In the face of an ever-increasing embargo on the part of the Allies, the Japanese needed resources, not the means to buy them - and a lot of resources (taking into account the war in China).
No gold would save them - they simply would not be sold and delivered to the desired amount in the required quantities. Because in the United States, after the adoption of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, shipping companies were actually controlled by the state, which put them on the needle of state subsidies.

[parusnik]

What actually could the Japanese capture in our Siberia? There are no roads. There are almost no cities. Minerals, including oil, have not yet been developed. I would have to fight for the taiga and tundra. And most importantly, the Japanese had almost no gas for this

.... And what did the Japanese do in the Far East and Siberia during the civil war in the amount of 70 people-the military contingent .. Folklore was collected, fairy tales, rites ... toasts ...? .. Barely kicked out ..

[alexej123]

Why think? It is easier to blurt out that the Japanese were not interested in the USSR. At Hapfrey, I see similar comments in the second article - Western firms did not help Hitler, now the Japanese are white and fluffy. These are the ones that form the "alternative history".

[Hapfri]

- Western firms did not help Hitler, now the Japanese are white and fluffy. These are the ones that form the "alternative history".

Hitler was helped until a certain point.
And rather, it was just a business. They also helped us.
They sold technology, built factories. Yes, we are for it
paid, but nothing happens for free. However when
the war with the Nazis began, all this help and cooperation with Hitler quickly came to naught. There was a threshold. Before and after ...
Spitfire, for example, had a wing from the Xe-70, and in the first
Me - 109 were English engines. But it was all
Before the war. NOT AT THE TIME. And there is no alternative story here. The allies did not negotiate with the Germans.
This was invented by Julian Semenov.

[ohtandur]

which was recognized even by the Soviets

for the offensive name of the country, I filed a complaint against you, since you violated the rules of the site. Keep your personal hostility to the USSR, here it is of little interest to anyone.

[rjxtufh]

Quote: ohtandur

I rolled a complaint against you

Well, I can’t help it.
I rolled it when it rolled.
And when the complaint, it rolled.
And here, probably, everything is according to Freud. First rolled, and only then rolled. Or vice versa. But for brevity, everything combined in one capacious phrase. Well done! Brevity is the soul of wit!

[ohtandur]

troll, I will not feed you. Mock as you please, it hurts me. I apologize for the grammatical error; I often make them. Does Freud have anything to do with it, I don’t know.

[hohol95]

"Brevity is the sister of talent, but the stepmother of the fee!"
You are doing a very good job!
"You pour like from the" Horn of Abundance "!

[Hapfri]

Complaining is not good. Smells like squealing

[ohtandur]

in vain reproach me with squealing. There are site rules. They must be observed by all, without exception. As they say in the West - civic consciousness (or something like that)?

[alexej123]

And you hike the term "the owner shook" that so "well" versed in the issues of "snitching"? Did you talk to the "godfather"? If you are pretending to be like a "knowledgeable intellectual liberal", it is better not to mess with Feny? And then "the boys can show." And further along S. B. Lavrov.

[Hapfri]

And you hike the term "the owner shook" that so "well" versed in the issues of "snitching"?

Well, really, are you not familiar with the basics of generally accepted etiquette.
We must defend our point of view, and not blaspheme the bosses.

[alexej123]

Etiquette on VO is his RULES. The man honestly warned that he would use them. Now, "according to etiquette" justify his "snitching". I'll tell you if you can't. And if not, then why throw offensive words? when there are no arguments, then get personal.

[parusnik]

We’ll deal with the Council of Deputies .. a state with that name didn’t exist .. There is not a single agreement .. concluded by the Council of Deputies and some other state .. RSFSR .. such a state existed .. I understand you correctly .. that with the consent of the FER on its territory introduced foreign troops ..? Regarding the Washington Conference, 1921 — 1922 is an international conference on the limitation of naval weapons and the problems of the Far East and the Pacific. It took place from November 12 1921 of the year to February 6 of the 1922 of the year in the congress hall, in Washington. The conference was attended by the United States, Britain, China, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, as well as five British dominions, although the main issues were decided by the three strongest naval powers of the United States - the British Empire - Japan. Soviet Russia did not receive an invitation to Washington, and therefore declared its non-recognition of any decisions of the conference. The Washington Conference was convened at the initiative of the United States, which hoped to achieve a favorable solution to the issue of naval armaments and to consolidate a new balance of forces in China and the Pacific. The conference was also directed against the national liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. The Soviet government, which did not receive an invitation to the conference, protested on July 19 and November 2 on November 1921 against its exclusion from participation in the conference, and on December 8 on November 1921, it protested against discussing the question of the China-East Railway. In December 1921, a delegation of the Far Eastern Republic arrived in Washington, but it was not admitted to the conference ... The question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the territory of the Russian Far East was not raised .. So study history .. judging by the flag of France ..

[parusnik]

On March 16, 1921, a trade agreement was signed between the RSFSR and Great Britain, which laid the foundation for the actual recognition of Soviet Russia by the major capitalist powers.

There was a republic with that name as part of the USSR.

... On January 6 (19), 1918, the Third Congress of Soviets was held in Petrograd at which the Russian Soviet Republic was proclaimed. On July 19, 1918, the Constitution of the RSFSR entered into force, which enshrined the new official name of the Soviet state - the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

The soldiers of the White Guard used the term "Sovdepia". They had the right to do so.

... and you seem to be the last warrior of the White Guard ... And you have the right ..? Yes, the word "Sovdepia" appeared in the 1920s among the emigre community as a scornful designation of Soviet Russia - something like the current "Rashka". Of course, the soldiers of the White Guard, the Soviets also called the Soviets of Canine and Crustacean Deputies by the following disparaging name ... Educated people were ... they loved their people to the point of madness ...

[rjxtufh]

Quote: parusnik

laid the foundation for the actual recognition of Soviet Russia

You can verbiage in the Soviet style at least until you turn blue. But the facts are stubborn, the USSR was recognized by Britain on February 2, 1924. And not a day earlier.

Quote: parusnik

Constitution of the RSFSR

This paperwork, as well as the "Congress of Soviets", had no legal force. The Bolsheviks were having fun in those days, playing the "state".

Quote: parusnik

Educated people were .. people loved their madness ...

I repeat to you once again, they had the right to do so. Because after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviks were ordinary coup plotters. And their "state" was only in their fevered minds.
The situation began to change only starting from 23.07.1923. Only from that moment on, the Bolsheviks began to legalize themselves in the world, like the USSR. Until that moment, they were not legally. And their "state" did not exist.

[alexej123]

Alexey, "not a horse feed".

[qwert]

Quote: Hupfri

about whether the business is southbound. Everything is directly opposite. Any analyst not suffering from Down Syndrome would prefer a southward move. In addition, there is oil. And the Japanese captured it all in a month.

I served in Vladivostok. Therefore, I will say this - there is something to fight for, oh, as it is. It may come from Moscow, it seems that the Far East is a hole. But, in fact, there are all the resources that Japan so lacks, and many of which are not in China. And besides, if there is an opportunity to snatch, taking advantage of the remoteness from the center of the country and the war of the USSR with Germany, then why should the samurai abandon such a perspective ?????

[Alexey RA]

Do not confuse the current Far East and Far East of the early 40s. There were then no developed resources in the Far East that would not have been in Manchuria. And the Japanese were already producing Sakhalin oil - until 1944, half of the oil fields in Soviet Sakhalin were developed by Japan under a concession agreement (payment for a peace agreement).

But to invest money in the development of the mining industry and transport in the Far East there would not be anyone who wanted to, especially after Manchuria. In addition, Japan urgently needed resources - in the summer of 1941 the Allies cut off their supplies.

[Hapfri]

I served in Vladivostok. Therefore, I will say this - there is something to fight for, oh, as it is.

