Exactly twenty years ago, 31 August 1996, in Khasavyurt, was signed the most shameful contract in the newest stories of RussiaWhile military academies around the world study different wars, from antiquity to the present day, the history of the first Chechen war remains completely unexplored. It’s more correct to say this: it’s not that they completely ignore it, but if they study it, it is “narrowly specialized” - actions of armored vehicles in urban conditions, actions aviation in the winter in the mountains, tactics of sabotage groups, etc.
It does not make the main, main conclusion of this war. And it sounds like this - the first Chechen war has no analogues in the history of world wars, since it is unique in its essence. After all, Russia was defeated in the war, to lose that ... it was impossible under any circumstances. It could not be lost simply by definition. Just like a preschooler can’t beat a heavyweight boxer, and pike can bite a white shark half to death.
Consideration of any armed conflict traditionally begins with an assessment of the potential of the warring parties. In this case, it is also not worthwhile to deviate from the generally accepted norms. Consider the balance of forces at the beginning of the autumn of 1994, when Yeltsin and his entourage decided to restore “constitutional order” in the Chechen Republic.
But first, a little background. It sounds paradoxical, but the same Yeltsin and his entourage made a lot of efforts to ensure that the motley and armed with artisanal "borz" and hunting rifles "army" of independent Ichkeria became an army without quotes. It was Yeltsin who initiated the transfer to Dudayev of a huge amount weapons, guided by one of his well-known considerations, from which for a mile off carries a grave state crime. Especially when you consider what this has led to in the future.
Directive No. 316/1/0308 of May 28, 1992, signed by Yeltsin's protege P. Grachev, ordered the Chechen armed groups to transfer 50% of the weapons in the republic. Of course, the Chechens did not give a damn about this directive of the “foreign state” and took as many weapons as they could take: 42 tank, 48 IFVs and armored personnel carriers, 940 vehicles, 266 aircraft, 139 guns, 523 grenade launchers, 18 Grad multiple launch rocket launchers, 740 ATGMs, 88 SAMs, 46 million rounds of ammunition, more than 40 small arms, 000 thousand shells and 158 tons fuel. Dudaev’s army even acquired Luna-M tactical missiles capable of carrying a nuclear charge. This was enough to arm 1620 - 35 thousand people. That is the number of the Dudaev army called by the researchers of the first Chechen war.
In addition, since 1992, weapons from Ukraine, the Baltic states, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Asian ex-republics of the USSR went to Chechnya. And to absolutely everyone - both in Moscow and Grozny - it was clear that if Ichkeria would fight with anyone, then not with Georgia or Azerbaijan, but with Russia. Despite all this, a huge amount of weapons were actually presented to Dudayev Yeltsin on a silver platter ... Is it worth saying that either a madman or a traitor could do that?
Well, in order to make Dudayev fight more comfortable, 4 trillion rubles leaked to Chechnya for fake avizovkam. It is clear that petty fraudsters could not steal so much money on their own and definitely someone covered them at the very top. What did these colossal funds go for? Certainly not for the payment of pensions and benefits to residents of the republic.
And now consider the enemy Dudayev - the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian army continued to be one of the strongest in the world. Its number reached 1,8 million people, its armament was (in combat readiness) more than 17 000 tanks and 3500 aircraft, including strategic missile-carrying bombers.
In principle, this can be finished, since without mentioning nuclear weapons to anyone it is clear that the forces of Ichkeria and Russia were simply not comparable. The superiority of the Russian army over its adversary in the 1994 year was not overwhelming, but overwhelming many times, and for all without exception indicators. The Russian army could simultaneously fight a dozen of such opponents as the army of Ichkeria, having absolute superiority in the same way. If Dudayev scrapped a hundred and fifty military personnel, then in the RF Armed Forces there were tens of thousands, and many with experience of the Afghan war.
In the Russian army, only the officer corps was several times superior to the entire army of Ichkeria. The material and human resources of Russia in general were ridiculous to compare with the extremely scarce resources of Ichkeria, which should have been enough for a month and a half of a full-fledged war. Foreign aid with money and mercenaries would only marginally extinguish the inevitable defeat of the Dudayev army, but ... the war ended in Khasavyurt with the actual signing of Russia's surrender.
World history really did not know this. So that a nuclear power with a huge and heavily armed army would capitulate to few separatists who lack aviation and heavy weapons ... This never happened and is unlikely to become possible in the future. Moreover, the ruler of the nuclear power and the Supreme Commander, for the first time in the entire thousand-year history of Russia, was forced to sit in their own Kremlin office as the Chechen delegation pointed out.