Am I arguing. Maybe there's. But turn your eyes to the East of India.
Or just to India. That's where the real wealth is. And most importantly. Oil.
Rubber, diverse natural resources. Food. All
that only the soul does not wish

[Alexey RA]

Moreover, in SEA there were not just real wealth, but real wealth being developed. For example, the second largest oil production center after the United States.
And it was not the UR line and the army of millions that defended these riches, but the colonial units of the Allies. Here, for example, is the condition of the British troops in Malaya:

6 Indian and 2 Australian infantry. brigades + 3 divisions (9 and 11 Indian, 8 Australian divisions) and 1 corps (3 Indian) sets of parts (incomplete). In addition to them, there was still the equivalent of 4 brigades in the form of garrisons of Singapore, Penang and airfields, but these troops (except 3 English and 1 Indian battalion in Singapore and 1 Indian battalion in Penang) were militias that did not have serious combat value.
But not that the regular parts were anything extraordinary.
Firstly, they lacked weapons (for example, only 1 Indian infantry battalion of 20 was staffed by state), and what was, was by no means the first grade (for example, almost all anti-tank missiles in Malaya were captured Italian 47 mm guns of delirium). In addition, the acquisition of new weapons also meant the reorganization of the unit (the states of the units with the "old" and "new" weapons were noticeably different) with the corresponding tactical retraining. How these perturbations affect the combat effectiveness of the unit is not necessary to say.
Secondly, the quality of troops also left much to be desired. The unusually rapid growth of the British and Indian armies (in the beginning of 1939 the first was 7, and in the second 4 divisions - by the end of 1941 there were 36 and 15, respectively) led to a shortage of qualified command personnel. This especially affected the Indian parts. The fact is that they, like all units with a low level of education and recruitment initiatives, very much depended on the quality of the officers. With the commander who thoroughly knew their language, customs and needs, these soldiers worked miracles - the trouble was that the best officers were sent to Africa and the Middle East. However, the officers of the "peacetime" level of training was also insufficient due to the fact that combat training was not uniform and to a large extent theoretical. And the soldiers until the widespread introduction at the end of 1942 a single so-called. “Combat training” did not have a standard training system at all - only general directives that the commander of each regiment depot could carry out at his discretion.
And thirdly, the British troops simply did not know how to fight in the jungle. This seems surprising, but, for example, the officer’s directory of the mid-20s does not contain the word “jungle” at all, although everything is described, from organizing a camp in the mountains to the weight of an 18-pound gun. In addition, of the 12 conditional brigades, only 2 were in Malaya for more than a year, of which only 1 (12th Indian) was a field unit. The rest at the beginning of the war were in Malaya for several months and prepared for action in the jungle according to their own understanding and, naturally, in the "appendage" to carry out other tasks (for example, the 11th Indian Division was simultaneously preparing for the offensive according to the Matador plan and preparation for the defense of northern Malaya).
But if these troops even went through acclimatization to local conditions, then reinforcements (17 Indian and 18 English divisions) were even deprived of this luxury. Moreover, the 17th Indian division consisted of recently formed battalions, half and more of which consisted of recruits that had only undergone basic individual training, i.e. was actually unworkable. And the Australian replenishment, aimed at replenishing the loss in the combat units, _in general_ did not undergo combat training.

© Evgeny Pinak

[Leto]

The author, here you are not a stupid person, but echo Soviet propaganda about the imaginary Japanese threat. I can recall that in 1941. Japan has already become completely bogged down in China and has switched to the use of chemical weapons (August 1941, Yichang, Hubei Province). In December, she entered the war with the United States and, in your opinion, could have waged a war also in the third direction against the USSR? Are you out of your mind? Can you tell me the lines of contact between the Japanese and the USSR? I can provide a card:

[hohol95]

But did the USSR have no border contact with Korea occupied by Japanese troops? As with occupied Japan Manchuria! Plus Sakhalin! Is this not enough for you?

[Leto]

Voooot. You brought the map correctly. Now see for yourself, what threat to Siberia could the Japanese troops pose? Now look at my map, what the Japanese troops in China were doing in 1941. If it’s not clear, the blue arrows are Japanese. Therefore, the threat of the USSR from Japan in 1941. nothing more than speculation.

[hohol95]

So Primorye was not a threat? Then why should we assume that there was no threat from Japan then! And from Russia now comes the threat to the Baltic States, Sweden, Finland and Norway !!!

[alexej123]

And in response - SILENCE.

[parusnik]

Yeah .. Leto didn’t return from the battle ...

[Alexey RA]

Let's separate the flies from the cutlets.
From Japan, referring to the Metropolis, there was no threat since August 1941 - the Southern option was adopted.
But from the Kwantung Army there was a threat. These scumbags could well try to organize a new Nomon Khan - purely in the pursuit of fame and ranks.

[Niccola Mack]

Let's all the same, we will not start the situation with the Kwantung army in the line of complete anarchy and independence from the General Staff and the Cabinet of Ministers.
A large-scale coordinated war was hardly possible, subordination would not allow. For such a war, an emperor’s rescript is required. For all the ambitions, for the Japanese, this is sacred. Now about a major provocation.
The headquarters of the Kwantung Army were not full, so as not to take the Soviet army seriously. Khalkhin-Gol and 60 thousand corpses (Japanese and Manchurian) should have been forced to think.
It should also be borne in mind that the shoulder of the supply of resources (and accordingly reinforcements) of our Mongolian group was at least 1000 kilometers, and if we fight on our territory, the bases will be nearby. But the Japanese will need to organize logistics in very difficult conditions.
Further, in 1938, Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushko, head of the NKVD Directorate for the Far East, defected to the Japanese side. He gave the Japanese extremely important and valuable information about the defense system and military units of the Far Eastern region.
Moreover, very unpleasant for the Japanese, as Koizumi Koichiro later wrote, "In the information received from Lyushkov, we were amazed that the troops that the Soviet Union could concentrate against Japan, as it turned out, had an overwhelming superiority." ... "This made it virtually impossible to implement previously drawn up plan of military operations against the USSR ". It is a fact that this report of Japanese intelligence was well known to the leadership of the Kwantung Army.
And in these conditions, even a rather small provocation could end very badly, despite the fact that part of the troops was obviously sent to the European part of the USSR.
And the last - the Kwantung army also did not sit idly by, the Chinese at least fought.
And ours rather densely supplied them with weapons and kept advisers, the same Chuikov. And in the event of an incident, this flow could increase dramatically, possibly even due to Lend-Lease.

[Alexey RA]

I know all this very well. And about Lyushkov, and about the absolute transparency of the theater. The error in the assessment by the Japanese of our forces in the theater of operations relative to the actual number in 1941 was 1-2 calculation divisions. And our intelligence gave the maximum size of the Kwantung army in full accordance with the figures of Kantokuen.

I didn’t mean that the Kwantung army would directly rush to the USSR connected with the war with Germany. It was about potential threat from the Kwantungs: with excessive weakening grouping of the Red Army in the Far East The Kwantung Army could try the USSR for strength, despite orders from the center - "winners are not judged"It was to counter this potential threat that the USSR was forced to keep a group of 700-900 thousand people in the Far East.

Quote: Nikkola Mac

A large-scale coordinated war was hardly possible, subordination would not allow. For such a war, an emperor’s rescript is required. For all the ambitions, for the Japanese, this is sacred.

But it was quite possible to creep into an undeclared border war through provocations on an incompletely delimited and demarcated border - as under Hassan.

[alexej123]

The author brought at least some evidence. And you, apparently, the least Admiral Yamamoto reported on the plans? So share them?

[hohol95]

The growth of the Japanese empire territories over the years!

[qwert]

Quote: Leto

In December, she entered the war with the United States and, in your opinion, could have waged a war also in the third direction against the USSR? Are you out of your mind?

But you didn’t read the article, Golubchik. It says about the events before getting into the war with the United States. And it says why Japan attacked the United States and not the USSR. Yes, and documents are provided confirming Japan’s plans to attack. And you all customize to your vision and do not even bother to read others. And Stalin, in your opinion, was a complete idiot and paranoid, so he kept his troops there, oh, how needed near Moscow ????

[jedjed]

there are always liberal creatures who admire the enemies of their own country and dream of either kimono or Bavarian beer, forgetting that at best they would have a dirty rag in the groin, a bowl of rotten rice a day if it was good to lick the boots of the peace-loving invader well or a bamboo stick for on the back. although no, they would lead this whole process, because the invaders get tired of beating and cutting. We need similar creatures to rule all kinds of lower races, while they peacefully sake sake, looking as separate enlightened individuals, with the help of a stick or a whip, the rest of the population join to the joys of world values. that is, to dig to death so that the higher race lives

[jedjed]

I’m embarrassed to ask, did they all who were crossing the border singing hari rama hari krishna and waving flowers inviting universal love, and bloodthirsty geeks of hedgehogs years viciously caught them at the border, threw cartridges and anti-Bolshevik leaflets and mercilessly tortured them into confessing to alleged crimes against the USSR? It’s a pity that the author focused on the internal cuisine of Japanese politics, but he wrote a little foggy about the specific actions of the Japanese. As for me, Japan should have been destroyed at least for what experiments they carried out with captured Soviet citizens when they explored the possibilities of bacteriological warfare.

[Alexey RA]

Let’s write it down: Hassan and Khalkhin-Gol are Sovdep's inventions.

[rjxtufh]

Quote: Alexey RA

Let’s write it down: Hassan and Khalkhin-Gol are Sovdep's inventions.

Open the map and see which country is Khalkhin Gol. This is for a start.

[Alexey RA]

To begin with, we will open the Protocol on mutual assistance between Mongolia and the USSR in 1936:

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic decided to draw up, as this Protocol, the agreement existing between them since November 27, 1934, providing for mutual support by all measures in preventing and preventing the threat of a military attack, as well as providing each other assistance and support in the event of an attack of any third party to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the Mongolian People's Republic, for which purpose they have signed this Protocol.
A rticle I. In the event of a threat of an attack on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the Mongolian People’s Republic by a third state, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People’s Republic shall immediately discuss the joint situation and take all the measures that could would be needed to protect the security of their territory.

A rticle II. The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic undertake, in the event of a military attack on one of the Contracting Parties, to render all sorts of assistance to each other, including military assistance.

A rticle III. The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic take for granted that the troops of one of the parties located by mutual agreement on the territory of the other side, in order to fulfill the obligations set forth in Articles I or II, will be withdrawn from the corresponding territory immediately after volume of need, just as it was in 1925 regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic.

This is the time. And here are two:

In accordance with this protocol, Soviet troops were deployed in Mongolia. By May 25, 1939, the number of these troops, members of the 57th separate rifle corps and taking part in the first battles on Khalkhin Gol, amounted to 5 544 people, of which 523 commanders and 996 junior commanders.

That is, Japan attacked a socialist state, linked to the USSR by a treaty on mutual assistance and whose territory was protected by Soviet troops. In fact - on the Soviet version of Manzhou-Guo.

[rjxtufh]

Quote: Alexey RA

To begin with, we will open the Protocol on mutual assistance between Mongolia and the USSR in 1936:

Is there a signature on Japan? No?
Yes, goodbye. For Japan, this "document" is insignificant. And she has the right to interpret the attack of Soviet troops on Khalkhin Gol as an act of aggression by the USSR against her.
And it’s not a document at all. Because Mongolia at that moment legally did not exist. These were the separatists who seized power in one of the provinces of China. Taking advantage of his weakness and the war with Japan.

Quote: Alexey RA

That is, Japan attacked a socialist state, linked to the USSR by a treaty on mutual assistance and whose territory was protected by Soviet troops.

The fact that Mongolia is a "socialist state" was known only in Moscow. Legally, Mongolia was then China, and Japan was at war with China. Therefore, there is nothing strange in the fact that she sent an expeditionary force to one of the Chinese provinces.
But what Soviet troops did in China (the province of Mongolia) is a big question. Those. in fact, there was an act of aggression of the USSR not only in relation to Japan, but also in relation to China.
Mongolia received the legal status of the state only on October 6, 1949. At the same time, Taiwan (the Kuomintang) recognized it only in 2002.

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: rjxtufh

Quote: Alexey RA
To begin with, we will open the Protocol on mutual assistance between Mongolia and the USSR in 1936:
Is there a signature on Japan? No?

What are you doing ???

Well it is necessary to get to such an interpretation of international treaties ...

[rjxtufh]

Quote: stalkerwalker

Well it is necessary to get to such an interpretation of international treaties ...

The agreement (any) implies the presence of at least two parties. There are no contracts with empty space.
Teach materiel.

[Hapfri]

China, as a single state, was not. There were separate areas controlled by different groups. So aggression against China could not be

[Uncle Murzik]

and where is Hassan Lake?

[alexej123]

Do not ask, it will not answer.

[hohol95]

And in what COUNTRY ?? Be affectionate! Provide a MAP !!!
NO Cards!
And BAZARA - NO!
The Japanese tried to dispute this, but our veteran made them shut up!
Those hills (Remezova and others) on eh how far were and are from the Manjurian territory! LEARN HISTORY! AND GEOGRAPHY!
And the fact that Imperial Japan did not sign the treaties of the USSR with the MPR is JAPANESE PROBLEMS !!!

[qwert]

Quote: rjxtufh

What's this. And how many "spies" were identified and shot in 1937-38? Many thousands!
They all wanted to attack the Soviets. They all wanted to offend her.
Lord, poor population. Well, for what, for what sins on his head is this plague? And after all, the fifth Sovdep column is still missing.

Let me continue you:
and the Germans did not want to attack us. Probably Stalin provoked them. And the Americans did not unleash the Cold War. This is all commies come up with.
And we imported the Japanese from China ourselves and shot them like spies.
And on the eve of the war, the Germans did not throw German deversants so that they would break and harm the connection. On the contrary, they threw radio specialists who were not there as you put it in the "Sovdepia". Hitler wanted to help us establish communication, but these German engineers were caught and fired by the bloody geb. And in general, everyone knows that the USSR wanted to enslave the whole world. And now

sovdepovo column

Lacking prevents us from being friends with the United States, who wish Russia good Toko ....

[mroy]

Quote: rjxtufh

By the way, I would be ashamed in your place to post pictures of an international terrorist on an avatar.
And I draw the attention of moderators to this fact.

And in your opinion, probably you need to hang a photo of the first EU president?

[parusnik]

And in your opinion, probably you need to hang a photo of the first EU president?

.... Probably a group portrait of Poroshenko, Avakov, Parubiya ..rjxtufh.. the little cossack is mishandled ... the bastard in other words ...

[parusnik]

rjxtufh

What the watmen can't understand

... Excuse me, but what will you be of yourself?

[Stas57]

Excuse me, what will you be of yourself?

relaxed without cons)

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: Stas57

Excuse me, what will you be of yourself?

relaxed without cons)

Yeah .... Rushing the kid is not childish ...

Hi Stas

[aksakal]

Are you talking about Che? This is not an international terrorist, this is the man who liberated Cuba from the terrible pro-American dictator and, accordingly, from American oppression. This is your Bandera - an international terrorist.
And how did you get here, my dear? Why should we even accept your philosophy about the fact that man is a wolf to man ("Homo gimini lupus est!"), Only interpreted by you in relation to states and entire peoples? This is your philosophy, use it yourself, you don't need to impose it on us.
There are competing peoples and there are fraternal peoples. Russian and English, here you are right, competitors on this planet, and competitors for many centuries. There is no reason to think that on other planets (when they are mastered) it will be different. But the Russian with the same Indian has nothing to share.

[fa2998]

Quote: Hupfri

But they had no reason to fight in Siberia. They didn’t need anything. In addition, they have already gotten involved in an endless war in China.