Even the Mongol khans did not behave like this with their Russian tributaries, but Yeltsin brought the country to such a collapse and utter absurdity that he, the king of yesterday's superpower, was told how and where any gangsters would sit down. If in the modern history of Russia there was a moment of the highest national humiliation, then it happened in the summer of 1996.
Even Tsushima and the Peace of Brest were not such a shame, because then the country lost the war, fighting with a more or less equal opponent. But in 1996, Russia lost the war not to another country, but to its own, tiny outlying province, whose potential could not be compared with the potential of the metropolis.
This is what should be studied in military academies. Not the wars of Hannibal, Belisarius, Napoleon, Moltke, or Suvorov, but the commanding and managerial "talents" of Tsar Boris, which led to the disgrace of Khasavyurt, unprecedented in world history. The history of the first Chechen war proved that the impossible is possible. What if you really want to, the Sun will rotate around the Earth, roses will bloom in winter, the fish will begin to live in the trees, and the preschooler will be able to force a beaten-up heavyweight boxer to retreat. Yes, even at the same time shook him all the little things out of his pockets. The main thing is to place traitors, embezzlers, pests and scoundrels with criminal inclinations in key government positions. And they will very quickly show how 25 hours can be in a day, and August will be replaced by January.
Of course, various supporters of “universal human values” will say that dear, in all respects, Boris Nikolayevich, of course, is largely to blame. But he is not the one to blame. Anyway, the time was very difficult. It is impossible to disagree with the last statement, but talks in favor of the poor are inappropriate in this case. Because the captain must always be responsible for everything. Or the president. Or king. In short, the one who called himself gruzdem. The people, by and large, do not care what Yeltsin did or did not do during the war. “Worked with documents”, played on spoons or ohazhalov a broom of “friend Ryu” in the bath. People needed one thing from him - the result. After all, the people from their own pockets and their lives paid for the Chechen adventure of Tsar Boris and had every right to demand it.
But the result for the 1996 summer of the year was depressing. More than 5500 dead Russian soldiers and officers, tens of thousands of wounded, lying in the ruins of Chechnya, to the "restoration" of which huge money flowed out of the already full of holes in the budget. How many civilians have died and how many have fled from the war is still unknown. And suddenly, instead of the long-awaited victory, Yeltsin and his entourage took and “zeroed” all these sacrifices. For a year and a half, the Russian army was bleeding on the streets of Grozny and in the mountains, huge amounts of money were spent monthly to continue the war, and it turned out that all this was ... nothing?
The victory was awarded to Ichkeria after someone played the “unexpected” assault on Grozny as if by notes, and the people of Russia found themselves once again in lowered fools. Since it was him - the people, not the oligarchs - that was actually obliged to pay reparations. After all, the status of Chechnya, the ingenious Yeltsin "strategists" offered to "freeze" for five years, during which a considerable amount of money would be transferred to the socialist republic from the Russian budget. If you call a spade a spade, then Russia actually pledged to finance the Ichkerian army, which again began to prepare for war. After all, only a fool could seriously believe that the billions transferred to Grozny would be used to pay pensions and restore the republic.
It is for such enchanting "feats" of Yeltsin and carved in marble. Moreover, the museum was opened and the huge "Yeltsin Center" was built, not regretting the budget money.
But what is interesting is that not even the slightest mention of all the above events can be found in the nine halls of the Boris Yeltsin Museum. Neither about the armament of the Dudayev army in 1991-1993, nor about false advice books, nor about the terrible New Year's storming of Grozny, nor about the bloody battles for Bamut, nor about the famous moratoriums that saved Dudaev people from the military disaster more than once, nor about the disgrace of Khasavurt.
In the museum you can see the presidential limousine ZIL, the game console Dendy and Playboy magazine, although for the sake of completeness there it would not hurt to put the burned-out armored personnel carrier of the Maikop brigade and torn fragments, burnt paintings from the Grozny Museum of Fine Arts.
The personal belongings of the dead Grozny residents and Russian soldiers would not hurt either. But no, these terrible evidences of Yeltsin's “constitutional order” guidance do not fit into the beautiful legend of the white marble Democratic president. Someone really wants the memory of the descendants of Yeltsin to remain as snow-white as his marble monument.
Without a doubt, the first president of Russia in people's memory will remain for a long time. And both Russians and Chechens will remember him. That's just remember it is not so white. With him, definitely, will be associated with completely different colors.