Yes, to fantasize a lot of something, but Japan was not going to attack the USSR. Firstly, the Japanese had already received "musals" on Khasan and Kholkhin Gol from the advice, they remembered a lesson. Secondly, the Japanese needed RICE AND OIL. In the north This is not. Only in the south-Indochina, the Philippines, Indonesia. But there is the influence of the United States, and the first blow is on the US Pacific Fleet. Thirdly, the increasing resistance in China, there the Japanese fought both the Communists and the Kuomintang. This is the strengthening Manchu Army.
The only Japanese could "snatch" part of the territory of the USSR, with the collapse of the country after defeat by Germany. How Italians "attacked" France when the Germans had already won the war.

[jedjed]

ha my friend it’s you repeating other people's fantasies. among other things, Japan never admitted that they defeated on Hassan and Halkingol, they still believe that they won there confidently. Second rice and oil is good, that is, eating and skating is certainly very nice BUT the USSR was the only a power that could challenge the conquest of Japan on land and had the strength to do this. Do not forget that in 1905 Japan attacked the Russian Empire and not vice versa and did not achieve all its goals. That's the purpose of the attack to seize the Far East isolated from the European part so that there is no chance of the onset of 45 years when the empire, within a few weeks from the actions of the USSR, lost everything on the continent and, accordingly, the ability to resist and maneuver when landing the allies directly to the metropolis. And here you can bring any arguments in favor of the peace of Japan, but this is all purulent crap sucked from liberal finger, for the facts of a direct violation of neutrality by Japan against the USSR are sea and small the trolley. and the fact that the strategy of ripe persimmon was actually adopted with respect to the USSR is the favorite Asian strategy to watch the tiger and the dragon wet each other and then go down the mountain and collect all the nishtyaki. well, the bloody STALIN did not lose Moscow and did not end up beyond the Urals, and most importantly, that he managed to transfer troops from the Far East in such a way that the Japanese did not understand the scope and scale of this action, despite the fact that they had a well-developed intelligence network in the Far East. .it is a good time to argue knowing the balance of power of the parties, and then the Japanese were bursting with their own invincibility;

[Alexey RA]

Please tell me - how are you going to fight without food and fuel?

And most importantly - what will happen after this war?
Suppose that Japan won hypothetically - the USSR gave the Far East. So what? But nothing: the minerals that Japan needs are not being developed in the Far East. For the offer "to capture the Far East, then to master it"The zaibatsu will simply dig in the one who proposed it somewhere in a quiet place - they had enough of Manchuria, which began to give at least some income only 10 years after the occupation, and before that it was pulling money like a vacuum cleaner.
And most importantly - this war will suck out all the fuel reserves. But there is nothing new - an embargo. And there is no place to take it (most of the oil and tonnage for its transportation were bought and chartered from the Allies). And there is nothing to capture Southeast Asia with oil reserves - ships do not go without fuel, planes do not fly.
And Japan is facing the United States and Britain in an extremely interesting position.

[Niccola Mack]

On December 5, 1941, Soviet troops launched a counterattack near Moscow. The defeat of the selected Wehrmacht armies at the walls of our capital meant the complete failure of the German Blitzkrieg plan against our country. That is why the Japanese ruling circles decided to refrain from the planned attack on the USSR in 1941.

A very strange statement, it is not clear where it came from!
The real prospects for the success of the Kalinin, Western and South-Western fronts appeared only on December 9 (although the operation itself began on December 5). And for such a strategic decision as the direction of the attack and entry into the war, only the famous Hitler stop order of December 16th can be considered the basis (given the wide propaganda on both sides). That was real and concrete!
But the surviving participants in the campaign to Pearl Harbor (Kido Butai detachment) unanimously state:
“December 2 talk was put to an end. A conditional signal was received from Akamagi from Yamamoto’s headquarters: “Start climbing Mount Niitaka”, which meant a blow to Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, 1941. This was announced to the personnel. ”
That is, December 2 for all Japan’s land and naval forces was a point of no return - nothing could be changed (although the commander of the Nagumo detachment had the right to turn the detachment back until December 6 when it was discovered, but the war would have started anyway).
That is, already on December 1 in Moscow (taking into account the time difference) - 4 days before the start of the counteroffensive near Moscow, Japan actually entered the war.

[Alexey RA]

Judging by Hattori, the decision to abandon the big war with the USSR was made in Japan in August 1941:

Due to the protracted German-Soviet war, the Stavka was increasingly paying attention to the areas of the South Seas. On August 9, she abandoned the plan for resolving the northern problem in 1941, regardless of how the situation on the German-Soviet front would develop, and headed for a advance in the south. Following this, the “Basic Principles of the Operations of the Imperial Army” were adopted, the content of which boiled down to the following: a) ensure the security of the Soviet Union by forces of sixteen divisions located in Manchuria and Korea; b) continue approved operations against China; c) to the south, accelerate military preparations against England and the United States with the aim of completing them by the end of November.

Further movements are exclusively the work of the Kwantung Army and its supporters in the Metropolis. But not central authority.

[rjxtufh]

Quote: Alexey RA

The decision to abandon the big war with the USSR was made in Japan in August 1941:
Due to the fact that the German-Soviet war took a protracted

What nonsense. In August 1941 the war has not yet taken on a protracted character. But in October, yes.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: rjxtufh

What nonsense. In August 1941 the war has not yet taken on a protracted character.

Just in August - already started taking.
Was it planned what? The rapid defeat of the main forces of the Red Army in a border battle until the end of Soviet mobilization and deployment, and then - victorious drang nah osten, interrupted by routs in parts of reserves that didn’t have time for a big battle and mobilized parts of internal districts.
And what do we have for August? Smolensk battle, battles on the Dnieper, battles on the Luga line. Yes, the Red Army lost the border battle - but managed to tighten reserves and build defense at new frontiers. The second French campaign, the Germans no longer came out.

[rjxtufh]

Quote: Alexey RA

Just in August - already started taking.

This time I agree.
Having refused July 11.07.41, 10.07.41 from the operation of Barbarossa (and all because 1941g. dragged into the Smolensk operation), the Germans XNUMX company. lost. Perhaps then it was not so noticeable. But military experts, because they are military specialists, because they understand the essence of events, proceeding only from indirect facts.
Perhaps the Japanese understood this point back in July. Perhaps in August. Perhaps they did not understand at all. This is not exactly known. Only the fact that September 11.09.41, XNUMX is known for sure. (most likely a little earlier) the GERMANS understood this.
Of course, losing a company is not a losing war. And the Germans of the USSR in 1942. certainly would have squeezed. But on September 29.09.41, 2 the key event of 2MB happened, which was completely crookedly and sparingly covered during the USSR - the USSR entered 2MB on the side of the Anglo-Saxons. Those. 22.06.41MV for the USSR did not begin on June 1939, 29.09.41. (and even more so, not in September 1939), but on September XNUMX, XNUMX. Until that moment, it was a German (with allies) -Soviet war. About the same as in XNUMX, Soviet-Polish.
For the Nazis, it was a disaster, because collectively, this meant losing in 2MB. And then there was already just agony.
For the Soviet people, this also meant a disaster, because his role in the "anti-Hitler coalition" was extremely costly. The French, for example, in 1940. this role was categorically abandoned.
But for the mustachioed Joe, this meant actually a happy end.

[alexej123]

Hey, svidomit, a complaint was sent for the "vatmeny". Hopefully a SPECIAL person will get you banned.

[Alexey RA]

The problem is that the majority considers Japan of that time to be a single, traditional European state — with a vertical of power and a single leadership. But this is not so. Japan of that time is swan, cancer and pike. The Emperor’s will is theoretically sacred ... but in practice what specifically was ordered by the Emperor determined by the winner in the struggle of various forces. Whoever won - he interprets this will as he pleases - and acts further, hiding behind the "will of Tenno".

On the one hand, there is a fleet that needs oil and which is on knives with an army taking money from it for the construction of its ridiculous airplanes and tanks.
On the other hand - the army, which is bogged down in China and which is on knives with a fleet that takes away money from it for the construction of useless boats, and even dreams of drawing Japan into a war with the whole world.
Moreover, "on knives" is in the literal sense of the word. The February 26 Incident is an example of this.
There is also the Foreign Ministry. who theoretically conducts Japanese foreign policy. But in practice, the army team wanted to spit on the instructions of some civilians - which greatly complicated the pacification of the lands occupied by Japan in Southeast Asia.

But that is not all. The army is not united either.
There is an Expeditionary Force in China, who consider themselves the navel of the earth, pulling the blanket over themselves and acting on the principle of "winners are not judged."
There is the Kwantung Army, which, from idleness and sharp thrust of officers to exploits, twice tried to act on the above principle. Just did not take into account that her opponent is different. As a result, she almost dragged Japan into the war with the USSR.
There is the General Staff of the Army in the Metropolis, trying to somehow rein in this freeman. For there they are well aware of what the war with the USSR could turn out to be. There are no minerals, there is no particular strategic importance - but all the key points are covered by the UR, there is a railway for the transfer of parts from the European part and there is Long-Range Aviation, theoretically covering most of the Japanese Islands. Oil painting: "Ki-27 tries to shoot down TB-3". As a result, the Metropolis tries to help the Kwantungs getting into the mess to a minimum - only to save face.
There was no unity and subordination even at the grassroots level: the commanders of the divisions considered it possible not to execute the repeated orders of the army commanders.

The attack on the USSR is, for the most part, the plans and dreams of the Kwantungs. In the Metropolis, the attitude towards this war was unequivocal:

We expect how things will develop.
(...)
If the German-Soviet war develops favorably for our empire, I believe that we will be able to use force to solve this problem and ensure the security of our northern borders.
(...)
I am convinced that America will not stand up for Indochina. The Soviet Union is too early to discount. We must wait 50 or 60 days. And only if we make sure that Germany is sure to win, will our turn come.

© Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Sugiyama

The only one who advocated the immediate entry of Japan into the war with the USSR was Foreign Minister Matsuoka — whom they like to quote in this article. That's just misfortune, sadness: not even a month has passed since the beginning of the Second World War, as Matsuoka flew from his post during the traditional procedure for the resignation and approval of the new composition of the cabinet. All remained - but he did not.

[qwert]

So Stalin was still paranoid ???? He kept his troops in the Far East, and they were needed near Moscow. Did the Japanese increase the size of the Kwantung Army in order to fight the Americans in the Philippines? Or is it the machinations of Matsuoka? Was the Minister of Foreign Affairs deciding in Japan where to deploy troops? And was he really so stupid that he voiced all the Axis allies nonsense that was not coordinated with the emperor and contrary to imperial politics.
It seems to me that the article is so interesting because it contains many documents and facts, and not conjectures and reflections of the author in the style of "What did Japan lose in Siberia?", "Why does she need it?" etc.

[Alexey RA]

Grouping of the Red Army in the Far East is insurance against harsh actions on the part of the Kwantung Army. Which, as I said, could start a war at any moment, even without sanction from Tokyo. The only thing the Kwantungs understood was the language of power. Nomon Khan, of course, cleared their brains - but without the presence of forces ready at any moment to give an answer, the Kwantungs could try again.

The body movements in the Kwantung Army in the summer and autumn of 1941 are just a reflection of the throwing in Japan. At first, the Kwantung people and Matsuoka, against the backdrop of euphoria from the first successes of the Reich in the USSR, pushed in the Metropolis the "Program of the national policy of the empire in accordance with the changing situation":

3. Although our attitude towards the German-Soviet war is based on the principles of strengthening the power of the Axis Powers, we will not intervene at this time and maintain an independent policy, while covertly completing military preparations against the Soviet Union. During this period, diplomatic negotiations, of course, should be conducted with great caution.
If the German-Soviet war develops in a direction favorable to the empire, the empire, having resorted to armed force, will solve the northern problem and ensure stability in the North.

But after reforming the cabinet, the strategy has changed:

Due to the protracted German-Soviet war, the Stavka was increasingly paying attention to the areas of the South Seas. On August 9, she abandoned the plan for resolving the northern problem in 1941, regardless of how the situation on the German-Soviet front would develop, and headed for a advance in the south. Following this, the “Basic Principles of the Operations of the Imperial Army” were adopted, the content of which boiled down to the following: a) ensure the security of the Soviet Union by forces of sixteen divisions located in Manchuria and Korea; b) continue approved operations against China; c) to the south, accelerate military preparations against England and the United States with the aim of completing them by the end of November.

© Takushiro Hattori
However, the threat from the Kwantung Army has not disappeared. And non-belligerent Japan dragged on as much strength as a belligerent.

On July 01 of 1942 of the year in the Far East, the Red Army had: 29 sd, 3 cd, 2 td, 10 aviation divisions, 20 sbr, 20 tbr, 4 air brigades and 15 UR. In total - 49,5 accounting divisions, 1 440 012 people. l / s, 11759 guns and mortars, 2589 tanks and self-propelled guns, 3178 aircraft.

As for the Japanese Foreign Ministry, you seriously believe in the sanity of the people who proposed in 1943, after the Kursk Bulge, organization and mediation in the peace talks between the USSR and Germany. And in all seriousness, until 1945, who believed that the USSR would mediate the negotiations between Japan and the Allies?
By the way, did you remember that Matsuoku was thrown out of the Cabinet for his initiatives in July 1941?

[Niccola Mack]

You have forgotten in the Japanese "cauldron" to indicate all kinds of "leagues promoting the throne, the emperor and Japan."
These leagues have always been eager to slaughter or blow up some "liberal" politician or military man for non-observance of Japanese interests, regardless of rank and position. And very often they cut and exploded.
Yamamoto himself before the war (not being aware of his real role in preparing the war) was directly threatened with reprisal.
It is also necessary to mention the tremendous influence of "zaibatsu", especially since many famous people of Japan were directly connected with them.

[Alexey RA]

This is yes ... Zaibatsu and Gunbatsu are twin brothers.

And in the end, this clan system also ruined Japan. When the army builds aircraft carriers and submarines, and the fleet - interceptors and tanks - it will not end in good.

[qwert]

Quote: parusnik

What actually could the Japanese capture in our Siberia? There are no roads. There are almost no cities. Minerals, including oil, have not yet been developed. I would have to fight for the taiga and tundra. And most importantly, the Japanese had almost no gas for this ...

.And what did the Japanese do in the Far East and Siberia during the civil war in the amount of 70 000 man-military contingent .. Folklore collected, fairy tales, rites ... toasts ...? .. Barely barely kicked ..

This is the truth. To the point, Alexey. This comment destroys all "Proofs" that Japan was not interested in our territories. Then they were interested in Far East and Siberia, but after a couple of decents they are no longer there? It's strange.

[Niccola Mack]

Strange is not enough, if you recall the figurative expression of the Japanese press before the war:
"Japan is like a fish in a pool from which water is slowly pumped out."
And water (oil, coal, metal) was needed after American sanctions now, and not after a 5-10 year fight with the regular army and partisans in the middle of the frosty taiga. In addition, the extraction of all this had to be organized with significant investments.
Therefore, the Japanese rushed to the south, where the Dutch in Indonesia pumped oil with might and main and it was warm.

[Uncle Murzik]

the entire construction infrastructure and production would be carried out by the Chinese, free labor!

[Niccola Mack]

And all this would be undermined by experienced taiga hunters (possibly from the same Chinese) under the strict guidance of GRU officers and vigilant control of the NKVD officers.
And then they would dissolve in the taiga, like sugar in boiling water.
The experience of civil war and intervention was still remembered by many.

[Alexey RA]

How is it in Manchuria? So even there, in a less severe climate and in the presence of puppet management structures, including the local police and army, the development of the territory took almost 10 years.
And how soon will Japan get something from Siberia and the Far East? But after all pool water not just pumped out - the Yankees are ready to open an emergency drain:

... since 1938, America has increasingly restricted its exports to Japan. It all started with the "moral embargo" of 1938 on the supply of aircraft. (For those who do not know what a "moral embargo" is, I explain - until July 1940, the president did not have the right in peacetime to impose administrative restrictions on American exports. Private enterprises had the right to trade whatever they wanted. The "moral embargo" represented himself a letter from the State Department to manufacturers, urging them to abandon transactions.)

In September 1940, exports to Japan of gasoline and raw materials for ferrous metallurgy (scrap, iron ore) were limited. And finally, on July 25, 1941, the US government announced the freezing of all Japanese financial assets, which effectively led to a complete trade embargo, including the oil one.

Moreover, the formally voluntary "moral embargo" was observed in practice rather rigidly - private traders did not want to fly past subsidies and government contracts for the mobilized US army and lend-lease supplies.

[Alexey RA]

Yes. During the intervention, Japan did not yet have experience in developing Manchuria. But in the 30s, the Japanese already counted - wept. For the Metropolis Far East not worth the dressing: a lot of spilled blood, a lot of expended resources, and the output - square kilometers of taiga, blown up bridges, tunnels and stations and a minimum of already developed resources. Plus a nightmare combination of mountainous and wooded areas and an absolutely disloyal local population, whose older generation has experience in guerrilla warfare.
And I still don't remember about the climate - EMNIP, they wrote in Tsushima that it is impossible to read the Japanese instruction on actions in winter conditions without shuddering. "Yuki no singing"in full growth.

[Hapfri]

But the Japanese were not ready to invest in the development of territories.
Where it is cheaper to mine near Chita or Sumatra. Where is it easier to export?

[Basil50]

Some comments are so amazing that it’s immediately clear that the fee is being worked out. Lobbying the interests of Japan is impossible without direct deception and manipulation of facts. The Japanese, in addition to the military force, did not see other options for building their own * empire *, and this was official policy until 1945. How saving the emperor from the tribunal and what argument was brought up is worthy of separate consideration, but to bring it to justify Japanese politics today, when all the information is available, is silly.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Vasily50

The Japanese, in addition to the military force, did not see other options for building their own * empire *, and this was official policy until 1945.

Actually seen. The problem is that these options were seen by civilian officials from the Foreign Ministry. And on the ground, the army and kempentai were in charge of everyone, who did not see these shuttles point blank.
The Foreign Ministry has repeatedly tried to rebuild the local administration of the occupied territories and at least shift order to local authorities - in the future, having in mind the creation of puppet armed forces to help the Army. And on the ground, all this was covered in cloth, local leaders and their supporters were thrown into jail, disarmed even pro-Japanese forces - and arranged for direct army rule. As a result, the army team with their own hands created problems out of the blue.

[Niccola Mack]

This ambitious project was called "The Great East Asian Sphere of Shared Prosperity", and provided for a very widespread use by the Japanese of collaborators and other Asians.
The main slogan is "Asia for Asians". And although it was clear from the very beginning that it was mainly the Japanese that would "prosper", the rest of the Asians also had to get something.
But it is absolutely true that the army had these projections on the drum.

[Hapfri]

Some comments are so amazing that it’s immediately clear that the fee is being worked out.

Oh, I’m Vasya, Vasya .... fee ... what a fee.

[voyaka uh]

"The Japanese plans were thwarted by our victories near Moscow." ///

Of course not.

Back in September 1941, the Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge told Moscow that Japan had decided to attack the Americans before the end of the 1941 year, and at the beginning of the 1942 year it would not oppose the USSR.

From the Far East, therefore, in October 1941, 26 personnel trained divisions were removed and transferred
near Moscow. There were Siberians counterattacking the Germans in December. Which turned out to be completely
unexpectedly for the Germans. They believed that there were no fresh reserves between them and Moscow.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: voyaka uh

Therefore, in October 1941, 26 personnel trained divisions were removed from the Far East and transferred to Moscow.

This is where such numbers are written? Even the official story says that:

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, from the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts, the Headquarters used on the Soviet-German front 12 rifle, 5 tank and motorized divisions - a total of over 122 thousand people, more than 2 thousand guns and mortars, 2209 light tanks, over 12 thousand cars, 1500 tractors and tractors.

As for the correlation of forces in the Far East, at the beginning of December 1941, immediately after Pearl Harbor, Apanasenko wrote to Stalin that the strength of the Far Eastern Front fell so much that they caught up with japanese. At the same time, by Japanese forces was meant the estimated strength of the Kwantung army according to the Kantokuen plan, with all the reinforcements.
It is interesting that Apanasenko immediately posed before Headquarters the question of the possibility of receiving an order to attack the Kwantung Army:

The time is coming when you will demand active action from the troops of the Far Eastern Front ...
5. Now it’s hard to say how the further situation will develop. In any case, under the current situation, the troops of the Far East Front should be prepared for all the unexpected.

There he wrote that if in the near future his front would be ordered to advance, then

Given the correlation of forces and groupings of Japanese troops in Manchuria, in order to solve the active tasks of the front, it is necessary to strengthen the front's troops with ten rifle divisions and ten air regiments, mainly armed with new munitions, and increase the number of ammunition to 12 ammunition against six existing ammunition ...

It seems that the old cavalryman decided that since the USSR and the USA became allies, then after the Japanese attack on the USA, the USSR could strike Japan in response.

[voyaka uh]

Well, 17 divisions, according to your information, went to Moscow. But this does not change the essence.
Japan decided not to attack the USSR already
in September 1941. And so indirectly (and involuntarily)
saved Moscow. And let her axis ally down -
Germany.
The main thing in the war - what are your allies . Stalin
USA and Britain with the entire British Commonwealth,
and Hitler has Italy and Japan. Japan put on
Germany immediately in 1941, and Italy instantly surrendered in 1943, as soon as the Americans landed in Sicily.

[Niccola Mack]

And so indirectly (and involuntarily)
saved Moscow. And let her axis ally down -
Germany.

Listen to you - so the history of the Second World War should be written with examples of full interaction and mutual understanding of the bloc allies. As they, guided only by common interests, they led fully coordinated actions.
In fact, Franco limited himself to participation in the war of the "Blue Division" (although he was greatly indebted to the Germans for their help in the civil war). The allies "dynamically" us to the last with the Second Front - until they realized that they might not get to the "banquet" at all and would receive soon "red" Europe.
And to the Germans themselves, the Japanese could recall the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact - for them it was a complete shock.
I remind you that this was the final of Halgin-Gol and the Japanese did not have time to stack corpses, desperately trying to unlock the encircled group.
The government of Kiichiro Hiranumoy miserably resigned and Japan was one step away from a fundamental change in its strategy.
According to the historian H. Teratani, "there has never been a case in history - neither before nor after - that the Japanese government resigned due to the conclusion of an agreement between the other two states."
So let's leave the moral side to the propagandists.

[voyaka uh]

I didn’t think about writing about the moral,
what's the moral? Solid predators.
Who entered into alliances, divided, broke up alliances, attacked,
deceived each other.

[Alexey RA]

With Franco, everything is clear - the caudillo sat on a solid leash in the form of food supplies from overseas. And there was no replacement - the Reich itself was starving (it came to the point that the "harvest-1941" included in advance the grain requisitioned in the occupied territory of the USSR).

... from the USSR, in any situation and any mood of the local population, it is expected to receive 2.5 million tons of grain, which the USSR promised Germany from the 1941 harvest and which are already included in the Reich's food balance (without them in any way), 3 million tons of grain per army food (if you drag it from the Reich, there is not enough rail capacity) and about 2 million tons more for Germany’s obligations to Romania, Hungary and others. Total approximately 8 million tons of grain.

So Franco invented various excuses for "Felix" and other plans, putting forward in advance the impossible conditions for Spain to join the Axis.
And with the "blue division" the move was truly ingenious: to send far from Spain to fight against Bolshevism the ultra-right and disguised communists who are muddying the water. Even if one of the Phalangists survives, his brains on the Eastern Front will be thoroughly cleared, any nonsense will be knocked out. And at the same time, improve relations with the Reich.

[Hapfri]

But our allies appeared after the outbreak of war. The question is why Hess flew to England.

[qwert]

Quote: voyaka uh

Back in September 1941, the Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge told Moscow that Japan had decided to attack the Americans before the end of the 1941 year, and at the beginning of the 1942 year it would not oppose the USSR.

About Sorge generally a separate topic. First, he bombarded Moscow with reports of the start of a war with the Germans. His first message was that the Germans would start the war in late February. In February, reported that in March, etc. until June. This is why Stalin was skeptical of his reports. This is anything but information about the exact date of the attack.
Farther. After the defeat of Japan, the Americans searched for the grave of Sorge, searched his apartment, and also went through his connections. According to former Soviet intelligence officials, Sorge worked not only for the USSR, but also for the United States. Some in their comments (the film was documented on the Zvezda channel), believed that the information that Japan did not attack the USSR was initiated by the Americans, and aimed to push Stalin to remove wax from the Far East, the faster to provoke Japan to attack the USSR and direct its expansion past US interests.

[voyaka uh]

Theories can be put forward different. You can still think that
Sorge also worked for ... Romania or Paraguay, who will deny now?

In fact: his reports were accurate - they trusted him. Troops with
The Far East were transferred to Moscow in advance and saved her,
and the Japanese attacked America and then moved south - for oil.

[alexej123]

Quote: parusnik

We’ll deal with the Council of Deputies .. a state with that name didn’t exist .. There is not a single agreement .. concluded by the Council of Deputies and some other state .. RSFSR .. such a state existed .. I understand you correctly .. that with the consent of the FER on its territory introduced foreign troops ..? Regarding the Washington Conference, 1921 — 1922 is an international conference on the limitation of naval weapons and the problems of the Far East and the Pacific. It took place from November 12 1921 of the year to February 6 of the 1922 of the year in the congress hall, in Washington. The conference was attended by the United States, Britain, China, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, as well as five British dominions, although the main issues were decided by the three strongest naval powers of the United States - the British Empire - Japan. Soviet Russia did not receive an invitation to Washington, and therefore declared its non-recognition of any decisions of the conference. The Washington Conference was convened at the initiative of the United States, which hoped to achieve a favorable solution to the issue of naval armaments and to consolidate a new balance of forces in China and the Pacific. The conference was also directed against the national liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. The Soviet government, which did not receive an invitation to the conference, protested on July 19 and November 2 on November 1921 against its exclusion from participation in the conference, and on December 8 on November 1921, it protested against discussing the question of the China-East Railway. In December 1921, a delegation of the Far Eastern Republic arrived in Washington, but it was not admitted to the conference ... The question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the territory of the Russian Far East was not raised .. So study history .. judging by the flag of France ..

[alexej123]

Quote: rjxtufh

Quote: jedjed

at best, they would have a dirty rag in the groin, a bowl of rotten rice a day if it was good all day to lick the boots of the peace-loving invader or a bamboo stick on the back.

Is it you who describe the Soviepy (Russia captured by the Bolsheviks)?
I also recommend to study the "grocery basket" of prisoners of German workers in concentration camps and Soviet "workers of the rear". And also the modes of their work. To finally figure it out.

Oh, how does that mean my grandfather should still bow to the burghers in the belt, that he spent 3 years in a concentration camp, and not in the "Sovdepia"? You are an ordinary traitor, you have betrayed the memory of your ancestors, who for centuries opposed Drang nach Osten.

[Grishka cat]

The claim to the VO-on saver before the beginning of the article depicts not the Japanese, but the Chinese of Florinda's new. Even Chiang Kai-shek himself is depicted and the Chinese flag in the background. A closer look is needed. If only Mao Zedong would be painted on a head in malachi!

[qwert]

And next to the Japanese flag. And officers in Japanese uniform. Explicitly maneuvers of the Japanese army

[Niccola Mack]

On the screen saver are Japanese and Chinese.
I do not know the source of this oil painting, but it most likely depicts joint maneuvers.
Japan with whom? And with the regime of Wang Jingwei (by the way, a former Kuomintang member), which was also called the "Republic of China".
If you think that Manzhou-go is the only puppet of the Japanese, then you are deeply mistaken.
At different times, only puppets of the central government level in Japan had 10 pieces.
(Find the Wiki article "The Great East Asian Sphere of Shared Prosperity" - there is a rough list).
And if Japan climbed into the "Drang nah Nord", it would certainly have taken these "passengers" with it.
Under the slogan "Asia for Asians".

[voyaka uh]

References of the Technical Engineer.
It sucks. Such an article came out.

Koshkin A. Kantokuen - Barbarossa in Japanese. Why Japan did not attack the USSR. M .: Veche, 2011. C. 12-19, 37-51.
Cherevko K. Sickle and hammer against the samurai sword. M .: Veche, 2003. C. 240-246, 330-340.
Cherevko K. Destroyed hopes // Sea collection. 1985. No.5. C. 62-64.
Savin A. Preparation of Japan for the war against the USSR. // visage 1976. No.1. C. 38-43
Kutanov L. The struggle of the USSR for the establishment and development of good-neighborly relations with Japan (1925 — 1939). M .: Science, 1975. C. 11-14.
Yu. Golitsyn. From the History of Russian-Japanese Relations // Expert. 3 November 1997.

[Alexey RA]

So ... the absence of Takushiro Hattori from the list of basic work is already strange.

[DimerVladimer]

The Japanese leadership considered it possible to start a war with us only if there was one of two factors: the defeat of the Soviet Union or a sharp weakening of the forces of the Soviet Far Eastern Army. By the end of 1941, both of these factors were absent.

Are there any documents on this? Meeting minutes? Testimony of witnesses?
The material is very unfounded - as from the agitation of the Brezhnev era. Or encyclopedias of the same years.

What gave Japan the seizure of the northern territories in economic terms? In addition to defeating a long-standing strategic competitor - at the same time very controversial from a military point of view. At the same time, Japan faces a severe shortage of oil due to the US embargo.
Is there oil in the Far East? No - in the Far East there is generally nothing interesting in economic terms - neither the economy nor the developed resources (except for the forest).

There is oil in Malaysia - but its capture will cause a confrontation with the United States.

Already at that time, the goals of the war were resources.
Hitler’s main economic goals are Ukrainian bread, coal, ore from the Donetsk basin, oil from the Baku and Grozny deposits. It is well known that Germany did not produce its oil - the main export from Romania, iron ore - export from Sweden. And on synthetic gasoline from potatoes - you won’t get much ...

It is very likely that the pragmatic Japanese leadership did not want to get involved in a military conflict with the risk of a protracted confrontation with the Far Eastern army, while having dubious benefits from captured bridgeheads.
At the same time, having oil reserves for no more than 3 years, they were forced to look for a source of replenishment of resources and this is precisely why the choice of the "southern" direction of expansion and direct military confrontation with the United States is connected.

[Niccola Mack]

My point of view is also fundamentally for the fact that Japan carried out its expansion south for objective economic and political reasons, in particular the lack of oil. But about Germany, do not speak with such certainty about what you do not know:

It is well known that Germany did not produce its oil - the main export from Romania, iron ore - export from Sweden. And on synthetic gasoline from potatoes - you won’t get much ...

You may be very surprised, but almost all of the Ground Forces (Das Heer) fought on synthetic gasoline throughout the war. Part of the Luftwaffe, too (70-85%). And they produced it in Germany not from potatoes, but from coal according to the Fischer – Tropsch process (and others too). And production was able to provide enough gas to supply troops without oil. And coal in Germany was enough throughout the war (until they began to bomb). In 1944, Germany produced 6 tons of synthetic fuel.
For example, everyone knows that our main tanks "ran" on diesels, and the German ones - on gasoline. So, the main reason for this is the Wehrmacht's fuel balance - the Germans were able to efficiently produce gasoline (other light fractions) from coal, but diesel fuel (heavy fractions) in this volume wasn’t. But we had enough oil, and under Lend-Lease we received practically fuel and lubricants only for capricious American and English equipment.
So why was Hitler so afraid throughout the war for the Ploiesti oil field and considered oil a strategic resource for Germany?
It's simple - all the submarines and a lot of surface ships of the Kriegsmarine worked on diesel engines, and there was nothing to replace oil for distillation into diesel fuel. A submarine war has always been considered by Hitler the main means of struggle with England and the United States.
The Americans also had a similar problem, but on the other side - they had enough oil, but most of the diesel engines from production were carefully scooped up for the Navy. And the diesels were put on the main battle tank M4 "Sherman" only on vehicles that went to the Marine Corps - they could be supplied from the same tank with the fleet, and this was decisive.
And now the fun part.
Oil in Germany was not only produced, but also produced today. The first well in Germany was drilled near Wietze, then owned by Hanover in 1859. Commercial oil production began in Germany in 1881, when an oil field with sufficient reserves was found near Olheim. And oil production in Germany at the time was quite significant.
Say in 1943:
-Total Germany imported oil - 2 tons.
-Mined by itself (including in Austria) - 1 tons
- Produced synthetic fuel of all kinds - 5

Here is the original table (read the sources below yourself - I'm not strong in German):


I heard that before the war, the Japanese also had a similar production of synthetics, but apparently they were very far from the Germans, and they practically did not have coal.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexey RA

Duc ... the absence of Takushiro Hattori from the list of basic work is already strange

True - a generalized translation work - although he does not have many references to documents - rather this book is more like his interpretation of the events of that time.
In China - a completely different interpretation of those events - especially the years 1932-1940.

For those who are too lazy to read - brief tricks on Takushiro Hattori.
As early as mid-1940, Konoe’s second cabinet adopted a resolution:

"In the field of foreign policy, the main course of the cabinet was reduced to the following most important provisions: to prevent the possibility of rendering assistance to Chiang Kai-shek, to resolve the Chinese incident, provide Japan with the South Seas. It was taken into account that the implementation of this policy will cause opposition from the United States and England. Based on this, the tasks of strengthening ties with Germany and Italy were put forward.
The capture of the South Seas was planned to be carried out by force at the most convenient time with the successful resolution of the Chinese incident... If the latter is not allowed, the actions of the armed forces in the southern direction were planned to be carried out in such a way as to prevent clashes with third countries, and in a particularly favorable internal and international situation. "
(- True, the author does not cite a specific document in the book, on the basis of which he made such conclusions ...)

"... The publication of the Triple Pact and the entry of the Japanese army into the northern part of French Indochina immediately provoked a response from the United States. On September 26 (1940), the American government announced a ban on the export of scrap metal, iron and steel to foreign countries, with the exception of the countries of the Western Hemisphere and England ... "

and then he has the same:

"PROMOTION PLANS SOUTH
After Japan faced the prospect of a long war in China, she turned her eyes to the areas of the South Seas, rich in various types of raw materials. In Dutch India, for example, about 8 million tons of oil was produced annually, which is about 20 times higher than oil production in Japan.

At that time, Japan’s annual oil demand was about 5 million tons.

, of which she was able to get only 10% from her own production. "

That is, even a Japanese historian confirms that there has been no hesitation about advancing in the South direction "since 1940.

"On July 21, the authorities of French Indochina agreed to Japan's demands. On July 29, an official ceremony of signing an agreement on joint defense between Japan and French Indochina took place. Japanese troops entered the territory of South Indochina."
Before this, on July 25, the Japanese government, through Ambassador Nomur, directly informed President Roosevelt of Japan’s intention to deploy troops in French Indochina. Pointing out the reasons for the entry of Japanese troops, the government simultaneously emphasized Japan’s desire to resolve relations with the United States. However, July 26, the United States announced the freezing of Japanese capital... England and Holland also made a similar statement. "

From that moment on, the war with the United States — almost on the verge — Japan was stuck in its politics and from that moment on it could only prepare for a future war with England and the USA.

"Due to the fact that the German-Soviet war was taking on a protracted nature, the Headquarters paid more and more attention to the regions of the South Seas. On August 9 (1941), it abandoned the plan to resolve the northern problem in 1941, regardless of how the situation in Germany would develop. -the Soviet front, and took a course to advance in the southern direction. Following this, the "Basic Principles of Operations of the Imperial Army" were adopted, the content of which was as follows: a) the forces of sixteen divisions located in Manchuria and Korea, to ensure security from the Soviet Union ; b) continue the approved operations against China; c) accelerate military preparations against England and the United States in the southern direction in order to complete them by the end of November. "

Hattori Takushiro - Japan in the 1941-1945 War

[Alexey RA]

Quote: DimerVladimer

That is, even a Japanese historian confirms that there has been no hesitation about advancing in the South direction "since 1940.

It would be more accurate to say that there were separate tactical and operational fluctuations (the same movements in Manchuria from June-August 1941), but a common strategic line for mastering with particular cynicism and cruelty resources of Southeast Asia Japan is maintained.

The Allies were even more fortunate that Japan during the interwar period carried 1/3 of its shipments on chartered ships (mostly with the Allies). As a result, at the beginning of the war she had only 6,5 million tons of her own tonnage with a minimum need for her own economy of 10 million tons peacetime. And out of this tonnage, only 1,45 million tons were mobilized for the DESO army, 0,71 million tons were supplied to the army, and 1,74 million tons were provided for the operation of the fleet. And for industry, agricultural and Only 2,6 million tons remained of the population (out of a minimum of 10 million tons required).

If Japan had more tonnage, the army would be able to allocate for the first stage not 11 divisions, but more. Yes, and the economy would not sit at 25% rations.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexey RA

It would be more accurate to say that there were separate tactical and operational hesitations (the same movements in Manchuria from June to August 1941), but the general strategic line for mastering with special cynicism and cruelty the resources of Southeast Asia by Japan was maintained.

Well, as hesitations, you referred to the opinions of individual "comrades" such as Sugiyama.
From June 1941 to August 1941, the Japanese took some measures to concentrate troops in the Northern direction, but obviously not sufficient for a strategic operation. And since August 1941, in this direction there has been no accumulation of forces and resources for offensive operations, rather, on the contrary, the number of troops has significantly decreased.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Nikkola Mac

My point of view is also fundamentally for the fact that Japan carried out its expansion south for objective economic and political reasons, in particular the lack of oil. But about Germany, do not speak with such certainty about what you do not know:

Why I don’t know: Speer and Manstein, in other sources, come across Hitler’s statements about the economic goals of the war, and these are the three main sources - coal (again, synth fuel necessary for mining), iron ore and the oil fields of Transcaucasia.

[Hort]

that the German leadership allegedly did not inform the Japanese government of the impending attack on the Soviet Union. It supposedly learned about the fascist attack on the USSR only on June 22, 1941 at 16 hours Tokyo time.

what the Germans didn’t precisely inform the Japs about was the signing of the non-aggression pact in 1939. Tokyo learned about this after the fact and, I must say, was very offended)
The Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact made a slight split in relations between Berlin and Tokyo, and, in particular, this influenced Japan’s decision not to start the war simultaneously with the Germans, but to wait for the capture of Moscow, at a minimum.

[Kenneth]

About the aggressiveness of the Japanese, I understood everything. Just tell me who someone eventually attacked.

[A. Privalov]

Quote: Kenneth

About the aggressiveness of the Japanese, I understood everything. Just tell me who someone eventually attacked.

Having waited for the atomic bombing of Japan by the Americans, the Best Friend of Athletes transferred part of the troops and equipment liberated in the west (over 400 thousand people, 7137 guns and mortars, 2119 tanks and ACS) to the Far East. Together with the troops stationed in the Far East, the regrouped units and units comprised three fronts totaling about 1,5 million people, commanded by Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky.
After that, I performed several successful operations, incl. Kuril landing operations. He captured more than 80 thousand Japanese soldiers only in the Kuriles, pressed 56 islands with a total area of ​​11 thousand square meters. km The fate of 100 thousand people of the local population is not known to this day, but given that the division of the NKVD acted there, something you can imagine. In short, the article is pure propaganda, based on the fact that local readers have a rough idea about the history of that time. Judging by the majority of comments, the calculation was correct. Alas...